# Worrell v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113581

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113581

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”
- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL LLOYD WORRELL,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-373-TJC-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case by
filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc.
1. He is challenging a state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of
conviction for seven counts of sexual battery. He is a designated sexual predator
serving a life term of incarceration. Respondents have responded. See Doc. 8;
Resp.1 Petitioner replied. See Doc. 11. This case is ripe for review.2
II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure
that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.
(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See
Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

1 Attached to the Response are several exhibits. See Docs. 9-1 to 9-12; S-14 The
Court cites the exhibits as “Resp. Ex.”

2 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish
the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299,
1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060
(11th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court
must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,
a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that
“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation,
the federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as
alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or
argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears
repeating that even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than
mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at
75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper
deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations modified).
B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254
habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]”
every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on
direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351
(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional
issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope
v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the
state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,” the
prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[3] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[4] supra, at 84–85, 97 S. Ct.
2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural rule to
deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the
claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural
rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the
judgment and the rule is firmly established and
consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562
U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62
(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612,
617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring
procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not
without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal
review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the
default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.
See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state
habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the
default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). For a petitioner to establish cause and prejudice,

3 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

4 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
the procedural default “must result from some objective
factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from
raising the claim and which cannot be fairly
attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome,
953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[5] Under the prejudice
prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial
actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense
so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at
1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would result.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there
remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of
a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier,
477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This exception is
exceedingly narrow in scope,” however, and requires
proof of actual innocence, not just legal innocence.
Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001).

5 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of

the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,
allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a
person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of
reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Notably, there is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong
of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th

Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied
to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the
performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-
versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As

stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.
“The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles
v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is
“any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying
the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high
bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
“Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation

was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Daniel v.
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is combined with §
2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel’s
performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t

of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J.,
concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. Relevant Procedural History and Evidence Presented at Trial
In 2012, Petitioner was arrested and charged with seven counts of sexual

battery involving three minor victims – A.E.; B.L.; and M.B. Resp. Ex. 7 at 41-
42. The state later filed a second amended information charging Petitioner with
ten counts of sexual battery involving the same three victims – counts one, two,
and three charged Petitioner with sexual battery of B.L.; counts four, five, six,

eight, and nine charged Petitioner with sexual battery of A.E.; and counts seven
and ten charged Petitioner with sexual battery of M.B. Resp. Ex. 3. While the
state intended to try all ten counts together, it also filed a pretrial Williams6
rule notice asking the trial court to determine the propriety of presenting at

trial evidence of the events involving all three victims. Resp. Ex. 4. After
conducting a hearing on the notice, the trial court entered an order permitting
the state to present “the testimony of A.E. as a witness to B.L.’s alleged abuse
and vice versa; the testimony of M.B. as a witness to A.E.’s alleged abuse and

vice versa; and the testimony of A.E. as a witness to M.B.’s alleged abuse and

6 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
vice versa.” Resp. Ex. 6. In support of its ruling, the trial court explained that
the ten counts had not been severed for trial; the collateral acts regarding each

victim were proved by clear and convincing evidence; the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
the defense; the evidence suggested a pattern of behavior; and the events were
close in time and similar in nature. Id.

On the morning of trial, the state advised the trial court that A.E. had
gone missing and was unavailable for trial. Resp. Ex. 7 at 552. Because A.E.
was unavailable, the state agreed to abandon the charges in counts four, six,
and eight of the second amended information. Id. at 553. Trial counsel moved

to continue the trial proceedings, but the trial court denied the request. Id. at
553-54. Petitioner proceeded to trial on the remaining seven counts.
The relevant trial testimony is summarized in Petitioner’s initial brief
filed on direct appeal:

First, Detective [Larry] Baker testified that he
investigated a case involving [Petitioner’s abuse of]
M.B. Later he identified A.E. as another possible
victim, and she informed him that she had engaged in
various sexual acts with the defendant in several
motels in Duval County. His discussion with A.E. led
him to B.L., who also gave a history of having sex with
the defendant at a local motel. M.B. and B.L. do not
know each other, and there is no link between them
except A.E.

No physical evidence was ever collected. Baker
determined that the incident with B.L. occurred in
2006 based on her history of attending a carnival at a
particular mall at the time. B.L. and M.B. pointed out
motels to him, and he determined that one of [the
motels] had no records, because it was under new
management as of 2012. He made contact with the
manager of an Executive Inn, who remembered the
defendant and said he was one of his best customers.
B.L. did not know the defendant before the single
incident [of abuse].

B.L., who was 18 years old at the time of trial,
testified that she met the defendant one time in the
company of her then friend, A.E., when the two were in
the fourth grade. B.L. spent the night at A.E.’s house
one time. On that occasion, they went to a carnival at
Regency Square. The defendant took them to the
carnival. B.L. testified that he dropped them off at the
carnival and picked them up later on. He took them to
a motel and apparently already had a key. The room
was on the first floor.

B.L. further testified that the defendant told
them to take a bath, and A.E. ran out of the bathroom
naked. A.E. was on the bed and B.L. was on the bed.
B.L. said the defendant performed oral sex on her,
rubbed his penis on her vagina, and put his finger
inside her vagina. B.L. said she screamed and someone
came to the door, and A.E. pushed her to the floor and
the defendant went to the door and nothing happened.
B.L. then ran into the bathroom and got her clothing.
When she came out she saw A.E. and the defendant
having vaginal intercourse. The defendant told her not
to tell her mother until she was 40. The defendant took
them back to the carnival and later on took them back
to A.E.’s house. B.L. did not tell anyone what had
happened except her cousin. Years later she told her
mother. She was 16 when the police located her. She
showed Detective Baker the motel. She did not stay in
touch with A.E. She does not know M.B.

On cross-examination, B.L. testified that she
never saw the defendant again and told police she did
not know who he was and did not previously identify
him. B.L. said that before they went to the motel A.E.
had her phone. B.L. said she knew the defendant as
A.E.’s godfather.

M.B., age 17 at the time of trial, testified that she
and A.E. were friends and the defendant had been her
brother’s teacher and her godfather. She lived in the
defendant’s home during seventh or eighth grade but
not during summers, and at times A.E. also lived there.
They were all about the same age. When she was about
13 or 14 years old, she went to a motel with A.E. and
the defendant and saw them having sex. M.B. was lying
down next to A.E., and the defendant touched her
breast and tried to have sex with her, but that did not
happen. She later went to a motel with the defendant
on other occasions without A.E., maybe about ten
times.

M.B. testified that they drank alcohol, smoked
weed and had sex. He put his mouth on her vagina and
put his penis in her vagina. The motel was near a flea
market and gas station. He went and got the room key
while she waited in the car and then they went into the
room, usually on the first floor. The defendant would
take her shopping and buy her clothes, and he also
bought school clothes for her brother. She once told her
mother about it, but then said it did not happen. She
showed Detective Baker where some of the motels were
located. She does not know B.L. She has not talked to
A.E. in years. M.B. had known the defendant since she
was in the fourth grade. She knew his family and they
went to school together. She would go home on
weekends. She and her brother lived with the
defendant’s family so they could go to a better school.
They were all on the same family phone plan. She said
the incidents with the defendant occurred during the
school year; she said all of [the incidents] did not
happen in the summer or in one year. At one point she
told her mother what had happened, but then told her
to never mind, that it never happened. She also tried to
tell her brother, but he did not listen.

Larnell Evans, A.E.’s father, testified that he
knew the defendant and he called himself A.E.’s
godfather. A.E. lived with the defendant between 2007-
11, off and on. Mr. Evans had last spoken to A.E. three
weeks earlier.

Mihir Patel testified that he manages the
Executive Inn motel in Jacksonville, and that he had
encountered the defendant often at the motel front
desk, and that he usually came to the night window.
The defendant checked into the motel alone in the
evening and was not seen there in the morning. He said
the defendant was one of their best customers. He
preferred a downstairs room. He rented a room once or
sometimes twice a week. Patel pulled records for 2011
and 2012. He did not recall seeing the defendant with
another person at the motel.

. . . .

The defendant, his son and his wife testified for
the defense.

D.W., the defendant’s son, testified that he was
17 years old and knew both A.E. and M.B. They were
in school together and became friends. To his
knowledge, his Dad was never alone with A.E., M.B. or
M.B.’s brother, who was also one of his friends. He had
not spoken to them recently, but knew A.E. had talked
to his Mom. He did not know B.L.

Alma Worrell, the defendant’s wife, testified that
they had been married for 26 years. She was aware that
he suffered from erectile dysfunction and had done so
since 2005, and took medication for that condition. Mrs.
Worrell knew A.E. and M.B. and her brother and also
their father. They spent time at her house on weekends.
They sometimes left from her house to go to school, and
her husband would take them to school. They
sometimes spent the night at her house. Her husband
was never alone in the house with them. She had no
contact with M.B. since the allegations were brought,
but A.E. called her. She did not know B.L.

Mr. Worrell, age 64 at the time of trial, testified
that he was a school teacher from 2005 until 2012 after
serving 30 years in the Navy. He had known his wife
for 30 years. He has four older children in addition to
D.W. He denied any sexual activity with any of the girls
and said he did not know B.L. He does know A.E. and
M.B., and had known them since they were in about
third grade. He tutored math and also gave M.B. and
her brother rides home from school. At times he also
picked them up in the morning before school. He met
A.E. under different circumstances, and also tutored
her. The children all became friends. M.B.’s mother
worked on weekends, and A.E.’s father was a single
parent, so the kids would come over and hang out on
weekends. They functioned as a family. At times his
wife had problems with the kids being around. There
were other family members around as well, and she
cooked for all of them. He paid the kids to help with one
of his side businesses, and when the kids were in
middle school, M.B. and her brother came to stay with
his family so they could go to a better school. They
stayed over on week days and went home on weekends.
A.E. did not go to the same middle school, and he would
pick her up and take her to school. The children were
in need so he tried to help. He purchased school
clothing for them at times. He did not expect anything
from them in return.

Mr. Worrell did recall taking A.E. and another
girl to a carnival in November, 2006. He dropped them
off and gave them money. He picked them up and went
to Larnell Evans’s home for a while. He could not say
who the other girl was. He did stay at the Executive Inn
once or twice a week because he suffered from PTSD
and got upset at times, so he went there to be alone. He
did not take anyone with him. The girls would have
known that he went there because of the receipts in his
car. Sometimes money was missing from his truck.
Sometimes he stayed at the motel all night. He would
get the key and watch movies and have a drink and that
was it. The kids did not stay over at his house very often
during the summer months. He did not behave
inappropriately with M.B., B.L., or A.E. Mr. Worrell
testified he only went to one motel.

Resp. Ex. 12 at 2-10 (record citations omitted).
Following closing arguments, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the
capital sexual battery offenses charged in counts one, two, three, and five, as
well as the first degree sexual battery offenses charged in counts seven, nine,
and ten. Resp. Ex. 7 at 200-06. The trial court adjudicated Petitioner as a sexual
predator and sentenced him to a mandatory life term of incarceration as to
counts one, two, three, and five, and a thirty-year term of incarceration as to
counts seven, nine, and ten. Id. at 428-38. Petitioner, with help from appellate
counsel, sought a direct appeal, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed
his judgment and sentences without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. 15. Petitioner
filed with the state court a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion,
which the trial court summarily denied. Resp. Ex. 24. Petitioner appealed the
trial court’s order, and the First DCA affirmed the denial through a written
opinion. Resp. Ex. 30. The Petition followed.
IV. The Petition
A. Ground One

Petitioner argues his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to
or seek to exclude A.E.’s testimonial statements introduced at trial through
other witnesses’ testimony. Doc. 1 at 16. According to Petitioner, “[b]efore trial,
A.E. recanted her testimony . . . and became unavailable for trial.” Id. He

contends Detective Baker testified to statements A.E. made to him during his
investigation and B.L. testified to alleged statements A.E. made during
Petitioner’s alleged assault of both B.L. and A.E. Doc. 11 at 4-3. Petitioner
argues this evidence, and all charged counts involving A.E., should have been

prohibited and dismissed because the jury could not observe A.E.’s demeanor
and consider her credibility; and presentation of her hearsay statements
violated Petitioner’s confrontation rights. Doc. 1 at 16-17.
Petitioner admits that he did not present this claim to the state court, and

thus it is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Id. at 12. But he attempts to
overcome this procedural default by relying on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1
(2012), and arguing he can show “cause” to excuse his default because he did
not have counsel when he filed his Rule 3.850 motion. Id. Under Martinez,

Petitioner must prove more than the general assertion that the trial court did
not appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding. Martinez, 566
U.S. at 14. Petitioner must “also demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the
prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. (citations

omitted); see also Lambrix v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th
Cir. 2017). On the other hand, his claim is “insubstantial” if “it does not have
any merit or . . . is wholly without factual support.” Id. at 16. For the reasons
that follow, the Court finds that even if Petitioner shows that his lack of

postconviction counsel caused his procedural default, he cannot show that his
underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial.
Prior to jury selection in March 2015, the state advised the trial court that
A.E. was reported missing and believed to be a runaway. Resp. Ex. 7 at 552-54.

According to the state, A.E. had not been seen by her family since the end of
January and state investigators could not locate her. Id. Considering her
disappearance, the state advised trial counsel of its intent to abandon the
charged offenses in count four (sexual battery of A.E. by “placing his mouth on

her vagina”); count six (sexual battery of A.E. by “placing his penis in her anus”);
and count eight (sexual battery of A.E. by “placing his penis in her anus”) of the
second amended information; but it intended to proceed on count five (sexual
battery of A.E. by “placing his penis in her vagina”) and count seven (sexual

battery of A.E. by “placing his penis in her vagina”) as evidence of those offenses
would be presented through testimony of other witnesses. Id. at 553-54; see also
Resp. Ex. 3. The state also advised it intended to call as a witness A.E.’s father
who would testify to A.E.’s date of birth and that she is missing. Resp. Ex. 7 at
553. Trial counsel advised he knew A.E. was missing, explained defense

investigators also could not find her, and noted that the trial court had granted
his prior requests for continuances. Id. at 555-56. Trial counsel also advised that
he did have an opportunity to depose A.E. before trial. Id. at 556-57. Despite
these facts, trial counsel requested another continuance because A.E. was

unavailable. Id. at 553-54.
The trial court then acknowledged that it had granted many of trial
counsel’s requests for continuance, over the state’s objection, in hopes of locating
A.E. but that the parties and the court set a hard trial date because the case

had been pending since 2012. Id. at 557-10. The trial court explained that it
understood trial counsel’s request to again continue trial in hopes of locating
A.E. but advised she had not been found by either her family or the parties’
investigators for two months. Id. at 558-59. It added that because of those

circumstances and the three-year pendency of the proceedings, it would not
continue the trial again. Id. In response, trial counsel argued that the other two
victims intended to testify about what they witnessed between Petitioner and
A.E., and thus Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to confront A.E. about

those issues and her unavailability required dismissal of counts five and seven.
Id. at 560. The trial court responded:
THE COURT: Well, I don’t think, and unless you can
all show me case law to the contrary, the Sixth
Amendment right . . . to confront witnesses against you
is just that, to confront the witnesses against you. It
doesn’t have to be the alleged victim in the count. If
there are witnesses that the state intends to prove, and
I don’t know who they are or how many there are, but
if they have witnesses that they intend to introduce to
prove up the elements of Count 5 and Count 7, then
clearly Mr. Worrell will have the right to confront those
witnesses by cross-examining them.

I don’t believe the Sixth Amendment or any case law --
and, again, unless you all can show me to the contrary
-- says the actual victim of the alleged crime has to be
presented, because we all know that victims of crimes
often don’t show up in cases, can be proven without
their assistance and without their presence at trial,
domestic battery, for instance, and other such charges.

So I don’t think that alone would preclude the state
from going forward on Counts 5 and 7 or from this
Court going forward on Count 5 and 7, assuming
evidence and testimony is sufficiently pled and proven.

If it’s not, that is what a JOA is for, and that is where I
would then come in. And if it is, then that is what the
jury’s decision will be, to decide whether the state has
proven those two counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

If -- who are the witnesses -- if either [ ] or [ ] can provide
enough testimony or evidence to prove the allegations
in Counts 5 and 7, then they would go forward.

I don’t think it requires [A.E.] to have to be here for
Count 5 and Count 7 to go forward.

Resp. Ex. 7 at 561-62. Trial counsel then argued that during the Williams rule
hearing, one reason the state sought to introduce A.E.’s testimony was to
identify Petitioner as the abuser of [B.L.] Id. at 562. The trial court then
acknowledged that reasoning but also explained that other alleged victims may
be able to identify Petitioner through other evidence and thus A.E.’s testimony

was unnecessary for that purpose. Id. at 562-63.
In light of this record evidence, and contrary to Petitioner’s assertions
here, trial counsel did argue, although unsuccessfully, that the state should
have abandoned all charges involving A.E. because A.E. was unavailable for

trial. Also, there is no record evidence that testimonial statements by A.E. were
introduced through other witnesses’ trial testimony. Detective Baker did not
testify to any pretrial statements A.E. made to him during his investigations.
Resp. Ex. 7 at 730-46. Indeed, the only statements Baker made during trial that

alluded to his discussions with A.E. were that after he interviewed A.E., he
identified two other potential victims. Id. at 734. Further, neither B.L. nor M.B.
testified to improper testimonial statements by A.E. Rather, each victim
testified that on separate occasions, they witnessed Petitioner having sexual

intercourse with A.E. Id. at 757, 790. In other words, B.L. and M.B. offered
“straight-forward eyewitness testimony.” United States v. Marshall, 259 F.
App’x 855, 861 (7th Cir. 2008). They had first-hand knowledge about the facts
to which they testified, and Petitioner’s ability to cross-examine them about

what they witnessed between A.E. and Petitioner satisfied his confrontation
rights.
As such, Petitioner cannot establish that his trial counsel acted
deficiently or that counsel’s alleged erroneous conduct resulted in prejudice to

Petitioner. Because this claim is insubstantial and lacks merit, Petitioner
cannot rely on Martinez to excuse the procedural default of this claim. Likewise,
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that failure to consider this claim will
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ground One is due to be denied.

B. Ground Two
Petitioner argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
B.L.’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of Petitioner as her abuser, which
were not based on her independent recollection. Doc. 1 at 17. According to

Petitioner, during law enforcement’s initial investigation into Petitioner’s
alleged assault of B.L., B.L. did not identify Petitioner during officers’ “showup”
because her alleged assault occurred six years earlier. Instead, B.L. was able to
only identify her assailant as “A.E.’s godfather” who she had met once. Id.

Petitioner argues officers then engaged in “suggestive out of court procedures”
and used the show up to advise B.L. that Petitioner is A.E.’s godfather.
Petitioner asserts officers’ suggestive identification measures then led to B.L.
making an in-court identification of Petitioner as the individual who abused

her. Id. He contends that counsel should have moved to suppress evidence of
B.L.’s identification testimony as it was tainted by officers’ impermissible
actions.
Petitioner again admits that he did not present this claim to the state
court and thus it is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Id. at 12. But he

attempts to overcome this procedural default by relying on Martinez and
arguing he can show “cause” to excuse his default because he did not have
counsel when he filed his Rule 3.850 motion. Id. But the Court finds that even
if Petitioner could show that his lack of postconviction counsel caused his

procedural default, he cannot show that his underlying ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is substantial.
Here, Petitioner does not point to any record evidence that during their
investigation, officers presented to B.L. an out-of-court “show up” either

through an in-person lineup or a photo lineup, and the Court can locate no such
evidence in its review of the record. In any event, assuming law enforcement
employed such procedures during their investigation, an out-of-court
identification is subject to exclusion if the identification procedure was unduly

suggestive such that it created a substantial risk of misidentification. Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). In determining whether an identification
violates due process, a court undertakes a two-part analysis. “First, we must
determine whether the original identification procedure was unduly suggestive

. . . . If we conclude that the identification procedure was suggestive, we must
then consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
identification was nonetheless reliable.” Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 895
(11th Cir. 1988) (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199).

In Biggers, the United States Supreme Court identified five factors to be
considered in determining whether the identification was reliable. They are: the
witness’s opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the crime, the witness’s
degree of attention, the accuracy of the description of the suspect, the level of

certainty of the identification, and the length of time between the crime and the
identification. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that absent “a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification,” the identification of a suspect by a witness is

evidence for the jury to weigh. Id. at 116.
During trial, B.L testified that she only met Petitioner one time, the same
day he sexually abused her, and she never saw him again after the assault.
Resp. Ex. 7 at 748-50. But B.L. testified that she could recognize Petitioner if

she saw him again and she made an in-court identification of Petitioner as her
abuser. Id. at 748. B.L. then provided detailed testimony of the events
surrounding Petitioner’s actions. Id. at 750-61. During cross-examination, B.L.
testified that she told police she did not know Petitioner when he abused her

and at no point did she ever identify him to police. Id. at 762. But on re-direct,
B.L. testified that on the day that the incident occurred, she met Petitioner at
A.E.’s house, she knew him as A.E.’s godfather, and he had introduced himself
to her as “Michael.”7 Id. at 782-83.
Under the totality of the circumstance, B.L.’s in-court identification of

Petitioner was reliable. She clearly remembered specific details of the incident
and there is no evidence that her testimony stemmed from any outside
influence. Trial counsel tried to test her credibility by eliciting testimony that
B.L. did not know who Petitioner was but those statements, in context, did not

suggest she could not recognize Petitioner. Rather, they suggested that her one
and only interaction with Petitioner was on the day he assaulted her. As such,
the Court cannot find that trial counsel acted deficiently in failing to move to
suppress B.L.’s identification of Petitioner. And to that end, because this claim

is insubstantial and lacks merit, Petitioner cannot rely on Martinez to excuse
the procedural default of this claim. Likewise, Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that failure to consider this claim on the merits will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ground Two is due to be denied.

C. Ground Three
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a
continuance before jury selection when the state could not locate A.E. for trial.
Doc. 1 at 18. According to Petitioner, during the pretrial Williams rule hearing,

7 The trial transcript shows that at the time of the incident, she identified
Petitioner through other information, but that information has been redacted. Resp.
Ex. 7 at 782-83.
the trial court and the parties clarified that A.E. was the only connection
between the alleged offenses involving B.L. and M.B., and the entire case,

including Petitioner’s defense strategy, was altered when A.E. failed to appear
for trial. Id. Petitioner argues that without A.E., there was no basis for the state
to pursue a single trial for the offenses involving the other two victims,
especially considering B.L.’s prior inability to identify Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner, with help from appellate counsel, raised this claim as his sole
issue on direct appeal.8 Resp. Ex. 12. The state filed an answer arguing:
The initial problem with the argument advanced
by the appellant is that, despite the wording of the
issue statement, the appellant in substance attempts to
assert an argument that the charges were improperly
joined. The appellant, plainly aware that the offenses
were charged in one information, never filed a motion
to sever the charges. Motions for severance are waived
if not timely raised. Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 890
(Fla. 2000) (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.152 (a)) (further
citation omitted).

The decision to decline the appellant’s request for
another continuance was not “arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable.” White [v. State], 817 So. 2d [779,] 806
[(Fla. 2002)]. To prevail on his motion [for continuance],
the appellant was required to demonstrate:

(1) prior due diligence to obtain the
witness’s presence; (2) that substantially

8 In his initial brief on direct appeal, Petitioner raised this claim in terms of
state law only and did not reference a due process violation or any other federal
constitutional right. See generally Resp. Ex. 12. Respondents, however, do not argue
that Petitioner failed to exhaust the federal nature of this claim and instead address
the claim on the merits. Resp. at 21-22. Considering the Response, and for purposes of
this Order, the Court considers this claim exhausted.
favorable testimony would have been
forthcoming; (3) that the witness was
available and willing to testify; and (4) that
the denial of the continuance caused
material prejudice.

Geralds [v. State], 674 So. 2d [96,] 99 [(Fla. 1996)]
(citations omitted). Here, the record contains no
showing by the appellant that A.E. was willing to
testify or was capable of being located. Nor does the
record contain a showing that A.E. would have
provided testimony favorable to the appellant.

Moreover, contrary to the argument by the
appellant, the transcript of the ruling reveals that the
trial court’s concern extended beyond “efficiency and
practicality.” The trial court stated:

This was a September 2012 arrest, and for
the very reason that we try to put cases on
the trial docket sooner rather than later,
that is to prevent witnesses from
disappearing, here is in fact what we have
now.

I understand your request, you want to
continue because A.E. is not available, but
there is no guarantee that she might be
found that she might be picked up on that
order or as a result of that [sheriff’s office]
bulletin.

In other words, the trial court’s concern extended to the
ability to secure at a later date the presence of the
witnesses who were present and were prepared to
testify. Having balanced this concern against the
uncertainty that A.E. would be found, the court
declined to continue the trial.

Because the appellant is unable to sustain his
burden of showing that the trial court judge abused her
discretion, this Honorable Court is requested to affirm
the judgment and sentence entered in this matter.

Resp. Ex. 13 at 8-10 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam
affirmed Petitioner’s judgment and sentence without a written opinion. Resp.
Ex. 15. The Court addresses this claim under the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications.
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he matter of continuance is
traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial
of a request for more time that violates due process . . . .” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376

U.S. 575, 589 (1964). Thus, “a constitutional violation occurs only where the
court exhibits an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in
the face of [a] justifiable request for delay.” United States v. Bonilla-Siciliano,
643 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). “To prevail, [Petitioner] must establish that the court’s decision was
so egregious that it was fundamentally unfair.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Here, the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s request for a continuance was

not fundamentally unfair. Petitioner was always aware that the case involved
three victims; all versions of the charging document included charges involving
all three victims; Petitioner never sought to sever the counts involving B.L. and
M.B. from those involving A.E.; and the evidence presented at trial supported
Petitioner’s convictions for the separate offenses involving A.E., M.B., and B.L.
As such, upon review of the record, the Court concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was it based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state court proceedings. Ground Three is denied.

D. Ground Four
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately investigate and/or present testimony from physicians who
unsuccessfully treated Petitioner for erectile dysfunction and conducted

psychosexual evaluations on Petitioner. Doc. 1 at 18.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. 23 at 28-
33. The trial court summarily denied the claim. Resp. Ex. 24 at 6-7. Petitioner
appealed, and the First DCA issued a written opinion affirming the trial court’s

denial. Resp. Ex. 30. The First DCA addressed this issue:
Michael Worrell was convicted on seven counts of
sexual battery against two young girls. Worrell filed a
postconviction motion alleging six reasons that his trial
counsel was ineffective, which the postconviction court
summarily denied. On appeal, we affirm the summary
denial, but write to address Worrell’s claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to present the
testimony of two doctors who would have supported his
defense.

To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient and prejudicial; counsel’s errors must have
been so serious that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
of counsel was not satisfied and the defendant was
deprived of a fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If a defendant asserts
ineffectiveness due to counsel’s failure to call,
interview, or investigate witnesses, he must allege the
testimony that could have been elicited from the
witness and how the failure to elicit this testimony
caused prejudice. See Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579,
583 (Fla. 2004). If this claim is legally sufficient, an
evidentiary hearing is required unless it is conclusively
refuted by the record. See Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d
82, 95 (Fla. 2011).

Worrell claimed that counsel should have called
Dr. Neidigh, who had conducted a psychosexual
evaluation of Worrell and would have testified that he
had no propensity to molest children. Worrell also
claimed that counsel should have called Dr. Kirk, who
would have testified that he had treated Worrell,
unsuccessfully, for erectile dysfunction, thus rendering
dubious the victims’ allegations.

“Typically, it will be necessary to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine why trial counsel did
not call a particular witness.” Terrell v. State, 9 So. 3d
1284, 1288-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). However, summary
denial is appropriate when the record shows that the
defendant knew of potential witnesses and told the trial
court that he did not wish to call additional witnesses.
See McIndoo v. State, 98 So. 3d 640, 641 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012) (“Because his sworn motion indicates that he was
aware of the witness and that witness’s testimony prior
to trial, the colloquy to the court conclusively refutes
his claim that his attorney failed to call a known
witness against the appellant’s wishes. He is bound by
his answers to the court.”). Similarly, in Terrell, the
defendant told the trial court that he did not wish to
call additional witnesses and had not asked counsel to
call or locate any before making contrary claims in his
postconviction motion. 9 So. 3d at 1287. The Fourth
District found that the claims were properly denied
summarily because “the defendant assured the court
that there were no other witnesses he wanted to call in
his defense” and is “bound by his sworn answers during
the colloquy.” Id. at 1289. At trial, the court asked
Worrell if he wished to call any additional witnesses
and Worrell named two – neither being Drs. Neidigh or
Kirk – but stated that they were unfortunately
unavailable. On [his Rule 3.850] appeal, he “admits
that during trial . . . he had neglected to recollect that
Drs. [Neidigh and Kirk] and others should have been
called as additional witnesses for his defense.” As
defendants cannot go behind their colloquy statements,
we cannot permit them to do so by asserting that they
simply forgot about potential witnesses during trial
and now, in postconviction proceedings, remember
them and their potential testimony.

Even had the record not conclusively refuted
Worrell’s claims, he would not be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Dr. Neidigh’s potential expert
opinion testimony as to Worrell’s propensities or
characteristics is not admissible. Section 90.405,
Florida Statutes, governs the admission of character
evidence and “does not permit evidence of character to
be made by opinion.” Wyatt v. State, 578 So. 2d 811,
813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). In Wyatt, the defendant faced
allegations similar to Worrell and intended to call a
clinical psychologist “to testify that the defendant does
not fit the profile of a pedophile,” the trial court
excluded the testimony, and the Third District held
that “the defendant sought to introduce evidence of his
character through the expert opinion of a psychologist,
which is not permitted by the statute.” Id. at 812-13.
Our rules of evidence would not have permitted Dr.
Neidigh to opine on whether he believes Worrell has the
characteristics of a child molester. As to Dr. Kirk, who
Worrell claims could have testified that he suffered
from erectile dysfunction, the postconviction court
found that any potential deficiency cannot be found to
have prejudiced Worrell. Given that Worrell and his
wife both testified as to this issue, the two victims did
not know each other and gave extremely similar
accounts of their experiences of Worrell bringing them
to a hotel to have sex, and other evidence presented,
such as a hotel owner’s testimony that Worrell often
rented a room in the most private area of the hotel, we
agree with the postconviction court that there is not a
reasonable probability that Dr. Kirk’s testimony would
have changed the outcome of the trial.

Worrell’s claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to present two witnesses is conclusively refuted
by the record, and we decline to permit defendants to
go behind their representations to the trial court by
asserting a lapse in memory. Even had Worrell’s claims
not been refuted by the record, summary denial was
proper. Therefore, we affirm the denial of his
postconviction motion.

AFFIRMED.

Resp. Ex. 30; see also Worrell v. State, 281 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
The Court addresses these claims under the deferential standard for
federal court review of state court adjudications. As the state court noted,
during trial, the trial court asked Petitioner whether there were any other
witnesses he wished to call in his defense. Resp. Ex. 7 at 876. Petitioner replied
that he wished to call Dr. Tiomico but explained that she was unavailable
because she was out of the country addressing a family emergency. Id.
According to Petitioner, she would have testified that she prescribed Petitioner
medication for his erectile dysfunction. Id. The trial court acknowledged his
concern but noted Petitioner’s wife testified about his prescribed medication for
erectile dysfunction, thus he presented that evidence to the jury without Dr.

Tiomico. Id. Petitioner agreed with the trial court’s reasoning and mentioned
no other expert witnesses he wished to call in his defense.9 Id. Thus, Petitioner
cannot demonstrate that but for trial counsel’s alleged error, the outcome of his
trial would have been different. Upon thorough review of the record and the

applicable law, the Court finds that the state court’s decision to deny
Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of
Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
given the evidence presented to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground

Four is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. If Petitioner appeals the dismissal of this case, the Court denies a

9 Petitioner did state that he would have liked to call Charles Burgess,
an inmate of the Duval County Jail, as a witness but explained that Burgess
was also not available to testify. Resp. Ex. 7 at 876-77.
certificate of appealability.'° Because the Court has determined that a
certificate of appealability 1s not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the
pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may
be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 7th day of August,
2023.

Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge

Jax-7

C: Michael Lloyd Worrell, #J55039
Counsel of record

10 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2258(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 4738, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues
presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2008) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration, the Court will deny a
certificate of appealability.
34

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113581. Public record. Not legal advice.