# Brown v. Jane Doe

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 10, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109384

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 10, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARLON BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:21-cv-545-JES-MRM

JANE DOE, Nurse, individual
capacity, FNU RICEWICK, LPN,
individual capacity, FNU
BEARD, Nurse, individual
capacity, FNU ATHEMIDOR,
Nurse, and J. JACKSON,
Nurse, individual capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 12) and Plaintiff Marlon Brown’s
Response (Doc. 16).
I. Background
Brown is a prisoner of the Florida Department of Corrections
(FDOC). He sues five nurses—the four named Defendants and an
unknown nurse identified as Jane Doe—over medical treatment he
received while incarcerated at DeSoto Correctional Institution.
The Court recounts the allegations as pled in Brown’s Complaint,
which the Court must accept as true when considering Defendants’
Motion. See Chandler v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d
1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).
On September 26, 2020, while getting dressed for a medical
appointment, Brown slammed his hand into a locker. During the
appointment, Brown showed Jane Doe his fingers, which were swollen,

disfigured, and painful, and told her he believed they were broken.
Doe told Brown to submit a sick call request. Brown did so on
September 28, 2020. On October 1, 2020, Brown saw Defendant
Athemidor for an unrelated medical appointment and complained
about the pain in his fingers. Athemidor responded that the
appointment was not for his fingers and told Brown to submit a
sick call request.
Brown submitted a second sick call request for his fingers on
October 9, 2020. Ten days later, at a medical appointment for
unrelated issues, Brown showed Ricewick his fingers. Ricewick
stated the fingers looked broken and advised Brown to submit a
sick call request. Brown submitted his third sick call request

on October 20, 2020. During another unrelated medical visit ten
days later, Brown showed Beard and Jackson his fingers, complained
about the pain, and informed the nurses he had injured the fingers
almost a month earlier. Beard and Jackson recommended Brown
submit a sick call request. During another unrelated medical
visit on November 2, 2020, Ricewick again suggested that Brown
submit another sick call request for his fingers.
Brown submitted his fourth request on November 23, 2020.
Brown saw Jackson for another unrelated medical visit the next
day. Brown brought up his fingers again, and Jackson said she was
tired of hearing about them. On December 24, 2020, Ricewick
finally saw Brown for his injured fingers. Ricewick noted the

fourth and fifth fingers on Browns right hand were swollen and
deformed and ordered an x-ray, which confirmed the fingers were
fractured.
Brown accuses each Defendant of violating his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to treat a serious medical need. He
seeks a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, and his costs
and fees.
II. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The preferential

standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings adorned
with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme
Court has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss
a claim when a party does not plead facts that make the claim
facially plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a court can draw
a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing
party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted)). And
a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions amounting

to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Brown files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state
a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant
deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal
law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law.
Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In
addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative
causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d
1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. Discussion

Defendants first claim Brown’s Complaint is a shotgun
pleading. A shotgun pleading is one that fails to comply with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b), or both. The
problem with shotgun pleadings is that they fail “to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Brown’s
Complaint does not suffer this defect. It states in clear and
plain language the specific factual allegations against each
Defendant in separate, sequentially numbered paragraphs, and it
separately accuses each Defendant of deliberate indifference to

Brown’s serious medical need. Brown’s Complaint is not a shotgun
pleading.
Defendants next argue Brown fails to state an Eighth Amendment
claim. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court established that
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
But not every claim of inadequate medical treatment gives rise to
an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 105. Negligence in
diagnosis or treatment—even if it constitutes medical malpractice—
does not necessarily violate the constitution. Id. at 106.
“To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to serious

medical need in violation of the [Eighth] Amendment, a plaintiff
must show: ‘(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant['s]
deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between
that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.’” Youmans v.
Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mann v. Taser
Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009)). In the
Eleventh Circuit, “[a] serious medical need is ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.’” Shaw v. Allen, 701 F. App’x 891, 893
(11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2003)). “Severe pain that is not promptly or adequately

treated can…constitute a serious medical need depending on the
circumstances.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1222 (11th Cir.
2016). Brown claims his fractured fingers were swollen, painful,
and disfigured, and that Defendants declined to treat the fingers
for three months. The Court finds that Brown has plausibly alleged
a serious medical need. See Lepper v. Nguyen, 368 F. App’x 35,
39 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Lepper’s hand injury certainly qualifies as
an objectively serious medical need.”)
Deliberate indifference has three components: “(1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;
(3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Conduct that is more than mere negligence
includes: (1) grossly inadequate care; (2) a decision to take an
easier but less efficacious course of treatment; and (3) medical
care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all.” Id.
But “a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s
medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course
of treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference.”
Wilson v. Smith, 567 F. App’x 676, 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, matters of
medical judgment do not constitute deliberate indifference.” Id.
(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107).
Brown’s claims against each Defendant follow the same

pattern: Brown saw each nurse for a reason unrelated to his hand,
he showed the nurse his swollen and disfigured fingers and
complained of pain, and the nurse declined to treat the fingers
and advised Brown to submit a sick call request. Each Defendant
has responded to Brown’s Complaint with the same arguments: Brown
failed to allege (1) that Defendants had subjective knowledge of
a risk of serious harm, (2) that the delay in treatment caused him
to suffer injury, and (3) that each Defendant’s decision not to
treat Brown’s injury was a matter of medical judgment.
The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments. The Court can
reasonably infer from Brown’s allegations—that he showed each
nurse his swollen and disfigured fingers and complained about the

pain—that each Defendant knew Brown was in severe pain. The Court
can also reasonably infer that Defendants’ refusal to treat Brown’s
fingers prolonged his pain, which satisfies the causation element
at this stage of the case. The Complaint does not suggest
Defendants refused to treat Brown’s injured fingers due to their
medical judgment. In fact, each nurse at least implicitly
acknowledged a need for treatment by advising Brown to submit a
sick call request.
In sum, the Court finds that Brown’s Complaint plausibly
pleads that each Defendant violated his Highth Amendment rights by
refusing to treat his fractured fingers.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 12)
is DENIED. Defendants must answer the Complaint within 14 days
of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 10th day
of February 2022.

Not & AKL.
JGHE E. STEELE
Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109384. Public record. Not legal advice.