# Carpezzi v. U.S. Department of Justice

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 27, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112494

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 27, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112494

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[r]ecords contained in CRS are exempt if they constitute law enforcement records within the meaning of the statute.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

ROBERT CHRISTOPHER CARPEZZI,

Plaintiff,

v.
Case No. 2:21-cv-180-JLB-KCD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,

Defendant.
_______________________________________/

ORDER

Plaintiff Robert Carpezzi, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against the
United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) to compel compliance with the
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (“FOIA”). (Doc. 49). The DOJ filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 63), which Mr. Carpezzi opposed (Doc. 65). The DOJ
filed a reply (Doc. 67) and Mr. Carpezzi filed a sur-reply (Doc. 69), which this Court
considered despite the fact that Mr. Carpezzi did not seek leave to file such sur-
reply. After careful review of the summary judgment record, the Court GRANTS
the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND1
In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Carpezzi claims that he seeks access
to the following: (1) “[a]ll records, including American Online (‘AOL’) investigation

into the illegal hacking and impersonation of [Mr. Carpezzi’s] rccarpezzi@aol.com
email address and the FBI’s investigation into the matter[;]” and (2) “complete
transcription of January 2016 conversation at FBI Headquarters in Denver.” (Doc.
49 at ¶ 2).
On November 23, 2015, Mr. Carpezzi wrote a letter to James Comey,
demanding $35,000,000 for the “impersonating of [his] email address and thwarting

any attempts for redress” and $1,750,000 for “all the other constitutional rights [he]
[has] tossed to the curb.” (Doc. 65-8 at 4).
On January 21, 2016, Mr. Carpezzi initiated an in-person complaint with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). (Doc. 65-2; Doc. 63-1 at ¶ 31). An FBI
Complaint form (“FD-71”) dated January 25, 2016, indicated that, among other
things, Mr. Carpezzi believes that his email was hacked by the government, that he
believes he is being followed by law enforcement, and that he complained about an

IRS audit. (Doc. 65-2 at 2).
On September 26, 2016, Mr. Carpezzi submitted a FOIA request to the FBI

1 This background is based on the Statement of Undisputed Facts in the DOJ’s
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 63 at 1–4) and the Statement of Undisputed
Facts in Mr. Carpezzi’s response (Doc. 65 at 2–3), with citations to the record where
available. Mr. Carpezzi stated that he agreed with the DOJ’s statement of
undisputed facts, but added additional facts, which the DOJ indicated were
irrelevant but did not dispute. (See Doc. 65 at 2; Doc. 67 at 3–4).
explaining that his email address was “hacked into by the government/police” and
that such hackers “took over [his] account [and] sent messages out to their
colleagues.” (Doc. 63-1 at 41). He indicated that he was “looking for all records,

including Aol’s investigation into the illegal hacking and impersonating of [his]
email address and the FBI’s investigation into the matter.” (Id.). On October 4,
2016, the FBI advised Mr. Carpezzi that his letter “did not contain sufficient
information to conduct an accurate search of the Central Records System.” (Id. at
44). That letter provided several blanks for Mr. Carpezzi to fill in and a space for
Mr. Carpezzi to provide any additional information that he thought would assist the

FBI with their search for records. (Id.). On October 24, 2016, Mr. Carpezzi
returned the letter, providing the requested information and certain additional
information. (Id. at 48). He also requested a transcription of the January 2016
conversation at FBI Headquarters. (Id. at 49).
On December 5, 2016, the FBI sent a letter to Mr. Carpezzi indicating, in
relevant part, that Mr. Carpezzi’s request was received at FBI Headquarters and
that they were searching the indices to the Central Records System (“CRS”) for

information responsive to the request. (Id. at 52). In a letter dated January 9,
2017, the FBI notified Mr. Carpezzi that it had reviewed and was releasing two
pages with certain information withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6),
(b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E). (Id. at 55).
On January 16, 2017, Mr. Carpezzi filed an administrative appeal with U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy (OIP), stating that the FBI’s
response “was so vague it shows they chose not to disclose the information
specifically requested.” (Id. at 59).
On January 31, 2017, OIP sent Mr. Carpezzi a letter, stating that they

construed his appeal as “limited to the adequacy of the FBI’s search for responsive
records” and affirmed the FBI’s action on his request. (Id. at 70). OIP also advised
Mr. Carpezzi of his right to “file a lawsuit in federal district court.” (Id. at 71).
On May 18, 2017, the FBI sent Mr. Carpezzi a letter indicating that his
complaint, which was directed to the DOJ, Office of the Inspector General, was
referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD),

FBI, and explained that the IIS/INSD is “the FBI entity responsible for
investigating allegations of misconduct or criminal activity on the part of FBI
employees.” (Doc. 65-4 at 2). The letter further informed Mr. Carpezzi that the
IIS/INSD reviewed the matter and determined that it does not warrant the opening
of an administrative inquiry. (Id.)
On January 15, 2018, Mr. Carpezzi wrote a letter to the FBI Director,
alleging the impersonation of his email address and his inability to hire an

attorney. (Doc. 65-5 at 2). And on June 11, 2019, Mr. Carpezzi wrote a similar
letter to the then-Attorney General. (Doc. 65-6 at 2). Mr. Carpezzi received a
response letter on June 11, 2019, letting him know that his letter was received and
would be reviewed. (Id. at 3).
On January 6, 2020, Mr. Carpezzi filed a complaint styled as Carpezzi v.
Untied States of America – U.S. Postal Service. See No. 2:20-cv-00005-JLB-MRM,
Doc. 1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2020). He filed an amended complaint on June 22, 2020, a
second amended complaint on March 5, 2021, and a third amended complaint on
April 4, 2021 (2:20-cv-00005 at Docs. 16, 47, 57). The final amended complaint in

that case, which alleged that the United States Postal Service was stealing or
refusing to deliver Mr. Carpezzi’s mail for political reasons, was dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on October 26, 2021. (See 2:20-cv-
00005 at Doc. 64).
On September 30, 2020, the FBI sent another letter to Mr. Carpezzi,
responding to his FOIA request and civil action. (Doc. 49-1 at 2; Doc. 63-1 at 73).

The letter stated that the FBI’s Record/Information Dissemination Section (“RIDS”)
conducted an additional search for records and identified “190” files, which are
FOIA administrative files, that were potentially responsive to Mr. Carpezzi’s
request. (Doc. 49-1 at 2; Doc. 63-1 at 73). The letter further stated that the FBI
“does not routinely process ‘190’ files, unless processing is specifically requested”
and instructed Mr. Carpezzi to notify RIDS in writing within thirty days from the
date of the letter if he desired to have these files processed. (Doc. 49-1 at 2; Doc. 63-

1 at 73). The letter specified that if RIDS did not hear from Mr. Carpezzi, it would
not process the records. (Doc. 49-1 at 2; Doc. 63-1 at 73).
Finally, on December 4, 2020, the FBI sent a letter to Mr. Carpezzi, stating
that because the FBI did not receive a response to their September 30, 2020 letter,
it was enclosing only the FBI’s initial release to the FOIA request, with Vaughn
coding and Bates numbers, along with an Explanation of Exemptions. (Doc. 63-1 at
75).
On March 6, 2021, Mr. Carpezzi filed the present lawsuit. (Doc. 1). Mr.
Carpezzi filed an amended complaint on October 8, 2021. (Doc. 23). After this

Court entered an order (Doc. 48) granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 24),
Mr. Carpezzi filed a second amended complaint on April 4, 2022 (Doc. 49). The DOJ
filed its answer on April 18, 2022. (Doc. 50).
Mr. Carpezzi claims that the DOJ is in violation of FOIA. (Doc. 49 at ¶ 6).
Mr. Carpezzi further alleges that he is being irreparably harmed because someone
(allegedly a “state sponsored actor”) illegally impersonated his AOL email address,

rccarpezzi@aol.com. (Id. at ¶ 7).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant can show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A district court must grant a motion for summary
judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc., 885 F.3d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 2018). An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all
of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light
of his burden of proof. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014).
And a fact is “material” if, “under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the
outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60
(11th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the material facts are undisputed and do not support a
reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment may be

properly granted as a matter of law.” DA Realty Holdings, LLC v. Tennessee Land
Consultants, LLC, 631 F. App’x 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Eleventh Circuit has found that “[g]enerally, FOIA cases should be
handled on motions for summary judgment, once the documents in issue are
properly identified.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S., 516 F.3d 1235,
1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miscavige v. I.R.S., 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993)).

“[I]n FOIA litigation, an agency has the burden of proving that it properly invoked
any FOIA exemptions when it decided to withhold information.” Id. at 1258 (citing
Ely v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d 1487, 1489–90 (11th Cir. 1986)). “To prevail on a FOIA
motion for summary judgment, ‘the defending agency must prove that each
document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is
unidentifiable, or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.’” Hooker
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 8:22-cv-956-CEH-MRM, 2023 WL 1929701, at *4

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2023) (quoting Goland v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 352
(D.C. Cir. 1978)).
ANALYSIS
The FOIA requires government agencies to disclose documents requested by
members of the public. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). “The basic purpose of FOIA is
to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society,
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed.” Hawkins v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 3:06-cv-00269-J-32TEM, 2005 WL
2063811, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Robbins Tire &

Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)). But “FOIA disclosure is not without limits.
It specifies nine exemptions from its general disclosure provisions.” Id. (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)). “These exemptions are designed to safeguard various public
interests against the harms that would arise from overbroad disclosure.” Id.
(citations and quotation marks omitted). In keeping with FOIA’s policy favoring
disclosure, however, FOIA’s “disclosure provisions are read broadly, its exemptions

narrowly.” Id. (citing Ely, 781 F.2d at 1489). “In a FOIA case, a district court
reviews an agency’s decision de novo and, if it finds that an exemption does not
apply, may order the agency to produce any improperly withheld document.” Id.
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). The determination of whether an exemption applies
is a matter of law. Id. (citing Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. United States Postal Serv.,
356 F.3d 588, 591 (4th Cir. 2004)).
I. The FBI’s search was reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive
documents.

The DOJ maintains that RIDS conducted searches reasonably calculated to
uncover all records that might be responsive to Mr. Carpezzi’s request through the
CRS. (Doc. 63 at 7). “To establish the adequacy of a search for responsive
documents, a government agency must show beyond a material doubt that it has
conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”
Broward Bulldog, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 939 F.3d 1164, 1176 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The agency may meet its burden by
“producing affidavits of responsible officials so long as the affidavits are relatively
detailed, nonconclusory, and submitted in good faith.” Id. (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Once the agency satisfies that burden, “then the burden shifts to
the requester to rebut the agency’s evidence by showing that the search was not
reasonable or was not conducted in good faith.” Id. (quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Because the standard is one of reasonableness, the Act does not require
an agency to exhaust all files which conceivably could contain relevant
information.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “a requester

cannot rebut a showing of an adequate search by arguing that he received only a
subset of the documents that he thought existed.” Id.
The Department of Justice satisfied its burden by submitting the Declaration
of Michael G. Seidel, who is the Chief of RIDS, is familiar with the procedures
followed by the FBI in responding to FOIA requests, and was aware of the FBI’s
handling of Mr. Carpezzi’s FOIA request. (Doc. 63-1 at 2–3). The Court finds that
Mr. Seidel’s declaration was “relatively detailed, nonconclusory, and submitted in

good faith.” See Broward Bulldog, Inc., 939 F.3d at 1176.
Mr. Seidel described the CRS as an “extensive system of records consisting of
applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files
compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling its mission and
integrated functions . . . .” (Doc. 63-1 at 7). He further explained that the CRS is
“indexed in a manner which meets the FBI’s investigative needs and priorities, and
allows FBI personnel to reasonably and adequately locate pertinent files in the
performance of their law enforcement duties.” (Id. at 8). He also described
Automated Case Support (“ACS”), which was an electronic, integrated case

management system designed to enable the FBI to locate, retrieve, and maintain
information in its files and the Universal Index (“UNI”). (Id. at 9). He explained
that the UNI was the automated index of the CRS searchable via ACS that provided
all offices of the FBI with a centralized, electronic means of indexing pertinent
investigative information into FBI files for future retrieval via index searching.
(Id.). Mr. Seidel explained that on August 1, 2018, the ACS case management

system was decommissioned and ACS data was migrated into Sentinel (which
became effective FBI-wide on July 1, 2012). (Id. at 10). Sentinel is the FBI’s next
generation case management system and retained the index search methodology
and function whereby the CRS is queried via Sentinel for pertinent index main or
reference entries in case files. (Id.).
Mr. Seidel described RIDS’s general search efforts when Mr. Carpezzi’s FOIA
request was submitted, which included conducting an index search via ACS/UNI

and, when records were reasonably expected to have been created on or after July 1,
2012, RIDS conducted an index search of Sentinel records to ensure that all
relevant data indexed after the implementation of Sentinel was captured. (Id. at
10–11). He then explained that a FOIA analyst must consider potentially
responsive indexed records against the specific parameters of individual requests,
and responsiveness determinations are made once indexed records are gathered,
analyzed, and sorted by FOIA analysts who then make informed “coping decisions
to determine the total pool of records responsive to an individual request.” (Id. at
11).

Following that, Mr. Seidel explained the adequacy of the search for Mr.
Carpezzi’s request. He explained:
In response to Plaintiff’s request, RIDS conducted a CRS
index search for potentially responsive records employing
the ACS/UNI and the Sentinel automated indices by
entering the following search terms: Carpezzi, Robert,
Christopher; Carpezzi, Robert, C; Carpezzi, Robert;
Carpezzi, R, Christopher; Carpezzi, Chris; Carpezzi, R, C;
Carpezzi, Christopher; Robert Christopher Carpezzi;
Robert C Carpezzi; Robert Carpezzi; R Christopher
Carpezzi; Chris Carpezzi; R C Carpezzi; and Christopher
Carpezzi.

(Doc. 63-1 at 11–12). Mr. Seidel also explained that because Mr. Carpezzi’s request
sought information about himself, such information would reasonably be expected to
appear in the CRS via the index search methodology. (Doc. 63-1 at 12). Moreover,
Mr. Seidel explained that because Mr. Carpezzi provided no information for RIDS to
reasonably conclude that records would reside outside the CRS and there was no
indication from the information located from the CRS index search efforts that
responsive records would reside in any other FBI system or location, there was no
basis for RIDS to conclude that a search elsewhere could reasonably be expected to
locate responsive material subject to the FOIA. (Doc. 63-1 at 12).
Moreover, Mr. Carpezzi fails to rebut the DOJ’s evidence that the FBI
conducted an adequate search. Indeed, Mr. Carpezzi does not challenge the
sufficiency of the CRS or the search terms that the FBI used. Instead, Mr. Carpezzi
accuses the DOJ of “purposely chang[ing] records searched.” (Doc. 65 at 6). Mr.
Carpezzi does not provide any evidence that such activity occurred, and his bare,
unsupported speculations do not create a genuine issue of material fact. See

Gadsby v. Am. Gold Corp. of Cal., 557 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We draw
all factual inference in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . But an
inference based on speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.”) (citation omitted).
Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Carpezzi requests that the FBI create a
complete transcript of his January 2016 conversation at FBI Headquarters in Dener
(see Doc. 65 at 5), the FBI is not obligated to create a transcript if one does not exist.

See Kissinger v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980)
(“[FOIA] does not obligate agencies to create or retain documents; it only obligates
them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and retained.”).
II. Although the DOJ met its burden of showing that the documents retrieved in
response to Mr. Carpezzi’s FOIA request could be exempted under 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j)(2), the Court will not grant summary judgment on this basis because
it is unclear whether the FBI withheld any information based on this
exemption.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) states that the head of an agency may promulgate rules
to “exempt any system of records within the agency” (with certain exceptions) if the
system of records “maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs
as its principal function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws,
including police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend
criminals.” The FBI has exercised that authority to exempt its Central Records
System from the individual access provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to its right
to waive the exemption where compliance does not “appear to interfere with or
adversely affect the overall law enforcement process.” See 28 C.F.R. § 16.96(a)(1).
“Records contained in CRS are exempt if they constitute law enforcement

records within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, the FBI bears the burden of
demonstrating a law enforcement purpose for each record as to which it has claimed
exemption in the case.” Majid v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 245 F. Supp. 3d 63,
70 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Doe v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 936 F.2d 1346, 1353
(D.C. Cir. 1991)). Records by a law enforcement agency must meet two criteria to
qualify as law enforcement records: (1) the agency’s investigatory activities giving

rise to the documents must relate to the enforcement of federal laws or to the
maintenance of national security; and (2) the nexus between the investigation and
one of the agency’s law enforcement duties must be based on “information sufficient
to support at least a colorable claim of its rationality.” Id. (citing Doe, 936 F.2d at
1353–54). “[A] reviewing court should be hesitant to second-guess a law
enforcement agency’s decision to investigate if there is a plausible basis for its
decision.” Doe, 936 F.2d at 1354–55. Once an agency meets both prongs of this test,

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence that “the asserted law
enforcement rationale for an investigation was in fact pretextual.” Majid, 245 F.
Supp. 3d at 70 (citing Doe, 936 F.2d at 1354). “If the plaintiff fails to rebut the
showing of law enforcement purpose, the agency is entitled to summary judgment.”
Doe, 936 F.2d at 1355.
Mr. Seidel’s declaration indicates that the investigatory records at issue were
identified through searches of the CRS and that these records were “compiled
during the FBI’s fulfillment of its law enforcement duties.” (Doc. 63-1 at 13).
Specifically, RIDS identified two documents: (1) an FBI Complaint form (“FD-71”)

dated January 25, 2016, documenting submission of a complaint by Mr. Carpezzi
alleging criminal activity; and (2) a letter from FBI personnel to state law
enforcement in response to a request for information as part of an investigation.
(Doc. 63-1 at 13–14). Mr. Seidel explains that the FBI creates an FD-71 during the
submission of a complaint of reported criminal activity, and therefore, the FD-71
was compiled to capture Mr. Carpezzi’s allegation of illegal activity and thus

compiled for law enforcement purposes. (Doc. 63-1 at 13). As to the letter in
response to the request for information, Mr. Seidel explains that the FBI responds
to official requests for information from law enforcement agencies “as part of its
duty to assist law enforcement.” (Doc. 63-1 at 14). The Court finds that the FBI’s
investigatory activities giving rise to both the FD-71 and the letter to state law
enforcement are related to the enforcement of federal laws and that the nexus
between the FBI’s investigation and its law enforcement duties is based on

information sufficient to support at least a colorable claim of their rationality—the
investigation related to the FD-71 was based on Mr. Carpezzi’s own complaint, and
the letter to state law enforcement was assisting state authorities in an ongoing
investigation. Accordingly, the DOJ meets its burden of demonstrating that these
documents fell under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2). See Majid, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 70
(explaining that “[r]ecords contained in CRS are exempt if they constitute law
enforcement records within the meaning of the statute.”).
Conversely, Mr. Carpezzi did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the
asserted law enforcement rationale for an investigation was pretextual. Indeed, Mr.

Carpezzi’s only argument on this point is that the “FBI had no right to consider any
claim under the Privacy Act” and that the DOJ “has had over 17 years to
manufacture evidence and file their own lawsuit against Plaintiff since placing him
on a target list in the early 2000’s.” (Doc. 65 at 5).
Notwithstanding this Court’s finding that the documents could have been
withheld in their entirety under the Privacy Act, Mr. Seidel confirmed that the FBI

still “reviewed the records under the access provisions of the FOIA to achieve
maximum disclosure.” (Doc. 63-1 at 13–14). Both the FD-71 and the letter to state
law enforcement, with redactions, are appended to Mr. Seidel’s declaration, as
redacted. Accordingly, because the FBI does not appear to have withheld any
information based on this exemption, the Court will not grant summary judgment
on this basis alone.
III. The FBI properly redacted names of law enforcement in the records pursuant
to FOIA Exemption 7(C).

5 U.S.C. § 552(b) contains various exemptions to FOIA. Two of these
exemptions are for “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (referred to as “Exemption 6”), and “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such
law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)
(referred to as “Exemption 7(C)’). “Exemption 6 has been held to cover all
information applying to a particular individual.” Stahlman v. U.S. Dep't of Just.,
No. 6:20-cv-733-WWB-EJK, 2021 WL 3176968, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2021)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). “Exemption 7(C) protects a broader range
of records.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Both Exemption 6 and
Exemption 7(C) require a balancing of the privacy interests of the individuals in not
having the records disclosed against the asserted public interest in disclosure.” Id.
(citations and quotation marks omitted). Importantly, “[w]here a court finds that a
withholding of documents meets the standard of Exception 7(C), it need not address
the more stringent ‘clearly unwarranted’ standard of Exemption 6.” Id. (citations
and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, because the Court finds that the FBI’s
redactions are properly exempted pursuant to Exemption 7(C), the Court shall not
address the Exemption 6 standard.
Mr. Seidel provides the following summary of information that the FBI
withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C):
LO ee) ee ee OL Oe we Orew edi.

Exemptions 6 & 7(C Unwarranted/Clearly Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy
b)(6)-1 and (b)(7)(C)-1 | Names of FBI Special Agents and Name of a Chief Division Counsel

(Doc. 63-1 at 15).
1. The records at issue were compiled for law enforcement purposes.
Exemption 7(C) requires the agency to show that the records at issue were

16

compiled for law enforcement purposes. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). As described in
Section I above, this Court has already found that both the FD-71 and the letter
between law enforcement, in response to a state law enforcement agency’s request

for information were compiled for a law enforcement purpose. Mr. Carpezzi,
however, cites two cases in support of his argument that the documents were not
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Each of these cases is readily
distinguishable.
First, in Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture,
398 F.2d 73, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Court analyzed the application of

Exemption 7 to an internal investigation by the USDA to determine whether
certain staff had engaged in racial discrimination and then found that
“investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes” must be given the same
meaning, whether the subject of the files is a government employee or an ordinary
private citizen. But the subject of the two files here are not internal audits by FBI
staff, making that case inapposite. Second, in American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, No. C 12-03728 SI, 2014 WL

4629110, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014), the Court found that although a
legitimate law enforcement purpose was established, the FBI failed to establish a
nexus between the documents at issue and that purpose. There, the only factual
information that the FBI provided was that the investigation involved “potential
criminal activity by protestors involved with the Occupy movement.” Am. Civ.
Liberties Union of N. Cal., 2014 WL 4629110, at *6 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). But, here, Mr. Seidel provides much more detail than just “potential
criminal activity”—he states that the complaint form “was compiled to document an
allegation of criminal activity filed by the Plaintiff” and that the letter to the state

law enforcement agency was “in response to a state law enforcement agency’s
request for information as part of an investigation.” (Doc. 63-1 at 16).
The Court finds that the DOJ has successfully established that the two
records at issue were compiled for law enforcement purposes, such that they meet
the threshold for Exemption 7(C).
ii. The records were properly redacted pursuant to Exemption 7(C).

Mr. Seidel explains that assignments of Special Agents to particular
investigations are not by choice, that publicity arising from a particular
investigation “may seriously prejudice their effectiveness in conducting
investigations and in performing day-to-day work,” that the publicity associated
with the release of a Special Agent’s identity in connection with a particular
investigation “could trigger hostility” towards the Special Agent, and that people
targeted in investigations “could seek to inflict violence on [a Special Agent] based

on his or her participation in the investigation.” (Doc. 63-1 at 19). On the other
hand, as Mr. Seidel points out, disclosure of the Special Agents’ identities would
serve no public interest because “their identities would not, themselves,
significantly increase the public’s understanding of the FBI’s operations and
activities.” (Id.). The Court agrees.
With respect to the name of a Chief Division Counsel, Mr. Seidel explains
that, similar to FBI Special Agents, the Chief Division Counsel “could be targeted
for reprisal based on his/her involvement in a specific investigation.” (Id. at 20).
Moreover, this CDC “was and possibly still is, in a position of access to information

regarding official law enforcement investigations, and therefore could become a
target of inquiries for unauthorized access to investigations if his/her identity were
released.” (Id.). Mr. Seidel avers that similarly to the release of Special Agents’
names, no public interest would be served by disclosing the identity of this Chief
Division Counsel to the public, because their identity would not increase the public’s
understanding of the FBI’s operations and activities. (Id.). The Court, again,

agrees.
Finally, with respect to the name of a State Law Enforcement Employee, Mr.
Seidel explains that the employee was “acting in their official capacity and aided the
FBI in the law enforcement investigative activities reflected in the records
responsive to Plaintiff’s request,” and that the rationale for protecting their identity
is similar to the rationale for protecting the identities of Special Agents and Chief
Division Counsel. (Id.). Thus, the Court finds that the interest in protecting the

State Law Enforcement Employee outweighs any public interest that might be
served by release of the identity because releasing the identity would not increase
the public’s understanding of the FBI’s operations and activities. (Id. at 20–21).
Balancing the private interest involved against the public interest (ensuring
an informed citizenry, checking against corruption, and holding the government
accountable, see Hawkins, 2005 WL 2063811, at *1), the Court finds that the
privacy interests of the identities of the FBI Special Agents, the Chief Division
Counsel, and the name of the State Law Enforcement Employee outweigh any
purported public interest that would be served by releasing their names.

Accordingly, requiring the FBI to release such names would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C). See Local 32B-
32J, Serv. Emps. Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 97 Civ. 8509
(LMM), 1998 WL 726000, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (“Courts have consistently
recognized the privacy interests of persons—both witnesses and investigate
agents—identified in agency documents. . . . [D]isclosure of the names of the law

enforcement personnel involved in an investigation could . . . lead to harassment
and could interfere with the performance of their duties.”) (citations omitted).
IV. The FBI properly redacted an FBI sensitive investigation file number and an
FBI database identifier under Exemption 7(E).

Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), FOIA does not apply to “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes” to the extent that production of such
information “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law.” The phrase “if such disclosure could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law” has been interpreted broadly. Broward
Bulldog, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-61735-CIV-ZLOCH, 2019 WL
13178390, at *30 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019). “Exemption 7(E) protects information
that would reveal facts about techniques or their usefulness that are not generally
known to the public, as well as other information when disclosure could reduce
effectiveness of such techniques.” Broward Bulldog, 939 F.3d at 1192. “An agency
must demonstrate only that release of a document might increase the risk that a

law will be violated or that past violators will escape legal consequences.” Jeanty v.
F.B.I., No. 13-20776-CIV, 2014 WL 4206700, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2014) (citing
Pub. Emps. For Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water
Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 2016 (D.C. Cir. 2014)) (quotation marks omitted).
The FBI cited Exemption 7(E) in supports of its redaction of two types of
information from the FD-71 complaint: FBI sensitive investigation file numbers and

FBI database identifiers. (Doc. 63-1 at 21–24).
With respect to the file number, Mr. Seidel explains that FBI file numbers
contain three components: (1) the CRS file classification number; (2) the
abbreviation of the FBI office of origin (“OO”) initiating the file; and (3) the assigned
individual case file number for that particular subject matter. (Doc. 63-1 at 7). Mr.
Seidel further explains that “[m]any of the FBI’s classification numbers are known
to the public, which makes disclosure of the non-public classification numbers even

more telling.” (Doc. 63-1 at 21–22). Additionally, according to Mr. Seidel, “releasing
non-public FBI file classification numbers would reveal critical information about
non-public investigative techniques and procedures, and provide criminals and
foreign adversaries with the ability to discern the types of highly sensitive
investigative strategies the FBI pursues whenever such file classification numbers
are present.” (Doc. 63-1 at 22). The second component, the two-letter office of origin
code also “provide[s] critical information about where and how the FBI detected
particular criminal behavior or national security threats, and reveal key pieces
about the FBI’s non-public investigations or intelligence or evidence gathering

sources and methods.” (Id.). Moreover, “[r]evealing this information could also
provide significant information about the FBI’s failure to detect certain types of
criminal behavior.” (Id.). Finally, with respect to the assigned string of numbers
for the particular subject matter under investigation, Mr. Seidel explains that
“[r]eleasing these singular file numbers would provide criminals and foreign
adversaries with a tracking mechanism by which they can place particular files, and

thus, investigations, within the context of larger FBI investigate efforts” and,
finally, that releasing all three components “would provide criminal and foreign
adversaries with an idea of how FBI investigations may be interrelated and,
potentially, when, why, and how the FBI pursues or pursued different
investigations.” (Id. at 22–23).
Mr. Carpezzi’s primary argument against summary judgment with respect to
the Exemption 7(E) redactions is that the FBI or the DOJ “purchased American

Online Source Codes allowing full access to spy on American emails before Edward
Snowden released information on the Prism program” and that the government
does not have “cart blanche to withhold ‘already disclosed law enforcement
techniques’ on the basis of their relation to an investigation.” (Doc. 65 at 9–10).
The Court does not see a connection between any AOL investigation and the
redacted file numbers. The Court finds that the DOJ has made an adequate
showing to support the redaction of this information. See Broward Bulldog, Inc.,
2019 WL 13178390, at *31 (finding that defendants made an adequate showing
where their reasoning for redacting file numbers included that file numbering

“identifies interests or priority” and provides information which could allow
suspects to “avoid detection, apprehension, or create alibis for suspected activities”).
With respect to the database identifier, Mr. Seidel indicates that revealing
the identity of this database (1) “would give criminal insight into the available tools
and resources the FBI uses to conduct criminal and national security investigation,”
(2) “would reveal the nature of its utility to FBI investigators,” and (3) “could

jeopardize the FBI’s investigative function by revealing exactly where the FBI
stores and from where it obtains valuable investigative data.” (Doc. 63-1 at 23–24).
For similar reasons as with the file numbers, the Court finds that the DOJ has
made an adequate showing to support the redaction of this information. See Kowal
v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. CV 18-2798 (TJK), 2021 WL 4476746, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept.
30, 2021) (finding that database identifiers were properly withheld because “[t]his
kind of technical information is regularly withheld under Exemption 7(E), and the

FBI has sufficiently explained the logic that justifies withholding it here”).
Consequently, the sensitive investigation file number and the database identifier
were properly redacted from the disclosed documents and withheld from disclosure.
-Remainder of page intentionally left blank-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the DOJ’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
63) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate
all other pending motions and deadlines and close the case.
ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida on March 27, 2023.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10112494. Public record. Not legal advice.