# Cole v. Williams

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 25, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110005

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 25, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110005

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TERRY LEE COLE,

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:22-cv-440-MMH-JBT

MIKE WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER
Plaintiff Terry Lee Cole, while a pretrial detainee housed at the
Montgomery Correctional Center (MCC),1 initiated this action on March 1,
2022 (signature date), by filing a pro se Complaint (Doc. 1).2 In the Complaint,
Cole names Sheriff Mike Williams, Detective Carteraun, the Jacksonville Fire
and Rescue Department (JFRD), and a Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO)
patrol officer. He asserts that he was denied medical care for his broken finger
on June 20, 2020. Complaint at 5. As relief, he requests monetary damages and
medical care for his finger.

1 According to the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) website, the
FDOC took custody of Cole on April 14, 2022.
2 For all referenced documents, the Court cites to the document and page
numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss this case
at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.3 See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either
in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing

Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A complaint
filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should only be ordered

when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327, or when the
claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims ‘describing
fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are

all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a
plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint “fails

3 Cole has neither paid the filing fee nor filed an application to proceed as a
pauper. As such, for purposes of the Court’s required screening, the Court will assume
Cole intends to proceed as a pauper.
2
to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both
contexts.4 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in
a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection
between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

4 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
3
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-

63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not
necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the
... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not
required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
4
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and
quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”
which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional
deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of
action against the defendant.
In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Cole’s pro se allegations

in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham,
654 F.3d at 1175. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.

1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel
for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,

1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other
grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).
5
Cole’s Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to this Court’s
screening obligation. The main thrust of the Complaint is the alleged subpar

conditions Cole experienced while housed at MCC as a pretrial detainee,5
specifically the denial of medical care. However, he also presents a variety of
unrelated claims spanning from March 2019 to December 2021. He asserts that
he was arrested in March 2019 when he failed to “register [his] job.” Complaint

at 3. Next, he states that a JSO officer arrested him on June 5, 2020, and told
the JFRD that Cole is “just a sex offender” and “don’t need nothing” for his
broken finger. Id. He maintains that the JFRD and MCC denied him medical
care. Id. He also avers that Detective Carteraun harassed him, and the

Jacksonville Re-entry Center (JREC) “turned [him] away” in December 2020
because he did not have the required $25.00 fee. Id. Additionally, he asserts
that he was denied treatment for a “different finger” on December 22, 2021. Id.
Finally, he states that he was not able to access the law library because

“tablets” were “down” for one month. Id.

5 Because Cole was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged events, the
Fourteenth Amendment applies. However, the standard of analysis for a Fourteenth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim and an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim are the same. See Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 n.1
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he standards under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to
those under the Eighth.”).

6
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel

and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth
Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane
conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an
objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct. Swain v.

Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834);
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit
has explained:
Under the objective component, a prisoner must allege
a condition that is sufficiently serious to violate the
Eighth Amendment. Id.[6] The challenged condition
must be extreme and must pose an unreasonable risk
of serious damage to the prisoner’s future health or
safety. Id. The Eighth Amendment guarantees that
prisoners are provided with a minimal civilized level
of life’s basic necessities. Id.

Under the subjective component, a prisoner must
allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted

6 Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289.
7
with a state of mind that constituted deliberate
indifference. Id. This means the prisoner must show
that the prison officials: (1) had subjective knowledge
of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and
(3) displayed conduct that is more than mere
negligence. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2003).

Oliver v. Fuhrman, 739 F. App’x 968, 969-70 (11th Cir. 2018). “To be cruel and
unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all
must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests
or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison
officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display
‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.
Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, [a
plaintiff] must show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2)
the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need;
and (3) causation between that indifference and the
plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d
1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). To establish deliberate
indifference, [a plaintiff] must prove “(1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of
that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]
negligence.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d
1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original).
The defendants must have been “aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
8
risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and then actually draw
that inference. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245
(11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

Easley v. Dep’t of Corr., 590 F. App’x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2014). “For medical
treatment to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be ‘so
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’” Nimmons v. Aviles, 409 F. App’x 295,
297 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.
1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“Grossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute deliberate
indifference, . . . as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less efficacious

course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem).
However, the law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated
by the negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348

(1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause,
whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care
by prison officials.”). A complaint that a physician has been negligent “in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at
1176 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
9
has noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a constitutional
deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his own

professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well
established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute
deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or
forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and
therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth
Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted). In sum, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:
A prisoner bringing a deliberate-indifference
claim has a steep hill to climb. We have held, for
instance, that the Constitution doesn’t require that
the medical care provided to prisoners be “perfect, the
best obtainable, or even very good.” Harris, 941 F.2d
at 1510 (quotation omitted).[ 7 ] Rather, “[m]edical
treatment violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only
when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable
to fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1505 (quotation
omitted). We have also emphasized—as have our
sister circuits—that “a simple difference in medical
opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the
inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of
treatment [fails to] support a claim of cruel and

7 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
10
unusual punishment.” Id.; accord, e.g., Lamb v.
Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We
have consistently held that prison officials do not act
with deliberate indifference when they provide
medical treatment even if it is subpar or different from
what the inmate wants.”); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d
63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[The Eighth
Amendment] does not impose upon prison
administrators a duty to provide care that is ideal, or
of the prisoner's choosing.”).

Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266.

Cole has not presented sufficient allegations to support a claim for a
federal constitutional violation against Defendants. He generally accuses the
JFRD and MCC of denying him medical care for a broken finger on June 5,
2020, and blames the “pee farm” for denying him medical care for “a different
finger” about a year later. He provides no facts suggesting how Sheriff
Williams was involved in the violation of his federal constitutional rights.
Additionally, Cole’s medical claim lacks specific facts that would allow the
Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants (or an unnamed medical
personnel) were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. He does not
specify what the medical personnel individually did or failed to do that caused
him to suffer. Nor does Cole state what treatment was withheld from him or
why any such treatment was needed or proper. Absent such facts, the Court
cannot infer that the conduct of the medical personnel amounted to anything
11
more than a disagreement in medical opinion or simple negligence. See Adams,
61 F.3d at 1545.

Additionally, Cole asserts that he was not able to access the law library
for one month because the tablets were not working. It is well-established that
inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir.

2003). To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege
an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1996); Barbour v. Haley,
471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be established by
demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were

frustrated or impeded by . . . an official’s action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225
(citations omitted). Therefore, “the plaintiff must identify within his complaint,
a ‘nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim.’” Id. at 1226 (quoting Christopher
v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Additionally, the plaintiff must show

that the underlying nonfrivolous claim was raised, or would have been raised,
in connection with a direct appeal, a collateral attack on his conviction, or a
civil rights action. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 57; Cranford v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr.,
398 F. App’x 540, 546-47 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, Cole fails to assert that

Defendants’ conduct resulted in an “actual injury,” as defined by the Eleventh
Circuit. He has not provided any facts suggesting that Defendants’ conduct
12
frustrated or impeded his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous claim in connection
with a direct appeal, a collateral attack on his conviction, or in a civil rights

action.
As to any alleged verbal abuse (including threatening or demeaning
comments) or insulting gestures on the part of Defendants, such allegations do
not state a claim of federal constitutional dimension. Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). To the extent Cole
alleges that Defendants belittled him, verbal taunts without more do not
deprive an inmate of his federal constitutional rights. See Paylan v. Dirks, 847
F. App’x 595, 601 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

Moreover, as to Cole’s interest in addressing any ongoing violations at
the hands of medical personnel, he may seek such relief by initiating a
grievance pursuant to the prison’s administrative grievance procedures.
Although the grievance process does not permit an award of monetary

damages, the grievance tribunal has the authority to take responsive action.
As an additional measure to provide Cole with potential guidance, he may
contact his classification officer to inquire about any concerns he may have
about access to sick call and/or physicians, including specialists, to evaluate

his medical condition and determine if he needs any remedial treatments. Also,

13
the website for the JREC (https://www.reentryprograms.com/go/jacksonville-
re-entry-center) may be helpful.

In light of the foregoing, this case will be dismissed, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), without prejudice to Cole’s right to refile his claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with factual allegations sufficient to support a claim
for relief if he elects to do so. Notably, pro se litigants are subject to the same

law and rules of court that govern other litigants who are represented by
counsel. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). All filings
with the Court must be made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case
without prejudice, terminating any pending motions, and closing the case.
3. The Clerk shall send a civil rights complaint form and an Affidavit

of Indigency form to Plaintiff. If he elects to refile his claims, he may complete
and submit the proper forms. Plaintiff should not place this case number on
14
the forms. The Clerk will assign a separate case number if Plaintiff elects to
refile his claims. In initiating such a case, Plaintiff should either file a fully
completed Affidavit of Indigency (Gf he desires to proceed as a pauper) or pay
the $402.00 filing fee Gf he does not desire to proceed as a pauper). Finally, he
must sign his name on the forms.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 25th day of April,
2022.

United States District Judge

Jax-1 4/21
C:
Terry Lee Cole, FDOC #555800

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10110005. Public record. Not legal advice.