# Williams v. Pinellas County Schools

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 6, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112589

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 6, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

BILLY JAMES WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:22-cv-2279-JLB-CPT

SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS
COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff Billy James Williams (“Mr. Williams”) brings suit against his former
employer, Defendant School Board of Pinellas County, Florida1 (the “School Board”),
for employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117. (Doc. 1). Before the Court is the School Board’s Motion
to Dismiss Mr. Williams’s Complaint. (Doc. 7). Mr. Williams has not responded to
the School Board’s Motion, and the time to do so has expired. M.D. Fla. R.
3.01(c). After careful review of the parties’ filings, the Court GRANTS the School
Board’s Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Williams’s Complaint is DISMISSED without

1 Mr. Williams referred to the Defendant in this case as “Pinellas County Schools”
in his Complaint. Defendant, however, advises that the properly named Defendant
is the “School Board of Pinellas County, Florida.” ( Doc. 7 at 1 n. 1.) The Court
will adopt this corrected party name and will refer to Defendant as the School
Board of Pinellas County, Florida as courts have done in other cases in which the
School Board of Pinellas County, Florida is a party. ,
, 484 U.S. 830 (1987).
prejudice. Mr. Williams will have the opportunity to amend his Complaint
consistent with this Order, should he choose to proceed forward with this litigation.
BACKGROUND

Mr. Williams filed his Complaint , but he has since retained counsel.
( Doc. 15). The Court construes the Complaint liberally, accepts the facts
alleged in the Complaint as true, and construes all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to Mr. Williams, as is required at the Motion to Dismiss stage.
, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018); , 187
F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

Mr. Williams was working as a bus driver for the School Board, and in March
2018, Mr. Williams went on medical leave. (Doc. 1 at 5–6). Mr. Williams asserts
that he has a “disability or perceived disability,” but he does not specify the nature
of this disability and it is unclear whether his medical leave was related to his
disability or whether it was related to some other illness. ( at 5). On October 10,
2018, the School Board held a hearing, which Mr. Williams attended “to try and
save [his] job.” ( at 6). Four days later, Mr. Williams received a letter, stating he

had been terminated. ( )
In November 2018, Mr. Williams spoke with “Mr. T Mark,” an individual who
the Court presumes to be an employee or representative of the School Board. ( )
Mr. T. Mark told Mr. Williams that he could be rehired if he “brought in
documentation that [he] could return to work full duty no restrictions.” ( )
On January 6, 2019, Mr. Williams reported to the “compound where [he] had
been working” prior to his medical leave, filled out paperwork, and took a dexterity
test “to see if [he] could perform the duties of [his] job and drive the bus.” ( ) Mr.
Williams alleges that he passed this test. ( ) He also provided the examiner with

his Department of Transportation card, which he asserts was valid. ( )
The School Board then required Mr. Williams to get a physical examination,
which Mr. Williams believes was a “DOT physical.” ( ) Mr. Williams states that
he did not pass this exam, and that he “never heard from [the School Board] again.”
( ) Mr. Williams filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on July 20, 2020, and on July 8, 2022, he received a Right to Sue letter.

( at 7). On October 5, 2022, Mr. Williams filed a Complaint in this Court against
the School Board under the ADA for (1) failure to hire him, (2) termination of his
employment, (3) failure to accommodate his disability, (4) retaliation, and (5) other
acts, specifically, that he “was demoted [and] had to go to [the] back of the line.”
( at 5).
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests
the sufficiency of a complaint and requests that the court determine whether the
complaint sets forth sufficient allegations to establish a claim for relief.”
, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1290 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2000). “A
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond a doubt that the proponent can prove no set of facts that support a claim

upon which relief can be given.” , 428 F.
Supp. 2d 1260, 1263 (M.D. Fla. April 6, 2006). When considering a motion to
dismiss, the Court must limit its evaluation to the pleadings and any exhibits
attached to those pleadings. , 225 F.3d 1228, 1231
(11th Cir. 2000). “The threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is . . . exceedingly low.”

, 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
To reiterate, Mr. Williams alleges five types of discriminatory conduct in his
ADA claim: (1) failure to hire him, (2) termination of his employment, (3) failure to
accommodate his disability, (4) retaliation, and (5) other acts, specifically his
demotion and “ha[ving] to go to back of the line.” ( Doc. 1 at 5). The Court will

assess claims (1) and (2) together, then claim (3), and, lastly, claims (4) and (5)
together.
I. Mr. Williams has failed to state a claim for discrimination under the
ADA under the theories of “failure to hire” and “termination.”

The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). The Court understands this subsection to include Mr. Williams’s claims
for “failure to hire” and “termination of his employment.” To state a claim for

discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that he was (1) disabled, (2) a
qualified individual, and (3) subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his
disability. , 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000).
The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . a record of such an
impairment . . . or . . . being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking
communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Major life activities also
include “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to,
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”

42 U.S.C. § 12012(2)(B).
Here, Mr. Williams has failed to identify any physical or mental impairment
that he suffers from or any way in which a major life activity has been substantially
limited by such an impairment as required by the statute. While he checked the
box on the complaint form indicating that he has a “disability or perceived
disability,” he does not specify the nature of his disability, despite the form’s clear
indication to do so. ( Doc. 1 at 5).
Ultimately, failure to identify any alleged disability is fatal to Mr. Williams’s
ability to withstand the School Board’s motion to dismiss his ADA claim.

, 442 F. App’x, 480, 485 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming
dismissal of employee’s ADA claim on the basis that she had not properly stated
such a claim because “she did not sufficiently allege a disability . . . . She did not
specify whether she had a physical or a mental disability, what the disability was,
or how it impaired a major life activity.”). As the Eleventh Circuit has instructed,
“[v]ague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not

sufficient to put an employer on notice of its obligations under the ADA.”
, 80 F.3d 445, 448 (11th Cir. 1996). And where a plaintiff cannot
show “that [his] employer had actual or constructive knowledge of [his] disability[,]”
the plaintiff cannot “sustain a prima facie case of handicap discrimination.”
And though complaints are to be construed liberally, courts throughout
the Eleventh Circuit have applied the same pleading requirements to
plaintiffs, looking unfavorably on bare or conclusory assertions in ADA claims.

, , No. 14-343-KD-C, 2015 WL 1444965, at *6
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim because “[t]he
[p]laintiff’s bare assertion that she was discriminated against on the basis of a
disability is unsupported by any factual allegations . . . . The plaintiff cannot state a
claim for disability discrimination merely by asserting that she was injured in an
automobile accident in her employee parking lot”);
, No. CV410-273, 2011 WL 806423, at *1 n.3, *1
(S.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2011), 2011 WL 806658
(Mar. 2, 2011). (“[P]laintiff must plead more than threadbare recitals, legal

conclusions and the mere possibility of misconduct . . . . [I]t is not sufficient simply
to cite to various health problems and an adverse employment result”);
, No. 3:06cv52/MCR/MD, 2006 WL 5882171, at *3
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006) (“[P]laintiff neither claims nor alleges facts to suggest she
has a disability. Even assuming that she does, she fails to allege facts
that even remotely suggest defendants’ decision to deny her medical benefits was

the result of discrimination based on that disability.”).
Because he failed to specify his disability, whether the school board perceived
his condition, or how he was discriminated against by the School Board on the basis
of this perceived disability, Mr. Williams has failed to state a claim for relief under
the ADA based on a theory of failure to hire or unlawful termination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(3) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such
an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an

action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity”); , No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 WL
3043021, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012) (explaining that the relevant inquiry in
disability discrimination cases brought under the ADA is how the defendant
“perceived [plaintiff’s] condition, including the reactions and perceptions of the
persons interacting or working with [him].”) Accordingly, Mr. Williams has failed to
state a claim for discrimination under the ADA based on a theory of failure to hire
or unlawful termination.

II. Mr. Williams has failed to state a claim for discrimination under the
ADA based on a theory of failure to accommodate.

The third of Mr. Williams’s five theories of discrimination under the ADA is
that the School Board “fail[ed] to accommodate [his] disability.” (Doc. 1 at 5).
Under the ADA, an employer discriminates against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability by, among other things:
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To state a claim for failure to accommodate
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he was a qualified
individual at the relevant time, which means that he could perform the essential
functions of the job; and (3) he was discriminated against because of his disability.
, 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). Critically,
where an employee has failed to request a reasonable accommodation, his failure to
do so is “fatal to the prima facie case.” , 188 F.
App’x 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2006). As the Eleventh Circuit has stated clearly, “the
duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a specific
demand for an accommodation has been made.”
, 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999).
Mr. Williams has failed to make this case because, as outlined
above, he has not properly asserted that he is disabled. Furthermore, Mr. Williams
has failed to assert any facts indicating that the School Board knew about his

disability (such that it could discriminate against him because of it) or that he
proposed any reasonable accommodations to the School Board. Thus, Mr. Williams
has not adequately alleged that the School Board’s duty to provide a reasonable
accommodation was triggered. , 167 F.3d at 1363. Instead, Mr.
Williams merely checked the box on the form complaint for “[f]ailure to
accommodate my disability.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Ultimately, Mr. Williams’s omission of

how the School Board failed to reasonably accommodate him, or what
accommodations—if any—he was owed, is “fatal to the prima facie case.”
, 188 F. App’x at 863. Accordingly, Mr. Williams has failed to state a claim
for discrimination under the ADA under a theory of alleged failure to accommodate.
III. Mr. Williams has failed to state a claim for retaliation under the ADA.

The Court notes at the outset of this subsection regarding retaliation that it
reads Mr. Williams’s fifth cause of action—“[o]ther acts: I was demoted had to go to
back of the line”—as part of the retaliation count since the alleged demotion is
presumed to be connected to his disability and is the type of adverse employment
action contemplated by the subsection of the ADA prohibiting retaliation, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a). ( Doc. 1 at 5). This subsection of the ADA provides that “[n]o person
shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
As the Eleventh Circuit has instructed, “to successfully allege a prima facie

retaliation claim under . . . the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] engaged in
statutorily protected expression; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression.”
, 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
“To establish that a plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected expression, [the
Eleventh Circuit] ha[s] held that a plaintiff must show that [he] had a good faith,

reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment
practices.” (quotation omitted). As for the “adverse action” element, “[a]n
employment action is considered ‘adverse’ only if it results in some tangible,
negative effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” , 257 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, the causal relation prong can be satisfied, for purposes of making the
case, so long as plaintiff can demonstrate “that the protected activity and the
adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” ,

344 F.3d 1161, 1180 n.30 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). The alleged adverse
action must “follow[ ] the protected conduct[,]” which stems from “the important
requirement that the employer was actually aware of the protected expression at
the time it took adverse employment action.” , 182 F.3d
1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Here, Mr. Williams has failed to show that he was engaged in any sort of
statutorily protected activity or that the adverse employment actions that he
suffered were causally related to the protected expression. Mr. Williams has only
alleged two forms of expression which could possibly constitute statutorily protected

expression: his filing of an EEOC charge and his contact, and involvement of, the
NAACP. ( Doc. 1 at 4, 6–7). The EEOC charge was filed on July 20, 2020,
roughly twenty-one months after Mr. Williams was terminated and roughly
eighteen months after Mr. Williams was not rehired by the School Board. (
at 5–6). Accordingly, the adverse employment actions that Mr. Williams
experienced could not have been in retaliation for his filing a charge with the

EEOC. , 182 F.3d at 1284 (“At a minimum, [plaintiff] must show that
the adverse act followed the protected conduct.”).
Mr. Williams also states that he “[c]alled the NAACP [and] got them
involved,” which could presumably constitute statutorily protected expression. (
at 6). It is clear from Mr. Williams’s Complaint that he had already been
terminated by the School Board at the time that he involved the NAACP. Thus, the
only potential adverse employment action that he might have suffered after

involving the NAACP is that the school board failed to rehire him, and he was
“demoted [and] had to go to [the] “back of the line.” ( at 5). The only statement
in the Complaint that could be construed as alleging some causal connection
between Mr. Williams’s protected speech and the adverse employment actions that
he has alleged to have suffered is that “when the NAACP got involved things went
downhill from there I was never offered any other position although released to
come back to work.” ( at 4). But it is unclear exactly what Mr. Williams’s
communications with the NAACP were, whether the School Board was aware of the
NAACP’s involvement, or how the NAACP’s involvement in his case was causally

related to the School Board’s decision not to rehire him. Without further
information or allegations, the Court cannot determine how, if at all, Mr. Williams’s
communications with the NAACP and the adverse employment actions that he
suffered “were not wholly unrelated.” , 344 F.3d at 1180 n.30 (“To prove a
causal connection, we require a plaintiff only to demonstrate that the protected
activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated”) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, Mr. Williams has failed to state a claim for retaliation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Williams’s claims that the School Board
violated the ADA by (1) failing to hire him, (2) terminating of his employment, (3)
failing to accommodate his disability, (4) retaliating, and (5) “demot[ing] [him]
[and] [sending him to] [the] back of the line” are due to be dismissed for failure to
state a claim. Accordingly,

1. Defendant School Board of Pinellas County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is
GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Billy James Williams’s Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Should he desire to amend his Complaint, any amended
complaint is due to this Court on or before April 21, 2023.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to change the party name for Defendant
in the CM/ECF docket from “Pinellas County Schools” to “School Board of
Pinellas County, Florida.”
ORDERED at Tampa, Florida on April 6, 2023.

if ale a Polite □□
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112589. Public record. Not legal advice.