# Grames v. Sarasota County, Florida

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 25, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109293

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 25, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

WILLIAM GRAMES, BROOKE
GRAMES, CRAIG B. DICKIE,
CYNTHIA D. DICKIE, JUDY H.
JOHNSON, JAMES KOSTAN, DIANE
KOSTAN, PATRICK J. LOYET and
LISA A. LOYET,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 8:20-cv-739-CEH-CPT

SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.
___________________________________/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant United States of America’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 95). In the motion,
the United States requests this Court enter an order dismissing with prejudice Count
I, which asserts a claim against the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C.
2409a. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (Doc. 102), and the United States
replied (Doc. 105). Also pending is Sarasota County’s Motion Joining the United
States’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 101). The Court, having considered the motions and
being fully advised in the premises, will grant Defendants’ motions, dismiss Count I
of the Second Amended Complaint, and dismiss the United States as a party to this
action.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs, William and Brooke Grames, Craig B. and Cynthia D. Dickie, Judy

H. Johnson, James and Diane Kostan, and Patricia J. and Lisa A. Loyet, (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) are owners of five properties in Sarasota, Florida. Doc. 93 ¶ 1. Plaintiffs
seek a declaration as to the respective rights to their property and to enjoin Sarasota
County from removing or demolishing their private property in order to build the
northern extension of the Legacy Trail. Id. The Legacy Trail is a public recreational

trail and a rail-trail corridor easement the federal government “railbanked” under the
National Trails System Act.2 Each of the five owners holds title to the fee estate in
land that is now subject to the Surface Transportation Board’s (“the Transportation
Board”) order invoking section 8(d) of the Trail Act. Doc. 93 ¶ 1. The Board, successor
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, is an agency of the United States. Id. ¶ 23.

The parties are familiar, as set forth in several prior orders, with the general
background of this rails-to-trails case regarding Adrian Honore’s granting of a right-
of-way easement to Seaboard Air Line Railway and CSXT Transportation and
Seminole Gulf Railway’s ultimate abandonment of the line. See Docs. 10, 66, 84.

1 The following statement of facts is derived from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 93), the allegations of which the Court must accept as true in ruling on the instant
Motion to Dismiss. Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1992); Quality Foods de
Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp. S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994 (11th Cir. 1983).
2 “The National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments), Pub. L. 98-11, 97
Stat. 48, to the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), Pub. L. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified,
as amended, at 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq.), is the culmination of congressional efforts to preserve
shrinking rail trackage by converting unused rights-of-way to recreational trails.” Preseault v.
I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990).
Relevant to the United States’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs assert a Quiet Title
Act (“QTA”) claim against the United States and Sarasota County in Count I of the
Second Amended Complaint. Doc. 93 ¶¶ 73–85. Specifically, Plaintiffs sue the United

States for the conduct of the Transportation Board and its members. Id. ¶ 23. A QTA
claim must set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which
the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired,
and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States. Id ¶ 76 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2409a(d)).

Regarding Plaintiffs’ claimed title in the property, Plaintiffs allege that William
and Brook Grames (“the Grames family”) bought their land on September 30, 1999.
Doc. 93 ¶ 2. Their property is identified by Sarasota County as parcel #0089-01-0055.
Id. ¶ 3. The Grames family holds title to the fee estate in land now subject to the Board’s

order invoking the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 4. By reason of the Transportation Board’s
invocation of section 8(d) of the Trails Act, the Grames family’s land is now subject to
an easement for public recreation and railbanking. Id. The Grames family owned their
property in May 2019 when the Transportation Board invoked section 8(d) of the
federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 5.

Plaintiffs Craig and Cynthia Dickie (“the Dickie family”) bought their land on
January 26, 1978 and owned their property in May 2019 when the Transportation
Board invoked section 8(d) of the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. The Dickie family’s
property is identified by Sarasota County as parcel #0053-04-0006. Id. ¶ 7. The Dickie
family holds title to the fee estate in land now subject to the Transportation Board’s
order invoking the federal Trails Act, and by reason of the Board’s invocation of
section 8(d) of the Trails Act, the land is now subject to an easement for public
recreation and railbanking.3 Id. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff Judy Johnson (“Johnson”) bought her land on January 19, 1998, and
owned the property in May 2019 when the Transportation Board invoked section 8(d)
of the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13. Johnson’s property is identified by Sarasota
County as parcel #0089-16-0006. Id. ¶ 11. She holds title to the fee estate in land now

subject to the Transportation Board’s order invoking the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 12.
By reason of the Board’s invocation of section 8(d) of the Trails Act, Johnson’s land is
now subject to an easement for public recreation and railbanking. Id.
Plaintiffs James and Diane Kostan (“the Kostan family”) bought their land on
December 16, 2011. Id. ¶ 14. The property is identified by Sarasota County as parcel

#0053-14-0002. Id. ¶ 15. The Kostan family holds title to the fee estate in land now
subject to the Transportation Board’s order invoking the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 16.
By reason of the Transportation Board’s invocation of section 8(d) of the Trails Act,
the Kostan family’s land is now subject to an easement for public recreation and
railbanking. Id. The Kostan family owned their property in May 2019 when the Board

invoked section 8(d) of the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 17.

3 “The term railbanking refers to the ‘preservation of railroad corridor for future rail use,’
while making the corridor available for other activities.” Caldwell v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl.
193, 194 (2003) (quoting Arnold v. United States, 137 Fed. Cl. 524, 552 (2018)).
Patrick and Lisa Loyet (“the Loyet family”) bought their land on January 30,
2001. Id. ¶ 18. The Loyet family’s property is identified by Sarasota County as parcel
#0070- 15-0037. Id. ¶ 19. The Loyet family holds title to the fee estate in land now

subject to the Transportation Board’s order invoking the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 20.
By reason of the Transportation Board’s invocation of section 8(d) of the Trails Act,
the Loyet family’s land is now subject to an easement for public recreation and
railbanking. Id. The Loyet family owned their property in May 2019 when the Board

invoked section 8(d) of the federal Trails Act. Id. ¶ 21.
Plaintiffs allege the United States’ right, title, or interest arises from the
Transportation Act of 1920. Id. ¶ 78. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the United States
took “an owner’s state law interest” in the real property under an abandoned or
terminated railroad line when the Transportation Board invoked section 8(d) of the

Trails Act. Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiffs allege the terms of the Honore easement originally
granted to Seaboard Air Line Railway was limited to use for railroad purposes and did
not contemplate other uses, such as for a public recreational trial. Id. ¶ 54. Thus,
Plaintiffs allege the United States’ invocation of the Trails Act imposed a new
easement on the landowners and “effected a Fifth Amendment taking of their

property.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 418, 432 (2009)).
Plaintiffs allege the United States’ right, title, and interest in land for a new rail-
trail corridor is preemptive of any right, title or interest the owners may hold under
state law. Id. ¶ 80. Additionally, the United States may reacquire the right to reactivate
rail service over the railbanked line. Id. ¶ 81. As to the United States’ right, title and
interest in the Plaintiffs’ real property, Plaintiffs allege the United States claims an
interest in the subject property for interim use as a public recreational trail and for use

as a future railroad. Id. ¶ 82.
Plaintiffs allege Sarasota County’s right, title, and interest in the real property
(as a trail user) is authorized by the Transportation Board for interim use as a
recreational trail and is subject to the right of the Board to replace Sarasota County
with another trail user or authorize a rail carrier to build a railway across the land. Id.

¶ 83.
Plaintiffs seek a determination by the Court as to “the right, title, and interest
the United States took in these owners’ real property” and what “right, title, and
interest in the subject property the United States gave to Sarasota County to use.” Id.

¶ 85.
The United States moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ QTA claim—the sole claim
pending against the United States in the Second Amended Complaint. Doc. 95. The
United States argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, citing two alternative
bases to support dismissal. First, the United States argues Plaintiffs fail to plead a

disputed interest in real property with the particularity required by the QTA to satisfy
their burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity. Second, even if Plaintiffs
were able to allege a real property interest claimed by the United States, Plaintiffs’
claims nevertheless fail as their QTA claim is simply an artfully pleaded Fifth
Amendment takings claim over which the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs respond that they have properly pleaded a QTA claim against the

United States. Doc. 102. Regarding the United States’ claimed interest, Plaintiffs argue
the United States claimed, and continues to claim, reserved easements in the Plaintiffs’
property. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that a QTA claim against the United States
is proper where, as here, a third party asserts the United States’ interests. Plaintiffs
submit that the United States’ jurisdictional challenge is a facial attack, and thus the

Court is limited to considering the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs assert the
United States, through the Board’s invocation of the Trails Act, has claimed an interest
in the subject property for use by Sarasota County as a recreational trail. Plaintiffs
allege they have interests in this same property by reason of their deeds granting them
title to the fee estate.

In response to the United States’ argument that the Second Amended
Complaint is a cleverly pleaded takings claim that should be litigated in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, Plaintiffs contend that the Court of Federal Claims can only award
money damages and does not have equitable jurisdiction to hear a QTA claim, nor
does it have jurisdiction over Sarasota County. For the reasons that follow, the Court

will grant Defendants’ motions and dismiss Count I of the Second Amended
Complaint.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In this case, the United States challenges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

A defendant may attack subject matter jurisdiction in two different ways—facially and
factually. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
Here, the United States makes a facial challenge. A facial attack on subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) “requires [] the court merely to look and see if [the]
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the

allegations in [the] complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.” Id. at
1529 (citations omitted). In assessing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule12(b)(1) the
Court affords Plaintiffs the same safeguards as those provided in opposing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, it considers all allegations of the complaint as true and it is confined
to the four corners of the complaint. Id.

III. DISCUSSION
It is black letter law that “[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit
[unless] it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court
define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted). The United States contends the Court lacks

jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a waiver of sovereign
immunity. The terms “upon which the Government consents to be sued must be
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Soriano v. United States,
352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957).
One such scenario in which the United States consents to be sued is in a properly
pleaded quiet title action. The QTA provides that the “United States may be named
as a party defendant in a civil action . . . to adjudicate a disputed title to real property

in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water
rights.” McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2409a(a)). As the phrase “adjudicate a disputed title” itself demonstrates,
there must be a dispute, and that dispute must relate to “title to real property.” Id. “The
dispute must not merely concern ‘title to real property’ in the abstract, but must

concern the quality of title between the plaintiff and the United States and not the
quality of title between the United States and a third party.” Id. (citation omitted).
As the United States’ motion points out, in Count I, Plaintiffs are seeking a
declaration of the respective rights, title and interest claimed by the parties. This

requested relief demonstrates the futility of Plaintiffs’ pleading. A QTA claim must
allege the right, title or interest claimed by the United States that is in dispute with the
Plaintiffs’ claimed interest. A QTA claim is not a vehicle for the Court to determine
what interest the United States claims.
The QTA provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to determine title

to disputed real property, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), and is only applicable where the
United States claims an interest in the subject property. Plaintiffs contend that the
United States asserted an interest to the subject property by the Board’s invocation of
the Trails Act thereby making Plaintiffs’ properties subject to an easement for public
recreation and railbanking. The United States responds that the property rights in a
rail-banked right-of-way are those of the trail sponsor, i.e., Sarasota County, and not
the United States. Doc. 95 at 13 (collecting cases). Indeed, review of the Plaintiffs’
allegations reveals the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaints concern Sarasota County’s

efforts to remove encroachments from Plaintiffs’ land such as “fences, sheds, septic
drain fields, warehouses, swimming pools, and other improvements.” Doc. 93 ¶¶ 64–
70. Thus, the competing claims to the property at issue are the Plaintiffs’ desire to leave
their sheds and swimming pools intact on the subject easement where they have
existed for decades, and Sarasota County’s interest in having these improvements

removed for a public recreational trail.
Plaintiffs allege that the United States holds an interest in the land to the extent
that the property may be reactivated as a railroad in the future. It is true the Board
retains regulatory authority over the railway line, including the power to reactivate
railroad service at some point in the future. A QTA claim, however, is not the

appropriate vehicle to challenge a federal agency’s regulatory authority. See, e.g., Sch.
Bd. of Avoyelles Parish v. Dep’t of the Interior, 647 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Nothing
in the text of the QTA suggests that it authorizes a suit to collaterally challenge a
permit issued by a federal agency.”). Further, Plaintiffs’ attempt to identify the United

States’ interest in the property as some amount of sticks it has retained after giving
Sarasota County a lesser number of sticks, see Doc. 93 ¶ 84, is too vague to sufficiently
allege a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs rely on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Leisnoi v. United States, 267 F.3d
1019, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001) for the proposition that this court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate a dispute when a third party’s claim clouds the plaintiff’s title. This Court
has previously stated that Plaintiffs’ claim that their titles are “clouded” does not
satisfy the specific pleadings requirements of § 2409a(d) and is too vague to establish

a waiver of sovereign immunity. Doc. 84 at 9. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has
made clear that the dispute in a QTA action must be a dispute calling into question
the title or ownership of the property as between the plaintiff and the United States.
McMaster, 177 F.3d at 941–42 (holding court lacked jurisdiction to consider QTA
claim where the present dispute between plaintiff and the United States concerning the

covenants failed to call into question either the title to or the ownership of the subject
property as between plaintiff and the United States).
Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Plaintiffs’ grievances derive from their
dissatisfaction with Sarasota County’s efforts to remove improvements from Plaintiffs’
land. Because Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege a disputed interested vis-a-vis the

United States, Plaintiffs fail to plead a cause of action under the Quiet Title Act and
fail to sufficiently allege the waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, the motion to dismiss
is due to be granted for lack of jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs have been given an
opportunity to identify the United States’ claimed interest that is in dispute and have
failed to do so. The Court finds further amendment would be futile.

Although Plaintiff names Sarasota County in Count I, a claim under the Quiet
Title Act (“QTA”) is a claim against the United States. Thus, Count I is due to be
dismissed against Sarasota County.
The United States alternatively argues that this action is merely a disguised
takings case, over which the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction. The Court
agrees. Where the primary focus of litigation is an effort by a plaintiff to obtain money

from the Government, as it is here, “the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court
cannot be avoided by drafting a complaint which appears to seek only injunctive,
mandatory, or declaratory relief against the Government.” Chula Vista City Sch. Dist. v.
Bennett, 824 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Hoopa Valley Tribe v. United States, 596
F.2d 435, 436 (Ct. Cl. 1979)). Thus, even if Plaintiffs were able to effectively plead a

disputed interest by the United States, the ultimate issue here is how Plaintiffs will be
compensated for the taking of their property.
Plaintiffs allege the Honore easement was limited to railroad use and was not
authorized for recreational trails. In discussing the Honore easement in another rails-

to-trails case, the Court of Federal Claims in Rogers v. United States explained:
If standard abandonment had occurred . . . , the railroad, as
the owner of the servient estate, would not retain any
property interest in the right-of-way, and that property
interest would revert to the dominant landowner. Thus, by
preventing this reversion under state law, the Trails Act
effects a taking. . . . In another sense—the dominant
consideration in these types of taking cases-the taking
occurs when the government, pursuant to the Trails Act,
creates a new easement for a new use over land that was
encumbered by an easement limited to railroad purposes.
See Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Preseault II”) (describing the conversion of a railroad
easement to a recreational trail as “a new easement for [a]
new use”). The statutory imposition of this second
easement—which otherwise had not been granted—is a
taking.
Rogers, 90 Fed. Cl. at 428. As it relates to the United States, this is precisely the
situation here. A new easement was created for a new use and is appropriately
addressed by a Fifth Amendment takings case before the Court of Federal Claims.
Indeed, Plaintiffs have filed and are actively litigating their takings case regarding the
subject easement in the Court of Federal Claims.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendant United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 95) is GRANTED.
2. Sarasota County’s Motion Joining the United States of America’s
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 101) is GRANTED.
3. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.
4. As all claims against the United States in this action have been dismissed,
the Clerk is directed to terminate the United States as a party to this action.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on January 25, 2022.

□□□ lene Ldwarda Mp TDs gl ell
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge

Copies to:
Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10109293. Public record. Not legal advice.