# Parisi v. Sabal Springs Homeowners Association Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 16, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113161

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 16, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

JOSEPH PARISI, and TERRY
CLARK

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 2:22-cv-504-JES-KCD

SABAL SPRINGS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant
Sabal Springs Homeowners Association, Inc.’s (Defendant or HOA)
Motion for Rule 56(d) relief (Doc. #43) filed on May 17, 2023.
Joseph Parisi and Terry Clark’s (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a
Response in Opposition (Doc. #44) on May 31, 2023. For the reasons
set forth, the motion is GRANTED.
I.
This case revolves around a rule imposed by the HOA.
Plaintiffs own a single-family home. The home is subject to Rule
& Regulation #11 (Rule #11) of the HOA, limiting each residence to
“no more than two (2) dogs and two (2) household pets . . . .”
(Doc. #30, Ex. 16, p. 2.) Plaintiff Joseph Parisi claims to be “an
individual with a disability” that “relies upon an assistance
animal, a dog named ‘Rokco’ . . . .” (Doc. #30, ¶¶ 2, 15.) Parisi’s
cohabitant, Plaintiff Terry Clark, “has two pet dogs,” Soonie and
Riley. (Id. at ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiffs, they requested Rule
#11 be waived and the HOA denied that request.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Doc. #30) is the
operative pleading. The SAC alleges three counts under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA): (1) failure to make a reasonable accommodation

for a person with a disability; (2) illegal interference, coercion,
threats, or intimidation; and (3) that amended Rule #11’s terms,
conditions, or privileges are facially discriminatory. All
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on all counts,
arguing there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they
are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law, with
the amount of damages being the only question left to the jury.
(Doc. #37, p. 24.)
Instead of responding on the merits, the HOA filed the current
motion requesting Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion be deferred
or denied pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). (Doc.

#43, p. 1.)
II.
“Under rule 56(d), a court may ‘defer’ or ‘deny’ a motion for
summary judgment, allow additional time for discovery, or issue an
appropriate order ‘[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition.” Burns v. Town of Palm Beach,
999 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2021)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d)). To invoke rule 56(d), the burden falls on the nonmovant to
“specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the
motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the
movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.’” City
of Miami Gardens v. Wells Fargo & Co., 931 F.3d 1274, 1287 (11th

Cir. 2019)(quoting Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., 862
F.2d 841, 843 (11th Cir. 1989)). “Failure to satisfy
[the rule 56(d)] burden is fatal to an argument that the district
court granted summary judgment prematurely by failing to order or
await the results of further discovery.” Id. at 1286. Ultimately,
the grant or denial of a Rule 56(d) motion is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923,
931 (11th Cir. 1989).
III.
The Court finds Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
premature. The discovery deadline is about five months away. See

(Doc. #20.) The HOA states it has yet to receive a requested HIPAA
authorization form, that Parisi’s doctors have yet to respond to
subpoenas, that depositions of Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ doctors
remain outstanding, and that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses are
incomplete. “Without this information,” the HOA asserts,
“Defendant cannot verify if an actual disability exists.” (Doc.
#43, p. 6.) In support, the HOA attaches a supposed declaration.
(See Doc. #43, Ex. 1.)1 Plaintiffs counter that HOA is not entitled
to Rule 56(d) relief because the declaration is deficient and
because the HOA has failed to demonstrate that further discovery
would raise any genuine issue of material fact. The Court disagrees
with Plaintiffs.

A. Any deficiency by the HOA’s attached declaration is not
fatal to its motion for Rule 56(d) relief
Plaintiffs argue that the declaration attached to the HOA’s
motion is not based on personal knowledge and that it is inherently
inconsistent with earlier testimony and thus “the Rule 56(d) Motion
could and should be denied for the document’s technical
deficiencies alone.” (Doc. #44, p. 3.)
That is not so. The declaration need not even exist, let alone
be perfect, for this Court to proceed and analyze the HOA’s motion
on its merits. Though a declaration or affidavit is the “preferred
vehicle” for invoking Rule 56(d) relief, City of Miami Gardens,
931 F.3d at 1287, “[i]n this Circuit, a party opposing a motion
for summary judgment need not file an affidavit [or declaration]
pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
order to invoke the protection of that Rule.” Snook v. Tr. Co. of

1 The attached exhibits to the HOA’s Motion for Rule 56(d)
relief (Doc. #43) are labeled in letter format (A,B,C, etc.).
Instead of the alphabetical letters used by the HOA, the Court
will cite each exhibit by the numerical number assigned to it by
the Court's CM/ECF system.
Georgia Bank of Savannah, 859 F.2d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 1988).2 This
is so “because ‘the written representation by [the opposing
party's] lawyer, an officer of the court, is in the spirit of Rule
56(f) under the circumstances.’” Fernandez v. Bankers Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 570 (11th Cir. 1990)(alteration in

original)(quoting Snook, 859 F.2d at 871). Thus, “the law of this
Circuit recognizes that the interests of justice will sometimes
require a district court to postpone its ruling on a motion for
summary judgment even though the technical requirements of Rule
56(f) have not been met.” Snook, 859 F.2d at 871. The Court will
not deny the HOA’s motion for 56(d) relief based on technical
deficiencies. Rather, the Court will analyze it on the merits.
B. Discovery as to Parisi’s purported disability could show a
genuine issue of material fact
Next, Plaintiffs argue that since all “[t]he discovery
Defendant contends is needed . . . boil[s] down to Defendant’s
desire . . . ‘to contest [Parisi’s] disability,’” then “discovery
would [not] show a genuine issue of fact” because “Parisi’s
disability is not at issue and discovery regarding it is not

2 “Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56(f) was reclassified as
Rule 56(d) with no substantial change.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746
F.3d 1288, 1295 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014). “Thus, precedent prior to
2010 citing [r]ule 56(f) is fully applicable to current [r]ule
56(d).” Burns, 999 F.3d at 1330 n.3 (quoting 10B Charles A. Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2740 (4th ed.
2020)).
crucial to the matters at issue in this case . . . .” (Doc. #44,
pp. 12-13)(alteration in original)(quoting Doc. #43, Ex. 1 at ¶
10.) Again, the Court disagrees.
To prevail on a reasonable accommodation claim as set forth
in Count I of the SAC, “a plaintiff must establish that (1) he is
disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he

requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was
necessary to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his
dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the requested
accommodation.” Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass'n,
Inc., 347 F. App'x 464, 467 (11th Cir. 2009). “Whether a requested
accommodation is required by law is ‘highly fact-specific,
requiring case-by-case determination.’” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d
1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002)(quoting Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens
Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2001)).
It follows that relevant discovery in this case necessarily
includes facts related to Parisi’s purported disability because it

is a necessary element. Postponing consideration of Plaintiffs’
summary judgment motion is prudent because “[i]f the documents or
other discovery sought would be relevant to the issues presented
by the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party should be
allowed the opportunity to utilize the discovery process to gain
access to the requested materials.” Snook, 859 F.2d at 871 (citing
Parrish v. Board of Comm.’rs of the Ala. State Bar, 533 F.2d 942,
948 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Discovery in this case has been contentious. First,
Plaintiffs themselves filed a motion to compel. (Doc. #35.) It was
ultimately denied by the assigned magistrate judge while
Plaintiffs’ present motion for partial summary judgment was

pending. See (Doc. #38.) Still, the Plaintiffs advance the notion
that the HOA “has neither diligently pursued discovery nor
accurately reported the discovery events that have actually
transpired.” (Doc. #44, p. 17.) Plaintiffs also seem to contest
whether the sought material is even discoverable. See (id., p.
10)(“Unfettered scouring of a resident’s medical records or
conducting an ‘independent medical examination’ are simply not
allowed.”)(citation omitted). As a result of this friction, the
HOA advises it is “preparing their [own] motion to compel,” subject
to ongoing good faith dialogue. (Doc. #43, p. 6.)
The Court does not today resolve whether the materials sought

are indeed discoverable. Such discovery disputes are best suited
for addressal in motions to compel, not here. Instead, this Order
simply acknowledges the requested materials pertain to an
essential element of Plaintiffs’ claim, and as such, the HOA
“should be allowed the opportunity to utilize the discovery
process” to gain access to them—if they are indeed entitled to
them. Snook, 859 F.2d at 871 (emphasis added)(citing Parrish v.
Board of Comm.’rs of the Ala. State Bar, 533 F.2d 942, 948 (5th
Cir. 1976)); see also Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1058 (llth
Cir. 1996) (“This court has held that it is error for a district
court to decide a summary judgment motion before ruling on an
outstanding motion to compel.”).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
1. Defendant Sabal Springs Homeowners Association, Inc.’s
Motion for Rule 56(d) relief (Doc. #43) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #37)
is DENIED without prejudice.
3. The Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. #20),
including its dispositive motions deadline, remains in
effect.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 16th day
of June, 2023.

ox
: le hy ) Zz. A, ob
adi EF. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113161. Public record. Not legal advice.