# Frederick v. Thompkins

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 15, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110287

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 15, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110287

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the dereliction of duty to be disturbing, but affirming the district court’s granting of defendants’ summary judgment motion based on Eighth Amendment law
- stating that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”
- noting that district courts are encouraged “to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DERRICK D. FREDERICK,

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:20-cv-1068-MMH-JBT
SGT. D. TOMPKINS,1

Defendant.

ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Derrick D. Frederick, an inmate in the custody of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on September 22,
2020, by filing a pro se Complaint (Doc. 1)2 with exhibits (Doc. 11). Frederick
filed an Amended Complaint (AC; Doc. 19) on February 4, 2021. In the AC,
Frederick asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (related to a December
13, 2019 incident at New River Correctional Institution (NRCI)) against
Defendant D. Tompkins.3 He seeks monetary damages.

1 The proper spelling of Defendant’s surname is Tompkins. See Doc. 46-1. The
Court will direct the Clerk to correct the docket.
2 In referencing documents filed in this case, the Court will cite the document
page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.
3 The Court previously dismissed Frederick’s claims against Defendant R.
Johnson, a corrections officer. See Order (Doc. 40).
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Tompkins’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 46). He submitted exhibits in support of the

Motion. See Docs. 46-1 through 46-6; 57. The Court advised Frederick of the
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting
of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a
final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the

matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Order (Doc.
5); Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 48). Frederick filed a response in
opposition to the Motion. See Motion to Refute Defendant’s Summary
Judgment (Response; Doc. 51). As such, Defendant’s Motion is ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations4
In the AC, as count one, Frederick asserts that Defendant Tompkins
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment when Tompkins directed Johnson, his subordinate, to slam the

quad door, which caused “a partial amputation” of Frederick’s finger. AC at 2.
He also asks that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 over the state law claims that he asserts in counts two through five;
specifically, civil battery (count two); civil assault (count three); negligent

4 The recited facts are drawn from the AC.
2
infliction of emotional distress (count four); and personal capacity negligence
(count five). Id. at 2-4.

As to the specific underlying facts supporting his claims, Frederick
alleges that he was returning to G dormitory after lunch between 11:30 a.m.
and 12:00 p.m. on December 13, 2019. Id. at 2. According to Frederick, he
entered the sallyport area, stood at the quad-four door, and waited for the

officer in the booth to open the door so he could enter. Id. He states that
Tompkins and Johnson were inside the wing waiting to exit. Id. Frederick
asserts that when he “grabbed the door frame,” Tompkins ordered Johnson to
close the door. Id. According to Frederick, Johnson “maliciously and

sadistically slammed the door on the inmates, pushing them in the process,
and on Mr. Frederick’s finger partially amputating [it].” Id. He maintains that
Tompkins and Johnson falsified their reports to “conceal” what happened. Id.
He avers that officers “rushed” him to the medical clinic. Id.

III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a
motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,
3
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).5 An
issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,
93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381
F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

5 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010
Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing
development of the decisional law construing and applying
these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not
binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3
(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review
remains viable.
4
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d
590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view
all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing

summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571,
1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however, if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

5
nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th
Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Summary of the Arguments
In the Motion, Defendant Tompkins maintains that the Court should
grant summary judgment in his favor as to Frederick’s Eighth Amendment
and state law claims against him. See generally Motion. Tompkins argues that

the video evidence supports his position that he did not violate Frederick’s
Eighth Amendment right. He also asserts that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 18-19. Additionally, Tompkins contends that Frederick fails
to state plausible assault, battery, and negligence claims. Id. at 14-18. In his

Response, Frederick repeats the allegations set forth in the AC, see Response
at 1-3, and asks the Court to “set this cause of action for trial,” id. at 3.6

6 Frederick also asks that the Court grant summary judgment in his favor as
to his claims against Defendant Tompkins. See Response at 3. However, a request for
affirmative relief, such as the entry of summary judgment in Frederick’s favor, cannot
be imbedded in a response to a party’s motion for summary judgment. Rather, a party
is required to file a proper motion seeking the entry of such relief in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District
Court, Middle District of Florida (Local Rule(s)). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); Local Rule
3.01(a) (requiring, among other things, a memorandum of legal authority in support
of a request from the Court). This, Frederick has not done. Thus, his request for entry
of summary judgment in his favor is not properly before the Court and for this reason
is due to be denied.
6
V. Applicable Law
A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for an Eighth
Amendment violation.
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones ....”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S. Ct. at 1976 (internal
quotation and citation omitted).[ 7 ] Thus, in its
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the
Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials
provide humane conditions of confinement. Id.
However, as noted above, only those conditions which
objectively amount to an “extreme deprivation”
violating contemporary standards of decency are
subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Hudson, 503
U.S. at 8-9, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.[8] Furthermore, it is
only a prison official’s subjective deliberate
indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm
caused by such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.
Ct. at 1974 (quotation and citation omitted); Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.[9]

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eighth
Amendment also requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 832 (quoting Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)); Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357

7 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
8 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
9 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
7
(11th Cir. 2021). However, not every injury that a prisoner suffers as a result
of a prison condition necessarily equates to a constitutional violation. See

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013). Only injuries
that occur as a result of a prison official’s deliberate indifference rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of harm as follows:
To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference,
a plaintiff must show “(1) a substantial risk of serious
harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to
that risk; and (3) causation.”[10]

The first element of deliberate indifference —
whether there was a substantial risk of serious harm
— is assessed objectively and requires the plaintiff to
show “conditions that were extreme and posed an
unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health
or safety.”[11] The second element — whether the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk —
has both a subjective and an objective component.
Subjectively, the “official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and ... also
draw the inference.”[12] Objectively, the official must
have responded to the known risk in an unreasonable
manner, in that he or she “knew of ways to reduce the
harm” but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.[13]

10 Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hale v.
Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)).
11 Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307.
12 Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
13 Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620 (quoting Hale, 50 F.3d 1583).
8
Finally, the plaintiff must show a “necessary causal
link” between the officer’s failure to act reasonably and
the plaintiff’s injury.[14]

Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(emphasis added); Johnson v. Bessemer, Ala., City of, 741 F. App’x 694, 698-99
(11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).15
The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Proof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal
more than does proof of negligence: “To be deliberately
indifferent a prison official must know of and
disregard ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.’” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319-20 (emphasis
supplied) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).[16]

In other words, a plaintiff in [Frederick]’s
position must show not only that there was a
substantial risk of serious harm, but also that
[Defendant] “subjectively knew of the
substantial risk of serious harm and that [he]
knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk.”
Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (alteration omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether prison officials
had the requisite awareness of the risk “is a question

14 Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622-23.
15 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);
see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not
considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
16 Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th
Cir. 2005).
9
of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence, and
a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew
of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk
was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at
1981 (citation omitted). At the same time, the
deliberate indifference standard – and the subjective
awareness required by it – is far more onerous than
normal tort based standards of conduct sounding in
negligence: “Merely negligent failure to protect an
inmate from attack does not justify liability under [§]
1983.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th
Cir. 1990) (per curiam). And[,] needless to say, to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, [a
plaintiff] must adduce specific evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find in his favor;
“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of [his] position will be insufficient.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512.

Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis added and deleted); Cox, 15 F.4th at
1358; Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2020); Scott v.
Miami Dade Cnty., 657 F. App’x 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that “a
plaintiff must allege facts that would allow a jury to conclude that: the
defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious
harm” (subjective component), and “the defendant disregarded that known risk
by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner” (objective
component)).
10
B. Supervisory Liability

As to supervisory liability, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:
Supervisory officials are not vicariously liable under
section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their
subordinates. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269
(11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff[] must instead allege that
the supervisor, through his own actions, violated the
Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022). A prisoner must assert
facts showing either that a supervisor personally participated in the alleged
constitutional violation or that there is a causal connection between the actions
of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation to state a
claim against a supervising official. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269
(11th Cir. 1999); Gaffney v. Warden, Taylor Corr. Inst., No. 20-13572, 2022 WL
18381, at *5 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (stating supervisory liability
“only occurs when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the
actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).

11
VI. Analysis17

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

Frederick contends that Defendant Tompkins violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. According to
Frederick, Tompkins (a supervisor) directed Johnson to close the quad door,
and when Johnson slammed the door shut, one-fourth of Frederick’s right
middle finger was caught in the door frame and severed. Tompkins contends
that he is entitled to summary judgment as to Frederick’s Eighth Amendment
claim against him. In support of his position, Defendant submitted exhibits,
including his own Declaration (Tompkins Decl.), Doc. 46-1; an Incident Report,

Doc. 46-2; Frederick’s grievances and appeals, Doc. 46-4; the Declaration of
Betty Renfroe, Doc. 46-6; and the Deposition of Derrick Frederick (P. Depo.),
Doc. 57. With the Court’s permission, see Order (Doc. 49), Defendant also
submitted a digital video disc under seal, see fixed wing (FW) video, Docs. 46-

3; 60 (sealed).
In his Declaration, Defendant Tompkins states in pertinent part:
I was employed by the Florida Department of
Corrections (“FDC”). On December 13, 2019, I was

17 For purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Frederick. Thus, the
facts described in the Court’s analysis may differ from those that ultimately can be
proved.
12
assigned to G dorm in New River Correctional
Institution in Raiford, Florida[,] as a Sergeant.

At the request of the Florida Office of the Attorney
General, I have reviewed the Complaint and reports
from the incident involving Inmate Derrick Frederick
on December 13, 2019. The allegations as alleged by
Inmate Frederick are not true. The facts are as follows:

On December 13, 2019, while in G-dorm, I was not
present at the door where the incident occurred. A
review of the video will show that someone pulled the
door open and just as soon as the door was pulled
open[,] Officer Johnson[] pulled the door shut.

Tompkins Decl. at 1 (enumeration omitted). In an Incident Report, Lieutenant
M. Nestved reported what he saw that afternoon. He stated in pertinent part:
At approximately 1235 hours on December 13, 2019,
while assigned as the G-dorm Housing Lieutenant[,] I
was present in G-Dorm and witnessed Inmate
FREDERICK, Derrick DC #122803 housed in G4101L
get his right middle finger shut in the Quad 4 door.
Inmate FREDERICK was escorted to medical where it
was determined that he be transported to an outside
medical facility for further treatment.

Doc. 46-2 at 1.
To defeat the Motion, Frederick is required to present evidence to show
that there is a genuine issue for trial. In opposing Defendant’s Motion,
Frederick submitted his medical records and a variety of his grievances and
appeals and the FDOC’s responses, many pertaining to alleged improper
13
medical care. Doc. 11. In one grievance, Frederick provided the details
surrounding the incident. He stated in pertinent part:

On 12/13/19 at approximately 1130 AM to 1230 PM an
incident occurred where C/O Johnson acted with
[]reckless disregard for my safety and well being while
I was attempting to open and enter the door to quad 4
of G-dorm. When he slammed the door shut and
severed 1/4 of my middle finger completely off. C/O
Johnson was waiting at quad 4 dorm door, inside
waiting to come out, at no time did C/O Johnson
motion or verbally tell me to back up or to the other
inmates to back away from the door. C/O Johnson was
visi[]bly upset at the C/O in the booth for letting the
inmates outside in before letting him out of the quad
4. His actions with []reckless disregard to inmates has
cost me grav[e] injury in the damage done to my right
middle finger. . . .

Docs. 11-9 (selected capitalization omitted); 46-4 at 3.
Frederick also submitted the notarized affidavit of inmate Quentin
Bradley, FDOC #C00374, who says he saw the incident. Doc. 51-1 (Bradley
Aff.). Bradley avers in pertinent part:
I was standing right there by the wing door on
camera[.] You will be able to see me on 12-13-19 at
approximately 11:30 AM to 12:30 PM. I was in G-dorm
wing 4 where I live[.] [W]hile I was in the dorm I saw
all the other inmates returning from lunch chow. I saw
inmate Derrick Frederick #122803 standing at the
dorm door waiting to come in as the door open[ed.]
Inmate Derrick Frederick #122803 was opening the
door to allow Sgt. Thompkins and Officer Johnson to
exit the wing[.] [W]hen I heard Sgt. Thompkins
scream at Officer Johnson telling him to close
the fu[--]ing door[,] Officer Johnson then forcefully
14
slammed the door close[d] and it cut off Inmate
Frederick[’s] finger. And since that time Inmate
Frederick has not been acting like himself[,] he acts
like he is depressed[,] he hasn’t been the same since.
[H]e’s not himself. . . .

Bradley Aff. at 1 (emphasis added).
Frederick filed a Motion to Submit Declarations of Witnesses (Doc. 58)
and attached the unsigned and unnotarized affidavits of two inmates who
allegedly were among the inmates with Frederick in the sallyport. Affidavit of
Anthony Johnson, FDOC #E38917, Doc. 58-2 at 1-2; Affidavit of Tommy
Poindexter, FDOC #B07828, id. at 3-4. In the Motion, Frederick asks that the
Court accept the affidavits “as notarized” because Johnson and Poindexter
were not able to get the affidavits notarized due to a lockdown at South Bay
Correctional Institution. Motion at 1. Defendant opposes the Motion. See
Notice to Court (Notice; Doc. 61). He maintains that neither inmate is housed
with Frederick at South Bay Correctional Institution,18 see Notice at 1-2, and

there is “no way for [Frederick] to prove that the testimony came from anyone
other than [Frederick],” id. at 2. Defendant argues that Frederick “asks the
Court to accept the affidavits under false pretenses.” Id.

18 Defendant attaches exhibits, showing that Johnson was released from
FDOC custody on March 2, 2022, and Poindexter has been housed at Graceville
Correctional Institution since September 16, 2021. Docs. 61-1; 61-2.
15
The Court agrees that neither Johnson nor Poindexter is housed with
Frederick at South Bay Correctional Institution. Additionally, Frederick’s

assertions related to their inability to get affidavits notarized is seemingly less
than candid. Notably, Frederick has had ample time to submit signed and
notarized affidavits from Johnson and Poindexter.19 And, regardless of the
penal lockdown experienced by Frederick, he was able to obtain and submit a

signed, notarized affidavit by Bradley, who is housed at South Bay
Correctional Institution with Frederick. As such, Frederick’s request that the
Court consider Johnson’s and Poindexter’s unsigned and unnotarized
affidavits is due to be denied, especially when Frederick had plenty of time to

compile his exhibits and relies on Bradley’s account of what transpired that
afternoon.20
The parties agree that the fixed wing video (no audio) evidence captures
the December 13, 2019 incident. Each generally cites to the fixed wing video

footage and argues that the video evidence supports his own factual accounts
as to how the events unfolded. See Motion at 3, 8, 11-14; Docs. 9; 11-9; P. Depo.

19 Frederick initially listed Johnson and Poindexter as witnesses on January
11, 2021. Doc. 9 at 1. Over a year later, the Court gave Frederick a deadline (April
29, 2022) to “submit the declarations of the two inmates (Anthony Johnson and
Tommy Poindexter) that [Frederick] lists in his Index of Exhibits (Doc. 9) as exhibit
S, if he elects to do so.” Order (Doc. 56), filed April 13, 2022.
20 The Court notes that Bradley, who allegedly was present in G dormitory,
provided a factual account that is similar to Johnson’s and Poindexter’s versions of
how the incident unfolded.
16
at 19 (“The camera will show you everything.”), 20-21, 24-25, 27, 46, 57.
Notably, the fixed wing camera angle pointed directly towards the entry/exit

door. See FW video. The first minute of the video is uneventful, showing Officer
Johnson as he waited at the door while several inmates gathered and waited
to enter the dormitory. Id. The video captures Frederick, as he leaned against
the plexiglass window to the left of the door and stood among other inmates in

the sallyport. Id. The video shows that Johnson pushed the door open, id. at
12:16:52, and then instantaneously pulled the door shut, id. at 12:16:54. Next,
the video displays Frederick as he backed away from the door, cradled his
hand, and walked away from the scene through the inmate crowd. Id.

Despite Frederick and Bradley’s contention to the contrary, the video
evidence establishes that Tompkins was not present at the doorway when
Johnson opened and closed the door. Id. Because the video surveillance camera
pointed directly towards the door, the area where Tompkins was present is off

camera. Id. Nevertheless, within seconds of the incident, Tompkins is seen
walking down the dormitory staircase and directly towards the door. Id. at
12:17:01. The video displays that when Johnson opened the door again, several
inmates pointed and peered at the site where the severed portion of Frederick’s

finger was embedded, as they paraded through the doorway. Id. The video also
shows an inmate using a cell phone, presumably to capture an image, as he
17
walked past the door jam. Id. The video evidence reflects that Tompkins and
Johnson kept the door ajar and waited for the arrival of another officer, who

retrieved the severed portion of Frederick’s finger from the door jam. Id.
In his deposition, Frederick explained what transpired that afternoon:
We [were] coming in from lunch, and the officer
in the booth has to buzz us in. So[,] when the officer in
the booth buzzed the door, I’m opening the door to let
Officer Johnson and them out. When [Johnson] got the
orders, he slammed the door forcefully on my finger
and chopped my finger off and left it in the door, and
the lieutenant got my finger out [of] the door and put
it in the glove, and I was on my way to the emergency
room.

My finger -- one-fourth of my finger is gone. It’s
really ugly. It’s an ugly nail growing on there, and it’s
not my fault because it’s a -- it’s a -- it’s a certain way
that you secure a door.

. . . .

For some reason, [Tompkins] went back upstairs
for a minute. Before the door even opened, he was on
the way back downstairs. If you look on that camera,
you’ll see him about over halfway downstairs from
probably five feet from Johnson. So[,] he’s definitely in
earshot of him. He can hear him. Plus, there ain’t too
many people in the quad, so you can say something
way from upstairs and hear downstairs. He got orders.
He got orders -- direct orders from his supervisor,
which is the sergeant of the dorm, to close the door.
And it’s not correct. Because like you say, you seen the
door open, and you seen him close the door. Why would
the officer buzz the door and I’m opening the door to
let them out? He going to slam the door back. He got
orders to slam the door from [Tompkins].
18
. . . .

[Johnson] pulled the door back, so it happened
so fast. I’m looking right at him. It happened so -- if
you see the camera, as soon as the door open[ed], boom,
it close[d] right back. That [is] not suppose[d] to
happen like that, ma’am. I’m not that fast. You need
Flash to be able to move that fast. Because I’m just
opening the door to be a gentleman to let the officers
out the door. Let Johnson and [Tompkins] out the door.

P. Depo. at 10-11, 20-21, 23-24. Frederick blamed Tompkins and Johnson for
his injury, stating that it was their “fault for not securing the door the proper
way.” Id. at 26. He explained:
Sergeant T[ompkins] and Johnson w[ere] at the door
first waiting to come out, but the officer in the booth
hadn’t opened the door yet [be]cause that’s the only
way we can get in and they can get out. If they don’t
have their key, the officer in the booth have to hit the
control panel to open the door. So[,] he was coming
back downstairs. Johnson was still at the door. You
can hear it when they open the door. It’s going to buzz.
So[,] the officer in the booth buzzed the door. I pulled
the door to let Johnson and them come out. As soon as
I pull[ed] the door, the door got slammed back and
Sergeant T[]ompkins gave him authority to slam the
door, which is wrong. It’s not professional because
care, custody, and control is a proper way to secure the
door. You don’t see nowhere on the video where
Johnson is telling nobody to move back from the door.
You didn’t tell -- you didn’t see him get on the walkie-
talkie and tell the officer in the booth not to open the
door. As they open the door, I didn’t want to rush in
and be disrespectful. When I see an officer at the door,
so I’m going to open the door and let them out. I’m a
gentleman, the courtesy. And he slammed the door. He
19
looked right -- I looked right at him closing the door.
Well, it happened so fast. I’m looking right at him close
the door on my finger. It happened so fast.

Id. at 14-15. According to Frederick, they should have secured the door the way
Tompkins did after the incident when he kept the door open for the lieutenant
to retrieve the severed portion of Frederick’s finger. Id. at 57.
In a conditions of confinement scenario involving an inmate, an officer’s
deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233
(emphasis added); see Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1331. To survive summary
judgment when asserting a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must

produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm (objective
component); (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that risk, i.e., the
defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious
harm (subjective component), and the defendant disregarded (by conduct that

was more than gross negligence) that known risk by failing to respond to it in
an objectively reasonable manner (objective component); and (3) causation, i.e.,
the defendant’s “failure to act reasonably” caused plaintiff’s injury. Goodman,
718 F.3d at 1332; Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir.

2010); Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (stating that plaintiff’s “deliberate-
indifference claim fails because he has not demonstrated a genuine factual
20
issue as to whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of serious harm” to him).

The fixed wing video evidence submitted by Defendant Tompkins is
reliable, establishes where Tompkins, Johnson, and Frederick were situated,
and provides a chronology of how the incident unfolded. Notably, Frederick
acknowledges that the fixed wing video accurately recorded the event.

Undoubtedly, it was a rapidly-evolving incident. What began as a routine
movement of inmates from the chow hall to a housing dormitory morphed into
a highly unfortunate event. The video evidence shows that Johnson opened the
quad door and immediately closed the door (which caught a portion of

Frederick’s finger). Indeed, the video evidence unequivocally establishes the
immediacy of Johnson opening and closing the door. Notably, Frederick
himself testified that “it happened so fast.” P. Depo. at 24.
Importantly, the crux of the matter is Tompkins’ alleged directive to

Johnson to close the door. Frederick and Bradley maintain they heard
Tompkins’ directive, and Frederick stated that Tompkins was “definitely in
earshot” of Johnson. Id. at 21. At his deposition, Frederick stated that he
opened the door for the officers as a gentlemanly gesture, and that Johnson

slammed the door when Tompkins ordered him to close it. Id. at 24. Notably,
Bradley stated that he overheard Tompkins “scream at Officer Johnson telling
21
him to close the f--king door.” Bradley Decl. at 1. Frederick confirmed that
inmates had told him that they heard a direct order from Tompkins to “close

the door.” P. Depo. at 10. He states that he heard it, but did not know it was
Tompkins until later when other inmates told him. Id. at 18. Tompkins denies
giving such an order. Tompkins Decl. at 1 (“The allegations as alleged by
Inmate Frederick are not true.”). The video evidence lacks audio, and therefore

does not capture the entirety of what may have transpired. With no audio, the
video itself neither confirms nor refutes Frederick’s contention regarding
Tompkins’ verbal order, nor does it capture any post-incident discussions
between Tompkins and Johnson, as they stood at the quad door to preserve the

scene. Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court accepts Frederick’s
contention that Tompkins ordered Johnson to close the door. However, as noted
previously, the video does affirmatively refute Frederick’s contention that
Tompkins was standing beside Johnson when the door opened and closed.

Indeed, the video shows that Tompkins was not standing by Johnson and that
he walked down the stairs from the upper level after Frederick’s finger was
caught in the door, and then Tompkins stood alongside Johnson at the doorway
as they preserved the scene.

The first element of Frederick’s claim requires him to show that he was
exposed to “conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511
22
U.S. at 834. Here, no jury could conclude that closing a door where inmates are
gathered on the other side awaiting entry creates an objectively substantial

risk of serious harm. Frederick fails to produce any evidence showing that this
prison condition was an extreme deprivation that posed an unreasonable risk
of serious damage to his health or safety. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233;
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).21

Closing the door knowing that an inmate’s hand was partially inside the
door’s threshold, on the other hand, could present a substantial risk of serious
harm sufficient to present a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. However,
Frederick must produce evidence showing that Defendant Tompkins was

deliberately indifferent to that risk, i.e., that before ordering Johnson to close
the door, Tompkins knew that Frederick’s finger had crossed the threshold and
was in danger of being severed if the door closed. This is so because it is “[a]
prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to

an inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828
(citations omitted). Indeed, the deliberate indifference standard requires that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the prison official “was subjectively aware” of

21 Frederick presents no evidence in support of his conclusory belief that
Defendant Tompkins’ “bad history with inmates,” P. Depo. at 16, 25, 31, means that
Tompkins wanted to hurt him. The lack of other injurious incidents negates any
suggestion that Frederick was exposed to conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.
23
the risk of harm; mere negligence is not sufficient. Id. at 829, 835-36. “The
known risk of injury must be a ‘strong likelihood, rather than a mere

possibility’ before a guard’s failure to act can constitute deliberate
indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F. 2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990); see also
Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“[I]t is only a heightened degree of culpability that will satisfy the subjective

knowledge component of the deliberate indifference standard, a requirement
that is ‘far more onerous than normal tort-based standards of conduct sounding
in negligence.’”). Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate
must show a prison official “actually (subjectively) knows that an inmate is

facing a substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregards that known risk by
failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Rodriguez, 508
F.3d at 617 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 844) (footnote omitted).
Here, despite the seriousness and truly unfortunate nature of the injury

to Frederick’s finger, the Court finds that Frederick fails to produce any
evidence suggesting that Defendant Tompkins could actually have known
Frederick faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and disregarded that known
risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Frederick himself seemingly suggests that
Tompkins and Johnson were not intentionally trying to hurt him, but instead
24
were reckless when they failed to follow prison protocol related to securing a
door, especially one with inmates nearby. See P. Depo. at 26-28. However,

negligence is insufficient. Frederick must show that Tompkins deliberately
disregarded a known substantial risk of serious harm. Goodman, 718 F.3d at
1332. Frederick simply points to no evidence supporting even an inference that
Defendant Tompkins was aware that Frederick faced a substantial risk of

serious harm as Frederick stood at the quad door among other inmates who
were waiting to enter the dormitory.
Indeed, nothing in the record supports an inference that at the moment
Tompkins ordered Johnson to close the door, Tompkins was aware that

Frederick’s finger had crossed the threshold of the door. Viewing the facts and
taking all reasonable inferences in Frederick’s favor, as the Court must, the
video evidence establishes that Tompkins would not have been able to observe
and appreciate the risk to Frederick from where Tompkins was located before

he gave the verbal command to Johnson. Indeed, the parties agree that the
video evidence shows the immediate succession of Johnson opening and closing
the door. Frederick himself testified:
[Johnson] pulled the door back, so it happened
so fast. I’m looking right at him. It happened so -- if
you see the camera, as soon as the door open[ed], boom,
it close[d] right back. That [is] not suppose[d] to
25
happen like that, ma’am. I’m not that fast. You need
Flash to be able to move that fast.

P. Depo. at 23-24. The video establishes Johnson’s rapid actions of opening and
closing the door were too fast to be in response to a verbal order given by
Tompkins. Moreover, even if it could have been in response to an order, the
video evidence establishes Tompkins’ vantage point from which he would not
have been able to see Frederick’s finger in the door when he told Johnson to
close the door. Additionally, given the speed with which Johnson opened and

closed the door, there simply was not enough time for Tompkins to observe and
appreciate a substantial danger of serious harm to Frederick’s finger, and then
recklessly disregard that risk by giving the order. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847
(stating that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment

for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates
face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate it”); Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332; Hale, 50
F.3d at 1583.

Notably, Frederick acknowledges that when the door caught his finger,
he immediately left the scene and reported to the medical clinic, as Tompkins
(along with Johnson) was “bodyguarding that door” to retrieve the severed
portion of Frederick’s finger. P. Depo. at 57. Indeed, Frederick fails to produce

any evidence showing Tompkins was deliberately indifferent to Frederick’s
26
health and safety needs following the incident. Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1334
(finding the dereliction of duty to be disturbing, but affirming the district

court’s granting of defendants’ summary judgment motion based on Eighth
Amendment law). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
Our cases are clear that to survive summary judgment
on a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must
present some evidence of prison officials’ subjective
awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm to the
inmate. See, e.g., McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248,
1255 (11th Cir.1999) (explaining that “a finding of
deliberate indifference requires a finding of the
defendant’s subjective awareness of the relevant risk”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). [Plaintiff] has
adduced no evidence that either [Defendant] was
subjectively aware of the peril to which [Plaintiff] was
exposed on the night in question, and that failure is
fatal to his claim.

Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1333-34. Given Frederick’s failure to provide any
evidence that Tompkins was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of
serious harm to Frederick, no reasonable jury could find that Frederick
suffered a violation of his Eighth Amendment right under these particular
circumstances. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
As such, Defendant’s Motion is due to be granted as to Frederick’s Eighth
27
Amendment claim against him, and Frederick’s request for summary
judgment in his favor is due to be denied.22

B. State Law Claims
Because Defendant Tompkins is entitled to summary judgment as to
Frederick’s Eighth Amendment claim against him and the Court has no basis
to exercise diversity jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over his pendent state claims. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370
F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that district courts are encouraged
“to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have
been dismissed prior to trial.”). Accordingly, counts two, three, four, and five

are due to be dismissed without prejudice. See id. Frederick may refile these
claims in state court if he wishes to do so.
In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:

1. Defendant Tompkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is
GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment (Doc. 51) is DENIED.

22 In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address Tompkins’ argument
on the issue of qualified immunity.
28
3. Plaintiffs Motion to Submit Declarations of Witnesses (Doc. 58) is
DENIED.
4. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state claims, and therefore, Frederick’s claims under counts two,
three, four, and five are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
5. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Tompkins,
correct the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Defendant’s surname,
terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 15th day of June,
2022.

United States District Judge

Jax-1 6/15
C:
Derrick D. Frederick, #122803
Counsel of Record

29

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110287. Public record. Not legal advice.