# Brown v. Transunion, LLC

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 4, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109363

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 4, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109363

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that while leave to amend ought generally to be freely granted, leave to amend need not be granted when any amendment would be futile

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

SHEKEVIA BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:21-cv-2371-VMC-JSS

TRANS UNION, LLC,
EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES, LLC, and
EXETER FINANCE, LLC,

Defendants.

____________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Exeter
Finance, LLC on December 27, 2021. (Doc. # 35). Plaintiff
Shekevia Brown responded on January 17, 2022, and Exeter filed
a reply on January 27, 2022. (Doc. ## 38, 47). For the reasons
given below, the Motion is granted.
I. Background
On October 7, 2021, Brown initiated this lawsuit,
alleging that Defendants Exeter, Trans Union, LLC, and
Equifax Information Services, LLC had violated her rights
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). (Doc. # 1). She
alleged that Trans Union and Equifax are consumer reporting
agencies (“CRAs”) and that Exeter furnished information to
the CRAs. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-12). The complaint alleges that Trans
Union and Equifax prepared and issued credit reports that
contained “inaccurate and misleading information” relating to
Brown’s Exeter account. (Id. at ¶ 14). Specifically, the
information furnished by Exeter and published by the CRAs “is
inaccurate since the accounts contain an incorrect current

payment status of ‘90 days past due’” when, in fact, the
account was paid and closed. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 16). According to
Brown, this “pay status” field is “specifically designed to
be understood as the current status of the account.” (Id. at
¶ 18). Further, “credit scoring algorithms take [the payment
status] field into account when generating a credit score,
and when it is showing this negative status, it would cause
a lower credit score to be generated than a closed status.”
(Id.).
Based on these allegations, Brown sued Trans Union and
Equifax for alleged FCRA violations and, as pertinent to the

instant Motion, also alleged claims of willful and negligent
FCRA violations under of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 against Exeter
(Counts Five and Six of the Complaint). (Id. at 12-15).
This case has been dismissed as to Trans Union, and
Equifax has filed an answer. (Doc. ## 21, 45). On November
24, 2021, Exeter filed its answer to the complaint. (Doc. #
22). Thereafter, Exeter filed its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. (Doc. # 35). The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. ##
38, 47) and is now ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the

pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings
is governed by the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.” StoneEagle Servs., Inc. v. Pay-Plus Sols., Inc.,
No. 8:13-cv-2240-VMC-MAP, 2015 WL 518852, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 9, 2015)(citations omitted). “In determining whether a
party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, [the Court]
accept[s] as true all material facts alleged in the non-
moving party’s pleading, and [the Court] view[s] those facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Perez
v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014).

When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
courts may consider documents that are not a part of the
pleadings so long as those documents are central to the claim
at issue and their authenticity is undisputed. Id. at 1340
n.12. Here, Brown’s Trans Union and Equifax credit reports,
while not attached to the pleadings, are central to her FCRA
claims and although the parties may dispute how they should
be legally interpreted, no party challenges the reports’
authenticity. See (Doc. # 38 at 3 n.1). Accordingly, the Court
will consider the credit reports.
III. Analysis
The FCRA requires entities that furnish information to

CRAs, such as Exeter, to furnish accurate information. 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A). Once such entities receive notice
of a dispute regarding the completeness or accuracy of any
information, the entity must conduct an investigation, review
all relevant information, and report the results of the
investigation to the CRA. Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(C). If the
investigation finds information to be inaccurate or
incomplete, the reporting entity must modify, delete, or
permanently block that item of information. Id. § 1681s-
2(b)(1)(E).
Here, Brown alleges that Exeter violated this duty when

it “failed to conduct its reinvestigation in good faith” and
“continued to report this account on the Plaintiff’s credit
report after being notified of her dispute regarding the
current payment status.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 64-65, 75-76).
The statute contemplates three possible outcomes of a
satisfactory investigation: (1) the information is accurate
and complete; (2) the information is inaccurate or
incomplete; or (3) the information cannot be verified. Felts
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir.
2018). Whether the furnisher has satisfied its obligations
under Section 1681s-2(b) is reviewed under a reasonableness

standard. Id. “When a furnisher ends its investigation by
reporting that the disputed information has been verified as
accurate, the question of whether the furnisher behaved
reasonably will turn on whether the furnisher acquired
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
information was true.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has declared
that a Section 1681s-2(b) claim “cannot survive a motion to
dismiss without some supportable allegation that the reported
information is inaccurate or incomplete.” Leones v. Rushmore
Loan Mgt. Servs., LLC, 749 Fed. App’x 897, 901 (11th Cir.

2018).
The Court now turns to Brown’s Exeter account
information, as reflected in the Trans Union and Equifax
credit reports.
Trans Union
The relevant portion of the Trans Union report is
reproduced below:
EXETER FINANCE LLC i (2101 W JOHN CARPENTER FWY, IRVING, TX 75063, (800) 321-9637)
Date Opened: 03/11/2019 Date Updated: 09/15/2020 Pay Status: »Account 60 Days Past Due Date<
Responsibility: Individual Account Payment Received: $0 Terms: $0 per month, paid Monthly for 74
Account Type: Installment Account Last Payment Made: 09/15/2020 months
Loan Type: AUTOMOBILE Date Closed: 09/15/2020
»Maximum Delinquency of 60 days in 08/2020
for $649 and in 09/2020«
High Balance: High balance of $14,045 from 04/2019 to 09/2020
Remarks: CLOSED
Estimated month and yearthat this item will be removed: 06/2027
[09/2020 | 08/2020 | 07/2020 | 06/2020 | 05/2020 | 04/2020 | 03/2020 | 02/2020 | 01/2020 | 12/2019 | 11/2019 | 10/2019 _|
Balance) S215] S251) 913,169 $13,288 915,414) 913,559 913,005| 913,764 913,578 $13,375]
P. int
Amount Paid
PastDue | SQ] Gea $324) SSS SSS
Rating
Logjz019 | 08/2019 | 07/2019 | 06/2019 | 05/2019 | 04/2019 |
Balance) 913,497 $13,021] $13,75¢ $13,850, 913,965 $14,077]
Payment
Amount Paid
PastDbue | SQ] SSH SSS
Rating
The document reflects that the “last payment made” was
on September 15, 2020, and the “payment received” was $0.
(Doc. # 35-2 at 5). The account was also closed on September
15, 2020, with a SO balance. Still, Brown’s credit report
continued to show that the Exeter account was 60 days past
due.! Under “Remarks,” the account shows “CLOSED.” (Id.).
Equifax
The relevant portion of the Equifax report is reproduced
below:

1 While Brown alleged in the Complaint that the pay status
was “90 days past due,” the exhibit reflects that the account
was actually marked as 60 days past due. The discrepancy is
irrelevant for purposes of the Court’s analysis.

>>> The information you disputed has been updated as well as other information on this item. Account # - 6 443° The results are:
This account has been updated. Additional information has been provided from the original source regarding this item. THE FOLLOWING FIELDS HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED: “STATUS “BALANCE “PAST DUE “SCHEDULED PAYMENT “CLOSED DATE *ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR *ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION “ACCOUNT HISTORY. If you have additional questions about this item please contact: Exeter, PO Box 166097, IRVING, TX
75076-6097
Exeter Finance PO Box 166097 Irving TX T50176- 6097
Account Number Drake O pared High Credit Cracit Lime Terns Duration «9 Terms Frequency Months Revd = Activity Designate Creditor Clasaflcadion
4" O91V/ai9 $14,045 74Morths Monthly 18 Paid and Closed
iems As cfO@e Gamnos “mou | Datectlast ActmiPaymant ScwauadPayment Oatectls Caectlas CateMa) Del Cragect . CweredPayGalonPay GulconPay Daan
Fiepertedl Amaurt Pst Due Poyrant Amauri Amount Delrquency Activity 4stFiped Amount Stat Date = Amount Dom Cloned
11/19/2020 $0 092020 $34 07/2020 og2020
Tan 'wa@Aoone |. ‘yemofooam |. Whe Acare |. PuUt@@lom@canr . . POM@OOGMEm |.
Charge Off Installment Auto Individual Account
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Account Paid For Less Than Full Balance
Closed or Paid Account/Zero Balance
Auto
Fixed Rate
Account History with Status Codes
or/2020
3 2 1

[Historical Account Information |
OP eer fer pee, PR Be
Payment Payment Last (Credit Limit Past Loan Desi gnator
Amaurit Amount Payrieant Due
[to20_[NoData Availabe
NT
ov20 [s2i77_ □□□ se fogmiamo [sos TS Auto □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
IN FORTRTRE
FuedRato
NT
fow2o [sates see formivamo [sta Tse Auto
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Fixed Rate

fov20 saia5_ gazes ato Jorma [stom | sme tut CT
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Fixed Rate
NT
fow2o |sasia_ sme | t06s2_fosmiemo [sos TT
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Fixed Rate

The document reflects that, under “activity designator,”
the account is marked “Paid and Closed.” (Doc. # 35-1 at 10).
The “balance amount” is $0. The last payment was made in
September 2020, and the account was closed that same month.
Under “status,” the account is marked “Charge Off.” And under
“Additional Information,” the account states: “Account Paid
for Less than Full Balance; Closed or Paid Account/Zero
Balance.” (Id.)}. Under “Account History,” September 2020 is

coded a “3,” meaning the account was 90-119 days past due.
(Id. at 4, 10). Like the Trans Union report, the Equifax
report shows that the account was up to date in June 2020,
became $324 past due in July 2020, then $649 past due in
August 2020, and the account was closed in September 2020.
(Id. at 11).
Here, Brown’s claim against Exeter fails because she has

failed to set forth a supportable allegation that the reported
information is inaccurate or misleading. See Leones, 749 F.
App’x at 901; see also Diaz v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No.
2:20-cv-437-JLB-MRM, 2021 WL 2814908, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb.
19, 2021) (applying Felts and Leones to conclude that a
plaintiff must plausibly allege that a “consumer’s
information [is] actually inaccurate” in order to state a
claim under Section 1681s-2(b)).
In the Eleventh Circuit, accuracy under the FCRA means
that the information “must be factually true and also unlikely
to lead to a misunderstanding.” Erickson v. First Advantage

Background Servs. Corp., 981 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2020).
Whether a report is “misleading” is an “objective” question.
Id. “If a report is so misleading that it is objectively
likely to cause the intended user to take adverse action
against its subject, it is not maximally accurate. On the
other hand, the fact that some user somewhere could possibly
squint at a report and imagine a reason to think twice about
its subject would not render the report objectively

misleading.” Id. When evaluating claims of inaccurate or
false information in a credit report, ”the report must be
reviewed and considered in its entirety, instead of focusing
on a single field of data.” Lacey v. TransUnion, LLC, No.
8:21-cv-519-WFJ-JSS, 2021 WL 2917602, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July
12, 2021).
Here, when viewing the credit reports in their entirety,
it is readily apparent that the account is accurate and not
misleading. The Trans Union report clearly states that the
account (1) has a balance of $0; (2) was last updated on
September 15, 2020; (3) was closed on September 15, 2020; (4)
was 60 days past due in August and September 2020; and (5) is
closed. Likewise, the Equifax account clearly states that the
account (1) is “Paid and Closed” and (2) was closed in
September 2020 (3) with a “Zero Balance.”

Viewing the credit reports objectively and in their
entirety, the only reasonable reading of the Exeter account
is that the account was past due in September 2020, at which
time the account was updated one last time and closed –
zeroing out the balance. It does not indicate, as Brown
argues, that she is currently 60 days (or 90 days) past due.
See O’Neal v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, et al., No. 21-cv-
80968-RAR, 2021 WL 4989943, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2021)
(pointing out that, under nearly identical facts, “there is
no possible way that a reasonable creditor would believe that
Plaintiff was 120 days late on a $0 balance”).
Other courts in this District have reached similar

conclusions on similar facts. See Lacey, 2021 WL 2917602, at
*6 (“[W]hen Plaintiff Lacey’s credit report is viewed in its
entirety, it is clear that it was accurately reported and is
not misleading. On its face, the credit report reflects that
as of August 7, 2015, the account: (1) had a balance of $0;
(2) was last updated on August 7, 2015; (3) was closed on
that same date; (4) was 120 days past due from June 2015
through August 7, 2015; and (5) was foreclosed with collateral
sale. Objectively, no reasonable creditor looking at the
report would be misled into believing that Plaintiff Lacey
had a present pending amount due.”); Smith v. Transunion,

LLC, No. 6:21-cv-349-GAP-LRH, 2021 WL 3111583, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. July 1, 2021) (“When viewed in its entirety, Trans
Union’s reporting of the Account is neither inaccurate nor
materially misleading. The report shows a pay status that is
60 days past due, but also shows that the Account was fully
paid off and closed, leaving a $0 balance. Smith does not
deny that she was at least 60 days past due when she paid off
the Account or otherwise claim that there was any factual
error in the report. Smith nevertheless argues that the pay
status section, which shows that the Account was 60 days past
due at the time it was closed, is materially misleading
because a creditor viewing the report may believe the Account

is still open and overdue. But the pay status section reflects
historical information regarding a past delinquency and does
not suggest that the Account is still open and past due.
Indeed, the Account clearly notates that it is closed and
that 60 days is simply the maximum delinquency that occurred
during the Account’s history. Therefore, the report is not
misleading as a matter of law, and that no reader would
mistakenly believe the Account is somehow still open.”);
Pineda v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 2:21-cv-653-SPC-MRM, 2021 WL
5798282, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2021) (“But looking
objectively at the report as a whole (not just at the ‘Pay

Status’ field as Pineda urges), it is not materially
misleading. The ‘Pay Status’ field reflects historical
information. The first page of the report explains that for
closed accounts (such as the Habitat account), the ‘Pay
Status’ field represents the last reported status of the
account. The ‘Pay Status’ field does not say that it
represents the current status of the account. The report notes
that the Habitat account is closed and that 30 days is the
maximum delinquency on the account reported in September
2015. Thus, viewing the credit report objectively, there is
no possible way that a reasonable creditor would believe that
Plaintiff was [30] days late on a $0 balance. (citations

omitted)); see also Deonarine v. TransUnion, LLC, et al., No.
6:21-cv-1278-GAP-GJK, at p. 7-8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2021)
(attached to Exeter’s Motion as Exh. C (Doc. # 35-3))
(dismissing identical claims against a CRA and an information
furnisher as without merit because no reasonable creditor
would believe the account was currently 120 days past due and
the report was not misleading as a matter of law).
In her response, Brown cites and attaches a different
Equifax credit report than the one submitted by Exeter. See
(Doc. # 38-1). She argues that the report cited by Exeter
contains Equifax’s investigation results in response to her

dispute, noting that the credit report cited by Exeter states
that:
The information you disputed has been updated as
well as other information on this item. Account #
- 8443* The results are:
This account has been updated. Additional
information has been provided from the original
source regarding this item. THE FOLLOWING FIELDS
HAVE BEEN MODIFIED: *STATUS *BALANCE *PAST DUE
*SCHEDULED PAYMENT *CLOSED DATE *ACTIVITY
DESIGNATOR *ADDITIONAL INFORMATION *ACCOUNT
HISTORY.

(Doc. # 38 at 6-7); see also (Doc. # 35-1 at 10). Brown points
out that the “original report . . . contains no such
designations” and instead states the following under “Account
Status”: “NOT_MORE_THAN_THREE_PAYMENTS_PAST_DUE.” (Doc. #
38-1 at 20). Under “Comments,” the account states “Consumer
disputes – reinvestigation in progress.” (Id. at 21).
But this argument does not carry the day for Brown.
Looking at the presumably earlier-in-time credit report
submitted by Brown as a whole, it is still readily apparent
that the account was closed in September 2020 with a $0
balance. (Doc. # 38-1 at 20-21 (stating a $0 “Balance” and a
“Date Closed” of September 1, 2020)). Thus, even without the
“Paid and Closed” language contained in the later report,
this credit report is also not inaccurate or misleading. See
Lacey, 2021 WL 2917602, at *6 (finding that, even in absence
of a “paid and closed” notation, credit report was not
inaccurate or misleading where the closing date and balance
indicated that account was closed); Smith, 2021 WL 3111583,
at *2 (same).
In addition, Brown does not dispute that the status of
the account as of the date the complaint was filed is correct.
She instead asserts that the “pay status” field “would cause
a lower credit score to be generated than a closed status.”
(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 18). She alleges that computer algorithms take
the “pay status” field into account when automatically
generating credit scores and that “[f]or this reason, it is

not appropriate to state that when the report is read as a
whole contains enough information as to not harm the consumer,
since the harm to the credit score is happening automatically
with this false information.” (Id. at ¶¶ 18-20).
But this argument has been rejected by multiple courts.
See Deonarine, Doc. # 35-3 at 8; Pineda, 2021 WL 5798282, at
*3; O’Neal, 2021 WL 4989943, at *3. As explained by the court
in O’Neal:
[S]uch allegations “completely ignore[] Eleventh
Circuit case law and the requirements of the FCRA
[because] . . . the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in
Cahlin and Erickson instruct lower courts to
consider ‘objectively reasonable interpretations
of the report.’ How third-party companies choose to
utilize algorithms to decipher the accurate
information reported by Defendant has no bearing on
the accuracy of the report itself. Plaintiff
essentially posits that Trans Union is required to
‘report only that information which is favorable or
beneficial to the consumer[,]’ which runs directly
afoul of Eleventh Circuit precedent and the FCRA.
O’Neal, 2021 WL 4989943, at *3. The Court agrees and adopts
the reasoning of the O’Neal court in this case.
Brown argues that the binding holding in Erickson and
the persuasive views set forth in O’Neal and Pineda are
“antiquated” and out of touch with the “real world of credit
lending.” (Doc. # 38 at 18-19). But this Court cannot ignore
binding and on-point Eleventh Circuit precedent. Moreover, to

the extent Brown argues that the text of the FCRA needs to be
updated to reflect modern technology, Congress is the branch
with the power to do so, not the courts.
In sum, the Court agrees with Exeter that Brown’s FCRA
claims are due to be dismissed. Further, because the text of
the credit reports is not in dispute, and it is derogatory
but not materially inaccurate, amendment of these claims
would be futile. Because Brown cannot establish inaccuracy or
falsehood in the reports, her claims against Exeter are due
to be dismissed with prejudice. See Lacey, 2021 WL 2917602,
at *6 (dismissing similar claims with prejudice); Smith, 2021

WL 3111583, at *2 (same); see also Silberman v. Miami Dade
Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining
that while leave to amend ought generally to be freely
granted, leave to amend need not be granted when any amendment
would be futile). Accordingly, Exeter’s Motion is due to be
granted and Brown’s claims against Exeter dismissed with
prejudice.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), this
Court may only direct entry of a final judgment as to fewer
than all claims or parties if the Court determines that there
is no just reason to delay entry of such final judgment. Here,
while, the Court has granted Exeter’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, Brown’s claims against Equifax are still
pending. Accordingly, the Court will not enter final judgment
at this time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Exeter Finance, LLC’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. # 35) is GRANTED.
(2) Counts Five and Six of the Complaint are dismissed with
prejudice.
(3) This case shall proceed as to the remaining Defendant,
Equifax Information Services, LLC.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
4th day of February, 2022.

fami 9m. Hunenby Cree
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109363. Public record. Not legal advice.