# Schneider

> District Court, M.D. Florida · November 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10111508

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** November 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10111508

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

IN RE THE COMPLAINT OF JAMES
SCHNEIDER, AS OWNER OF A 2005 34'
S2 YACHTS MOTOR VESSEL, IILN
SSUH4102G405, USCG OFFICIAL NO.
1267657, IN A CAUSE OF
EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY,

Petitioner.
Case No: 2:21-cv-549-JES-KCD

IN ADMIRALTY

________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of Allstate
Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, and Supporting
Memorandum of Law (Doc. #94) filed on September 22, 2022.
Petitioner James Schneider filed a Response in Opposition (Doc.
#95) on October 12, 2022, as did third-party defendant Robert Slade
(Doc. #96) on October 13, 2022.
This case involves the collision of two recreational vessels
in heavy fog while they were underway in the Gulf of Mexico off
the coast of Naples, Florida. One of the vessels, a 2005 34’ S2
YACHTS (Pursuit) Motor Vessel, HIN# SSUH4102G405, USCG Official
No. 1267657 – the “the Whiskey Tango Foxtrot” – was owned by
Petitioner James Schneider (Petitioner or Schneider). The second
vessel, a 2019 24’ Boston Whaler, HIN# BWCE1678A919 and Florida
Registration No. FL6069SM – the “Paradox” – was owned by Julie
Leonard (Leonard) and insured by Allstate Property and Casualty
Insurance Company (Allstate). Due to the collision, both vessels
suffered damage (Doc. #1, ¶ 8), and Leonard claims to have suffered

bodily injuries that are either permanent or continuing in nature.
(Doc. #12, ¶ 19.)
On July 20, 2021, Petitioner initiated this action seeking to
exonerate or limit his liability pursuant to Limitation of
Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (the Limitation Act)1. (Doc. #1.)
Leonard filed an Answer and affirmative defenses on August 19,
2021, claiming that Schneider’s negligence caused the collision
between the vessels. (Doc. #12.) Allstate then filed an Answer,
affirmative defenses, and a subrogated claim against Petitioner
for damages to the Leonard vessel resulting from the collision.2

(Doc. #21.) Leonard also filed a third-party complaint against

1 "A shipowner can assert its right to limitation of liability
in one of two ways. First, the shipowner can claim limitation by
pleading it as a defense in an answer to a claim in any court.
Alternatively, the shipowner can file a limitation of liability
proceeding in federal district court." Martinez v. Reynolds, No.
21-11084, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10035, at *15 (11th Cir. Apr. 14,
2022)(quoting El Paso Prod. GOM, Inc. v. Smith, 406 F. Supp. 2d
671, 675 (E.D. La. 2005)) (citations omitted).
2 Allstate seeks to recover $165,012.20 in property damages.
(Doc. #21, p. 11.)
Robert Slade (Slade), who was allegedly operating Petitioner’s
vessel at the time of the collision, for personal injury damages.
(Doc. #58.) Petitioner and Third-party Defendant Slade3 deny any
liability with respect to the collision.
Allstate moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that the

Limitation Act does not apply because of Schneider’s negligence,
and requests that this Court lift the stay so that Leonard and
Allstate may litigate personal injury and property damage claims
in state court. (Doc. #94, p. 2.) Petitioner and Slade argue there
are material facts in dispute which would preclude an entry of
summary judgment in this matter. (Docs. ##95, 96.) For the reasons
set forth below, the motion is denied.
I.
Motions for summary judgment should only be granted when the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, show “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex

3 Allstate’s motion is not directed against third-party
defendant Slade, however, Allstate argues that Slade was negligent
in the operation of the Petitioner’s vessel and that Petitioner
negligently entrusted the vessel to Slade. (Doc. #94.) Slade
therefore filed a Response to Allstate’s motion, arguing there are
disputed issues of fact as a reasonable fact-finder could find
that Slade was not negligent and the collision was solely due to
Leonard’s negligence. (Doc. #96, p. 3.)
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d
265 (1986). However, “[c]onclusory, uncorroborated allegations by
a plaintiff in an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue
of fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well supported summary
judgment motion.” Solliday v. Fed. Officers, 413 F. App'x 206,
207 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “An issue of fact is

‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Baby Buddies,
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).
A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). “A court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views

all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir.
2010). "If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising
from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary
judgment." St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken
Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee
Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir.
1983)). "If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could
draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference
introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should
not grant summary judgment." Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb
Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
II.

The material relevant facts (some of which are undisputed)
are as follows:
On February 8, 2021, Leonard was bringing her vessel (the
“Paradox”) back to her residence from Marine Max (the Marina) in
Naples, Florida, where it was being serviced. (Doc. #1, ¶ 10; Doc.
#94-1, pp. 13, 15.) When Leonard left the Marina (around 4:30
p.m.), she did not turn the vessel’s running lights on because it
was “clear and sunny.” (Doc. #94-1, pp. 18-20.) Leonard expected
to reach her home by sunset — around 6:20 p.m. (Id.) During
Leonard’s voyage home, a dense, heavy fog came about — there was
zero visibility, and it was getting darker. (Doc. #85-2, p. 10;

Doc. #80, p. 20; Doc. #94-1, p. 28.)
Schneider and Slade were aboard Schneider’s vessel (the
“Whiskey Tango Foxtrot”); both men were going north to Naples to
fish from a spot Schneider had selected. (Doc. #94-2, pp. 14-15.)
Slade was operating Schneider’s vessel for the first time.4 (Id.,

4 Although this was Slade’s first time operating the Whiskey
Tango Foxtrot, Slade had experience operating several vessels that
p. 15.) Slade had one beer on the vessel before lunch and one
beer at lunch, while Schneider just had one beer several hours
before the accident, which did not occur until between 5:30 p.m.
and 6:30 p.m. (Id., pp. 16, 23; Doc. #85-2, pp. 22-23; Doc. #85-
3, pp. 23-24.)
The remaining facts about what occurred prior to and during

the collision between Leonard and Schneider’s vessels are heavily
disputed. Leonard claims that her average speed on the way home
was under 20 mph, and that she was going 5 to 6 mph at the time of
the collision between her and Schneider’s vessels. (Doc. #94-1,
pp. 20-21, 28.) Due to the fog, Leonard turned on her running
lights, wrapped a bungee cord (safety lanyard) from the motor
around her hand, put on a life jacket, and sounded her vessel’s
horn as much as she could (but not every two minutes).5 (Id., pp.
29-30, 39.)
In contrast, Schneider and Slade allege that Leonard did not

slow her vessel down prior to the collision – GPS data shows that

he owned, including a 22’ Pontoon boat with 110 horsepower and a
19’ Mastercraft with 260 horsepower. (Doc. #85-2, pp. 11-12.)
Schneider and Slade boated together before in the Great Lakes.
(Doc. #80, p. 56.) Slade did not have a Florida boating safety
identification because Florida law does not require it for people
born before January 1, 1988. (Doc. #85-2, p. 5.)
5 Leonard alleges that she was familiar with a “boating
requirement” to sound a vessel’s horn every two minutes when in
fog. (Doc. #94-1, pp. 30-31.)
Leonard’s vessel was traveling at 29 mph at the time of the
collision, and that Leonard’s vessel was moving at that rate of
speed, and up to 35 mph, in the six minutes before the collision.
(Doc. #80, p. 21; Doc. #85-1, pp. 2-3.) Schneider recalled that
the running lights on Leonard’s vessel were not on prior to the
collision, and that Leonard did not wrap the safety lanyard around

her arm because her vessel kept running in circles after the
collision. (Doc. #80, pp. 35, 39, 41.) Leonard also failed to sound
her fog horn when she observed Schneider’s vessel. (Doc. #94-1, p.
73.)
Leonard alleges that she saw Schneider’s vessel about a
hundred feet away; the two vessels were in a direct, head-on
collision course. Leonard saw a man was standing outside the
center console. (Id., pp. 45-46, 49.) Leonard did not have time to
reduce the speed of her vessel before the collision because she
was trying to get out of the way. (Id., p. 50.) Leonard believes
that Schneider’s vessel was going faster than her vessel. (Id., p.

66.) Upon impact of the two vessels, Leonard was knocked
unconscious and does not recall her vessel going in circles or
there being a second impact with Schneider’s vessel. (Id., pp.
51, 56.) Leonard did not recall seeing running lights on
Schneider’s vessel before impact. (Id., p. 63.) Following the
collision, Leonard boarded Schneider’s vessel and alleges that
Schneider and Slade smelled of alcohol. (Doc. #94-1, p. 95.)
Schneider and Slade, on the other hand, state that right
before the collision the two vessels were not headed directly
towards one another – Schneider’s vessel was heading due south
while Leonard’s vessel was heading north to northeasterly. (Doc.
#80, pp. 20, 22.) Schneider’s vessel was traveling less than 10
mph at the time of the collision. Schneider, who was acting as a

“spotter,” saw Leonard’s vessel about three seconds before the
collision. (Doc. #85, pp. 13-14; Doc. #94-2, pp. 16-18, 20.)
Schneider yelled “boat, boat, boat,” but Slade did not have time
to turn the vessel and avoid the collision because Leonard was
“going too fast” and there was “zero visibility.”6 (Doc. #80, pp.
20, 29; Doc. #94-2, p. 20; Doc. #95-2, pp. 12-13.) Schneider claims
that his vessel’s navigational lights were turned on at the time
of the collision because he had set up all the lights while Slade
was operating the vessel. (Doc. #80, p. 20; Doc. #85-2, p. 11.)
Schneider and Slade deny that there is any evidence showing they

were intoxicated at the time of the collision. According to both
men, Leonard asked them not to call 911, and she did not call the
police. (Doc. #94-1, p. 100.)

6 Slade testified that he was familiar with the navigational
rule which applies when two vessels are approaching each other in
close proximity, and requires turning the vessel “starboard.”
(Doc. #85-2, p. 13.)
III.
A. The Limitation Act
The Limitation Act (the Act) "limits a vessel owner's
liability for any damages arising from a maritime accident to the
value of the vessel and its freight, provided that the accident
occurred without such owner's 'privity or knowledge.'"7 Beiswenger

Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1996);
In re Phillips, No. 2:19-CV-14070, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109130,
at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2020). Specifically, the Act provides
that the shipowner's liability "shall not exceed the value of the
vessel and pending freight," at least for certain claims. 46 U.S.C.
§ 30505(a); see also Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918
F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021). Qualifying claims are "those
arising from any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any
property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel,
any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or

thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,
without the privity or knowledge of the owner." Id. § 30505(b).

7 Federal courts are vested with exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner may have limited
liability under the Limitation Act. Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1036.
See also Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060,
1063 (11th Cir. 1996)("A vessel owner's claim to limited liability
must be adjudicated exclusively in the admiralty court, which sits
without a jury.").
“[T]he Act functions by ‘limiting the physically remote
shipowner's vicarious liability for the negligence of his or her
water-borne servants.’" Freedom Unlimited v. Taylor Lane Yacht &
Ship, LLC, No. 20-11102, 2021 WL 3629904, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
24524, at *7-8 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2021) (quoting Suzuki of Orange
Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1064).

In a proceeding under the Limitation Act, maritime torts are
reviewed under a two-step analysis. First, the court "determine[s]
what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused
the accident." Martinez v. Reynolds, 2022 WL 1113001, 2022 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10035, at *16 (quoting Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United
States, 273 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotations
omitted)). Liability is established only where the vessel owner's
negligent acts were "a contributory and proximate cause of the
accident." Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Fla., 768
F.2d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs of the
Port of New Orleans v. M/V Farmsum, 574 F.2d 289, 297 (5th

Cir.1978)). If the shipowner is free from any contributory fault,
he is exonerated from all liability. See Am. Dredging Co. v.
Lambert, 81 F.3d 127, 129 (11th Cir. 1996).
If negligence was at least partly what produced the accident,
the court proceeds to the second step and determines whether the
vessel owner had knowledge of or was in privity with the acts of
negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness. Martinez, 2022 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10035, at *16 (citing Tug Allie-B, Inc., 273 F.3d at
944). "The damage claimants bear the initial burden of establishing
liability (i.e., negligence or unseaworthiness), and the shipowner
then bears the burden of establishing the lack of privity or
knowledge." In re Phillips, 2020 WL 3315994, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
109130, at *10 (quoting Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86

F.3d 1060, 1062-63 (11th Cir. 1996)). If there is liability, but
the vessel owner is entitled to limitation of liability, the "court
oversees the distribution of the limitation fund among the damage
claimants." Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1063.
IV.
A. Negligence or Unseaworthiness
As the Court previously mentioned, “[t]he first step in
determining a shipowner's entitlement to limitation of liability
is to establish what acts of negligence or conditions of
unseaworthiness caused the accident.” Hercules Carriers, Inc., 768
F.2d at 1565. Allstate bears the initial burden of proving such

negligence or unseaworthiness. Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86
F.3d at 1063.
"Establishing negligence under either maritime or common law
requires proving the same elements." In re Royal Caribbean Cruises
Ltd., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1182 (S.D. Fla. 2013). "To prevail in
a negligence action, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the
defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff; (2)
that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the breach was the
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff; and (4) that the
plaintiff suffered damages." Hasenfus v. Secord, 962 F.2d 1556,
1559-60 (11th Cir. 1992).
In their Answer, Allstate asserts that Schneider breached the
duties owed in the operation of his vessel by (1) failing to

maintain a proper lookout; (2) failing to proceed at a safe speed
in reduced visibility caused by dense fog; (3) failing to sound
his vessel’s horn every two minutes (4) turning his vessel Port
(right) rather than starboard; (5) failing to take action to avoid
the collision; (5) failing to supervise and guide Slade’s actions;
and (6) failing to sound the danger signal (five short whistle
blasts) upon observing Leonard’s vessel. (Doc. #21, pp. 10-11.)
Allstate argues that as a direct and proximate result of
Schneider’s negligence, the collision between the two vessels
occurred and Leonard (and Allstate, as subrogee) suffered property
damages. (Id., p. 11.)

While the Court agrees that the aforementioned facts may serve
as a basis for Schneider’s negligence and the proximate cause of
the collision and damages, there are numerous material facts in
dispute as to vessel speed, lighting, and pre-collision maneuvers
that preclude such a finding as a matter of law. There is also
ample contradictory evidence demonstrating that Leonard’s actions
– the speed at which she was traveling, whether her vessels’ lights
were on, the lack of use of a foghorn, and the direction of her
vessel – may have been negligent, and thus, the proximate cause
for the collision between the vessels. Viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to Petitioner, the Court finds that the record
shows that a genuine dispute of fact exists over whether Schneider
was negligent and whether he was the proximate cause of the

collision between the vessels.
B. Lack of Privity or Knowledge
The Eleventh Circuit explained that "consistent with the
statutory purpose to protect innocent investors, 'privity or
knowledge' generally refers to the vessel owner's personal
participation in, or actual knowledge of, the specific acts of
negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness which caused or
contributed to the accident." Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d
at 1064. "The shipowner's privity or knowledge is not measured
against every fact or act regarding the accident; rather, privity
or knowledge is measured against the specific negligent acts or

unseaworthy conditions that actually caused or contributed to the
accident." Id. "[K]nowledge is not only what the shipowner knows
but what he is charged with discovering in order to apprise himself
of conditions likely to produce or contribute to a loss." Hercules
Carriers, Inc., 768 F.2d at 1564.
Allstate argues that the record clearly shows Schneider had
knowledge and privity of the negligent operation of his vessel
because Schneider not only negligently entrusted the operation of
his vessel to Slade, he participated in the negligent operation of
his vessel as well.8 (Doc. #94, p. 19.)
“There can be no ‘privity or knowledge’ unless the claimant
can establish negligence.” ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. v. ROYAL

CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1372 (S.D. Fla.
1999)(citing Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th

8 To the extent Allstate is arguing pursuant to Fecht v.
Makowski, 406 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1969), that limitation of
liability cannot be granted because it is otherwise impossible
under any circumstances for Schneider to demonstrate the absence
of privity or knowledge since Schneider was on his vessel at the
time of the collision (Doc. #94, pp. 11-13, 20), the Court does
not agree. The Eleventh Circuit cautioned district courts from
applying Fecht’s reasoning too strictly and stated that “[t]he
owner's presence [on a vessel] is not necessarily fatal to his
right to limit if the evidence suggests that his conduct was in
all respects prudent.'" Petition of M/V Sunshine, II, 808 F.2d
762, 763 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit went on to conclude
that:
In short, in most circumstances negligence in operation
will be sufficiently connected to the owner on board his
own small vessel and operating it that he will be found
to have privity or knowledge, but this common sense
recognition of how the facts will usually work out is
not an ineluctable doctrine to be applied at the pleading
stage, on conclusory and disputed allegations, as a
substitute for the knowledge necessary to lead a court
to rational decision. The "owner at the helm" doctrine
is a useful tool directed toward proper decision and not
a talisman.
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there are many disputed
material facts that preclude the Court from concluding that
Schneider’s presence on the vessel at the time of collision makes
it impossible for Schneider to demonstrate the absence of privity
or knowledge.
Cir. 1976)). Because a genuine dispute of fact exists over whether
Schneider was negligent in operating his vessel and whether his
negligence was the proximate cause of the vessel collision, the
Court is unable to reach a determination of whether Schneider
personally participated in or had actual knowledge of negligence.
See Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1064. Thus, the Court
cannot conclude as a matter of law that “it is impossible under
any set of circumstances for [Petitioner] to establish his lack of
privity or knowledge” which would necessitate the limitation
action be dismissed, and that Leonard and Allstate should be
allowed to try liability and damages issues in state court. Id.
The Court therefore denies Allstate’s motion on this basis.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, and
Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. #94) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 22nd day of
November, 2022.

0 x
off | 0 hy Akiel
JGHN E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Parties of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10111508. Public record. Not legal advice.