# Fields v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 2, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113568

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 2, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113568

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”
- noting “that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

GREGORY KAZON FIELDS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-881-TJC-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this case by
filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc.
1. He is challenging a state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of
conviction for lewd and lascivious battery. He is a designated sex offender
serving a fifteen-year term of incarceration. Respondents have responded. See
Doc. 7; Resp.1 Petitioner replied. See Doc. 8. This case is ripe for review.2
II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure
that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.
(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See
Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

1 Attached to the Response are several exhibits. See Docs. 9-1 to 9-12; S-14 The
Court cites the exhibits as “Resp. Ex.”

2 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish
the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299,
1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060
(11th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court
must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,
a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that
“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is
unaccompanied by an explanation,
the federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as
alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or
argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears
repeating that even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than
mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at
75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper
deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations modified).
B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254
habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]”
every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on
direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351
(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional
issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope
v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the
state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
“‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,” the
prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[3] supra, at 747–
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[4] supra, at 84–85, 97 S. Ct.
2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural rule to
deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the
claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural
rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the
judgment and the rule is firmly established and
consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562
U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62
(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612,
617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring
procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not
without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal
review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the
default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.
See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state
habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the
default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d
1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). For a petitioner to establish cause and prejudice,

3 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

4 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
the procedural default “must result from some objective
factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from
raising the claim and which cannot be fairly
attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome,
953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier,
477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[5] Under the prejudice
prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial
actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense
so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at
1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would result.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there
remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of
a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier,
477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This exception is
exceedingly narrow in scope,” however, and requires
proof of actual innocence, not just legal innocence.
Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001).

5 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of

the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,
allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a
person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of
reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Notably, there is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong
of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th

Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied
to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the
performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-
versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As

stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.
“The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles
v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is
“any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying
the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high
bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
“Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation

was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Daniel v.
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is combined with §
2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel’s
performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t

of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J.,
concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. Relevant Procedural History and Evidence Presented at Trial
In February 2014, Petitioner was arrested and charged with one count of

lewd and lascivious battery on a person twelve years of age or older, but less
than sixteen years of age. Resp. Ex. A at 1-4, 8-9. During Petitioner’s jury trial,
the victim, Z.S., testified that she was fifteen years old on the day Petitioner
abused her. Resp. Ex. D at 370. According to Z.S., on that day, she was walking

home when a black male, who was driving a “golden brown” vehicle, pulled up
to her and asked if she needed a ride. Id. at 371. Z.S. agreed and got into the
car with the man and advised him where she lived. Id. Z.S. stated that the man,
however, began driving in the wrong direction and pulled into the parking lot

of an abandoned restaurant. Id. The man parked his car in the back of the lot,
got out of the vehicle, and told Z.S. to also get out. Id. at 372-73. Z.S. got out of
the car and the man put his arm around her and led her down a path into a
nearby wooded area. Id. at 373. Once in the woods, the man asked Z.S. to

perform oral sex on him in exchange for money. Id. at 373-74. Z.S. stated that
she began performing the sex act and about two minutes later, a police officer
walked up. Id. at 374-75. She then told the officer her age and she was taken to
the police station for questioning. Id. at 375.
During cross-examination, Z.S. testified that she did not know if it was

morning, afternoon, or evening when the incident occurred, and she was not
going to school at that time. Id. at 376-77. Z.S. explained that when the assault
occurred, she was a runaway and was also receiving psychiatric treatment for
anxiety, depression, and an “inability to separate truth from reality.” Id. at 386.

Z.S. also testified that she does not remember what she told police and she does
not remember most events that occurred that day. Id. at 389. According to Z.S.,
however, she remembered Petitioner making her perform oral sex on him. Id.
at 393-94.

Officer John Gray testified that on the day of the incident, he was working
as a patrol officer. Id. at 398. He testified that during his patrol, he pulled into
the parking lot of an abandoned McDonalds where he often parked to work on
written police reports. Id. at 399. According to Officer Gray, on the days he

parked in the lot, it was typically empty, but on that day, he saw a parked car
in the back of the lot. Id. Officer Gray noticed that the vehicle was empty and
when he exited his patrol car and walked up to the car, he noticed that the hood
of the car was warm, which suggested that it had recently been parked. Id. at

399-400. Officer Gray explained that the car concerned him because it was
parked in the vicinity of a large, wooded area where he believed the driver may
be hiding. Id. at 400. Officer Gray stated he walked to the line of the wooded
area and Petitioner immediately began walking out of the woods towards
Officer Gray. Id. at 401. According to Officer Gray, Petitioner’s shirt was pulled

up over his head and behind his neck and he was holding his exposed penis. Id.
at 401. Officer Gray explained that when Petitioner saw him, Petitioner began
acting erratic and screamed that he needed to go to the bathroom. Id. at 403. At
that time, Officer Gray saw another individual running from the same wooded

area Petitioner emerged from. Id. at 404. Officer Gray ordered Petitioner to lay
on the ground and issued verbal commands to the other individual running. Id.
Petitioner complied with Officer Gray’s commands and backup officers arrived
to look for the other individual. Id. Officer Gray explained he then found Z.S.

lying on the ground in a fetal position and acting frantic and scared. Id. at 405.
Officers took Petitioner and Z.S. to the station for questioning. Id. at 405-06.
Detective Harmony Brooks testified that she took latent fingerprints from the
passenger side door of Petitioner’s vehicle and submitted them for testing. Id.

at 414. Detective Richard Kocik testified that he tested the prints retrieved by
Brooks and determined that the prints matched Z.S. Id. at 441.
After Kocik’s testimony, the state rested its case and trial counsel moved
for a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 450. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at

455. Petitioner presented no defense witnesses on his behalf. Id. at 485-86, 472.
The jury ultimately found Petitioner guilty of lewd or lascivious battery. Id. at
561. The trial court sentenced him to a fifteen-year term of incarceration.
Petitioner, with help from appellate counsel, sought a direct appeal. Resp. Ex.
F. The First District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed Petitioner’s judgment

and sentence without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. I.
III. The Petition
A. Ground One
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

review discovery documents with him before trial and failing to question the
victim about her erroneous pretrial description of Petitioner’s genitals. Doc. 1
at 6.
Petitioner, with help from postconviction counsel, raised this issue in his

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion filed in state court. Resp. Ex.
J at 12-13. The trial court directed the state to file a response to the claim. Id.
at 29. The state responded as follows:
In Ground Two of his Motion, the Defendant alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s
failure to review CCR# 2014-77649 Supplemental
Report #1 with the Defendant. In the narrative portion
of this Report, the victim described the defendant’s
penis as “circumcised without any hair.” The Defendant
alleges that his penis is not circumcised and defense
counsel failed to address this fact during the trial and
failed to cross-examine and impeach the victim on her
misidentification of a critical piece of evidence.

CCR# 2014-77649 Supplemental Report #1 was
provided to the defense as a part of the State’s discovery
obligation. On January 19, 2016, Judge Aho conducted
a Final Pre-Trial colloquy on the record with Mr. Fields
and his trial counsel, Mr. Barrar, to ensure that they
were ready and prepared for trial. During this colloquy,
the following sworn testimony was provided by the
defense, in pertinent part:

The Court: Have all the discovery, Mr.
Barrar, including names of witnesses,
copies of tapes, witness statements, and all
of the discovery provided by the State of
Florida been provided to and reviewed with
your client, Mr. Fields?

Mr. Barrar: I have gone over everything
with him . . . .

The Court: Very well. So, Mr. Barrar,
would it be fair to say that your
investigation of this matter is now
complete?

Mr. Barrar: Oh yes, Judge. We are ready to
go. As a matter of fact, if we did not go
today, we would have filed a demanded
(sic) for speedy trial. And I had already
discussed that with Mr. Fields . . . .

The Court: Is there anything else you want
your attorney to do to ensure that you are
fully prepared for jury selection later on
today?

Defendant: No.

Here, the record refutes the Defendant’s claim that
CCR# 2014-77649 Supplemental Report #1 was not
provided and reviewed with the Defendant. Mr. Barrar
expressly stated that he had gone over all of the
discovery with his client. The Defendant then agreed
on the record that there was nothing else he wanted his
defense attorney to do before proceeding to trial.
Not only does the record refute the Defendant’s claim
that he was not provided CCR# 2014-77649
Supplemental Report #1 but the Defendant has also
failed to show any prejudice by this alleged omission
because the victim was effectively impeached by trial
counsel regarding many other topics. A defendant fails
to establish prejudice if a witness is impeached, albeit
in a different area, and the defense attorney
extensively argues the impeachment and lack of
credibility in closing argument. Mungin v. State, 932
So. 2d 986, 998-999 (Fla. 2006).

According to Section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes
(2018), impeachment may be accomplished by: “(1)
Introducing statements of the witness which are
inconsistent with the witness’s present testimony, (2)
Showing that the witness is biased, (3) Attacking the
character of the witness in accordance with the
provisions of s. 90.609 or s. 90.610, (4) Showing a defect
of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to
observe, remember, or recount the matters about which
the witness testified, (5) Proof by other witnesses that
material facts are not as testified to by the witness
being impeached.” In order to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel based on the failure to adequately
cross or impeach witnesses, the defendant must prove
that counsel’s questioning was so defective that it “so
affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding
that confidence in the outcome is undermined.”
Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101 (Fla. 2013).

Although Mr. Barrar did not ask the victim about her
alleged misidentification of the Defendant’s penis, he
did effectively cross-examine and impeach the victim on
many other matters. For example, the record shows
that defense counsel attacked the victim’s credibility by
establishing that she was a runaway, that she was not
in school or employed, and that she was being treated
by a psychiatrist for anxiety and depression and for her
inability to separate truth from fiction. The record also
establishes that defense counsel impeached the victim
by showing that she did not remember specific details
of the incident. The record also conclusively establishes
that defense counsel highlighted these deficiencies in
closing argument. For example, defense counsel argued
that the victim’s testimony was not reliable because she
could not identify the Defendant as her assailant and
because she could not separate the difference between
truth and reality. Although the Defendant evidently
wanted his trial attorney to impeach the victim more
than what occurred, a defendant is only entitled to a
fair trial, not a perfect trial, as there is no such thing
as a perfect trial. Bell v. State, 930 So. 2d 779, 783 (Fla.
4th DCA 2006) and Brunelle v. State, 456 So. 2d 1324
(Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

The record rebuts the Defendant’s allegations that he
was not provided with CCR# 2014-77649 Supplemental
Report #1 and shows that the victim was effectively
impeached on various other matters during cross-
examination and that these matters were argued
extensively by his defense counsel during closing
argument. Accordingly, the State suggests this Court
may summarily deny Ground Two of the Defendant’s
Motion based upon the record and the arguments
contained within this Response, without holding an
evidentiary hearing.

Resp. Ex. J at 39-41 (record citations omitted). The trial court adopted the
state’s response and summarily denied the claim, explaining it “carefully
reviewed the response and f[ound] that it address[ed] [the] claim with both
factual and legal accuracy” and “therefore [found] it appropriate and judicially
efficient to adopt the State’s response as the [trial] [c]ourt’s findings.” Id. at 82.
Petitioner, with help from postconviction counsel, appealed (Resp. Ex. K), and
the First DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial without a written
opinion (Resp. Ex. M).
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. As the state court
noted, during counsel’s cross-examination of the victim, counsel impeached her
based on her inability to recall the events that occurred on the day of the
incident. Indeed, counsel elicited testimony from the victim that she did not

recall what time of day the incident occurred, and she testified that she had a
history of not being able to “separate truth from reality.” Also, the state’s case
did not solely rely on the victim’s recollection of the assault but also focused on
the testimony of Officer Gray who witnessed Petitioner and the victim in a

problematic state. Considering this record evidence, the Court finds counsel’s
conduct was not deficient and Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice under
Strickland. Thus, upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law,
the Court finds that the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and it was
not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence
presented to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground One is denied.
B. Ground Two

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
present six alibi witnesses. Doc. 1 at 15. Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule
3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. J at 13-15. The state responded to the claim:
In Ground Three of his Motion, the Defendant alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s
failure to call six (6) defense alibi witnesses at trial that
would have testified that the Defendant was at the
doctor’s office during the incident, showing the jury
that the sequence of events provided by the victim could
not have occurred.

In the instant case, Officer Gray testified at trial that
he pulled into a parking lot behind an abandoned
restaurant and observed a vehicle near the wood line of
some trees. He stated that he touched the hood of the
car and it felt warm. He stated that as he was
approaching the woods, the Defendant came running
out, with his shirt over his head and his penis in hand.
Officer Gray then testified that he saw the victim, who
was crouching down in the woods. Officer Gray testified
that the Defendant was taken into custody at the scene.
Officer Gray identified [ ] Mr. Fields as the Defendant
in open court during trial. On June 19, 2015, the
Defendant testified under oath that he was in the
woods and approached by a police officer during the
time of the incident.[6]

“Whether to call a witness at trial is the type of
strategic decision for which the lawyer’s professional
judgment is generally not subject to postconviction
second-guessing, as the court held in Strickland v.
Washington.” Ferguson[v. State, 101 So. 3d 895, 897
(Fla. 4th DCA 2012).] “[A] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might
be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland[, 466
U.S.] at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,
101 (1955)).

6 On June 19, 2015, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on Petitioner’s
motion to suppress, during which Petitioner testified. Resp. Ex. B at 333-35.
It was uncontroverted and conclusively established by
the evidence that the Defendant was present at the
incident location and taken into custody at the scene.
Defense counsel acted well within the scope of
professional assistance by not putting on an alibi
defense when the defendant previously admitted that
he was at the scene, where law enforcement stopped
him at the scene, and where he was taken into custody
at the scene. Clearly, defense counsel’s decision not to
call witnesses that would squarely contradict the
Defendant’s prior sworn testimony and all of the other
evidence in the record cannot be deemed deficient or
ineffective. Accordingly, since the Defendant has failed
to show a prima facie case for relief as to Ground Three
regarding either a legal deficiency or prejudice to him,
the State suggests this court may summarily deny
Ground Three of the Defendant’s Motion based upon
the record and the arguments contained within this
Response, without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Resp. Ex. J at 42-43 (record citations omitted). The trial court adopted the
state’s response and summarily denied the claim, explaining it “carefully
reviewed the response and f[ound] that it address[ed] [the] claim with both
factual and legal accuracy” and “therefore [found] it appropriate and judicially
efficient to adopt the State’s response as the [trial] [c]ourt’s findings.” Id. at 82.
Petitioner, with help from postconviction counsel, appealed (Resp. Ex. K), and
the First DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial without a written
opinion (Resp. Ex. M).
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that the state court’s
decision to deny Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts given the evidence presented to the state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground Two is denied.
C. Ground Three
Petitioner argues his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to depose

witnesses before trial. Doc. 1 at 17. Petitioner raised this claim in this Rule
3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. J at 10-12. The state filed a response arguing:
In Ground One of his Motion, the Defendant alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s
failure to investigate and depose the State’s ten (10)
category A witnesses, including the listed victim in the
case. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that if the
victim in this case had been deposed, defense counsel
would have known about the victim’s inability to: (1)
identify her accuser, (2) make an in-court
identification, (3) remember the specifics of what
happened on February 3, 2014, and (4) identify the
vehicle she was in on February 3, 2014. Further, the
Defendant alleges that if the victim had been deposed,
defense counsel would have known about information
regarding the victim’s educational background and
mental health and would have known that the victim
was also a victim in a federal human trafficking case.
The Defendant alleges that had the victim been
deposed, his trial counsel would have been able to
formulate a proper defense, attack the victim’s
credibility, and demonstrate to the jury that he was
unjustly accused.

Counsel’s decision of whether or not to interview,
depose or cross-examine certain witnesses or potential
witnesses are tactical choices and are within the
standard of competency expected. Ferguson, 101 So. 3d
[at] 897-98 [ ]. “[A] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might
be considered sound trial strategy’” Strickland, [466
U.S.] at 689 (quoting Michel[ ], 350 U.S. [at] 101[ ]. “[I]f
the defendant consents to counsel’s strategy, there is no
merit to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Gamble v. State, 877 So. 2d 706, 714 (Fla. 2004). See
also Mendoza v. State, 81 So. 3d 579, 582 (Fla. 3d DCA
2012) (“[N]ot only is Mendoza unable to rebut the
presumption that counsel’s decision was reasonable
and strategic, Mendoza’s express agreement to such a
decision is fatal to his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).

On January 19, 2016, Judge Aho conducted a Final Pre-
Trial colloquy on the record with Mr. Fields and his
trial counsel, Mr. Barrar, to ensure that they were
ready and prepared for trial. During this colloquy, the
following sworn testimony was provided by defense
counsel and Mr. Fields:

The Court: Very well. And to your attorney
has all the discovery been completed Mr.
Barrar?

Mr. Barrar: Judge, as a strategic matter, I
didn’t take deposition (sic). But as you
recall, we had rather lengthy evidentiary
hearings. So as far as I am concerned, the
answer is yes.

The Court: Very well. Mr. Barrar, I
understand what you just said about your
position about depositions. But my
question is have all depositions that you
deem necessary been taken?
Mr. Barrar: Well, I didn’t take any judge.

The Court: And you deem them to be non-
necessary; is that correct?

Mr. Barrar: Correct.

The Court: And you discussed that with
your client?

Mr. Barrar: I did.

The Court: And Mr. Fields, you are [in]
agreement with your lawyer not taking
depositions?

The Defendant: Yes, Judge.

Here, the record establishes that the Defendant
provided sworn testimony that he was in agreement
with his defense counsel’s strategy not to take
depositions. This claim should be summarily denied
because when a defendant consents on the record to
counsel’s strategy, there is no merit to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ferguson, [101 So.
3d] at 897-98 (“[A]ppellant consented on the record to
this strategy. That is fatal to his claim”).

Resp. Ex. J at 38-39 (record citations omitted). The trial court adopted the
state’s response and summarily denied the claim, explaining it “carefully
reviewed the response and f[ound] that it address[ed] [the] claim with both
factual and legal accuracy” and “therefore [found] it appropriate and judicially
efficient to adopt the State’s response as the [trial] [c]ourt’s findings.” Id. at 82.
Petitioner, with help from postconviction counsel, appealed (Resp. Ex. K), and
the First DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial without a written
opinion (Resp. Ex. M).
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. As the state noted
in its response to Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 motion, trial counsel advised the trial
court before trial that he made a tactical decision not to depose any witnesses.
Resp. Ex. C at 5-6. Petitioner advised the trial court that he discussed this

strategy with counsel and agreed with trial counsel’s decision. Id. at 6. As such,
“the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy”; and Petitioner
has failed to demonstrate deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
He has also failed to show that but for trial counsel’s alleged error, the outcome

of his trial would have been different. Petitioner neither alleges how deposing
the state witnesses would have assisted in his defense, nor does he suggest how
their potential deposition testimony would have varied from their trial
testimony. Accordingly, upon thorough review of the record and the applicable

law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland, and it was
not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground Three is due to be

denied.
D. Ground Four
Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask
about a Brady7 violation during trial. Doc. 1 at 20. Petitioner raised this claim
in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. J at 15-18. The state responded:

In Ground Four of his Motion, the Defendant alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s
failure to inquire about an alleged violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Defendant alleges
that after the victim testified that she met with two
Assistant State Attorneys, defense counsel should have
inquired as to whether the victim told the Assistant
State Attorneys that she could not identify the
Defendant as her assailant, as this is an issue the State
should have disclosed pursuant to Brady.

“Postconviction relief cannot be based on speculative
assertions.” Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 64 (Fla.
2003). The Defendant cannot show Strickland prejudice
where his allegations are mere speculation. Ferguson,
[101 So. 3d] at 898. Ground Four of the Defendant’s
Motion is based entirely on speculation about what did
or did not occur during a conversation between the
victim and the Assistant State Attorneys who handled
this case at trial. Because postconviction relief cannot
be based on speculative assertions, Ground Four should
be denied.

Additionally, the Defendant is not able to show how
this alleged Brady violation prejudiced him. No
evidence was presented at trial that the victim was ever
able to identify the Defendant. The victim was not
asked by either the State or the Defense to identify the
Defendant. The Defendant’s trial counsel then pointed
out during his closing argument that the victim was
unable to identify her assailant. Accordingly, the
Defense cannot show that they were prejudiced because
defense counsel still argued in closing that the victim
could not identify the Defendant due to the lack of an
in-court identification. The Defendant has failed to

7 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
show a prima facie case for relief as to Ground Four
because the allegations are entirely speculative and the
Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced. This
Court may summarily deny Ground Four of the
Defendant’s Motion based upon the record and the
arguments contained within this Response without
holding an evidentiary hearing.

Resp. Ex. J at 43-44 (record citations omitted). The trial court adopted the
state’s response and summarily denied the claim, explaining it “carefully
reviewed the response and f[ound] that it address[ed] [the] claim with both
factual and legal accuracy” and “therefore [found] it appropriate and judicially
efficient to adopt the State’s response as the [trial] [c]ourt’s findings.” Id. at 82.
Petitioner, with help from postconviction counsel, appealed (Resp. Ex. K), and
the First DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial without a written
opinion (Resp. Ex. M).
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Here, Petitioner
has failed to establish a Brady violation. During cross-examination of the
victim, trial counsel elicited extensive testimony about her inability to recall
facts surrounding the incident. Indeed, the victim never identified Petitioner as
her assailant and trial counsel knew about her inability to make that

identification. Petitioner does not allege that the state suppressed evidence of
the victim’s inability to identify him, and he cannot demonstrate that her lack
of identification would have materially affected the outcome of Petitioner’s trial
considering Officer Gary presented testimony implicating Petitioner.
To that end, finding no Brady violation, it follows that there can be no

meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate
and raise a Brady claim. Thus, upon thorough review of the record and the
applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision to deny
Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Ground Four is denied.
E. Ground Five

Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors
denied Petitioner a fair trial. Doc. 1 at 23. Petitioner raised this claim in his
Rule 3.850 motion. Doc. 1 at 18. The state responded:
In Ground Five of his Motion, the Defendant claims
that the cumulative effect of the claims made in
grounds one through four resulted in a fundamentally
unfair trial procedure. However, “where allegations of
individual error are found to be without merit, a
cumulative error argument based thereon must also
fail.” Bryan v. State, 748 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Fla. 1999).
Specifically, if no error occurred by the attorney, it can
be concluded that a claim of cumulative error has no
merit. Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1994).
There is a strong presumption that the Defendant must
overcome to establish that trial counsel’s performance
was deficient. Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730 (Fla.
2011) (citing Strickland, [466 U.S.] at 690). The critical
test is whether the adversarial process worked
adequately, not whether counsel could have done more.
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir.
1992) and Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1518 (11th
Cir. 1995). “[T]he Constitution requires a good deal less
than maximum performance.” Atkins v. Singletary, 965
F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1992). Likewise, a defendant is
only entitled to a fundamentally fair trial, not a perfect
trial, as there is no such thing as a perfect trial. Tavares
v. Sec., Dept. of Corrections, 2008 WL 1931351 (M.D.
Fla. 2008) and Bell v. State, 930 So. 2d 779, 783 (Fla.
4th DCA 2006).

In the instant case, Grounds One through Four all fail
to establish an error by trial counsel. Thus, the Court
can summarily deny Ground Five as the Defendant has
failed to demonstrate a legal deficiency, or prejudice to
himself. The Defendant cannot establish prejudice
because the totality of the evidence clearly shows his
guilt and none of trial counsel’s alleged errors would
have put the case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict. Way v. State, 760
So. 2d 903, 914 (Fla. 2000).

Resp. Ex. J at 44 (record citations omitted). The trial court adopted the state’s
response and summarily denied the claim, explaining it “carefully reviewed the
response and f[ound] that it address[ed] [the] claim with both factual and legal
accuracy” and “therefore [found] it appropriate and judicially efficient to adopt
the State’s response as the [trial] [c]ourt’s findings.” Id. at 82. Petitioner, with
help from postconviction counsel, appealed (Resp. Ex. K), and the First DCA per
curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial without a written opinion (Resp. Ex. M).
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. “The cumulative
error doctrine provides that an aggregation of non-reversible errors (i.e., plain
errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless errors) can yield a denial of

the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v.
Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit addresses “claims of cumulative error by first considering
the validity of each claim individually, and then examining any errors that [it]

find[s] in the aggregate and in light of the trial as a whole to determine whether
the appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial.” Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012). Because the Court has determined
that none of Petitioner’s individual claims of error or prejudice have merit,

Petitioner’s cumulative error claim cannot stand. Cf. United States v. Taylor,
417 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[There being] no error in any of the
district court’s rulings, the argument that cumulative trial error requires that
this Court reverse [the defendant’s] convictions is without merit.”). Accordingly,

the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary
to clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings. Ground Five is denied.
F. Ground Six
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion
for judgment of acquittal. Doc. 1 at 23. According to Petitioner, the state only
presented circumstantial evidence at trial, and it could not rely on the victim’s

testimony because she was incompetent. Id. at 25. As such, Petitioner contends
the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal and its
failure to do so violated his due process rights. Id.
Petitioner, with help from appellate counsel, raised this issue during his

direct appeal. Resp. Ex. F at 20. Respondents, however, submit that Petitioner
failed to present this claim as a federal constitutional claim to the state
appellate court, rendering it unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Resp.
at 60-66. The Court agrees.

A review of Petitioner’s initial brief filed on direct appeal reveals that
when briefing this issue, he did not state or suggest that it was a federal claim
about due process or any other federal constitutional guarantee. Resp. Ex. F at
20-34. Instead, Petitioner argued, in terms of state law only, that the trial

court’s failure to grant a judgment of acquittal was based on an impermissible
stacking of inferences and circumstantial evidence. See id. at 32-33 (citing Davis
v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1956); Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974);
State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989); Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258 (Fla.

1996)). Consequently, the First DCA was never notified of any federal
constitutional claim during Petitioner’s direct appeal, and presumably, the
First DCA exclusively applied state law in affirming Petitioner’s conviction. See
Preston v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 461 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We can
safely assume that when the Florida [appellate court] considered [petitioner’s]

appeal, it did so through the prism of this longstanding state doctrine, rather
than federal law.”). As such, this claim is unexhausted and procedurally
defaulted. Petitioner fails to argue cause excusing the default or actual
prejudice resulting from the procedural bar. He also identifies no fact

warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.
See generally Doc. 8. Thus, Ground Six is due to be denied.
G. Ground Seven
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in limiting trial counsel’s

cross-examination of the victim. Doc. 1 at 29. According to Petitioner, the trial
court impermissibly narrowed the scope of counsel’s questioning and prohibited
him from asking the victim if she participated in a human trafficking ring. Id.
He contends that counsel’s questions would show if the victim’s testimony was

motivated by a fear of federal indictment or if she had experience manipulating
her responses to law enforcement to avoid prosecution for prostitution. Id. at
30. According to Petitioner, the trial court’s limitation on questioning the victim
violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment. Id.

Petitioner, with help from appellate counsel, raised this issue on direct
appeal. Resp. Ex. F at 41. The state filed an answer brief arguing:
In its Third Motion in Limine, the State sought a ruling
that evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity was
not admissible. Mr. Barrar, counsel for the defendant,
asserted that Z.S.[] was involved in “a federal
investigation for human trafficking.” The investigation,
to the State’s knowledge, “involved a boyfriend that
was pimping [the victim] out to several other
individuals.” The Motion was granted by Judge Aho,
stating:
. . . I am very cognizant of the right of
confrontation. I take it very seriously. But
I am also aware of the situation in terms of
the age of this victim, and I do find that any
relevance would be outweighed by the
prejudicial effect of such evidence.

Judge Aho, however, was amenable to Mr. Barrar’s
request to question Z.S. regarding whether she was
currently a Government witness, without reference to
her sexual background. [FN 5]

It is well-settled that “cross-examination must relate to
credibility of the witness or be germane to the matters
brought out on direct examination.” Salas v. State, 972
So. 2d 941, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Steinhorst
v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982)). “[T]he
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.’” Kentucky v. Stincer,
482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (quoting Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 20 (1985)) (emphasis omitted).

Trial courts have “wide latitude to impose reasonable
limits on the scope of cross-examination.” Jones v.
State, 580 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla. 1991) (citation omitted);
see Geralds v. State, 674 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 1996). The
limits placed on defense counsel’s inquiry may reflect
concerns about:

among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
Here, the scope of Mr. Barrar’s cross-examination was
reasonably limited to whether Z.S. was a Government.
witness, omitting references to the victim’s “sexual
background.”

The limitation was reasonable because it allowed the
appellant to explore the possible motive or bias he
claimed existed -- that the victim wanted “to curry favor
with the . . . state or the feds” -- without revealing that
the victim was “involved as a prostitute in a human
trafficking case.” [FN 6] The alleged probative value of
that disclosure was far outweighed by the danger the
proffered evidence presented of confusion of the issues
and unfair prejudice. [FN 7] Judge Aho’s ruling allowed
the appellant to inquire about the victim’s testimony;
allowing counsel to cross-examine Z.S. regarding her
sexual background would have served no purpose other
than to improperly impugn her character. § 90. 404
(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

[FN 5] The appellant did not pursue this inquiry
during the victim’s cross-examination.

[FN 6] Three questions were proffered after the
jurors retired to deliberate. The appellant offered no
support for his second proffered question and expected
response: that Z.S. expected to be charged in the federal
matter. That assertion was not made during the pre-
trial hearing, before Judge Aho ruled on the Motion in
Limine. Insofar as Z.S. was involved in human
trafficking, she appeared to be a victim.

[FN 7] The appellant believed that the probative
value of the proffered evidence was to establish that
Z.S. “learned about the allegations she could make”
against the appellant through her involvement in
human trafficking.
Resp. Ex. G at 22-24 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam
affirmed Petitioner’s judgment and conviction without a written opinion. Resp.
Ex. I. The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications.

Before trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the state’s third motion
in limine, in which it sought to exclude any testimony about the victim’s prior
sexual activity with anyone other than Petitioner. Resp. Ex. D at 334. Trial
counsel argued that his questioning of the victim should not be limited because

the victim “is a prostitute, an underage prostitute, . . . involved in a human
trafficking case, solely separate and apart from this” case and that information
shows “[h]ow she learned about the allegations she could make in this case . . .
.” Id. at 336. According to trial counsel, that testimony was necessary “to show

bias, motive, or ability to perceive and remember.” Id. But while the trial court
denied Petitioner’s request to ask those questions, Petitioner was allowed some
leeway in questioning the victim about the circumstances that led her to accuse
Petitioner of sexually assaulting her. Trial counsel was permitted to question

the victim about whether law enforcement coached her on what her testimony
should be, to which she responded no one had influenced her testimony. Resp.
Ex. D at 390.
Also, and likely of more import, “the Sixth Amendment only protects
cross-examination that is relevant.” Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 469 (11th
Cir. 1993). And questions about the minor victim’s prior sexual activity or

involvement in an unrelated trafficking organization bore no relevance to
whether Petitioner committed the alleged offense. Indeed, considering the
victim was a minor at the time of the incident, such evidence was particularly
immaterial. Thus, upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law,

the Court concludes that the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim
was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and it
was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented to the state court. Ground Seven is denied.

Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED
with prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. If Petitioner appeals the dismissal of this case, the Court denies a
certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined that a certificate
of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed
in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 2nd day of
August, 2028.

□ Cirmotheg Corrig oN
Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge

Jax-7

C: Gregory Kazon Fields, #J56817
Counsel of record

8 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner makes
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration,
the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
35

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113568. Public record. Not legal advice.