# Klein v. Receivable Management Group, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 27, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109985

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 27, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109985

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that an injury-in-law is not an injury-in-fact

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

STEPHANIE KLEIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:22-cv-667-WFJ-AAS

RECEIVABLE MANAGEMENT
GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Stephanie Klein’s Motion to
Remand to State Court, Dkt. 8, in which Plaintiff asserts that she does not have
Article III standing to present her case in federal court. Defendant Receivable
Management Group, Inc. filed a response in opposition, Dkt. 11. Upon careful
consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing and her motion
is due to be granted.
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit on February 15, 2022, in the County Court of
the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida. Dkt. 1-2. In her
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated provisions of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. and the Florida
Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. § 599.55 et seq. Id.
Asserting federal-question jurisdiction, Defendant removed the case to this Court
on March 22, 2022. Dkt. 1.

A removing defendant bears the burden of proving a plaintiff has Article III
standing to proceed in federal court. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338
(2016). Concerning her sole federal claim, Plaintiff contends that she has not

alleged an injury-in-fact that would give rise to standing. When the Court issued an
interrogatory directly asking Plaintiff whether she has Article III standing to bring
her FDCPA claim, Dkt. 9, Plaintiff responded “No,” Dkt. 10. Defendant disagrees,
citing Plaintiff’s allegations of her fear of future harms and Defendant’s disclosure

of her private information to a third-party letter vendor. Dkt. 11 at 4−5.
The Court finds that Defendant has not carried its burden of showing
Plaintiff has standing to pursue her claims in this Court. While Plaintiff’s FDCPA

claim alleges an injury-in-law, it does not allege an injury-in-fact. See TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (explaining that an injury-in-law is
not an injury-in-fact). Other courts assessing similar claims under the FDCPA have
found that, without more, allegations of emotional harm are insufficient to

constitute concrete injuries. See, e.g., Ojogwu v. Rodenburg Law Firm, 26 F.4th
457, 463 (8th Cir. 2022) (“fear of answering the telephone, nervousness,
restlessness, irritability, amongst other negative emotions”); Pennell v. Glob. Tr.

Mgmt., LLC, 990 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2021) (“stress and confusion”); Ross v.
O’Hara, No. 2:18-CV-118-TLS, 2022 WL 951390, at *4−5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30,
2022) (“stress, fear, and anxiety”). Courts have reached the same conclusion

regarding the disclosure of private information to third-party letter vendors in
FDCPA cases. See Sputz v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 21-CV-4663, 2021 WL 5772033,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2021); Brown v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 1:21-CV-595, 2022

WL 377001, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2022); Quaglia v. NS193, LLC, No. 21-C-
3252, 2021 WL 7179621, at *3−4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2021).
Given this case law, the parties’ filings, and Plaintiff’s interrogatory answer,
the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing. The Court is therefore without subject

matter jurisdiction and must remand this action to state court. Esteves v. SunTrust
Banks, Inc., 615 F. App’x 632, 636−37 (11th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, Dkt. 8, is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to REMAND this case to the County Court of
the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida. Thereafter, the Clerk
is directed to TERMINATE any pending motions and CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on April 27, 2022.

/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109985. Public record. Not legal advice.