# Ford v. Antonides

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 26, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10111284

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 26, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10111284

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of section 1983 complaint because the plaintiff’s “state criminal proceeding is ongoing, implicates and important state interest, and will provide an adequate opportunity for [Plaintiff] to raise constitutional challenges”
- noting that so- called “sovereign citizens” are individuals who believe they are not subject to courts’ jurisdiction and that courts have summarily rejected their legal theories as frivolous

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

TYREE FORD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-384-JES-KCD

KARA ANTONIDES, YESENIA
CASTRO, YALINA RODRIGUEZ,
AND KEVIN KARNES,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Tyree Ford (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial detainee at the Lee
County Jail, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff generally
alleges that he was unlawfully arrested after a traffic stop, was
not allowed to see a judicial officer upon demand, and has been
unlawfully charged with twenty felonies. Because Plaintiff
proceeds in forma pauperis (Doc. 7), his complaint is before the
Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
After careful consideration of Plaintiff’s allegations, the
Court dismisses his complaint as frivolous and for failure to state
a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
(i), (ii).
I. Complaint
On February 25, 2022, Plaintiff was traveling on Cape Coral
Parkway in Cape Coral, Florida. (Doc. 1 at 6). The tags on his
car “clearly displayed” that he was a “Traveler – not for hire.

Private Property.” (Id.) Nevertheless, he was pulled over by
defendant police officer Kara Antonides, who approached his window
and requested Plaintiff’s driver’s license. (Id.) Plaintiff
informed Defendant Antonides that he was a “traveler.” (Id.)
Defendant Antonides called for backup, and the police forced
Plaintiff out of his car. (Id.) The police continued to demand
a drivers license, and Plaintiff “continued to inform them that
[he] was a traveler, and [he] stated that [he] was a citizen of
the republic of the United States of America.” (Id.) The police
then arrested Plaintiff, “hypothecating [his] name and making
[him] a citizen of the U.S. Corporation.” (Id.)
After posting bond, Plaintiff went to the Clerk of Court’s

Office, “to invoke [his] jurisdiction and due process.” (Doc. 1
at 6). Defendant Yesenia Castro told Plaintiff that he “couldn’t
see a judge and nobody could see [him].” (Id.) Defendant
Castro’s supervisor, Defendant Yolanda Rodriguez, told him the
same and refused to bring Plaintiff before a judge. (Id.) When
Plaintiff asked to see Defendant Kevin Karnes, they told him that
he was unavailable and would not see him. (Id.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff left the Clerk’s Office, but sent
Defendants Castro and Rodriguez and non-defendant Linda Dogget a
“jurisdictional challenge” by notary presentment. (Doc. 1 at 7).

However, it was dishonored. (Id.) The Clerk’s office then issued
Plaintiff a certificate of non-response, a certificate of non-
performance, a certificate of default, and a certificate of
service. (Id.) He asserts that these “were all presented to
[him] by a notary which I recorded with the clerk of courts.”
(Id.) Plaintiff asserts that when he “went to record it in the
official records, they altered them and retaliated by issuing 20
capias warrants and charging me with 20 felonies.” (Id.)
Plaintiff now seeks to place Defendant Kara Antonides under
citizen’s arrest for an unlawful traffic stop and official
misconduct. (Doc. 1 at 8) He also seeks two million dollars for
loss of wages and psychological damages. (Id.)
II. Legal Standards
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A federal district court is required to review a civil
complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint
that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the
section provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that--
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal-
(i) is frivolous or
malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be
granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who
is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is
frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the
defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a
right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition,
where an affirmative defense would defeat a claim, it may be
dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd.,
915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted” has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of
section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards
in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”) That
is, although a complaint need not provide detailed factual

allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough facts
to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
In making the above determinations, all factual allegations
(as opposed to legal conclusions) in the complaint are viewed as
true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations
in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Therefore, to state a claim under section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such
deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb
County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). Additionally, where
a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on one who is not an active
participant in the alleged constitutional deprivation, that
plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional
deprivation. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th
Cir. 1982).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant
Kara Antonides.
Plaintiff does not explain how Defendant Antonides’ stop of
his car violated his civil rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Even self-represented plaintiffs are required to
allege sufficient facts to support their claims, and the Court
will not assume facts that are not alleged. See GJR Investments,

Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not
give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or
to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action[.]” (internal citations omitted)).
Instead of alleging facts showing that the stop of his car
was somehow improper (leading to a claim for false arrest or false
imprisonment), Plaintiff bases his claims against Defendant
Antonides on an argument that he was immune from the traffic stop
she initiated (and that eventually led to his arrest) because he
displayed a sign on his car informing her that he was a “Traveler

– Not for hire. Private Property.” (Doc. 1 at 6). This argument
is similar to those espoused by self-proclaimed “sovereign
citizens,” as explained in a 2019 law review article:
The most common type of Sovereign Citizen claim
encountered by local and state police, as well as federal
border patrol agents, is the “right to travel.” Citing
the Constitution, Supreme Court cases, and a plethora of
other sources, Sovereign Citizens believe they are not
required to have driver's licenses, license plates,
vehicle registration, or to stop at border or sobriety
checkpoints. Similar to other claims, Sovereign
Citizens discussing the “right to travel” place special
emphasis on the words being used. They differentiate
between a driver and a traveler; an automobile and a
motor vehicle; commercial and non-commercial; and public
versus private conveyances. Once a Sovereign Citizen
claims that he or she is merely a traveler or traveling,
he or she then uses federal and state cases to support
the “right to travel.” Sovereign Citizens also believe
the right to travel constitutes a complete bar on
government interference with travel in the absence of
probable cause or evidence that a victim has been harmed.

Caesar Kalinowski, IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen
Movement, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 167–68 (2019) (citations omitted).
These types of claims—that a plaintiff is entitled to different
treatment as a “sovereign citizen”—are routinely rejected by
federal courts as frivolous. See, e.g., United States v.
Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that so-
called “sovereign citizens” are individuals who believe they are
not subject to courts’ jurisdiction and that courts have summarily
rejected their legal theories as frivolous); United States v.
Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761-67 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the
conduct of a “sovereign citizen” and collecting cases rejecting
the group's claims as frivolous, and recommending that “sovereign
citizen” arguments “be rejected summarily, however they are
presented.”); Reed v. Jones, No. 4:21CV3051, 2021 WL 2913023, at
*3 (D. Neb. July 12, 2021) (“sovereign citizen” argument that

motor-vehicle registration and licensing laws do not apply to
plaintiff rejected as frivolous); Trevino v. Florida, 687 F. App’x
861, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of
1983 action based on sovereign citizens as frivolous and noting
that if those theories challenged the conviction, habeas was the
proper avenue of relief).
Nothing alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint even remotely
suggests that he is entitled to relief against Defendant Antonides
under recognized theories of relief. And, as noted, Plaintiff’s
sovereign citizen argument has been soundly rejected by federal
courts. Accordingly, all claims against Defendant Antonides are
dismissed from this action as frivolous and for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
B. Plaintiff does not state claims against Defendants
Yesenia Castro, Yalina Rodriguez, or Kevin Karnes.
Again, it is unclear the theory of relief Plaintiff asserts
against Defendants Castro, Rodriguez, and Karnes—all employees of
the Clerk of Court in Lee County. To the extent Plaintiff argues
that any of these defendants violated his rights to due process by
not immediately bringing him in front of a judge upon demand, the
complaint is completely without merit. To be clear, Plaintiff has
a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to be heard on the charges that were filed against him as a result

of the traffic stop. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976)(“The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” (quotation omitted)). However, nothing in the
Constitution suggests that a defendant is entitled to an immediate
appearance before a judicial officer upon demand or that a state
employee’s refusal to acquiesce to that demand subjects that
employee to civil liability. And by complaining that he was
issued certificates of non-response, non-performance, default, and
service by the clerk’s office, Plaintiff acknowledges that he did
not appear before a judge in state court when provided the
opportunity to do so. (Doc. 1 at 7).

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that the Clerk’s employees were
responsible for “charging him with 20 felonies” is illogical. The
state prosecutor, not employees of the clerk’s office are
responsible for filing charges against a defendant. See State v.
Greaux, 977 So. 2d 614 (Fla 4th DCA 2008) (“The prosecutor has the
sole discretion to charge and prosecute criminal acts.”). And to
the extent Plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully charged by
anyone, the Younger abstention doctrine prohibits federal courts
from interfering (through a section 1983 complaint) in a
plaintiff’s pending state criminal proceedings. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger and its progeny, federal
courts must abstain from interfering with an ongoing state criminal

proceeding when it implicates important state interests and there
is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise
constitutional challenges. See Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d
1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Considering whether Plaintiff has
been wrongfully charged would significantly interfere with his
pending state criminal proceedings. Moreover, the state courts
provide an adequate forum for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims,
and he has not alleged that any extraordinary circumstances exist
to justify this Court’s interference with his ongoing prosecution.
See Boyd v. Georgia, 512 F. App’x 915, 918 (11th Cir. 2013)
(affirming dismissal of section 1983 complaint because the
plaintiff’s “state criminal proceeding is ongoing, implicates and

important state interest, and will provide an adequate opportunity
for [Plaintiff] to raise constitutional challenges”); Turner v.
Broward Sheriff’s Office, 542 F. App’x 764, 766–67 (11th Cir. 2013)
(finding that abstention was appropriate in a section 1983 case
where plaintiff alleged false arrest because the plaintiff’s
“state criminal proceedings commenced prior to his filing a
complaint”).1

1 Generally, a district court will consider staying, rather
than dismissing, premature section 1983 claims. See Deakins v.
Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted against Defendants Castro, Rodriguez, or Karnes, and these
defendants must be dismissed from this complaint. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. Conclusion
The Court finds that all named defendants are dismissed from
this action for failure to state a claim against them on which
relief may be granted. With no remaining claims or defendants,
this action is dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, any claim that
challenges Plaintiff’s ongoing state criminal case is subject to
dismissal under Younger. Therefore, it is apparent from
Plaintiff’s pleadings that granting leave to amend would be futile.
Mitchell v. Thompson, 564 F. App’x 452, 456 (11th Cir. 2014)
(affirming denial of pro se plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
based on futility of amendment).

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is DISMISSED as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which

Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 198 (1988) (holding that district courts
should stay federal claims for monetary relief when abstaining
from a parallel state proceeding). However, other reasons provide
cause to dismiss this case as frivolous and for failure to state
a claim on which relief may be granted. See discussion infra.
Accordingly, the Court will not stay the case pending resolution
of Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings.
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (i),
(ii).
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending
motions, close this case, and enter judgment
accordingly.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 26, 2022.

—_— ~ (2. _ f
AA) Pe,
JGHH E. STEELE
3 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTIMP-2
Copies to: Tyree Ford

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10111284. Public record. Not legal advice.