# McFadden v. Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · May 31, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110209

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** May 31, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110209

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a psychologist’s testimony concerning the “fight or flight” response was admissible as state-of-mind evidence to support a claim of self- defense
- finding counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ERNA McFADDEN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-891-TJC-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,

Respondents.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, Erna McFadden, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action in the Northern District of Florida by filing a pro se Petition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody.
Doc. 1. The Honorable Gary R. Jones, United States Magistrate Judge,
transferred the action to this Court. Doc. 3. Petitioner challenges a state court
(Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for armed robbery and two
counts of aggravated battery.1 Petitioner is serving a cumulative life term of

1 Petitioner entered an open plea of guilty to the two counts of aggravated
battery. She subsequently proceeded to trial on the armed robbery charge and the jury
found her guilty of the offense. In the Petition, Petitioner only raises claims
challenging her armed robbery conviction and trial counsel’s actions during trial.
incarceration. Respondents filed a Response. See Doc. 13 (Resp.).2 The Court
provided Petitioner with an opportunity to reply, but she declined and filed a

notice advising that she relies on her allegations as stated in her Petition. See
Doc. 15. This case is ripe for review.3
II. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure

that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.
(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

2 Attached to the Response are several exhibits. The Court cites the exhibits as
“Resp. Ex.”

3 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish
the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299,
1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060
(11th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court
must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the
record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,
a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that
“further factual development” is not necessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275
(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s
decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation,
the federal court should “look through” the unexplained
decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale. It should then
presume that the unexplained decision adopted the
same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different
grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as
alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or
argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears
repeating that even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than
mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at
75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper
deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations modified).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a
person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of
reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the
Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to
show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance
prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.
(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should
be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.
Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether
that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.”
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If
there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s
representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is
combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling
on counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.
2004).
III. Analysis

A. Grounds One and Two4
Petitioner alleges her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
“improper prosecutorial comments”; specifically, the state’s inclusion of a jury
instruction on the principal theory. Doc. 1 at 5. According to Petitioner, the

4 Petitioner raises the same claim in Grounds One and Two of the Petition. See
Doc. 1 at 5-7.
evidence presented at trial did not support the instruction, and its presence
misled and confused the jury during deliberations. Id.

Petitioner raised this claim in her amended Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. Resp. Ex. C1 at 15-17. The
trial court summarily denied the claim, finding the following:
In Defendant’s Amended Motion, she avers the
State improperly argued principal theory and that the
jurors were improperly instructed on the theory.
Specifically, Defendant argues the State only alleged
that Defendant committed the robbery at CVS, not that
she aided her codefendant in committing the robbery.
Thus, Defendant contends it was improper for the jury
to be instructed on the principal theory and for the
State to argue anything regarding the principal theory.

To prove the offense of Armed Robbery, the State
had to show Defendant took property of value from CVS
with the intent to permanently deprive CVS of that
property and that “force, violence, assault, or putting in
fear was used in the cour[se] of the taking.” The jury
was instructed on the principal theory to find these
elements. The State is entitled to proceed on alternate
theories where there is evidence to support both
theories. See Hodge v. State, 970 So. 2d 923, 926 (Fla.
4th DCA 2008).

Here, the State indeed presented evidence [] to
support both theories. The State presented evidence
Defendant committed the armed robbery herself by
presenting the following evidence: testimony from the
store manager that he witnessed Defendant conceal
CVS store merchandise in her blue purse, testimony
from two individuals that Defendant never went to the
register to pay for these items, testimony from those
same two individuals that Defendant cut them both
with an object while trying to leave the store, and
testimony that when Defendant was pulled over in the
car described by a CVS employee soon after the
robbery, there was merchandise and a box cutter found
in the car.

However, the officer who stopped the vehicle
Defendant was a passenger in, stated that Defendant’s
blue and white bag only had [a] box-cutter in it, not any
store merchandise. Defense counsel used this
testimony to argue that, while Defendant did commit
the aggravated battery offenses, she did not rob the
store and commit Armed Robbery. In response, the
State alternatively argued the principal theory to
allege that even if the jury did not believe Defendant
took items from CVS, she knew of the plan and assisted
the other suspect by using the boxcutter on the victims
to allow her and the other suspect to escape the store.

Considering the evidence, this Court finds it was
proper for the trial court to give the principal
instruction. Thus, counsel cannot be deemed deficient
for failing to object to the instruction being given or the
arguments made by the State regarding the principal
theory. See Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546
(Fla. 2010) (finding counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection).
Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief on this
Ground. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[T]here is no
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance
claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”).

Resp. Ex. C1 at 28-29 (record citations omitted). Petitioner appealed, and the
First District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial through a written opinion.
Resp. Ex. C4. The First DCA explained the following, in relevant part:
In the Appellant’s first and second grounds, she
argued that her attorney was ineffective for failing to
object to the reading of the principal instruction. She
alleged that neither the information nor the evidence
showed that she acted in concert with anyone to commit
a robbery. She asserted that she was simply shopping
with the codefendant until Mr. McDonald approached
and asked to search their purses. She claimed that she
had been unaware that the codefendant was stealing
until she ran away. The Appellant alleged that she only
struck the clerk because he struck her first, not to aid
in the codefendant’s escape. She argued that if counsel
had objected, she would have been acquitted of robbery
or convicted of a lesser offense.

To prove ineffective assistance, an appellant
must allege (1) the specific acts or omissions of counsel
that fell below a standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms and (2) that the
appellant’s case was prejudiced by these acts or
omissions such that the outcome of the case would have
been different. Strickland[], 466 U.S. [at] 690-92.
However, “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
failing to make a meritless objection.” Hitchcock v.
State, 991 So.2d 337, 361 (Fla. 2008).

“The principals instruction may be given if the
evidence adduced at trial supports such an instruction.”
McGriff v. State, 12 So. 3d 894, 894 (Fla. 1st DCA
2009). Under the law applicable to principals,

a defendant will be treated as if he did all
the acts performed by the others involved
in the perpetration of a crime if (1) the
defendant “ha[d] a conscious intent that
the crime be done” and (2) the defendant
“d[id] some act or sa[id] some word which
was intended to and d[id] incite, cause,
encourage, assist, or advise another person
to actually commit the crime.”

Charles v. State, 945 So. 2d 579, 581-82 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006) (quoting R.J.K. v. State, 928 So. 2d 499, 503 (Fla.
2d DCA 2006)).
Here, the evidence supported the jury
instruction. Mr. McDonald testified that he saw both
women stealing items from the store. When confronted
about the theft, the Appellant attacked Mr. McDonald.
Both Mr. McDonald and Mr. Campbell testified that
when the attack began, they were distracted by the
codefendant and were not paying attention to the
Appellant. It was only after the Appellant injured Mr.
McDonald that Mr. Campbell struggled with her.
Furthermore, the Appellant attacked Mr. Campbell
again after he had disengaged from her to aid Mr.
McDonald. This interaction was caught on video
surveillance. Under these circumstances, grounds one
and two were properly denied.

Resp. Ex. C4; McFadden v. State, 268 So. 3d 224, 226-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that the state court’s
decision to deny Petitioner’s claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts given the evidence presented to the state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Grounds One and Two are denied.
B. Ground Three
Petitioner argues that her trial attorney was ineffective for failing to call
an expert witness at trial who would have testified about Petitioner’s extensive
mental health issues and how long-term incarceration may affect Petitioner’s
conduct. Doc. 1 at 8.
Petitioner raised this claim in ground four of her amended Rule 3.850
motion. Resp. Ex. C1 at 18-19. The trial court summarily denied the claim as

follows:
Defendant alleges counsel was ineffective for
failing to present information regarding her “extensive
mental health issues” and for failing to call an expert
to testify regarding those issues at trial. Defendant
notes counsel had her evaluated by a doctor and
presented that doctor’s testimony at sentencing but
avers counsel should have had her evaluated prior to
trial so that testimony could have formed viable
defenses.

On October 2, 2017, this Court granted
Defendant sixty days leave to amend this ground to
provide more details regarding her allegations.
Defendant still does not specifically identify her
“extensive mental health issues.” She does, however,
allege the doctor could have testified regarding a link
between her illness and her response to the employee’s
actions to “show[] that the Defendant perceived the
CVS employee’s actions as a threat and that
[Defendant] felt that she needed to defend herself.”
This Court finds such testimony would be improper for
a doctor to give as they are Defendant’s assertions, not
his own conclusions. Moreover, this Court finds such
testimony regarding why the Defendant cut the
employee with her razor blade, and any theory of self-
defense, would only be relevant to the Aggravated
Battery charges Defendant pleaded guilty to, not the
Armed Robbery charge on which Defendant was tried.
Such testimony would have been irrelevant and, thus,
inadmissible at trial. Counsel, therefore, cannot be
deemed deficient for failing to try to present this
testimony at trial. Additionally, contrary to
Defendant’s assertions, because the testimony would
have been irrelevant to the charge tried, there is no
reasonable probability the result of the proceeding
would have been different if counsel had Defendant
evaluated sooner and presented that testimony at trial.

Lastly, as mentioned by Defendant, counsel did
have Defendant evaluated by a doctor who then
testified at sentencing to show mitigation. Accordingly,
this Court finds Defendant is not entitled to relief on
this Ground.

Resp. Ex. C1 at 30-31 (record citations omitted). Petitioner appealed, and the
First DCA affirmed, finding the following in pertinent part:
In the Appellant’s fourth ground, she argued that
her attorney was ineffective for failing to call an expert
witness to testify regarding her mental health issues.
She alleged that Mr. McDonald grabbed her arm and
threw her into a wall, prompting her to use the
boxcutter to defend herself. She asserted that a mental
health expert could have testified that she felt
threatened under these circumstances due to her
mental health issues. She claimed that this omission
left the jury without a complete picture of her state of
mind. She also argued that counsel failed to present
mitigating evidence regarding her mental health
issues.

The Appellant does not appear to be arguing that
at the time of the offense, she was unable to appreciate
the difference between right and wrong or understand
the nature or quality of her act. Thus, she does not seem
to suggest that an insanity defense was available.
Rather, because this argument is premised upon
demonstrating her state of mind and the need to defend
herself, it appears to be a self-defense argument. Cf.
Filomeno v. State, 930 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006) (holding that a psychologist’s testimony
concerning the “fight or flight” response was admissible
as state-of-mind evidence to support a claim of self-
defense).
As an initial matter, the Appellant’s factual
allegations in this ground are inconsistent with the
evidence presented at trial. Mr. McDonald’s and Mr.
Campbell’s testimony established that the Appellant
injured Mr. McDonald with the boxcutter while he was
distracted by her codefendant’s flight. Mr. McDonald
did not touch or strike the Appellant. Rather, it was Mr.
Campbell who struggled with the Appellant and only
after Mr. McDonald had been attacked. The Appellant
subsequently attacked Mr. Campbell after the struggle
was over, while he was assisting Mr. McDonald.

Furthermore, the Appellant pleaded guilty to the
aggravated battery charges and only proceeded to trial
on armed robbery. Her attorney relied on her guilty
pleas to argue that while she committed the aggravated
batteries and would be punished for them, she neither
stole property nor intended to help her codefendant
steal, and thus, she did not commit armed robbery. The
Appellant does not explain how a self-defense theory
would apply under these circumstances. Regardless,
even if a self-defense theory would apply, this ground
remains facially insufficient after an opportunity to
amend, as the Appellant does not identify her mental
illness or how it affected her perceptions. Therefore,
this aspect of her claim was properly denied with
prejudice. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(3).

Insofar as the Appellant argued that counsel
failed to present expert testimony regarding her mental
health as mitigating evidence, the record reflects that
counsel did present such testimony. Therefore, this
aspect of ground four is conclusively refuted by the
record.

Resp. Ex. C4; McFadden, 268 So. 3d at 227-28.
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that the state court’s
decision to deny Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts given the evidence presented to the state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground Three is denied.
C. Ground Four

Petitioner asserts her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for
a judgment of acquittal based on the state’s failure to present a prima facie case
for armed robbery. Doc. 1 at 10. According to Petitioner, the state did not prove
that Petitioner took money or other CVS property or that Petitioner used force

or violence during the alleged taking. Id.
Petitioner raised this claim in her amended Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex.
C1 at 20-24. The trial court summarily denied the claim as follows:
Defendant asserts counsel was ineffective for
failing to make an adequate motion for judgment of
acquittal.

To be entitled to relief on such a claim, Defendant
must show he “may very well have prevailed on a more
artfully presented motion.” White v. State, 977 So. 2d
680, 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “Where there is no
showing that a motion for judgment of acquittal had a
likelihood of success, a movant has not presented a
facially sufficient claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.”
Neal v. State, 854 So. 2d 666, 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
(citation omitted). Additionally, counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of
acquittal where there is sufficient evidence to support
the defendant’s convictions and the argument would
have been meritless. Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 976
(Fla. 2010) (citing Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 997
(Fla. 2006)).

The Florida Supreme Court has said the
following about motions for judgment of acquittal:

[a] defendant, in moving for a judgment of
acquittal, admits not only the facts stated
in the evidence adduced, but also admits
every conclusion favorable to the adverse
party that a jury might fairly and
reasonably infer from the evidence. The
courts should not grant a motion for
judgment of acquittal unless the evidence
is such that no view which the jury may
lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite
party can be sustained under the law.
Where there is room for a difference of
opinion between reasonable men as to the
proof or facts from which an ultimate fact
is sought to be established, or where there
is room for such differences as to the
inferences which might be drawn from
conceded facts, the Court should submit
the case to the jury for their finding, as it is
their conclusion, in such cases, that should
prevail and not primarily the views of the
judge. The credibility and probative force of
conflicting testimony should not be
determined on a motion for judgment of
acquittal.

Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974).

At trial, counsel made a boilerplate motion for
judgment of acquittal and [a] renewed motion for
judgment of acquittal. However, based on the evidence
as outlined in Grounds One and Two, this Court finds
even a more artfully presented motion for judgment of
acquittal would have been properly denied as there was
sufficient evidence to support the conviction[].
Defendant is, thus, not entitled to relief on this Ground.

Resp. Ex. C1 at 31-32 (record citations omitted). Petitioner appealed, and the
First DCA affirmed, explaining the following in relevant part:
In the Appellant’s fifth ground, she argued that
her attorney was ineffective for failing to make an
adequate motion for judgment of acquittal. She alleged
that her attorney should have argued that the state did
not prove all the elements of robbery, as she did not
take any property, use force in the course of a taking,
or have the intent to deprive the victim of any property.

“In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a
defendant ‘admits not only the facts stated in the
evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion
favorable to the adverse party that a jury might fairly
and reasonably infer from the evidence.’” Beasley v.
State, 774 So. 2d 649, 657 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Lynch v.
State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974)). “A motion for
judgment of acquittal should only be granted if there is
no view of the evidence from which a jury could make a
finding contrary to that of the moving party.” Jeffries v.
State, 797 So. 2d 573, 580 (Fla. 2001) (citing Lynch, 293
So. 2d at 45).

Here, any motion for judgment of acquittal
arguing that the state did not prove the elements of
robbery would have been denied. When viewed in the
light most favorable to the state, the evidence
introduced at trial shows that the Appellant and a
companion stole items from CVS. When two clerks
confronted them about the theft, the Appellant injured
them both with a boxcutter to aid in her and her
companion’s escape. Under these circumstances, this
ground was properly denied.

Resp. Ex. C4; McFadden, 268 So. 3d at 228-29.
The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough

review of the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that the state court’s
decision to deny Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts given the evidence presented to the state court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground Four is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate
any pending motions, and close this case.
3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate of

appealability. Because the Court has determined that a certificate of
appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed
in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.®
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 31st day of May,
2022.

□ Cirmotheg Corrig oN
Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN
United States District Judge

Jax-7
C: Erna McFadden, # J47975
counsel of record

5 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if Petitioner makes
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration of
the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110209. Public record. Not legal advice.