# Rodriguez-Bonilla v. Ivey

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 6, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112560

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 6, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112560

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- acknowledging tha “[w]here the prisoner has suffered increased physical injury due to the delay [o medical care],” the Eleventh Circuit has “consistently considered . . . the reasor for the delay” in determining if a defendant acted with more than gross negligence
- finding no supervisory liability where there was no underlying violation of clearly established constitutional rights

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ-
BONILLA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 6:21-cv-428-JA-DAB
WAYNE IVEY, KELLY HAMAN,
GEORGE FAYSON, RICHARD
ZIMMERMAN, ROBERT
WAGNER, JR., FREDDY
CEDENO, ALLISON
BLAZEWICZ, DEBORA
NADEAU, AYANA ROBINSON,
YOLANDA JONES and ARMOR
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH
SERVICES INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER
Gregory Lloyd Edwards tragically died on December 10, 2018, following a
short stint at the Brevard County Jail Complex. Two years later, Margarita
Rodriguez-Bonilla, as personal representative of Edwards’s estate, commenced
this action in state court against various individuals and entities affiliated with
the jail. (Doc. 1-3). Defendants timely removed the case, (Doc. 1), and it was

eventually transferred to this Court, (Doc. 12).1 On October 5, 2021, the Court
dismissed Count I insofar as it was brought against Defendants Debora Nadeau
Ayana Robinson, and Yolanda Jones, but otherwise allowed the case to proceed
(Doe. 72).
With discovery complete, Defendants have now filed two separate motions
for summary judgment—one on behalf of Defendants Nadeau, Robinson, Jones
(the Nurse Defendants), and Armor Correctional Health Services, LLC
(collectively, the Armor Defendants) (Doc. 129), and a second on behalf ot
Defendants Robert Wagner, Jr., Richard Zimmerman, George Fayson (the
Deputy Defendants), and Sheriff Wayne Ivey (collectively, the Sheriffs Office
Defendants) (Doc. 131).2 Rodriguez-Bonilla has responded to both motions
(Docs. 159 & 160), and the Sheriffs Office Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc.
170). While the Court expresses sympathy for Edwards and his family—and
concern regarding some of the Defendants’ actions—both motions are due to be
granted for the reasons set forth below.

1 Rodriguez-Bonilla originally filed this case in state court in Miami-Dade
County. Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida before the parties agreed to transfer it here to the Middle
Pisin In August 2022, the parties jointly stipulated to the dismissal of all claims
against three other Sheriff's Office Defendants: Freddy Cedeno (Doc. 118), Allison
Blazewicz (Doc. 117), and Kelly Haman (Doc. 118).

I. BACKGROUND
1. Edwards’s Arrest
The circumstances giving rise to this case began on the morning 0!
December 9, 2018, when Edwards was arrested for attacking a Christmas toy.
drive volunteer outside the Walmart store in West Melbourne, Florida.3 At
approximately 11 a.m., Edwards and his wife Kathleen arrived at the store ir
search of sleep medication. (Kathleen Edwards Dep., Doc. 147, at 52). Kathleen
later testified that Edwards—an Army combat veteran with a history of post:
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—had not slept in four days, and she did not
want to leave him at home by himself because “he was psychotic” and she
worried that “he was a danger to himself and other[s].” (Id. at 52, 57).
When they arrived at Walmart, Kathleen entered the store, believing
Edwards was in tow. (Id. at 59). In fact, however, Edwards had peeled off from
his wife to investigate a box truck parked outside, which was being used to
collect toys for a Christmas charity drive. (Perez Body Cam Video at 10:55—
11:30).4 According to witnesses, Edwards climbed into the back of the truck,

3 Rodriguez-Bonilla sued the officers who arrested Edwards in a related but
separate case, Rodriguez-Bonilla v. City of West Melbourne, No. 6:20-cv-2235-JA-DAB,
which was consolidated with the current suit for the purposes of discovery and
mediation. (Doc. 42). The Court has since disposed of all claims in that case. (See Docs.
94, 105, and 110 in Case No. 6:20-cv-2235).
+ Defendants have filed multiple flash drives containing video footage of
Edwards’s arrest and his time at the jail. Some of this footage remains under seal. (See
Doc. 128).

removed his sandals, began laughing to himself, and fell backwards into a pil
of toys. (Id.). After being asked to leave the truck, Edwards became agitated an
attacked one of the volunteers, repeatedly punching, scratching, and kickin:
him before a second volunteer was able to tackle Edwards and pin him to th
ground. (/d. at 10:20—10:35),.
Bystanders quickly flagged down Jacob Mathis, an officer with the Wes
Melbourne Police Department who was patrolling nearby. (Mathis Dep., Doc
150, at 10). After arriving to the scene and learning about the attack, Office
Mathis attempted to handcuff Edwards, who resisted. (Mathis Body Cam Vide
at 00:30—01:44). During the ensuing struggle, Officer Mathis pleaded witl
Edwards to relax and asked him why he was fighting, to which Kathleen—whx
had since exited the store and joined the crowd of onlookers surrounding he:
husband—replied that Edwards had PTSD and was “having a psychotic
episode.” (Id. at 01:44—02:00).
Officer Mathis was eventually able to restrain Edwards with the help o:
Officer Kevin Krukoski and Sergeant Michael Perez, fellow members of the
West Melbourne Police Department who had responded to the scene. (/d. at
06:00—08:20). In addition to applying handcuffs, the officers shackled Edwards’s
ankles and placed a “hobble” around his knees to prevent him from kicking.
(Krukoski Dep., Doc. 149, at 10). They then lifted him to his feet and placed
him in the back of Officer Krukoski’s patrol car. (d.). All told, Edwards’s

struggle with the officers lasted close to eight minutes, with Edwards oscillating
between active resistance and seeming compliance throughout. (Mathis Bods
Cam Video at 00:40—08:00).
Once the officers were able to restrain Edwards, Sergeant □□□□□
interviewed Kathleen, who reiterated that Edwards was a military veteran whc
suffered from PTSD and was going through a “psychotic episode,” as he tended
to do around Christmas time. (Perez Body Cam Video at 02:20—02:30). According
to Kathleen, Edwards had been exhibiting strange and “paranoid” behavior over
the past few days, including pacing around the house at odd hours, opening and
closing doors, and waking up their young daughter in the middle of the night,
seemingly without reason. (Id. at 03:40—04:10). Kathleen explained that despite
Edwards’s erratic behavior—or because of it—she chose not to leave him at the
house because she feared that he might commit suicide, something he had
threatened to do in the past. (Id. at 04:15-04:25). She also disclosed that
Edwards was on probation for attacking hospital workers when he was “Baker
Acted”5 for a previous psychotic episode the year before. (Id. at 05:00—05:18).

° The Baker Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.451 et seq., “allows an authorized person, such
as a police officer, to initiate an involuntary examination of an individual whom the
officer believes may have a mental illness, is substantially likely to cause serious bodily
harm to himself or others, and refuses a voluntary examination or is unable to
understand the need for an examination.” Crane v. Lifemark Hosps., Inc., 898 F.3d
1130, 1133 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018).

After speaking with Kathleen, Sergeant Perez interviewed othe
witnesses, including the victim of the attack, who confirmed that he would lik
to “press charges.” (Id. at 09:45-10:36). Edwards was eventually arrested fo:
battering the toy-drive volunteer, resisting officers with violence, and violatin;
the terms of his probation. (Police Report, Doc. 149-1, at 1). Due to Edwards’
manic behavior and the mental health history provided by Kathleen, the officer:
decided that Edwards should be involuntarily committed for a psychologica
evaluation pursuant to the Baker Act. (Perez Dep. at 16). But because Edwards
was also being arrested for suspected felonies, the officers determined that, ir
accordance with police department policy, he should first be taken to the jail tc
be processed and given a court date rather than taken directly to a mental
health facility. Krukoski Dep. at 16-17; Perez Dep. at 17-19).
By the time he was placed in the back of Officer Krukoski’s patrol car,
Edwards had largely calmed down. Footage from the backseat camera shows
that Edwards sat there quietly, clearly winded, and occasionally mumbled or
laughed to himself while the officers interviewed witnesses outside. (Rear Patrol
Car Video 1 at 08:30-18:00). At one point, Officer Mathis and another officer
opened the doors of the cruiser and checked Edwards for any visible injuries.
That process elicited no aggression from Edwards, even when Officer Mathis
crawled into the backseat to examine specks of blood behind Edwards’s ear.

(Rear Patrol Car Video 2 at 36:58-38:00). Mathis asked Edwards if he woulc
like to be checked again by medical staff on scene, but he did not respond.
As time went on, Edwards continued to appear calm and cogent—ii
somewhat frustrated by his prolonged confinement in the patrol car. He
complained, for example, that Officer Krukoski was taking too long to complete
his arrest report and expressed that he was eager to get moving because he was
“not comfortable” in the back seat. (Id. at 44:00—43:30). Later, Edwards asked
Officer Krukoski: “What am I locked up for? What’s the charges?” When Officer
Krukoski responded that Edwards was being charged with battery and resisting
arrest, Edwards initially denied hitting anyone before admitting, “oh, I did
punch him” and chuckling to himself. (Id. at 26:45-27:00). After nearly thirty-
five minutes in the patrol car, Edwards briefly became agitated, pleading with
Officer Krukoski to remove his handcuffs. When Officer Krukoski refused,
however, Edwards dropped the issue and calmed down. (Id. at 28:00—29:00).
Later, Edwards made small talk with Officer Krukoski on topics such as their
shared military service and Officer Krukoski’s pay as a police officer. (Id. at
51:20—52:30; 54:40—-55:20).
Edwards largely maintained this calm demeanor during the half-hour
drive to the Brevard County jail, with a few minor outbursts. (Id. at 56:20—
1:29:00). About fifteen minutes into the trip, for example, Edwards complained
that he could not feel his hands and asked Officer Krukoski to pull over so that

he could use the bathroom and remove his handcuffs—a request that wer
unfulfilled. 7d. at 1:10:10-1:12:30). A few minutes later, apparently realizin
that he was not being taken to an outpatient clinic, Edwards became agitatec
repeatedly yelling at Officer Krukoski to “take the next exit,” stomping his fee
on the floor, and accusing Officer Krukoski of kidnapping him. (/d. at 1:13:30
1:15:00). Officer Krukoski later testified that, in response to this behavior, h
contacted Sergeant Perez and had him relay to the jail staff that Edwards wa
being “combative in the back seat” and that he may need assistance when th
duo arrived. (Krukoski Dep. at 19-20). Within a few minutes, however
Edwards had again calmed down, spending the remainder of the trip in silence
(Rear Patrol Car Video 2 at 1:18:00~1:29:00). By the time Edwards was take
into the jail, he appeared to be relaxed and fully compliant. (Id. at 1:29:00-
1:31:00).
2. Edwards’s Time in the Jail
Officer Krukoski and Edwards arrived at the jail just after 1 p.m. (Vehicle
Sally Port Video at 01:09:28). They were met in the vehicle sally port by Deputy
Wagner and Sergeant Zimmerman of the Brevard County Sheriffs Office, whc
took custody of Edwards, patted him down, and accompanied him into the jail
to await processing. (Id. at 01:09:47—-01:12:09; Inner Sally Port Video at
01:12:10-01:14:48). Testifying later, neither deputy remembered being told that
Edwards was being committed under the Baker Act. (Zimmerman Dep., Doc.

137, at 11; Wagner Dep., Doc. 138, at 15). But Officer Krukoski testified that h
“would have handed them the Baker Act form” along with the other arres
paperwork when they took custody of Edwards. (Krukoski Dep. at □□□□□□□ □□
also Police Report, Doc. 149-1, at 12). And upon his arrival Edwards was put i
a red jumpsuit, indicating that he would be housed in the mental health unit □
the jail. (Zimmerman Dep. at 20; Wagner Dep. at 19).
According to Deputy Wagner, jail policy dictated that an inmate brough
in under the Baker Act should be given a mental evaluation “as soon a
reasonably possible,” on a “first come, first serve” basis. (Wagner Dep. at 22
“Normally,” Sergeant Zimmerman explained, an arrestee “gets processed in, h
gets pictures taken, fingerprints, and he’s seen by the nurse after that
depending on ... [the nurse’s] workload at the time, if there’s people in front o
[him].” (Zimmerman Dep. at 19). On the day Edwards was brought in, the jai
was “quite busy,” (Wagner Dep. at 25), and although Edwards appeared caln
and compliant, the deputies decided to place him alone in Holding Cell 7 to “coo
down” while he waited to be processed. (Zimmerman Dep. at 23).6
Video footage shows that Edwards entered Holding Cell 7 just after 1:15
p.m. and remained there for the next thirty minutes. (Holding Cell 7 Video at

6 It is unclear from the deposition testimony whether Edwards’s □□□□□□□
combative behavior led the deputies to delay his processing time or to simply place him
in a different cell while he waited for his turn.

01:19:46—01:51:30). His time in the cell was unremarkable. During the first
fifteen minutes, Edwards sat down, picked at his jail-issued lunch, and briefly
engaged in calisthenics, including push-ups and tricep dips. (Id. at 01:19:47-
01:41:46). At 1:41 p.m., jail personnel walked by the cell, and Edwards knocked
gently on the glass to get their attention. (Id. at 01:41:37-01:42:00). Ignored, he
returned to his lunch and began pacing around. (Id. at 01:42:00-01:47:34). Six
minutes later, jail personnel walked by again, and Edwards tried once more to
flag them down, knocking harder this time. (Id. at 01:47:35-01:47:55). When
that did not work, Edwards became frustrated, angerly slapping the wall of his
cell and then returning to the window to pound it intermittently with his fists.
(Ud. at 01:47:56-01:51:00).
Finally, at 1:51 p.m., a deputy appeared, opened the cell door, and
attempted to direct Edwards to the booking area, where he would have been
photographed, fingerprinted, and examined by a nurse. (Id., 01:51:30—01:51:45:
Wagner Dep. at 25). Video footage from outside the cell shows Edwards
complying at first, before turning and walking in the wrong direction. (Receiving
2 Video at 01:51:46-01:51:52). The deputy, Corporal Otto, calmly stopped
Edwards and redirected him to the booking area. (Id. at 01:51:53-01:52:04).
Edwards took a few more steps in the right direction but then abruptly turned

10

back around and swung at Corporal Otto with a hefty left hook.7 Ud. ¢
01:52:05-01:52:08). Anticipating the assault, Corporal Otto grabbed Edward
and attempted to sweep his legs, losing his own footing in the process. (Id.). Bot
men then fell to the ground, with Edwards landing on top of the deputy. (Id. a
01:52:08-01:52:10).
Deputy Wagner, Sergeant Zimmerman, and others immediately rushed t
Corporal Otto’s aid, tackling Edwards and wrestling for control of his hands a
he continued to strike Corporal Otto in the head. Ud. at 01:52:11-01:52:48)
Corporal Otto eventually crawled out from under Edwards, removed the peppe
spray from his utility belt, and thrusted it into the pileup, spraying Edwards it
the face. Ud., 01:52:49-01:53:07). Other deputies used fist and knee strikes t
try to force Edwards to comply. (Id. at 01:52:21, 01:52:32, and 01:53:40-
01:53:54). Soon, Lieutenant Fayson arrived at the scene and called over the
radio for “all available officers” to come assist getting Edwards under control
dd. at 01:53:11-01:53:30; Fayson Dep., Doc. 139, at 14). More deputies arrivec
shortly, and one of them quickly shocked Edwards with her taser. (Receiving 2
Video at 01:54:50-01:54:55). By 1:57 p.m., after nearly five minutes o:

7 It is not clear from the video how well Edwards’s punch landed. Nurse Nadeau
who witnessed the attack from her office near the booking area, told investigators that
Edwards had “clocked [Corporal Otto] right in the face,” causing Corporal Otto to fall
down, “smack[] his head on the concrete, and black{] out.” (Nadeau Interview,
Doc. 161-7, at 6). The video does show Corporal Otto's head hitting the floor, but he
does not appear to lose consciousness. (Receiving 2 Video at 01:52:08-01:52:12).

11

struggling, the deputies finally managed to get Edwards into handcuffs. Cd. :
01:56:52). All told, at least twelve deputies responded to the fight, and at lea:
nine are seen on the video actively struggling with Edwards. (See, e.g., id. <
01:54:44).
Once Edwards was subdued, Lieutenant F ayson called for a restrair
chair, explaining later that he felt compelled to do so “for officer safety,” give
Edward’s aggressiveness. (Fayson Dep. at 18). The deputies lifted Edwards int
the chair and tightened the straps around his shoulders, waist, and ankles
(Receiving 2 Video at 01:57:15—02:00:49). Because Edwards was already i
handcuffs, the deputies did not strap his hands to the chair, placing ther
instead through a hole in the back. (Zimmerman Dep. at 42). The deputies als
placed a “spit mask” over Edwards’s head to shield them from the mucus an
saliva that had accumulated on his face—presumably from the pepper spray
(Receiving 2 Video at 01:59:00; Zimmerman Dep. at 47; Fayson Dep. at 24)
Although some of the deputies later dabbed their own eyes with paper towels
(see, e.g., Receiving 2 Video at 02:06:00), they did not wipe the pepper spray fron
Edwards's face or otherwise decontaminate him before putting on the spit mask
(id. at 01:58:55-01:59:05). They also failed to remove the taser barbs fror
Edwards’s back. (See Holding Cell 9 Video at 02:26:05—02:26:15).
Many of the deputies remained in the area for the next few minutes.
talking and observing Edwards as he continueed to tense up and squirm in the

12

restraint chair. (Receiving 2 Video at 02:00:56—02:07:10).8 At one point, two
the deputies leaned down and retightened the straps around Edwards’s ankle:
(Id. at 02:02:17-02:02:53). Then, at 2:07 p.m., the deputies wheeled Edward
into Holding Cell 9 and closed the door. Ud. at 02:07:10-02:08:10). No deput
was specifically assigned to observe Edwards during this time, but Deput
Wagner and Sergeant Zimmerman both testified that they could see Edward
from their seated positions in the booking area. (Wagner Dep. at 34; Zimmerma:
Dep. at 44; see also Receiving Video at 02:16:45). Video footage from the ce!
shows Edwards moving his head and legs sporadically over the next fiftee:
minutes, writhing under the straps of the restraint chair. (Holding Cell 9 Vide
at 02:08:10—02:23:00). The video does not contain audio, and the spit masl
obscures Edwards’s mouth, but Deputy Wagner and Nurse Nadeau testifie:
that Edwards was yelling unintelligibly during this period. (Wagner Dep. at 42
Nadeau Dep., Doc. 130, at 31-32).
At 2:15 p.m., Deputy Wagner walked by Holding Cell 9 and lookec
through the window at Edwards. (Receiving Video at 02:15:52). A minute later
he was joined by Nurse Nadeau, who peered through the window herself
looking for “signs of distress.” (Id. at 02:16:00—02:16:10; Nadeau Dep. at 32-33)
Finding none, Nurse Nadeau walked back to her office, and Deputy Wagner

8 At times the deputies also appeared to speak to Edwards, but the video has nc
sound.

13

returned to his desk. (Receiving Video at 02:16:10—02:16:45; Nadeau Dep. at
33).° At 2:18 p.m., Lieutenant Fayson also walked by and looked into the cell
before continuing on his way. (Receiving Video at 02:17:57-02:18:05). None o:
the individuals who viewed Edwards during this time reported seeing any
indication that he needed medical attention. (Nadeau Dep. at 33; Wagner Dep
at 42; Zimmerman Dep. at 41).
Within minutes, however, things took a turn for the worse. At 2:22 p.m..
as Deputy Wagner was speaking with another deputy at his desk, an
unidentified jail employee entered the receiving area and saw Edwards ir
Holding Cell 9. (Receiving Video at 02:22:17-02:22:25). Apparently concerned.
she beckoned a passing deputy and the two approached the cell door together,
observing Edwards through the window. (id.. 02:22:26—02:22:52).19 A few
seconds later, the employee said something to Deputy Wagner, who quickly left

° Nadeau was asked during her deposition why she did not enter the cell at this
point and perform a more thorough medical examination on Edwards. She replied that
she was not allowed to do so until the deputies determined that Edwards was no longer
combative. (Nadeau Dep. at 33-34). None of the Sheriff's Office Defendants were able
to confirm the existence of such a rule. (Wagner Dep. at 43; Zimmerman Dep. at 48).
10 Tt is not clear from the video why the jail employee was concerned about
Kdwards’s condition. As she peered inside the cell, Edwards continued to move his legs
and struggle against the straps of the restraint chair, as he had been doing on-and-off
for fifteen minutes. (Holding Cell 9 Video at 02:22:17—02:22:52). It was only after the
deputies entered his cell that Edwards appeared to become limp and unresponsive. (/d.
at 02:23:20). In his deposition testimony, Deputy Wagner stated only that the employee
“indicated to [him] that she had concerns about his well-being.” (Wagner Dep. at 35).
As one possible explanation, Nurse Nadeau told investigators shortly after Edwards’s
death that he had “abruptly stopped hollering. So the officer went right to him.”
(Nadeau Interview at 8).

14

his chair and approached the cell with Lieutenant Fayson. Ud. at 02:22:53-
02:23:04). After returning to Deputy Wagner’s desk to grab the keys, the tw
deputies entered the cell as Nurse Nadeau arrived and waited by the door. Ud
at 02:23:04—02:23:20).
Inside the cell, Edwards appeared lethargic and unresponsive. (Holdings
Cell 9 Video at 02:23:20-02:24:38). Lieutenant Fayson immediately removed the
spit mask and used it to wipe Edwards’s face, while Deputy Wagner applied =<
series of sternum rubs to no avail. (Id.). Soon, more deputies entered the cel.
and began freeing Edwards from the restraints, his limp body hunching over as
they removed his handcuffs and pulled out the taser barbs still in his back. Ud.
at 02:25:00-—02:26:21). At 2:26 p.m., Nurse Nadeau entered and began
administering oxygen to Edwards, who was breathing with “shallow breaths’
but had a pulse of 68. (Id. at 02:26:20—2:27:50; Nadeau Dep. at 41). According tc
Nurse Nadeau, she attempted at some point to contact the charge nurse but
received no response. (Nadeau Dep. at 40). A few minutes later, Nurses
Robinson and Jones arrived with a stretcher, (Holding Cell 9 Video at 2:30:00),
but the deputies decided to wheel Edwards to the medical unit in the restraint
chair instead, (Nadeau Dep. at 43).
At 2:32 p.m., almost ten minutes after the deputies first entered
Edwards’s cell and found him unresponsive, they started transporting him to
the medical unit. (Holding Cell 9 Video at 02:32:29). The group arrived less than

15

three minutes later, and medical personnel immediately began to assess
Edwards’s condition. (Medical Entrance 03 Video at 02:34:15—02:38:00). At 2:38
p.m., his condition appeared to deteriorate further, as the deputies and medical
staff removed Edwards’s limp body from the restraint chair, placed him on the
floor, and began administering CPR. (Id. at 02:38:28-02:40:00). Around this
time, the charge nurse asked Sergeant Zimmerman to call 911. (BCSO Report,
Doc. 185-1, at 26). At 2:49 p.m., paramedics arrived and took control of the scene,
continuing to administer CPR and employing other emergency measures.
(Medical Entrance 03 Video at 02:49:10—03:04:20). Fifteen minutes later, the
paramedics lifted Edwards onto a stretcher and transported him to Rockledge
Regional Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead at 8 p.m. the next day.
(Id. at 03:04:20—03:05:26; Autopsy Report, Doc. 141-1, at 1).
3. The Cause of Death
Exactly what caused Edwards’s death remains in dispute. Dr. Sajid
Qaiser, the Brevard County Medical Examiner who performed the official
autopsy, listed Edward’s cause of death as “excited delirium and complications
due to hyperactive and violent state with subsequent restraint.” (Autopsy
Report at 1). As he later explained, excited delirium is a “disturbance in the
cognition and the consciousness of [an] individual” that “becomes more
exaggerated with combativeness, like in the fighting attitude or any kind of
hyperactivity.” (Qaiser Dep., Doc. 141, at 19). In this state, according to Dr.

16

Qaiser, “neurotransmitters in our body,” such as adrenaline, “increase in leve’
because of their increased activity and level in the blood... exert[ing] □□□□
effect on the heart and blood vessels” and eventually leading to cardiac arrest.
Ud. at 21). In Edwards's case, Dr. Qaiser said, these effects were exacerbated by
attempts to restrain him during his hyperactive state, including his initia
detention by bystanders outside of the Walmart, his altercations with the West
Melbourne police officers and the Brevard County deputies, and his eventual
placement in the restraint chair. (/d. at 21).
Dr. Vernard Adams, a forensic pathologist hired by the Armor
Defendants, agreed with Dr. Qaiser’s conclusion that Edwards died from
“excited delirium,” though he appeared to place some blame on Edwards’s
preexisting “hypertensive heart disease.” (Adams Dep., Doc. 142, at □□□□ Like
Dr. Qaiser, Dr. Adams opined that some of the techniques used by the deputies
to subdue Edwards—including the taser, pepper spray, and restraint chair—
likely contributed to his fatal adrenaline dump, “not only though pain, but also
probably from fear,” by keeping Edwards in a prolonged state of fight-or-flight.
(id. at 14-16). While these actions may have exacerbated the effects of
Edwards’s condition, however, Dr. Adams confirmed his belief that “the excited

1 During his deposition, Dr. Adams repeatedly referred a medical report that
he prepared for Defendants. That report has not been presented to the Court.

17

delirium that [Edwards] suffered from [when he died] was due to h:
schizoaffective disorder and his chronic substance abuse.” Ud. at 14).
Dr. Daniel Schultz, the medical expert hired by Rodriguez-Bonilla, offere
a different take. To start, Dr. Schultz clarified that he does not “believe in th
phenomenon of excited delirium,” noting that it is “not recognized by th
American Medical Association or the psychiatric association.” (Schultz Dep
Doc. 144, at 16-17). According to Dr. Schultz, “[w]hile a person could be deliriou
and excited ... I don’t ascribe to the concept that that in and of itself is th
reason for the death.” (Id. at 17). Instead, Dr. Schultz concluded that Edward
died from “rhabdomyolysis,” a condition in which the breakdown of muscl
tissue releases toxins into the bloodstream, damaging the kidneys an
eventually leading to cardiac arrest. (Id. at 14).
As for the cause of this rhabdomyolysis, Dr. Schultz acknowledged tha
Edwards’s muscles might have been damaged by his own exertions against th
arresting officers and, later, the deputies. (Schultz Dep. at 16). He maintained
however, that “the primary issue [was] the tight strapping to the restraint chai
... with a smaller component from the primary struggles that ensued prior t«
that.” (Schultz Dep. at 20). Dr. Schultz wrote in his report that “[t]he prolongec
pressure over at least roughly half a[n] hour [in the restraint chair] to large
muscle groups [is] in my opinion the primary reason|]” for Edwards’s rapic

18

decline in health. (Schultz Report, Doc. 144, at 7).!2 Dr. Schultz does not believe
that the use of a taser contributed to Edwards’s death, and although he
suggested in his report that the combined use of pepper spray and a spit mask
may have played some role in Edwards’s death, Dr. Schultz later demurred
admitting: “I think I could fall back on removing that as a contributory
issue... . [I]n retrospect, I think I would have not included that specifically or
the contributory line.” (Schultz Dep. at 56—57).13
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled tc
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must construe the
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000). “However, [courts] draw these inferences only ‘to the extent supportable
by the record.” Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007)). “Thus, the requirement to view

12 Dy. Josef Thundiyil, a toxicologist hired by the Sheriffs Office Defendants,
also believes that Edwards died from rhabdomyolysis. (Thundiyil Dep., Doc. 143, at
16-17). Unlike Dr. Schultz, however, Dr. Thundiyil attributes this rhabdomyolysis to
Edwards’s alleged “huffing” of inhalants, not to his time in the restraint chair. (Id. at
a None of the medical experts appear to believe that Edwards died from being
“suffocated very slowly and painfully” by the spit mask, as alleged in the operative
complaint. (Sec. Amend. Compl., Doc. 42, § 147).

19

the facts in the nonmoving party’s favor extends to genuine disputes over
material facts and not where all that exists is ‘some metaphysical doubt as tc
material facts.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp..
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Sawyer v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).
Ill. DISCUSSION
Rodriguez-Bonilla brings an exhaustive ten counts against a total of eight
Defendants. The first five of these counts are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides for a cause of action against any person who, “under
color” of state law, deprives an individual of the “rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” The
claims brought under this statute are: excessive force against the Deputy
Defendants (Count I); deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
the Deputy Defendants and the Nurse Defendants (Count II); supervisor
liability against the Deputy Defendants (Count IID): failure to intervene against
the Deputy Defendants and the Nurse Defendants (Count IV); and a Monell

20

claim against Sheriff Ivey! and Armor (Count V).15 Notably, only Counts I an
IT may stand alone—Counts III-V are derivative (and in some cases
duplicative) claims that depend on the existence of an underlying constitutiona
violation. In other words, if the Court determines that summary Judgment i
appropriate on Counts J and II, the remaining federal counts fall as well.
The remaining five counts are state-law claims: willful and wanto:
negligence against the Deputy Defendants (Count VI);16 ordinary negligenc
against Sheriff Ivey (Count VII); medical malpractice against the Armo
Defendants (Counts VIII & IX); and vicarious liability against Armor itsel
(Count X).
The Sheriff's Office Defendants now move for summary judgment on al
claims against them. The Armor Defendants move for summary judgment solel;
on the federal claims. Should that motion be granted, the Armor Defendant:
request that this Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims and instead remand them to state court. See 2§
U.S.C. § 13867(c)(8).

14 Sheriff Ivey is sued solely in his official capacity. (Sec. Amend. Compl. § 21).
‘5 Monell established that “[l]ocal governing bodies [and officials] ...can be suec
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the actior
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that □□□□□□
officers.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serus., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978).
16 In her Response to the Sheriffs Office Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Rodriguez-Bonilla states that she is no longer pursuing Count VI. (Doc. 15¢
at 2).

21

1. Excessive Force (Count I)
In Count I, Rodriguez-Bonilla alleges that the Deputy Defendants violatec
Edwards’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The
Deputy Defendants deny using excessive force on Edwards and argue that
regardless, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
(a) Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable persor
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “The purpose of this immunity
is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without
the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee
v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Willingham v.
Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 537
U.S. 801, 801 (2002)). “[T]o receive qualified immunity, an official must first
establish that ‘he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d
1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194). If so, “the burden

22

then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the grant of qualified immunity i
inappropriate.” Id.
Here, Rodriguez-Bonilla does not contest the Deputy Defendants
assertion that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authorit;
during their interactions with Edwards—and any such challenge woul
certainly fail. See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 126!
(lith Cir. 2004) (explaining that an official acts within his discretionary
function when he is “(a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is
pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within his power □□
utilize”). Thus, the burden shifts to Rodriguez-Bonilla to establish that (1) the
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to her, show a violation of Edwards’:
constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the
events at issue. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
(b) Did the Deputy Defendants Violate Edwards’s Rights?
“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guards against the use of excessive force
against arrestees and pretrial detainees.” J W ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018).17 Rodriguez-Bonilla concedes

17 By the time of his death, Edwards had not yet received a probable-cause
hearing. As a result, there is some uncertainty regarding whether the Defendants’
actions should be assessed under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment. See Crocker
v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1256 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring) (recognizing
that Eleventh Circuit precedent “hasn’t settled the issue” whether a claim “brought by
an individual who has been arrested but hasn't yet received a judicial determination

283

that the force initially employed by the Deputy Defendants to subdu
Kdwards—including the use of body strikes, pepper spray, a taser, a restrain
chair, and a spit mask—was not excessive, as Edwards was still resisting th
deputies following his attack on Corporal Otto. (Doc. 159 at 13). She argues
however, that the Deputy Defendants violated Edwards’s constitutional right:
by continuing to apply force after Edwards was fully restrained. Among □□□□□
alleged violations, Rodriguez-Bonilla cites: (1) keeping Edwards in the restrain:
chair without allowing a nurse to check his vital signs or the tightness of the
straps; (2) keeping him handcuffed behind his back while in the restraint chair
(3) not removing the taser barbs in his back; (4) failing to decontaminate him
after the use of pepper spray and then placing a spit mask over his head; anc
(5) failing to continuously observe him after he was placed in the restraint chair.
Ud. at 13-14).

of probable cause . . . arise[s] under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment”). Since
every party to this case has proceeded under the assumption that Rodriguez-Bonilla’s
§ 1983 claims fall under the Fourteenth Amendment—and because the Eleventh
Circuit has yet to direct otherwise—this Court will assess them under that standard.
See id. at 1261-62 (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that “[iJn the past, and in the
absence of an affirmative answer as to when arrest ends and pretrial detention begins,
[the Eleventh Circuit] has deferred to the characterization given by the parties, where
they agree”). Indeed, following Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 567 US. 389, 397 (2015), this
may be nothing more than a formalistic concern, as “the Fourteenth Amendment
standard has come to resemble the test that governs excessive-force claims brought by
arrestees under the Fourth Amendment.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 952-
53 (11th Cir. 2019).

9A

“Prior to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), ... ‘{a] claim o
excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment [was] analyzed as if it were
an excessive-force claim under the Eighth Amendment’ and, therefore . . . a ‘uss
of force against a pretrial detainee [was] excessive .. . if it shock[ed] the
conscience’ or was ‘applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Patel v
Lanier Cnty., 969 F.3d 1173, 1181 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fennell v. Gilstrap
559 F.3d 1212, 1216 n.5, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009)). “In Kingsley, though, the
Supreme Court clarified that the Eighth Amendment's malicious-and-sadistic
standard—which applies to incarcerated prisoners—does not extend to pretria.
detainees.” Id. Now, “[a] pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable,” with
no additional element of subjective intent. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396—97. In othe:
words, “[a]fter Kingsley, the Fourteenth Amendment's standard is analogous tc
[that of] the Fourth Amendment|],” not the Eighth Amendment. Patel, 969 F.3d
at 1182; see also Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 952-53 (11th Cir. 2019)
([Jnasmuch as it entails an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of the
officers’ actions, the Fourteenth Amendment standard has come to resemble the
test that governs excessive-force claims brought by arrestees under the Fourth
Amendment.”).18

18 Rodriguez-Bonilla, apparently unaware of Kingsley’s doctrinal shift, argues
her Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim under the old standard. She insists,

25

As in the Fourth Amendment context, assessing the “objectiv
reasonableness” of a use of force under the Fourteenth Amendment “turns o
the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 39
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “A court must make thi
determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene
including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision c
hindsight.” Id. Moreover, “[a] court must ... account for the ‘legitimate interest
that stem from [the government's] need to manage the facility in which th
individual is detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that it
th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order an
discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)).
With these caveats in mind, Kingsley points to a number of factors tha
“may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness” of a particular use o

for example, that her claim requires both an “objective showing of deprivation or Injury
and a subjective showing that the official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind,’
(Doc. 159 at 11 (citing Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010))—that
is, that the force was applied not “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline,” but rather “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” (Id. (quoting
Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992))). Perplexingly, even after misstating the
standard under which her claim will be assessed, Rodriguez-Bonilla makes no effort tc
show that the Deputy Defendants exhibited this malicious state of mind. Moreover.
ignoring Kingsley, she makes no effort to establish that the force used by the Deputy
Defendants was objectively unreasonable, stating (incorrectly) that “[iJn a claim fox
excessive force, the objective requirement is satisfied by a demonstration that the
plaintiff suffered any degree of harm.” (Doc. 159 at 11 (citing Skelly v. Okaloosa Cnty.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 456 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2012))).

26

force, including: “[1] the relationship between the need for the use of force an
the amount of force used; [2] the extent of the plaintiff's injury; [3] any effor
made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; [4] the severity o
the security problem at issue; [5] the threat reasonably perceived by the officer
and [6] whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 567 U.S. at 397.
Considering these factors together, there is little doubt that the Deput:
Defendants’ initial use of force was not excessive—as Rodriguez-Bonilla □□□□□
concedes. Edwards, who had just initiated a violent, unprovoked attack or
Corporal Otto, undoubtedly posed a grave threat to jail security and was □□□□□□□□
resisting the Deputy Defendants’ efforts to restrain him. In response, the
Deputy Defendants gradually increased the severity of their force techniques a:
the struggle progressed, applying no more force than necessary to gain contro
of Edwards, and disengaging when they managed to subdue him. While the force
used against Edwards—and the pain it caused him—was unfortunate, it was
not unreasonable.
What happened after Edwards was placed into the restraint chair
presents a closer call. “Obviously, ‘legitimate interests —including the need tc
‘preserve internal order and discipline’ and ‘maintain institutional security —
may at times require jail officers to use force.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 953 (quoting
Kingsley, 576 F.3d at 397). Still, jail officials may not “continue to employ force

27

or other coercive measures after the necessity for such coercive action ha
ceased.” Id. (quoting Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 327 (11th Cir. 1987)).
The jail security footage makes clear that even after being subdued
Edwards continued to struggle against the straps of the restraint chair
providing no indication that he would stop fighting if he were released. Thus, 1
was reasonable for the Deputy Defendants to keep Edwards restrained for the
twenty-five minutes that elapsed between when he was placed into the chai
and when he suddenly became unresponsive in the holding cell. See Williams v
Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574-77 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding no constitutiona
violation where a disruptive inmate was gagged and placed in a restraint □□□□
for “twenty-eight and one-half hours, with brief intervals for eating, physica.
exercise, and toilet use”). It was also reasonable to leave Edwards’s arms
handcuffed behind his back, since any adjustment was likely to subject the
Deputy Defendants to further assault.!9 And, given the chaotic scene that
preceded Edwards’s placement into the chair. the Deputy Defendants may be
forgiven for not removing the taser barbs from his back before they managed to
strap him down, after which his back became inaccessible. Finally, some of the
actions Rodriguez-Bonilla points out—such as the Deputy Defendants’ failure

19 On this point, Rodriguez-Bonilla’s own use-of-force expert appears to agree,
stating that he would “defer . . . to [the deputies] on the scene” regarding whether
Edwards’s arms should have been left handcuffed behind his back or strapped into the
restraint chair, given his level of resistance. (Neely Dep., Doc. 140, at 90-91).

28

to have a nurse physically inspect Edwards in the restraint chair, or t
continuously observe him after he was placed in Holding Cell 9—are faciall:
insufficient to constitute excessive force, even if they amounted to violations o
internal jail policy. See Beck v. Beck, No. 2:12-cv—312-FtM—29SPC, 2012 WI
2792936, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 2012) (“A violation of a jail’s policies does no
amount to a violation of the Constitution.”).
That said, at least one action of the Deputy Defendants gives this Cour
significant pause: their decision to cover Edwards’s head with a spit mask anc
leave him in a holding cell for fifteen minutes without first removing the peppe:
spray from his face.
Considering the Kingsley factors once more, there was no ongoing reasor
to subject Edwards to the effects of the pepper spray once he was placed into the
restraint chair, even as he continued to struggle against the straps in vain. Anc
although Edwards’s presence in the chair may have prevented the Deputy
Defendants from giving him a full decontamination shower, they made no effort
to minimize the effects of the pepper spray by washing his face with water o1
even simply wiping it with paper towels, as some of the deputies were doing tc
their own faces after the scuffle. (See, e.g., Receiving 2 Video at 02:06:00).
Indeed, rather than minimizing the effects of the pepper spray, the Deputy
Defendants arguably exacerbated them, covering Edwards’s face with a spit

29

mask without any indication that he was actively spitting at the deputies. (Se
Wagner Dep. at 39; Zimmerman Dep. at 47; Fayson Dep. at 24).
Finally, although Rodriguez-Bonilla’s medical expert retracted his initia
statement that the pepper spray and spit mask played a role in Edwards’
death—which he attributed to “rhabdomyolysis,” (Schultz Dep. at 56-57)—a
least one medical expert maintains that the combination exacerbated Edwards’
“excited delirium” “[nJot only through pain, but also probably from fear,” (Adam:
Dep. at 15-16). There is at least some evidence, then, that the □□□□□□□
Defendants’ actions may have injured Edwards. See Patel, 969 F.3d at 1184 (“We
[do not] think the Kingsley Court meant to suggest that unforeseeable injurie:
can transform a reasonable application of force into an excessive one. But
resulting injuries can be an indicator, however imperfect, of the severity of the
force that caused them.” (citations omitted)).
Still, there are reasons to doubt that the Deputy Defendants’ failure tc
decontaminate Edwards’s face—irresponsible as it may have been—yrose to the
level of a constitutional violation, given the relatively short time in which
Edwards was subjected to the effects of the pepper spray and the lack of any
intelligible complaints. As the Eleventh Circuit has advised:
Whenever the force used against a pretrial detainee consists in his
subjection to hazardous conditions, the “amount of force used” is a
function of two component factors—(1) the severity of those
conditions and (2) the duration of his subjection to them. These two
considerations combine to create a sliding scale: The more severe

380

the conditions, the shorter the detention need be before it amounts
to excessive force—and vice versa.
Patel, 969 F.3d at 1188.
Here, there is very little information regarding the severity of the
conditions to which Edwards was subjected. Because the video footage is
obscured, for example, the Court cannot tell how much pepper spray was usec
or whether it was applied directly to Edwards’s face. And because there is nc
evidence that Edwards ever asked for his face to be decontaminated—however
unrealistic that may have been—the Court can only speculate about the amount
of pain it caused him above and beyond other sources. Indeed, the only evidence
that the pepper spray had any effect at all is the Deputy Defendants’ own
testimony that there was “spit” and “mucus” on Edwards’s face after the melee—
there were no reports of coughing, vomiting, or breathing problems, as one
might see after a heavy dose. And, finally, while common sense may suggest
that the addition of a spit mask would exacerbate the effects of pepper spray,
Rodriguez-Bonilla has presented no evidence that that is the case—or by how
much. A perforated spit mask, after all, is inherently designed to allow the
wearer to continue breathing.
The bottom line is this: the Court is certain that, had the identifiable
effects of the pepper spray been more severe, or had Edwards been subjected to
them for much longer than he was, Rodriguez-Bonilla might be able to show

3l

that the Deputy Defendants violated Edwards’s constitutional rights. But here
the severity of the lingering pepper spray was questionable, and Edwards wa:
subjected to it for less than half an hour, making it more difficult to □□□□□□□□
that there was a constitutional violation. Were this the end of the road
analytically speaking, the Court would be forced to grapple with this
uncertainty and make a definitive ruling regarding when and if the Deputy
Defendants’ actions crossed the line into unconstitutional territory. Ultimately.
however, the second prong of the sovereign immunity test forestalls the need for
such tortured analysis. Even if the Court were to conclude that the Deputy
Defendants violated Edwards’s constitutional rights in this case, Rodriguez:
Bonilla would still need to show that these rights were “clearly established’
when that violation occurred. See Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d
1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[D]iscussion of a constitutional violation may
become unnecessary for qualified immunity purposes when the right was not
clearly established. It is therefore not mandated that the Court examine the
potential constitutional violation under . . . step one prior to analyzing whether
the right was clearly established under step two.”) As explained below,
Rodriguez-Bonilla has not met that burden.
(c) Was That Right Clearly Established?
“The usual rule in a qualified-immunity case is that, in addition to proving
a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the law

32

underlying [her] claim was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the incident ir
question.” Patel, 969 F.3d at 1185. The purpose of this rule is to “ensure that
before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct is
unlawful.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20€
(2001)). Before Kingsley, there was an exception to this requirement for
excessive-force claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment based on the
simple fact that the old malicious-and-sadistic standard was “so extreme that
every conceivable set of circumstances in which this constitutional violation
occurs 1s clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution.” Fennell, 559
F.3d at 1217 (quoting Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002)).
After Kingsley, however, this exception no longer applies. Patel, 969 F.3d at
1183 (“[A]lthough the Johnson/Fennel exception continues to apply to Eighth
Amendment claims, we must abandon it as applied in the Fourteenth
Amendment context.”).
Now, as in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] right may be clearly
established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law
with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a
broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that
clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a
constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.”

33

Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2009). With respect to the first route, th
Eleventh Circuit has advised as follows:
For qualified immunity purposes, a pre-existing precedent is
materially similar to the circumstances facing the official when the
specific circumstances facing the official are enough like the facts in
the precedent that no reasonable, similarly situated official could
believe that the factual differences between the precedent and the
circumstances facing the official might make a difference to the
conclusion about whether the official's conduct was lawful or
unlawful, in the light of the precedent.
Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, “case law does not provide the necessary precedent, eithe
specifically or through broad principles, to clearly establish the right” asserte
on Edwards’s behalf. Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1299. Rodriguez-Bonilla, operatin
under the mistaken belief that “[t]here is no qualified immunity to claim
setting forth violations of a Plaintiffs right to be free from excessive force in th
custodial setting,” (Doc. 159 at 12), cites only a single case that could have pu
the Deputy Defendants on notice that their conduct was unlawful: Danley v
Allen, 540 F.3d 1298 (llth Cir. 2008). But the facts of that case are
distinguishable in a number of important ways.
In Danley, the plaintiff was brought to the jail following his arrest fo:
drunk driving. Id. at 1304. After asking the deputies several times to use the
restroom, the plaintiff was taken to a “small cell” with a “nasty” toilet in the
corner and “no toilet paper.” Id. The plaintiff used the toilet and exited the cel!

34

but continued to complain in colorful terms about the unsanitary conditions. Id
The deputy replied by telling the plaintiff “to watch his language, to shut up
and to get back into” the cell from which he had just emerged. Id. The plaintifi
responded that he was done using the toilet, but the deputy threatened tc
“spray” him if he did not comply. Jd. When the plaintiff asked what that meant
the deputy sprayed him with pepper spray “for three to five seconds,” pushed
him back into the “small, poorly ventilated” cell, and closed the door, leaving
him there for twenty minutes. Id. According to the plaintiff, the effects of the
pepper spray were so severe that he “began having trouble breathing, started tc
hyperventilate, screamed and cried to the three jailers that he could not breathe,
and begged to be let out.” Id. The deputies simply “laughed at [the plaintiff] and
made fun of him, . . . [holding] their hands to their necks in a ‘mock-chocking’
gesture.” Id.
After twenty minutes, the deputies removed the plaintiff from the cell and
allowed him to take a short, two-minute shower, which “did not permit him
adequate time for effective decontamination.” Id. The deputies then placed the
plaintiff in a group cell, where his eyes “swelled so badly that he could hardly
see” and his breathing became so labored that he “almost blacked out.” Id. at
1304-05. Even after his shower, the lingering pepper spray was apparently so
strong that the plaintiffs new cellmates complained about its effects on them.
Id. at 1304. All told, the plaintiff spent “twelve to thirteen hours” at the jail

385

without adequate decontamination or medical treatment, despite repeated pleas
for both. Id. at 1305.
Faced with these facts, the Eleventh Circuit held that the deputies ir
Danley had violated the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights.
acknowledging that “subjecting a prisoner to special confinement that causes
him to suffer increased effects of environmental conditions,” including lingering
pepper spray, “can constitute excessive force.” Jd. at 1808 (emphasis added). In
that case, the court concluded, “there was no need for the jailers to continue
using force after spraying him.” Jd. at 1309. Therefore, “[t]he use of force in the
form of extended confinement in the small, poorly ventilated, pepper spray-filled
cell, when there were other readily available alternatives, was excessive.” Id.
Danley is similar in kind to the case before this Court, but it is quite
different in degree. Unlike Edwards, the plaintiff in Danley posed no threat to
the deputies, either before or after he was pepper sprayed; he was not actively
resisting the deputies, and there was no reason to think that he might try to
harm them if they attempted to promptly decontaminate him. Moreover, the
effects of the pepper spray on the plaintiff in Danley were clearly quite severe,
and he communicated those effects consistently and coherently, leaving no
doubt that the pepper spray was continuing to cause him significant pain and
difficulty breathing. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the plaintiff in
Danley was subjected to the lingering effects of the pepper spray for a full

36

“twelve to thirteen hours” before he was released—incomparably longer tha
the roughly thirty minutes between when Edwards was sprayed and when k
became unresponsive in his cell. 20 Although the plaintiff in Danley—unlik
Kdwards—was given a shower after twenty minutes, that shower ws
ineffective, prolonging the plaintiffs exposure to the pepper spray far beyon
what Edwards experienced.
Ultimately, these factual distinctions are too significant for Danley t
have clearly established “either specifically or through broad principles” tha
the Deputy Defendants’ conduct violated Edwards’s constitutional rights. Lewis
561 F.3d at 1292. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “Danley certainly hold
that, under certain circumstances in a prison setting, an officer violates th
Fourteenth Amendment if he does not timely and adequatelh
decontaminate ...a prisoner who is suffering from the prolonged effects of ar
incapacitating chemical spray... . [But] Danley did not set out the minimun

20 The Court recognizes the seeming insensitivity in suggesting that if only
Edwards had protested more or lived longer, Rodriguez-Bonilla would be able tc
establish a claim for excessive force—especially when at least one medical expert
believes that the pepper spray itself may have contributed in some way to his death
But to suggest otherwise would be to base this Court’s ruling on an unknowable
counterfactual. Had his condition not deteriorated, the Court cannot say whether
Edwards would have continued to suffer from the effects of the pepper spray for five
minutes or for five hours. All the Court knows is that, on these facts, roughly thirty
minutes passed between the time Edwards was sprayed and the time he became
unresponsive. The Deputy Defendants were not put on notice by Danley that delaying
the decontamination of a combative inmate for less than half an hour would cross the
line into unconstitutional territory, especially when the true effects of the pepper spray
on Edwards are unknown.

37

decontamination procedures that the Constitution requires an officer tc
pursue.” J W ex rel. Williams, 904 F.3d at 1261. And although the Deputy
Defendants’ failure to decontaminate Edwards sooner is regrettable, it was not
under these circumstances, “so far beyond the hazy border between excessive
and acceptable force that [they] had to know [they were] violating the
Constitution even without caselaw on point.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199 (quoting
Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997).
Because their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional]
right, the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Rodriguez.
Bonilla’s claim of excessive force. Accordingly, the Deputy Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment will be granted as to Count I.
2. Deliberate Indifference (Count II)
In Count II, Rodriguez-Bonilla alleges that both the Deputy Defendants
and the Nurse Defendants violated another of Edwards’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights, this time by acting with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. Both sets of Defendants argue that even when construing
all factual disputes and reasonable inferences in her favor, Rodriguez-Bonilla
cannot establish that their actions (or inactions) violated Edwards’s
constitutional rights. The Court agrees.
(a) Deliberate Indifference Doctrine

388

The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Eighth Amendment in the pos
conviction context, prohibits government officials from acting with □□□□□□□□□
indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees. Goerbert v. Le
Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). To prove her deliberate-indifferenc
claim Rodriguez-Bonilla needs to show that: (1) Edwards had a “serious medic:
need;” (2) the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need; and (3) the
indifference caused Edwards’s injury. Id.
A medical need is “serious” enough to satisfy the first prong if: (a) the nee
is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or on
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity fo
a doctor's attention,” id. (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Regi Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3
1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994); or (b) “a delay in treating the need worsens th
condition.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 13807 (11th Cir. 2009). L
either case, “the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses :
substantial risk of serious harm.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir
2003).
As for the second prong, “[a] defendant is deliberately indifferent to ;
plaintiffs serious medical need when he ‘(1) ha[s] subjective knowledge of a ris]
of serious harm; (2) disregard[s] that risk: and (3) act[s] with more than gros:
negligence.” Patel, 969 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., 592 F.3¢
1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010)). Importantly, “deliberate indifference is not ¢

39

constitutionalized version of common-law negligence.” Hoffer v. Sec *y, Fla. Dep’
of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3¢
1276, 1288 (11th Cir. 2020)). The standard Rodriguez-Bonilla must meet □□
establish that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference “is far □□□□
onerous than normal tort-based standards of conduct sounding in negligence,
and is in fact akin to ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Id
(quoting Swain, 961 F.3d at 1288).21
Rodriguez-Bonilla divides her deliberate indifference claim into twc
distinct time periods: before Edwards’s altercation with Corporal Otto, and
after. The Court will address each in turn.
(1) Before the Altercation
With respect to the first time period, Rodriguez-Bonilla argues that
“Edwards’[s] behavior before and after his arrival at the jail... demonstrated
obvious signs and symptoms of mental illness, including agitation, anxiety|[,]
and paranoia.” (Doc. 159 at 19). But, “[i]nstead of being given a medical and

21 The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged some “tension within [its] precedent
regarding the minimum standard for culpability under the deliberate-indifference
standard,”—specifically, whether the required culpability should be stated as “more
than gross negligence,” or “more than mere negligence.” Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1270 n.Q.
But “[t]hese competing articulations—‘gross’ vs. ‘mere’ negligence—may well represent
a distinction without a difference because . . . the Supreme Court itself has likened the
deliberate-indifference standard to ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal
law.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1970)). “Accordingly, no
matter how serious the negligence, conduct that can't fairly be characterized as
reckless won't meet the Supreme Court's standard.” Jd.

40

mental health evaluation, [Edwards] was placed in holding cell 7, where h
waited for over thirty minutes.” (Id. at 18). “By failing to address Edwards's
mental health needs” as soon as he arrived at the jail, Rodriguez-Bonilla argues
“his psychological condition deteriorated to the point that it ultimately cause
the confrontation with the .. . deputies requiring the use of force.” Ud. at 19).2:
Even construing the facts in her favor, Rodriguez-Bonilla has no
established that any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Edwards’
serious medical needs before his altercation with Corporal Otto. Assuming tha
Edwards’s mental state at the time he entered the jail was dire enough t
constitute a serious medical need—something the Defendants do not appear t
challenge—Rodriguez-Bonilla has not shown that Deputy Wagner, Sergean
Zimmerman, or Nurse Nadeau knew that Edwards was at risk of serious harm
or that they disregarded that risk in a reckless manner.
As the Defendants point out, Edwards was calm and compliant when he
arrived at the jail, giving no indication that he was still in the midst of the
violent “psychotic episode” that led to his arrest. To the extent the Defendants
did know about Edwards’s mental condition, they were not “indifferent” to it
Instead, they acted on it, giving Edwards a red jumpsuit to indicate his

22 Rodriguez-Bonilla appears to direct this portion of her claim solely against
Deputy Wagner, Sergeant Zimmerman, and Nurse Nadeau—and with good reason:
Lieutenant Fayson, Nurse Robinson, and Nurse Jones were not present until □□□□□
Edwards’s altercation with Corporal Otto.

41

assignment to the mental health unit and placing him in a solitary holding cel
away from other inmates to await further processing—including a plannec
assessment by Nurse Nadeau. Although Rodriguez-Bonilla takes issue with the
fact that Edwards was forced to wait “for over thirty minutes” before he was
retrieved by Corporal Otto, (Doc. 159 at 18), such a short delay on a “quite busy’
day does not enter—let alone exceed—the bounds of gross negligence. Finally
Rodriguez-Bonilla has not shown that the Defendants’ actions (or inactions
somehow caused Edwards further injury. To the extent that she attempts to link
Kdwards’s booking holdup to his death—a dubious causal chain to begin with—
Rodriguez-Bonilla has presented no evidence that an earlier mental health
assessment would have prevented his altercation with Corporal Otto □□□□□□
than simply expedited it.
(it) After the Altercation
After Edwards’s altercation with the deputies, the problem shifted from
his mental health to his physical health. According to Rodriguez-Bonilla,
“Edwards [s] serious medical needs . . . were outwardly apparent and obvious”
once he was strapped into the restraint chair. (Doc. 159 at 22). Despite this, she
says, both sets of Defendants “offered such cursory assistance as to amount to
no treatment at all while knowing that such indifference posed a substantial
risk of harm.” (d.; Doc. 160 at 16). As specific evidence of the Defendants’
indifference, Rodriguez-Bonilla points to their failure to medically evaluate

42

Kdwards, their failure to continuously observe him after he was wheeled int
Holding Cell 9, and their failure to immediately call 911 once he □□□□□□
unresponsive.
Again, even construing the facts in Rodriguez-Bonilla’s favor, the □□□□□□
does not show that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Edwards’:
serious medical needs. First, while it is now apparent that Edwards’s healtl
deteriorated at some point after he was restrained, Rodriguez-Bonilla has
presented no evidence that any of the Defendants knew that he was at risk □□
serious harm during the fifteen minutes he spent in Holding Cell 9 before he
suddenly became unresponsive. To the contrary, every one of the Defendants
who observed Edwards during this time testified that he showed no signs □□
medical distress. (Nadeau Dep. at 33; Wagner Dep. at 42; Zimmerman Dep. at
42; Fayson Dep. at 41).23 Second, assuming for the sake of argument that a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the risk of serious harm to Edwards
was “obvious” following the various force techniques used against him, see
Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1827, the Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to

23 Although Rodriguez-Bonilla insists that Edwards was not continuously
observed after he was wheeled into Holding Cell 9, video footage shows that jail
personnel approached the cell window and evaluated his condition at four separate
times during the fifteen minutes he spent there. (See Receiving 2 Video at 02:15:52
(Deputy Wagner), 02:16:00 (Deputy Wagner and Nurse Nadeau), 02:18:00 (Lieutenant
Fayson); 02:22:30 (unidentified jail personnel)). Moreover, Sergeant Zimmerman
testified that he could see Edwards from his office and checked on him “frequently,
every couple minutes.” (Zimmerman Dep. at 44).

43

that risk—they monitored him regularly over the course of fifteen minutes, an
came to his aid as soon as his condition deteriorated.
While it would have been preferable for Nurse Nadeau to check Edwards’
vital signs as soon as he was strapped into the restraint chair, her choice to wai
until Edwards had calmed down did not amount to “more than gros:
negligence,” especially considering Edwards’s aggressive state and her initia
impression that he was not in medical distress. See id. (acknowledging tha
“[w]here the prisoner has suffered increased physical injury due to the delay [o
medical care],” the Eleventh Circuit has “consistently considered . . . the reasor
for the delay” in determining if a defendant acted with more than gross
negligence).24 Moreover, Rodriguez-Bonilla has provided no evidence that □□□□□□
Nadeau would have been able to detect that Edwards was suffering from a fata.
level of either “excited delirium” or “rhabdomyolysis,” or that recognizing
Edwards’s deteriorating condition fifteen minutes earlier would have made 2
difference in its outcome. In other words, Rodriguez-Bonilla has failed to show
that the Defendants’ delay had any causal connection to Edwards’s ultimate
injury.

24 Rodriguez-Bonilla makes much of the fact that jail policy “dictates that after
each use of force . . . the inmates will be examined by a member of the medical staff’
and placed under “continuous observation” for the next thirty minutes. Setting aside
the question whether this policy was followed here, a “failure to follow procedures does
not, by itself, rise to the level of deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a
form of negligence.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000).

44

Once Edwards became unresponsive, there was no doubt that he had -
serious medical need, and the risk of substantial injury to Edwards wa
obvious.2° Again, however, the Defendants were not deliberately indifferent t
this need—they acted on it, entering the holding cell, freeing Edwards from thi
restraint chair, and bringing Nurse Nadeau in to check his vital signs anc
administer oxygen. Rodriguez-Bonilla suggests that the Defendants shoulk
have called 911 immediately once Edwards became unresponsive—and in □□□□
sense she may be right. But the decision to allow Nurse Nadeau to evaluate
Edwards and to transport him to the jail’s own medical unit before callings
emergency services does not meet the “onerous” bar set to establish deliberate
indifference—especially given that Nurse Nadeau was actively treating
Edwards during this time and reported that he was both breathing and had =
pulse. See Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1278 (11th Cir.
2020) (“[P]rison officials do not act with deliberate indifference when they
provide medical treatment even if it is subpar... .” (quoting Lamb v. Norwood,
899 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2018))). Finally, although Rodriguez-Bonilla
argues that the Defendants’ failure to call 911 “directly caus[ed] [Edwards’s]

25 This appears to be the only portion of Rodriguez-Bonilla’s deliberate-
indifference claim for which Nurses Robinson and Jones could possibly be found liable.
Although they responded to the “all available” call given by Lieutenant Fayson during
Edwards's fight with the deputies, they were not assigned to booking and returned to
their own areas shortly after Edwards was wheeled into Holding Cell 9. Nurses
Robinson and Jones did not interact with Edwards again until they arrived with a
stretcher to take him to the medical unit.

45

medical condition to needlessly deteriorate,” she cites no evidence to suppor
this assertion. (Doc. 159 at 24).26
One last point: In her Response to the Armor Defendants’ Motior
Rodriguez-Bonilla appears to imply that Nurse Nadeau was deliberatel
indifferent to Edwards’s medical needs because she did not decontaminate th
pepper spray from his face, citing Danley for the proposition that “a jailer’
refusal to permit proper decontamination violates] a clearly established right.
(Doc. 160 at 17 (citing Danley, 540 F.3d at 1313)). Although Danley made clea
that prolonged exposure to pepper spray can create a serious medical need
there is scant evidence that Edwards’s exposure rose to that level. In Danley
for example, the Eleventh Circuit based its analysis on the plaintiffs allegation:
“that he had difficulty breathing, that his eyes burned and became so □□□□□□□
he could hardly see, and that more than twelve hours after he had been sprayec

*6 In her Response to the Armor Defendants’ Motion, Rodriguez-Bonilla does cite
(rather obliquely) an “Expert Witness Declaration” made by Nurse Ashley Taylor, the
charge nurse at the jail on the date of this incident. (Doc. 160 at 23). In hen
declaration—which was made to satisfy the pre-suit requirements for Rodriguez,
Bonilla’s state-law claims—Nurse Taylor states that the Nurse Defendants’ conduct
“delayed Edwards’s ability to receive timely emergency medical care [and] directly
caused Edwards’ medical condition to needlessly deteriorate.” (Taylor Decl., Doc. 161.
5, at 2). Notably, however, Nurse Taylor does not explain how she came to this
conclusion, and she stops short of stating that the Nurse Defendants’ conduct caused
Edwards’s actual death. Indeed, at the time Nurse Taylor wrote this declaration, it
was used to support Rodriguez-Bonilla’s contention that Edwards died due tc
“respiratory distress”—a theory of death that she has seemingly abandoned. (Id. at 1).
In any event, even if Nurse Taylor’s declaration were sufficient to create a triable issue
of fact on the question of causation, Rodriguez-Bonilla has failed to show that any of
the Defendants was deliberately indifferent to Edwards’s medical needs.

46

he nearly blacked out as a result of all his breathing problems,” Danley, 54
F.3d at 1311. Indeed, the court concluded in Danley that the plaintiffs “inabilit
to breathe and his bronchospasms essentially described an asthma attack
Danley, 540 F.3d at 1311. Here, by comparison, the only effect on Edward
readily attributable to the pepper spray was the mucus and saliva on his face.
Assuming that Edwards’s exposure to the pepper spray did constitute
serious medical need—and that Nurse Nadeau knew about the substantial ris
it posed to Edwards—the Court is not convinced that Nurse Nadeau’s failure t
decontaminate him for less than thirty minutes meets the more-than-gross
negligence standard, especially given that one “reason for the delay” wa
Edwards’s own aggressive behavior. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. Nurse Nadeaw’
conduct is certainly not comparable to that of the deputies in Danley, wh
allegedly mocked the plaintiffs cries for help, refused multiple requests fo
medical attention, and then left the plaintiff in lingering pepper spray for twelv
to thirteen hours after an inadequate decontamination shower. Danley, 540 □□□□
at 1304-05. Finally, to the extent Rodriguez-Bonilla is suggesting that Nurs
Nadeau’s failure to decontaminate Edwards caused his death, she has presentex
no evidence to support that theory. Indeed, Rodriguez-Bonilla’s own medica
expert retracted his original assessment that the pepper spray may hav
contributed to Edwards’s demise. (Schultz Dep. at 56-57).

A7

Ultimately, even after construing the evidence in Rodriguez-Bonilla’
favor, the Court cannot conclude that the Deputy Defendants or the Nurs¢
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Edwards’s serious medical needs it
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, both motions for summary
judgment will be granted as to Count II.
3. Derivative Claims (Counts IIJ-V)
In Counts III-V, Rodriguez-Bonilla brings a series of derivative claim:
against the Defendants based on their status as supervisors (Count ITI), thei
failure to intervene in an ongoing constitutional violation (Count IV), and, ir
the case of Sheriff Ivey and Armor, their responsibility for the policies, practices
or customs that gave rise to that violation (Count V). As noted supra, these
claims hinge on a determination that at least one of the Defendants actually
violated Edwards's clearly established constitutional rights. See Rooney v.
Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding no supervisory liability
where there was no underlying violation of clearly established constitutional
rights); Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (Plainly, an
officer cannot be liable for failing to stop or intervene when there was no
constitutional violation being committed.”); Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (“There can be no policy-based liability
or supervisory liability when there is no underlying constitutional violation.”);
Vielma v. Gruler, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1141 (M.D. Fla. 2018) ([A] Monell claim

48

is derivative of—and thus requires—an underlying constitutional violation.”
Because the Court has determined otherwise, both motions for summar
judgment will be granted as to Counts III, IV, and V.
4. State Law Claims (Counts VI-X)
In Count VI, Rodriguez-Bonilla brings a state-law negligence clair
against the Deputy Defendants, alleging that they breached their duty of car
towards Edwards by “wantonly and/or willfully disregarding [his] human right
and/or safety” during his time at the jail, ultimately resulting in his death. (Sec
Amend. Compl., Doc. 42, § 203). In her Response to the Sheriffs Offic
Defendants’ Motion for Summary J udgment, however, Rodriguez-Bonill:
concedes that she is no longer pursuing this claim. (Doc. 159 at 2). The Motior
will therefore be granted as to Count VI.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exerciss
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. See Carnegie
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in whick
all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors □□ □ wil
point toward declining to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.”): see also Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086.
1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any
remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed
prior to trial.”); Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F4th 863, 866 (11th Cir.

49

2022) (“A district court, exercising its already broad discretion, will rarely e
by declining supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims that supporte
its jurisdiction are dismissed.”). Accordingly, Counts VII, VIII, IX, and X will k
remanded to state court for further adjudication.
IV. CONCLUSION
The death of Gregory Lloyd Edwards was an unquestionable tragedy
And, at times, the Defendants’ actions may have fallen short of the hig
standards of conduct we expect from government officials charged wit.
holding—and protecting—pretrial detainees. But not every decision that migh
fail in hindsight to comport with the highest levels of prudence and □□□□□□□□□□
gives rise to a constitutional claim. In this case, Rodriguez-Bonilla has failed t
meet her heavy burden of showing that the Defendants violated Edwards’
clearly established constitutional rights. Whether they had some lower level o
culpability is a question better presented to the state court. Accordingly, it i
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1. The Armor Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 129
is GRANTED.
2. The Sheriffs Office Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgmen:
(Doc. 131) is GRANTED as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI. The Motion is
DENIED without prejudice as to Count VII.

50

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment providing th:
Rodriguez-Bonilla take nothing on Counts I, II, II, IV, V, and VI.
A, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court DECLINES
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims; Counts VI
VIII, IX, and X are therefore REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Elevent
Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Case No. 2020-02627:
CA-01.
5. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
6. After entry of judgment, the Clerk shall close the case.
—— th \
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, am March , 2023.
LO ff (
JOHN ANTOON II
United States District Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112560. Public record. Not legal advice.