# Hall v. Jones

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 9, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113093

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 9, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113093

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting a prisoner's due process claim for failure to allege a liberty interest, in part, because “[t]he chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause[.]”
- finding no loss of liberty or property when prisoner received as part of his disciplinary punishment a two-week loss of commissary privileges
- concluding that an inmate does not have a protected interest in visitation arising from the Due Process Clause

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

WENDALL HALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-320-JES-KCD

COURTNEY JONES AND
H. HOUSTON,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on consideration of a motion
to dismiss filed by Defendants Courtney Jones and H. Houston (Doc.
19) and Plaintiff Wendall Hall’s response in opposition to the
motion. (Doc. 20). After careful consideration of the Complaint
and Hall’s response, the Court grants the defendants’ motion and
dismisses this case without prejudice as premature and failing to
state a claim on which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
I. Background and Pleadings
Hall, a resident of the Florida Civil Commitment Center
(“FCCC”), initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Hall alleges the
following in his complaint:1 On April 18, 2022, Hall received a

1 The Court presents the facts as alleged in Hall’s complaint
(Doc. 1), and at this stage, his factual allegations are accepted
as true. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453
behavior management report (“DR”) charging him with disorderly
conduct. (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 4). Captain King noted on the DR that
Hall wanted to attend the DR hearing. (Id. at 4, ¶ 5). Later

though, Hall was directed to return the DR because it contained an
error. (Id. ¶ 6). Hall returned the DR and was told that a
corrected DR would “include all the previous statements and
information” from the earlier one. (Id. ¶ 7). He never signed a
refusal stating that he would not attend the DR hearing to be held
on April 27, 2022, and he did not inform staff that he would not
attend the hearing. (Id. ¶ 8).
On April 27, 2022, Hall resided in Sea Dorm. (Doc. 1 at 4,
¶ 9). No notice was posted in the dorm that Hall was supposed to
attend the DR hearing. (Id.) No official called him to attend
the meeting, and the intercom system in Sea Dorm was malfunctioning
on that day, causing announcements to come through unclearly.

(Id. at 5, ¶ 11). Therefore, Hall did not hear his name called

(2006) (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept
as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint”). The
“tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And even in the case
of pro se litigants, the court does not have “license to serve as
de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. V. Cnty. Of
Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d
701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, as best it is able, the
Court extracts Hall’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” from his
complaint to “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 679.
for the DR hearing. (Id. ¶ 11). Hall also asserts, without
explanation, that the FCCC staff “never informed [him] twice of
the time of the DR hearing on April 27, 2022.” (Id. ¶ 12).

Hall went to the DR hearing room at 9:00 am, but because no
official was present in the hearing room and the lights were off,
he went back to his dormitory and took a shower. (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶
13). After his shower, he applied shaving cream to his face.
(Id.) The shaving cream began to burn his face. (Id. at 6, ¶
14). Thereafter, an FCCC officer came to Hall’s room and asked
whether he wanted to attend the DR hearing. (Id.) Hall told him
that he wanted to attend, but would need a “few minutes” to take
off the shaving cream and apply medicated ointment to his face.
(Id. ¶ 15). The official told Hall that he would alert the DR
team that he needed some time to attend the hearing. (Id. ¶ 16).
Hall waited fifteen minutes to remove the shaving cream and then

applied ointment, put on clothing, and went to the DR hearing room.
(Id. at 6–7, ¶ 17). However, when he arrived, nobody was there.
(Id. at 7, ¶ 18). Hall assumed the hearing had been rescheduled.
(Id.) However, Defendants Jones and Houston conducted the hearing
without Hall’s presence, found him guilty of disorderly conduct,
and restarted his CARE level at level three as a sanction. (Id.
at 9, ¶ 19).
Hall asserts that the defendants violated procedural due
process by holding the hearing without his presence, which has
caused him “severe mental anguish, mental distress and severe
depression.” (Doc. 1 at 8, ¶ 19). He claims that he would have
obtained a CARE level 4 on May 1, 2022 if he had not received the

DR for disorderly conduct and that he is not allowed to possess a
personal television or obtain a job, which are privileges afforded
to residents at CARE level 4. (Id. at 8–9, ¶ 19).2 He also
alleges that the State Attorney could use the DR as proof to show
the civil commitment court that Hall’s mental condition has not
changed, which could extend his civil commitment. (Id. at 9, ¶
20). Hall seeks five million dollars in compensatory damages and
another five million dollars in punitive damages. (Id. at 11, ¶
25). He also seeks to have his DR overturned. (Id. ¶ 27).
The defendants move to dismiss this action for two primary
reasons. (Doc. 19). First, they argue that Hall’s claims are
premature because he has not alleged that the disciplinary charges

terminated in his favor. (Id. at 6–7). Next, they assert that
Hall has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he was deprived
of a protected liberty interest arising from the Due Process
Clause. (Id. at 7–8). Hall has filed a response to the motion,
in which he generally asserts that it should not be granted.3
(Doc. 20).

2 Hall asserts that he needed to remain “DR free for 6 months
as a care level 3” to be entitled to the privileges afforded those
in care level 4. (Doc. 1 at 9–10).
3 Very little of Hall’s 14-page response consists of arguments
II. Standard of Review
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all the
allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372

F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors
the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations
in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901
F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (“On a motion to dismiss, the
facts stated in [the] complaint and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are taken as true.”) However, the Supreme Court has
explained that factual allegations must be more than speculative
as follows:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, courts are not
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

directed at those raised by the defendants. (Doc. 20). The
remainder can loosely be described as legal argument that consists
primarily of relevant and non-relevant case citations and text cut
and pasted from court opinions.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court,
referring to its earlier decision in Twombly, set forth a two-
pronged approach to evaluating motions to dismiss. First, a

reviewing court must determine whether a plaintiff’s allegation is
merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not entitled to an
assumption of truth. Next, the court must determine whether the
complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Evaluating a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is “a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id.
III. Discussion
A. Hall’s civil rights complaint is subject to dismissal as
premature.
The defendants argue that Hall’s complaint is premature
because he has not alleged that the DR was terminated in his favor.
(Doc. 19 at 7). They cite Middle District of Florida cases
Kleparek v. Florida Civil Commitment Center, No. 2:13-cv-490-FtM-
38CM, 2014 WL 7218881 (M.D, Fla. Dec. 17, 2014) and Douse v. Budz,
No. 2:09-cv-596-FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 3256328 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2009)
to support their arguments.4 Upon review of the complaint and

4
In Kleparek, the plaintiff sought only injunctive relief
(the expungement of the DR), and in Douse, the plaintiff alleged
that the disciplinary report had been completely fabricated by the
defendants, which implicated the supreme court holdings in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisak, 520 U.S. 641
caselaw applicable to prisoners who allege due process violations
in prison disciplinary proceedings, the Court concludes that
Hall’s complaint must be dismissed without prejudice as premature

because success on this claim would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his punishment.5
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a state
prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable in a § 1983 action
if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. 477,487
(1994). The Supreme Court later expanded the Heck bar to a

(1997). While these cases are instructive, neither mandates
automatic dismissal of this case.

5 The Court recognizes that Hall is not a prisoner. And the
Supreme Court has concluded that, as a general rule, civil
detainees are “entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 322 (1982). Indeed, the involuntarily civilly committed have
liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom
from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate
training as might be required to ensure safety and freedom from
restraint. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly held that
“Youngberg establishes that the due process rights of the
involuntarily civilly committed are at least as extensive as the
Eighth Amendment rights of the criminally institutionalized, and
therefore, relevant case law in the Eighth Amendment context also
serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the
civilly committed.” Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863
(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041
(11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the case
law that has developed in the prison context also sets forth the
contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed. Id.
prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary proceedings. See Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). In Balisok, the Court held
that a prisoner’s claim “for declaratory relief and money damages,

based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the
decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the
punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 648.
A plaintiff need not seek only monetary damages or the
reinstatement of good time credits for Heck to apply; the test is
whether a civil judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily
negate the underlying punishment. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). See also Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d
488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It is irrelevant that [the plaintiff]
disclaims any intention of challenging his conviction; if he makes
allegations that are inconsistent with the conviction's having
been valid, Heck kicks in and bars his civil suit.”).

Here, Hall alleges that he was deprived of due process after
receiving a DR and seeks damages for the punishment that was
imposed in the disciplinary proceeding as well as expungement of
the DR. As noted by the defendants, Hall does not assert that the
DR at issue in this case has been overturned administratively, in
state court, or through federal habeas relief. A finding that
Hall did not receive due process in this action would be
inconsistent with the punishment imposed on him in the disciplinary
proceeding—the re-start of his CARE level. Therefore, Hall’s §
1983 action is not cognizable in light of Heck and Balisok unless,
and until, Hall has the disciplinary report overturned, which he
does not allege has occurred. State differently, success on this

claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the penalty imposed on
Hall, and therefore his complaint is subject to dismissal as
premature.
B. Hall has not stated a procedural due process claim.
The defendants alternatively argue that even if Hall can bring
this claim in a section 1983 complaint without first having his DR
overturned, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim on which relief may be granted. (Doc. 19 at 7).
Specifically, the defendants argue that Hall was not deprived of
a protected liberty or property interest as a result of receiving
the DR. (Id.) The Court agrees.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the United States

Supreme Court described the minimum due process requirements for
prisoners who receive discipline that results in the loss of good-
time credits or the imposition of solitary confinement. These
protections include advance written notice of the charges,
adequate time to prepare a defense, an opportunity to present
witnesses and evidence, and a written statement by the factfinder
explaining the reasons for the decision. Id. Here, Hall asserts
that the defendants violated Wolff because he did not have an
opportunity to present witnesses and evidence at the hearing on
his DR, presumably because he was unaware of the precise time the
hearing would occur. Moreover, when he was eventually notified,
the defendants did not allow him sufficient time to remove the

shaving cream from his face and apply ointment before holding the
hearing without him present.
However, a defendant’s failure to follow each Wolff
procedural requirement violates the Constitution only when the
failure results in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s interest in
life, liberty, or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
221 (2005) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or
property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection
must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”) Thus,
the threshold question for any due process claim is whether the
plaintiff was deprived of the type of “life, liberty, or property”

interests protected by the due process clause. Kentucky v. Dep’t
of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
Hall asserts that he has alleged a constitutionally protected
liberty interest because FCCC detainees with recent DRs are not
allowed the same privileges at the FCCC (such as owning a personal
television or getting a paid job) as detainees who do not receive
DRs. (Doc. 1 at 10). Specifically, based on the allegations in
the complaint, the DR caused Hall’s CARE level to restart at the
beginning of level three, even though his CARE level was due to
increase from three to four in less than a month. He asserts that
a resident must go six months without a DR to receive the increased
privileges attendant with CARE level four. (Id. at 9). Under

these alleged facts, Hall was—at most—delayed from receiving his
CARE level 4 for a little more than five months.6
Hall’s temporary delay of his rights to seek paid employment
at the FCCC and to possess a personal television—privileges
presumably allowed at CARE level 4, but not level 3—does not evince
a denial of adequate food, exercise, medical care, sanitation, or
any other circumstance that, in the Court’s view, would constitute
an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of resident life at the FCCC. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at
486 (finding that two 30-day periods of administrative confinement
did not implicate a liberty interest because it was not an
“atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Thompson, 490 U.S. at
460 (concluding that an inmate does not have a protected interest
in visitation arising from the Due Process Clause); Moore v.

6 Hall also speculates that the discipline reports could be
used in the future to deny his release from the FCCC. (Doc. 1 at
9). However, this is not the type of liberty interested protected
by, and requiring, a Wolff-style hearing. See Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (rejecting a prisoner's due process claim
for failure to allege a liberty interest, in part, because “[t]he
chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is
simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the
Due Process Clause[.]”).
Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no loss of
liberty or property when prisoner received as part of his
disciplinary punishment a two-week loss of commissary privileges);

Walker v. Loman, No. 06–0896–WKW, 2006 WL 3327663, at *1, *3 (M.D.
Ala. Nov. 15, 2006) (holding the 90-day loss of store, telephone
and visitation privileges, recommended custody increase, and
referral for possible free-world prosecution did not result in the
deprivation of a liberty interest).
Simply put, the sanction imposed on Hall as a result of the
DR (a restart at CARE level three) did not implicate due process
concerns. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Hall has
not shown the existence of a protected liberty interest, and as a
result, he does not state a procedural due process claim.7 Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
IV. Conclusion

Hall’s complaint is both premature and fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted. The Court will not order an

7 More than six months have passed since Plaintiff received
the DR at issue. As a result, Plaintiff is no longer on a reduced
CARE level as a result of the DR. Because this case is dismissed
as premature and for failure to state a claim, the Court will not
consider whether Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is now
moot. Nor will the Court consider whether the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities on
the basis that no clearly established Supreme Court or Eleventh
Circuit case suggests that a reduction in a civilly committed
plaintiff’s privileges (or extension of a lower CARE level)
implicates the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.
amended complaint because—-even liberally construed-the allegations
raised in the complaint do not present a situation “[w]here it
appears a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.”
See Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:
1. The motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) filed by Defendants
Courtney Jones and H. Houston is GRANTED as to all claims
raised in the complaint.
2. With no remaining claims or defendants, the Clerk is
directed to terminate any pending motions, close this
case, and enter judgment accordingly.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on the 9th day
of June 2023,

J =e Ae
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J9GHN E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-2
Copies to: Wendall Hall, counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10113093. Public record. Not legal advice.