# PB Legacy, Inc. v. American Mariculture, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · October 26, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108754

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** October 26, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

TB FOOD USA, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability
Company,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:17-cv-9-FtM-29NPM

AMERICAN MARICULTURE, INC.,
a Florida Corporation,
AMERICAN PENAEID, INC., a
Florida Corporation, and
ROBIN PEARL,

Defendants.

AMERICAN MARICULTURE, INC.,
a Florida Corporation,

Counter-Plaintiff,
v.

PB LEGACY, INC., a Texas
Corporation, KENNETH GERVAIS,
and RANDALL AUNGST,

Counter/Third-Party
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of the following
four motions in limine concerning expert witnesses: (1) defendants
American Mariculture, Inc., American Penaeid, Inc., and Robin
Pearl’s Motion to Limit or Exclude Expert Testimony By Dr. Lian
Gan (Doc. #328) filed on October 29, 2020; (2) defendants American
Mariculture, Inc., American Penaeid, Inc., and Robin Pearl’s
Motion to Limit or Exclude Expert Testimony By Carlos F. Massad
(Doc. #329) filed on October 29, 2020; (3) defendant American
Mariculture, Inc.’s Motion to Limit or Exclude Expert Testimony of
Granvil D. Treece (Doc. #330) filed on October 30, 2020; and (4)
plaintiff TB Food USA, LLC’s Motion to Partially Exclude The

Testimony of Experts Dr. Roger W. Doyle and Dr. James Wyban (Doc.
#331) filed on October 30, 2020. Defendants American Mariculture,
Inc., American Penaeid, Inc., and Robin Pearl (collectively, the
Defendants) filed a Response In Opposition to Plaintiff’s motion
(Doc. #341) on December 17, 2020. Plaintiff filed Responses in
Opposition to each motion (Doc. #342; Doc. #343; Doc. #344) on
December 18, 2020.
I.
In brief, Primo Broodstock, Inc. (Primo, nka PB Legacy), the
original plaintiff in this case, operated a commercial shrimp
breeding business and enlisted the assistance of defendant

American Mariculture, Inc. (AMI) and its Chief Executive Officer
Robin Pearl (Mr. Pearl) to provide a large indoor grow-out facility
in Florida. Primo and AMI entered into certain agreements to
effectuate this business relationship, and to ensure Primo’s
breeding techniques were kept confidential. (Doc. #20, ¶¶ 1-3;
Doc. #20-2.) Disputes arose between Primo and AMI. Ultimately,
AMI retained the Primo shrimp, and with the assistance of American
Penaeid, Inc. (API), bred and sold the Primo shrimp on the open
market. (Doc. #20, ¶¶ 40-42.) In 2017, Primo filed this lawsuit
against Defendants asserting breach of contract, misappropriation
of trade secrets, and unfair competition claims, among other
claims. (Doc. #1; Doc. #20.)

Plaintiff TB Food USA, LLC (Plaintiff1) has engaged Dr. Lian
Gan, Carlos F. Massad, and Granvil D. Treece to provide expert
testimony. Defendants seek to exclude some or all of their
testimony on a variety of grounds. Plaintiff in turn seeks to
exclude all or portions of the testimony of Defendants’ expert
witnesses, Dr. Roger W. Doyle and Dr. James Wyban.
II.
The admission of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Perry, No. 16-
11358, 2021 WL 4448600, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29333, at *16 (11th
Cir. Sep. 29, 2021). Rule 702 provides that:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

1 While this litigation was pending, plaintiff TB Food USA,
LLC (TB Food) purchased substantially all of Primo’s assets (Doc.
#253-2. As a result, this Court dismissed Primo as a plaintiff,
and found TB Food was now the proper party in interest. (Doc. #306,
pp. 16-18.)
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the
case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 contemplates that the district court
serve as gatekeeper for the admission of such testimony in order
to ensure that any and all expert testimony is both relevant and
reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589
(1993); Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng’g, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171, 1183
(11th Cir. 2013). “The Supreme Court did not intend, however,
that the gatekeeper role supplant the adversary system or the role
of the jury: vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2004) (marks and citations omitted).
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under
Rule 702, the Court applies a “rigorous” three-part inquiry.
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is
qualified to testify on the topic at issue, (2) the methodology
used by the expert is sufficiently reliable, and (3) the testimony
will assist the trier of fact. Perry, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29333,
at *16; Moore v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 995 F.3d 839, (11th Cir
2021). The burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission

of expert testimony “is on the party offering the expert, and the
admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010).
The admission of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion
of the district court, which is accorded considerable leeway in
making its determination. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1258.
The first requirement for the admissibility of expert
testimony is that the expert is qualified to testify competently
regarding the matters he or she intends to address. Frazier, 387
F.3d at 1269-61). Rule 702 permits a person to qualify as an
expert based upon knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260-61; Perry, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29333, at *17.
The second inquiry for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony is whether the methodology used by the expert is
sufficiently reliable. Tampa Bay Water, 731 F.3d at 1183. The
reliability prong is distinct from an expert's qualifications;
thus, an expert can be qualified but his opinions unreliable. See
Moore, 995 F.3d at 852; see also Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261. The
Supreme Court has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to
guide courts in assessing the reliability of expert opinions: "(1)
whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether

the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3)
the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific
technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in
the scientific community." Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1335 (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). Although these criteria are more
applicable to assessing the reliability of scientific opinions,
they "may be used to evaluate the reliability of non-scientific,
experience-based testimony." Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262 (citing
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
"Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to case,
but what remains constant is the requirement that the trial judge

evaluate the reliability of the testimony before allowing its
admission at trial." Id.
The third requirement for admissibility is that the expert
testimony must assist the trier of fact. “[E]xpert testimony is
admissible if it concerns matters that are beyond the understanding
of the average lay person. Proffered expert testimony generally
will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than
what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments."
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262-63; see also Edwards v. Shanley, 580 F.
App'x 816, 823 (11th Cir. 2014). “This condition goes primarily
to relevance.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
III.

With these standards in mind, the Court will address each of
the proposed experts.
A. Dr. Lian Gan
Plaintiff has proffered the expert testimony of Dr. Lian Gan
(Dr. Gan), who has a “Bachelor of Agriculture, a Master of
Agriculture, and . . . [in 2011 received] a Doctorate in Aquatic
Biology Aquaculture.”2 (Doc. #328-2, p. 3; Doc. 343-1, pp. 10-11.)3
Dr. Gan studied nutrition, reproduction, and immunization
concerning shrimp, fish, and other life forms. (Doc. #343-1, pp.
15-16.) Since 2015, Dr. Gan has worked as an Associate Professor
at Southern China Agriculture University, and he has also been

2 Aquaculture is “the breeding, rearing, and harvesting of
animals and plants in all types of water environments.”
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/aquaculture (last visited
Oct. 13, 2021).
3 The page numbers refer to those generated by the Court’s
computer system upon filing (upper left-hand corner) and do not
always correspond with the page number at the bottom of the
document.
employed as a consultant for various corporations involved in
shrimp reproduction. (Doc. #328-1, p. 32; Doc. #328-2, p. 4; Doc.
#343-1, pp. 11-12.) Dr. Gan’s doctoral thesis, along with his other
publications, focus on dietary issues in aquaculture. (Doc. #328-
2, pp. 5-6; Doc. #343-1, p 22.)
There are thirteen topics on which Dr. Gan proposes to offer

an opinion, which can fairly be reduced to the following six
categories: (1) the distinctiveness, value, and reputation of the
Primo name and its shrimp in commerce, including among shrimp
farmers and breeders in China; (2) Defendants’ and/or their agents
Charles Tuan and John Wu’s actions in using, marketing,
advertising, and associating Defendants shrimp with Primo, and the
impact in commerce as to these actions; (3) Defendants’ non-use of
the Primo name, and Defendants and its agents’ bad faith trademark
filing of the literal Mandarin translation of “Primo”; (4) the
confusion and/or deception caused in commerce, including the
Chinese shrimp broodstock market, by Defendants’ use, marketing

of, and association with the Primo name and Primo shrimp; (5)
resulting damages—unjust enrichment obtained by Defendants, as
well as the lost profits suffered by Plaintiff, the amount of
disgorgement to which Plaintiffs are entitled, and the price
erosion in the marketplace of Plaintiff’s shrimp due to Defendants’
sales and actions; and (6) the cost of corrective advertising to
alleviate any confusion Defendants created in the shrimp market.
(Doc. #328-1, p. 3.)
Defendants argue the Court should exclude all of Dr. Gan’s
opinion testimony because (1) he is unqualified to opine on the
designated topics; (2) it is impossible to determine whether his
opinions are based upon reliable methodology, and (3) his testimony

will not be helpful to a jury. (Doc. #328, pp. 15-16.) The Court
agrees with the first argument, and therefore does not reach the
next two.
Defendants argue that Dr. Gan lacks both the education and
work background regarding business, intellectual property, market
surveying, studying market conditions, or determining the value of
a trademark in any market. (Doc. #328, pp. 7, 15.) Thus, Defendants
assert, Dr. Gan has no scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge in any of the proposed topics which would allow him to
offer expert testimony. (Id., p. 15.) Plaintiff responds that Dr.
Gan is qualified because his experience in shrimp and fish

nutrition requires “a deep grounding in statistical analysis,” and
that he has conducted extensive research into “operational issues
within the industry,” and is familiar with the “economic context”
underlying the shrimp industry. (Doc. #343, pp. 3-4.)
The record establishes that Dr. Gan does not have the
requisite education or experience to be qualified as an expert on
the designated topics. It is undisputed that Dr. Gan has extensive
scientific background and experience in shrimp reproduction,
immunization, and dietary issues, and that he has served as a
technical consultant for various corporations involved in shrimp
reproduction. (Doc. #343-1, pp. 12, 20-25.) However, there is
no indication that Dr. Gan’s education or work experience

meaningfully goes beyond the scientific or technical aspect of
these areas. While "[a]n expert is not necessarily unqualified
simply because [his] experience does not precisely match the matter
at hand," see City of S. Miami v. DeSantis, No. 19-cv-22927, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226867, 2020 WL 7074644, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3,
2020), an expert must "have at least some minimum training,
education, experience, knowledge, or skill" pertaining to the
particular subject matter of his proposed testimony. See Bouton v.
Ocean Beach Props., Ltd., No. 16-cv-80502, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
174989, 2017 WL 4792488, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2017); see
also Bowers v Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1376 (M.D.

Ga. 2007) ("Rule 702 and Daubert still require that the area of
the witness's competence match the subject matter of the witness's
testimony.").
Here, Dr. Gan testified he was not qualified to provide an
expert opinion as to trademark registration and whether a trademark
was filed in bad faith, and admitted he did not strictly follow
the list of topics on which he was to opine when writing his
report. (Doc. #328-2, p. 36.) The record establishes that the
proposed testimony concerning determination of the market value,
reputation and distinctiveness of a tradename, assessing market
conditions, conducting market surveys4, evaluating validity of
trademark filings and bad faith actions, estimating the costs of

corrective advertising, and determining damages (i.e., loss
profits, unjust enrichment, disgorgement, or price erosion) are
all outside the scope of Dr. Gan’s expertise. See, e.g., Seatrax,
Inc., v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
an expert on marine cranes could not testify to the defendant's
profits from infringing activity in an infringement action); Ancho
v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Just as a
qualified and board certified heart surgeon does not possess
sufficient knowledge of orthopedic medicine to render an expert
opinion on spine surgery, likewise . . . a mechanical engineer .
. . lacks qualifications to give expert testimony about plant

4 In 2014, Dr. Gan also conducted one survey prior to this
litigation which sought information about issues confronting
“shrimp feeders.” (Doc. #343-1, p. 32.) This experience is not
sufficient for Dr. Gan to be an expert in market surveys. Cf. Louis
Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558,
616 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (in noting that “[e]xtensive experience can be
a sufficient basis for expert testimony on matters such as consumer
surveys,” the Court found that 40 years of experience in conducting
market research and designing surveys was sufficient to qualify as
an expert in conducting surveys).
reconfiguration . . ..”); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir.
1994)(sociologist was qualified to testify about effects of
domestic violence, but not about whether a police department
provided sufficient training to its officers responding to
domestic violence reports); Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., No.
2:13-cv-36-FtM-29DNF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227942, at *3, 14 (M.D.

Fla. Dec. 4, 2020) (finding that a doctor, who specialized in
emergency medicine and pre-hospital care with a two-year
professional development degree in human resources and finance was
unqualified to determine damages or economic losses).
For these reasons, the Court finds Dr. Gan is not qualified
to testify as an expert about the identified topics. Because the
Court finds Dr. Gan lacks the proper qualifications to address the
identified topics, it does not reach issues pertaining to
reliability or helpfulness to the jury.
B. Carlos F. Massad
Mr. Massad’s education consists of a Master of Science in

marine resources management with a focus on business
administration and aquaculture, a master’s degree in zoology, and
a Bachelor of Science. (Doc. #329-5, pp. 2, 4.) Mr. Massad’s resume
reflects that since 1995 he has worked for various companies in
the aquaculture business as a CEO or managing director, overseeing
the genetic selection of various fish and shrimp, developing
harvesting processes, and establishing sales channels and markets
for such products. (Id., pp. 2-4.) Mr. Massad is the current
Chief Executive Officer of TB Food. (Doc. #329-1, p. 3.)
Defendants object to Mr. Massad offering any opinions about
(1) the development of Primo shrimp and the characteristics which
make Primo shrimp unique and desirable in the world market; (2)

clarification of industry terms and assertions made by witnesses
in proceedings before the Court during consideration of a
preliminary injunction against Defendants; (3) how Primo’s shrimp
were used by AMI and API in creating their broodstock shrimp
program; (4) the genetic make-up of Primo shrimp and if it derives
economic value from not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by other persons who could obtain economic value from their use;
(5) whether PB Legacy took reasonable efforts to maintain the
confidentiality of Primo’s shrimp (including genetic and
biological data) by preventing the use of the genetic make-up of
Primo shrimp; and (6) the advantage gained by AMI/API using Primo

shrimp to found its broodstock program. (Doc. #329, pp. 6-7; Doc.
#329-1, p. 3.)
(1) Qualifications to Render Opinions
In general, Defendants argue that Mr. Massad is not
academically qualified to testify about the matters noted above
since he is not a geneticist. Nor does he have a legal education
in intellectual property, and most of his work history relates to
running a business rather than performing science operations.
(Doc. #329, pp. 4, 14-15.) The Court finds Mr. Massad is qualified
to offer opinions on some but not all of the proposed topics.
There is nothing in the record which would qualify Mr. Massad
to offer opinions concerning the factual details of the development

of Primo shrimp prior to his arrival at TB Foods. Such testimony
appears to simply be a recitation of what others have told him,
which may or may not be admissible, but is not the proper subject
of expert testimony. Similarly, there is nothing in the record
which would establish his knowledge of how AMI or API used Primo
shrimp prior to this arrival at TB Foods.
Mr. Massad has an educational background in science and over
25 years of working in aquaculture, approximately ten of which
were spent managing and directing shrimp hatcheries. (Doc. #329-
5, pp. 2-4.) When overseeing shrimp hatcheries, including those
belonging to TB Food, Mr. Massad implemented “a family based

selective breeding program which uses genomic 5 selection to
accelerate the genetic gains per generation for desirable
characteristics of high resistance to disease and rapid growth.”

5 Genomics is a form of technology that allows a person to
see the whole genome of the shrimp which in turn permits more
particularized selection of traits in a shrimp. (Doc. #342-1, p.
13.)
(Doc. #329-1, p. 3.) While Mr. Massad is not a geneticist or a
technician, the record establishes a sufficient basis for an
understanding of the underlying genetic traits that are vital to
the Primo brand (i.e., rapid growth and disease resistant), how
the genetic traits for shrimp are selected, the time it takes to
develop shrimp broodstock like that of Primo’s, the value and

distinctiveness of the Primo broodstock in worldwide markets as
one of the only brands to be resistant to “White Spot and Early
Mortality Syndrome (EMS),” and why it is vital to protect a genetic
selection program, and the challenges of doing so. (Doc. #342-1,
pp. 8, 11, 13-14, 16-19, 27-28, 31-34, 36-37.) The Court finds
this experience sufficient to meet the "relatively low threshold
for qualification" of expert testimony. StoneEagle Servs., Inc.
v. Pay-Plus Sols., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79955, 2015 WL
3824170, *4 (M.D. Fla. June 19, 2015).
Plaintiff asks Mr. Massad to opine on whether the genetic
make-up of Primo shrimp derives independent economic value by not

being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who
could obtain economic value from their use. The Court finds that
Mr. Massad’s background satisfies the qualification requirement.
The Court also finds that Mr. Massad is qualified to discuss
industry terminology.
Plaintiff also asks Mr. Massad to opine whether PB Legacy
took reasonable efforts to maintain the confidentiality of Primo’s
shrimp. Mr. Massad considered such efforts, which are necessary
in determining the existence of a trade secret pursuant to §
688.002(4), Fla. Stat., and concluded that Primo’s shrimp genetic
code is a trade secret. (Doc. #329-1, pp. 10-11; Doc. #342-1, p.

32.)
While the adoption of Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence abolished the “ultimate issue rule” which proscribed
opinion testimony that ostensibly invaded the province of the jury,
the Eleventh Circuit has noted that the distinction between an
admissible factual opinion or an inadmissible legal conclusion is
not always easy to perceive. Hanson v. Waller, 888 F.2d 806, 811
(11th Cir. 1989). Thus, while “[a]n expert may testify as to his
opinion on an ultimate issue of fact[,] [a]n expert may not,
however, merely tell the jury what result to reach . . . . A
witness also may not testify to the legal implications of conduct;

the court must be the jury's only source of law.” Montgomery v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir.
1990)(quotations omitted). The distinction may turn on the
phrasing of the question. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236,
240 (5th Cir. 1983).
Mr. Massad is qualified to testify as to whether Primo shrimp
derived economic value, the efforts PB Legacy took to maintain
confidentiality, and his view as to the reasonableness of the
efforts. Mr. Massad may not, however, testify that the Primo
shrimp genetics constitute a “trade secret.”
Finally, Mr. Massad’s opinion about the advantages gained by

AMI/API in utilizing Primo shrimp to found its broodstock program
is not admissible because Mr. Massad is neither qualified nor, as
discussed below, is his opinion reliable on this topic.
(2) Reliability of Testimony
Defendants argue that Mr. Massad’s opinions on the topics at
issue are inadmissible because they are based on assumptions of
fact, and provide no data, calculations, or sufficient facts to be
found reliable. (Doc. #239, pp. 7-12, 14-15, 17.) Mr. Massad’s
methodology used to reach his opinions is described in his report
as being:
[B]ased upon [his] knowledge, observations,
experience, education, training, review of the
Aquaculture literature, review of the broodstock
market data, review of Primo’s and TB Food’s internal
records, review of relevant testimony in this matter,
and review of information obtained throughout the
discovery process.

(Doc. #329-1, p. 4.) With one exception, Mr. Massad’s opinions
appear sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
With respect to the sixth topic, Mr. Massad was asked to
provide an opinion about the advantage gained by AMI/API using
Primo shrimp to establish its broodstock program. (Doc. #329, pp.
6-7; Doc. #329-1, p. 3.) Mr. Massad estimated that the cost each
year for research and development of shrimp broodstock is
$1,500,000.00, which demonstrated that Defendants gained an

advantage of approximately $22,500,000.00 ($1.5 million times 15
years) for the 15 required years of research and development, plus
any profits since its founding. (Doc. #329-1, p. 13.) When asked
how he determined this amount, Mr. Massad admitted that he did not
know how much Primo had spent in the years prior to his employment,
but in general he estimated it cost that much to run a well-managed
genetic program based on his seven years of experience running the
shrimp hatchery for Blue Genetics. (Doc. #342-1, pp. 33-34.) Mr.
Massad did not provide any data or computations to show how he
reached this estimation. See Gardner v. Ford Motor Co., 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 194098, 2015 WL 12841011, *4 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2015)

("Opinions that are formulated in accordance with an unknown
methodology cannot be tested or evaluated and cannot be deemed
reliable."). Accordingly, Mr. Massad’s opinion on this topic is
not reliable and will not be admissible at trial.
(3) Assistance to the Jury
Defendants further argue that none of Mr. Massad’s opinions
will assist the jury and, therefore, are not admissible. (Doc.
#329, pp. 16-17.) The Court disagrees.
Mr. Massad’s admissible opinions provide background
information about customs and practice in the aquaculture shrimp

business, what makes Primo shrimp distinct and valuable in the
global shrimp market, the breeding practices of other worldwide
shrimp broodstock competitors, and whether or to what extent
Defendants incorporated Primo genetics into its shrimp broodstock.
Such opinions go directly to the breach of contract and trade
secret and unfair competition claims, and are based on knowledge
and experience unlikely to be held by the average citizen. See
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. The Court therefore concludes that
Plaintiff has satisfied the third criteria as to the opinions which
have satisfied the first two requirements.
C. Granvil D. Treece

Mr. Treece’s education consists of a Bachelor of Arts and a
Master of Science in marine biology. (Doc. #330-1, p. 1; Doc. #330-
3, p. 2.) Mr. Treece’s resume reflects that he has taught
aquaculture classes as an adjunct professor at Texas A&M University
for 14 years, and served as one of the universities’ aquaculture
specialist for 30 years. (Doc. #330-3, p. 2.) Mr. Treece also has
considerable experience working as a global consultant in the
mariculture and aquaculture industries since 1978 for shrimp
farming and hatchery, has managed a shrimp hatchery three years,
and has produced several publications concerning Biofloc Systems
for Marine Shrimp and on various topics relating to aquaculture
and shrimp. (Id., pp. 2-27.)

Defendants seek to exclude Mr. Treece from providing opinions
about the following: (1) what was permitted or forbidden under the
Grow-Out Agreement between Primo and AMI/API, and its purpose; (2)
that it would have taken AMI 18 years to develop their own lines
of shrimp for it to be similar to that of Primo; and (3) that some
of Defendants’ activities in China may have been harmful to Primo’s
sales in China. (Doc. #330, pp. 5-9.) Defendants assert that such
opinions do not meet either the qualifications or reliability
factors for admissibility under Rule 702. (Id.)
(1) Qualifications to Render Opinions
Defendants argue that Mr. Treece is not qualified to offer

“legal opinions” concerning the first two opinions identified
above because Mr. Treece has no legal education or background, nor
is he a lawyer. (Doc. #330, pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff responds that
Defendants’ argument lacks merit because many of the legal opinions
Mr. Treece offered relating to the parties’ legal agreements were
solicited by Defendants during Mr. Treece’s deposition, and due to
Mr. Treece’s substantial experience in aquaculture he is well-
familiar with contractual agreements and industry practices to
provide an opinion as to grow-out and non-disclosure agreements.
(Doc. #344, p. 4.)
The Court is unconvinced that Mr. Treece has the requisite
experience to opine on legal implications of the contractual

agreements between Primo and Defendants. It is undisputed that Mr.
Treece is not an expert in the legal area of contacts. Indeed, Mr.
Treece admitted he did not have legal training and was not
qualified to interpret contractual provisions. (Doc. #330-4, pp.
8-9.) While Mr. Treece may have some practical experience involving
contractual agreements and industry practices in the field of
aquaculture, such experience is simply insufficient to constitute
expertise under Daubert as to the agreement in this case.
Moreover, "questions of law are not subject to expert testimony."
Commodores Enter. Corp. v. McClary, 879 F.3d 1114, 1128-29 (11th
Cir. 2018); see also Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541 ("A witness . .

. may not testify to the legal implications of conduct; the court
must be the jury's only source of law."). Therefore, the Court
finds Mr. Treece is not qualified to render expert testimony as to
terms or purpose of the Grow-Out Agreement.
(2) Reliability of Testimony
As to the remaining two opinions, Defendants argue Mr.
Treece’s opinions are unreliable. (Doc. #330, pp. 7-9.) First,
Defendants appear to take issue with Mr. Treece’s opinion that “it
would have taken AMI at least 18 years to develop an SPF and SPR
line, similar to Primo, if at all possible.” (Doc. #330-1, p.

18.) The Court finds Mr. Treece’s opinion regarding the time it
could take AMI to develop the disease resistant shrimp is
sufficiently reliable.
The record indicates that in formulating this opinion, Mr.
Treece relied upon various studies, publications, and his own
experience. In his report, Mr. Treece recalls the various shrimp
genetic programs and the difficulties they faced in breeding
disease free shrimp. (Doc. #330-1, pp. 2-10.) Mr. Treece notes
that it generally takes at least 7 to 9 years to develop minimal
level shrimp genetic programs, but that disease resistant shrimp
may only be developed after 15 to 18 years. Mr. (Id., p. 3.) To

further buttress his opinion, Mr. Treece identifies the Oceanic
Institute in Hawaii, which took 18 years to develop fast growing
and disease resistant shrimp. (Id., p. 5.) The Court finds this
foundation sufficient under Daubert. See Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Schoenthal Family, LLC, 555 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150) ("A district court may
decide that nonscientific testimony is reliable based 'upon
personal knowledge or experience.'"); Goines v. Lee Mem'l Health
Sys., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37549, 2019 WL 1101878, *6 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 8, 2019) (finding expert's opinion sufficiently reliable when
it was based on examination of record evidence, including
depositions, and applied against expert's knowledge and

experience).
Finally, regarding the third opinion, Defendants state that
Mr. Treece testified as to some “possible activities by the
Defendants in China” that Mr. Treece believes harmed Primo’s sales
in China. Defendants argue this is not expert testimony, but
instead is argumentative and regurgitation of speculation since
Mr. Treece admitted he has no evidence of Primo or API’s results
in China. (Doc. #330, pp. 8-9; Doc. #330-2, p. 3.) Mr. Treece’s
deposition testimony shows he testified about whether Primo’s lack
of success in the Chinese broodstock market was due to confusion
between the Primo and AMI/API brands because there was “bad

publicity.” (Doc. #330-4, pp. 19-20.) Mr. Treece stated he heard
that the same person who was helping Primo sell its brand in China
was also contracted by API and was essentially “wearing two caps.”
(Id.) Mr. Treece admitted he did not know the whole story, but
heard bad things were going on in China. (Id.)
Rule 702 requires judges to act as the gatekeeper to ensure
that expert testimony "is not only relevant, but reliable."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. For expert testimony to be reliable,
it requires that the testimony be "more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation." Silcox v. Hunter, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
127442, 2018 WL 3633251, * 29 (Fla. M.D. July 31, 2018). Here,

Mr. Treece admitted that he did not know all the facts and his
opinion was based on hearsay and speculation. Accordingly, this
portion of Mr. Treece’s opinion is unreliable and inadmissible.
(3) Assistance to the Jury
The Court finds that Mr. Treece’s admissible opinion would
assist the trier of fact. Mr. Treece’s report and testimony
provide sufficient evidence that his overall knowledge and history
of aquaculture and the detailed processes involved in breeding
shrimp are not only relevant to this case, but would assist the
jury in understanding these matters that are beyond that of the
average lay person. McDowell, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004);

Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262.
D. Dr. Roger W. Doyle
Defendants’ have proffered the expert testimony of Dr Doyle.
(Doc. #331-2, p. 1.) Dr. Doyle’s education consists of a Bachelor
of Science in biology and physical chemistry, a master’s degree in
oceanography, and a doctorate in biology. (Doc. #331-1, p. 1.) Dr.
Doyle served as an associate professor of biology at Duke
University for four years, as well as Dalhousie University where
he retired as a full professor of biology and was the founding
director of the Marine Gene Probe Laboratory. (Id.) Dr. Doyle also
served as the president of the International Association for
Aquaculture Genetics, the coordinator of the Aquaculture Genetics

Network in Asia, and as a mentor in genetics and biodiversity for
the Network of Aquaculture Centers in Asia-Pacific. (Id.)
Dr. Doyle also has extensive experience in aquaculture
research, development and commercial experience in the Americas,
Middle East, Africa, and Asia. (Id.) He also assisted in
establishing a tilapia broodstock development in the Philippines,
oversaw students involved in breeding various species, and
consulted with broodstock development companies. (Doc. #331-4, p.
34.) Presently, Dr. Doyle is the president of the Genetic
Computation Ltd., a Canadian consulting company that specializes
in aquaculture and conservation genetics. (Doc. #331-1, p. 1.) Dr.

Doyle has published numerous works about aquaculture, the latest
of which considered “Domestication and genetic improvement:
balancing improved production against increased disease risks from
inbreeding.” (Id.)
Plaintiff objects to Dr. Doyle offering opinions about
thirteen topics which relate to Primo and AMI/API shrimp
broodstock, including the gene pools, the origins of the
broodstock, breeding methods, the performance of each respective
broodstock, and the reason for an increase/decrease of Primo and
AMI/API’s market shares in China. Plaintiff seeks to exclude Dr.
Doyle’s opinions on these matters based on a lack of qualifications
and reliability. (Doc. #331, pp. 2-4.)

(1) Qualifications to Render Opinions
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Doyle’s professional background and
training are almost entirely as a geneticist, with little to no
experience in marketing, administration, legal interpretation, or
working in the Chinese market. (Doc. #331, p. 3.) Plaintiff
therefore asserts that Dr. Doyle’s opinions linking Primo’s market
share to farm management procedures, commentary on what
constitutes a trade secret and customer confusion in the Chinese
market, and why Chinese farmers choose AMI/API broodstock over
that of Primo’s, must be excluded. (Id., p. 10.) The Court
disagrees with the majority of Plaintiff’s arguments.

Dr. Doyle references farm management procedures not from a
business perspective, but rather how the respective parties have
managed their shrimp broodstock and the breeding procedures
utilized. (Doc. #331-1, p. 5.) Dr. Doyle acknowledges that there
are remarkable differences in management — like the procedures
utilized by each party to protect their intellectual property, the
creation and retention of genetic diversity, and minimization of
inbreeding in the Primo and AMI broodstock in the United States.
(Id.) Overall, his opinions are based on the different generation
process of genetics in the broodstock and inbreeding. In other
words, they are science-based, and are well within Dr. Doyle’s
extensive knowledge regarding aquaculture and genetics, and are

admissible.
Likewise, the Court does not find that Dr. Doyle’s opinion
exceeded his qualifications. Dr. Doyle readily admitted he has
no legal training or education, but he opined that from a
geneticist’s (scientific) perspective he does not perceive any way
in which AMI/API received protected information concerning the
creation or maintenance of the shrimp broodstock it inherited from
Primo. (Doc. #331-1, pp. 16-17.) The Court does not find that Dr.
Doyle’s anticipated testimony provides any legal opinion or
conclusion, and he is qualified to address this matter from a
genetics point of view. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v.

Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1112-13 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2005) (Rule 704(a) provides that an opinion or inference is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact).
Finally, with respect to customer confusion in the Chinese
market and the Chinese farmers preference for AMI/API shrimp
broodstock, the Court finds that although Dr. Doyle has the unique
personal experience of working within the Asian aquaculture
markets for over 35 years, he is not an expert in marketing or
conducting market surveys. Dr. Doyle confirmed this in his
testimony, stating that has no experience working in the Chinese
market or administering market surveys.6 (Doc. #331-4, pp. 45-

46.) See Lebron v. Sec'y of the Fla. Dep't of Child. & Families,
772 F.3d 1352, 1368 (11th Cir. 2014)(“Expertise in one field does
not qualify a witness to testify about others.”); see also Dura
Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir.
2002) ("A scientist, however well credentialed he may be, is not
permitted to be the mouthpiece of a scientist in a different
specialty."). Thus, Dr. Doyle’s testimony on these topics is
inadmissible.
(2) Reliability of Testimony
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Doyle’s testimony and report are
inherently unreliable because they are based on an insufficient

factual basis or self-serving testimony. (Doc. #331, pp. 11-14.)

6 Dr. Doyle was interviewed and published in a Chinese trade
magazine for the sole purpose of discussing the problem of
misrepresentation and mislabeling in Chinese aquaculture and what
should be done about it. (Doc. #331-1, p. 18.) Dr. Doyle, however,
clarified that it was not confusion about brands such as Primo and
AMI/API, but instead farmers were confused about what the quality
of what they were buying—was it Brand A or a knockoff of Brand A.
(Doc. #331-4, pp. 129-30.)
As such, Plaintiff argues that “garbage in, garbage out” cannot
serve as the foundation for an admissible expert report. (Id., p.
13.)
The record indicates that in formulating his opinions, Dr.
Doyle reviewed affidavits, AMI’s Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, Dr. Gan, Mr. Massad and Mr. Treece’s expert reports,
University of Arizona documents, and various Primo documents
(including Primo Challenge Testing). (Doc. #331-4, pp. 29-31.) His
expert report also refers to approximately 40 scientific
publications regarding shrimp reproduction, inbreeding, disease
reduction in aquaculture, survival rates of shrimp, and DNA
fingerprinting, all of which were utilized in supporting his
findings or conclusions. (Doc. #331-1, pp. 19-22.)
The Court finds Dr. Doyle’s opinions are sufficiently
reliable to be admissible.7 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s
argument that Dr. Doyle’s opinions do not have the requisite

factual predicates because he failed to review the deposition
transcripts or certain emails of fact witness in this case, or, on

7 Because the Court determined Dr. Doyle was not qualified to
render opinions about customer confusion in the Chinese market and
the Chinese farmers’ preferences for Primo or AMI/API shrimp
broodstock, the Court does not reach issues as to whether Dr. Doyle
employed reliable methodology in reaching such conclusions or
whether his opinion would be helpful to the jury.
the other hand, considered Mr. Robin Pearls’ sworn affidavits.
“These are considerations that may affect the weight a fact finder
accords [Dr. Doyle’s] testimony, but they do not operate to
preclude his testimony.” Kleiman v. Wright, No. 18-cv-80176-
BLOOM/Reinhart, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213482, at *27 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 16, 2020). "So long as an expert's scientific testimony rests

upon 'good grounds, based on what is known,' it should be tested
by the adversarial process." Lawes v. CSA Architects & Eng'rs LLP,
963 F.3d 72, 98 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
"If [Plaintiff] believes that the basis for [Dr. Doyle’s] opinions
is insufficient, [it] can explore that with [him] on cross
examination and argument for the benefit of the trier of fact.".
In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust, 329 F.R.D. 336, 372 (M.D.
Fla. 2018). Thus, the Court finds that Defendants have met their
burden of proving Dr. Doyle meets the reliability requirements for
admissibility.
E. Dr. James Wyban

Dr. Wyban received his Bachelor of Science in biology, and a
master’s degree and PhD in zoology. (Doc. #331-5, p. 1.) Dr. Wyban
was founder/chairman of the High Health Aquaculture (HHA), which
was the world’s first Specific Pathogen Free (SPF) shrimp breeding
company. (Id.) In 1994, upon forming HHA, Dr. Wyban developed SPF
technology and bred and exported over 350,000 SPF shrimp broodstock
to over 26 countries worldwide, including China. (Id.) Dr. Wyban
earned the title of “The Father of SPF Shrimp” because he developed
“the core technology, the original SPF shrimp stocks and the first
SPF breeding company.” (Id.) Currently, Dr. Wyban is the Director
of Marine Genetics, LLC, where he provides consulting services in
shrimp breeding and hatchery systems. (Id.)

Plaintiff objects to Dr. Wyban’s opinions concerning (1)
whether Primo allegedly obtained its founding stock from Ecuador
by means of illegal exporting; (2) whether Primo possessed
protectable trade secrets or intellectual property; (3) ownership
of Primo and AMI/API broodstock and germplasm; (4) Primo’s breeding
and selection methods; (5) Chinese farmers inability to duplicate
SPF broodstock; (6) Primo’s allegedly poor reputation in the
aquaculture industry; (7) Dr. Wyban’s disagreement as to the
terminology “locked pairs”; and (8) Dr. Wyban’s assessment of Mr.
Massad’s slot machine metaphor. (Doc. #331, pp. 14-17). Plaintiff
argues Dr. Wyban’s opinions are inadmissible under at least one of

the three various prongs of Daubert. (Id.)
(1) Qualifications to Render Opinions
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Wyban’s qualifications prevent him
from providing admissible testimony about opinions one, two, and
three. (Doc. #331, pp. 15-17.) Plaintiff argues that Dr. Wyban is
not a lawyer or an expert on Ecuadorian law regarding the
illegality of exporting shrimp from Ecuador, nor does he have the
legal training to opine as to whether Primo sufficiently protected
its shrimp broodstock in the global market via its Non-Disclosure
and Growout Agreements, or Term Sheet, i.e., protected its
ownership or had a protectable trade secret. (Id., pp. 15-16.)
With respect to Dr. Wyban’s opinion regarding the legality of

exporting live shrimp from Ecuador, he expressed in his report
that “Primo shrimp founding stock were acquired from Ecuador under
a questionable process. It is illegal to export live shrimp from
Ecuador.” (Doc. #331-5, p. 5.) The Court agrees that to the extent
Dr. Wyban is concluding or inferring that Primo obtained their
shrimp illegally from Ecuador, this is outside his expertise and
is not admissible. See, e.g., Commodores Enter. Corp., 879 F.3d at
1128-29 ("questions of law are not subject to expert testimony.");
see Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541 ("A witness . . . may not testify
to the legal implications of conduct; the court must be the jury's
only source of law."). Claussen v. PowerSecure, Inc., No. 3:18-

CV-607, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173429, 2019 WL 4941109, at *8 (M.D.
Ala. Oct. 7, 2019) (A non-lawyer expert therefore "cannot testify
. . . about whether someone violated a law.")
Turning to his second and third opinions, Plaintiff argues
that Dr. Wyban’s opinion as to the ownership of Primo broodstock
and whether Plaintiff sufficiently protected it through legal
documents such as the NDA and Growout Agreement is improper based
on Dr. Wyban’s lack of legal training. (Doc. #331, p. 15.)
Specifically, Dr. Wyban stated that “[b]ased on my experience
selling broodstock shrimp into the global industry, I don't think
Primo's rudimentary documents (NDA, Growout Agreement, and Term
Sheet) are sufficient to protect their ownership of their stock if

they freely chose to sell their shrimp to buyers (including API).”
(Doc. #331-5, p. 3.) Plaintiff also objects to Dr. Wyban’s opinion
that Primo’s “trade secret” is only that Primo acquired shrimp
stocks from Ecuador and brought the stocks to the United States,
and that there is no “Primo method.” (Doc. #331, p. 16.)
It does not appear that Dr. Wyban’s testimony exceeds his
expertise. Dr. Wyban does not opine whether there were valid and
enforceable legal agreements between Primo and AMI/API, only that
in his view they were insufficient to protect Primo’s ownership of
its broodstock. Dr. Wyban appears to concede Primo possessed a
protectable trade secret, but disagrees that there is such a thing

as a “Primo method.”
(2) Reliability of Testimony
Defendants argue that Dr. Wyban’s testimony about “Primo’s
breeding and selection methods must also be excluded since he was
not provided with anything more than limited, self-serving
information from Defendants and not given Primo’s records or the
testimony of fact witnesses.” (Doc. #331, p. 16.)
As with Dr. Doyle, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments
about the materials Dr. Wyban considered in reaching his
conclusions go to the weight a fact finder should accord to Dr.
Wyban’s opinion, rather than its admissibility. See Kleiman, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213482, at *27. Furthermore, Dr. Wyban provided

his opinions about Primo’s breeding and selection methods upon
consideration of and rebuttal of conclusions reached in the expert
report of Mr. Massad, including genomic selection of shrimp and
what can and cannot be used for a proper breeding program. (Doc.
#331-5, pp. 5-7.) In this situation, where the experts disagree,
it is “precisely the type of dispute that should be decided within
the crucible of cross examination, rather than by a judge at the
Daubert stage.” Moore v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 995 F.3d 839,
857 (11th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Wyban’s opinion about why
Chinese farmers have been unable to replicate or create SPF

broodstock is not reliable based upon Dr. Wyban’s admission that
he has not worked in the Chinese market since 2012. (Doc. #331,
p. 16.) Dr. Wyban’s opinion on this matter has extensive
experience developing SPF technology, and was the first person to
successfully breed SPF shrimp broodstock which was sold in the
global market and included China. See Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am.,
760 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Breg,
Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010) ("[T]here are instances
in which a district court may determine the reliability prong under
Daubert based primarily upon an expert's experience and general
knowledge in the field."). The Court finds that Dr. Wyban’s
experience would provide a reliable foundation as to why SPF shrimp

were not successfully bred in China. Plaintiff’s argument goes to
the weight to be accorded to Dr. Wyban’s opinion, not its
admissibility. See Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d
1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Quite the contrary, 'vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.'").
The Court, on the other hand, agrees that Dr. Wyban’s opinion
concerning who is responsible for advertising AMI/API shrimp
broodstock in China is pure speculation since Dr. Wyban has
provided no factual foundation for his conclusion, nor is he

qualified as an expert in advertising in China. In re Abilify
(Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1336
(N.D. Fla. 2018)(“the expert must know[] of facts which enable him
to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to
conjecture or speculation.”)(quotations omitted).
(3) Assistance to the Jury
Finally, Plaintiff argues that several of Dr. Wyban’s
opinions would only serve to confuse the jury and would not assist
the tier of fact, therefore they are not admissible under the third
Daubert factor. (Doc. #331, pp. 14-17.) Plaintiff asserts that
while Dr. Wyban disagrees strongly with the “locked pairs”

terminology, he actually agrees with the “sum and substance of the
concept.” (Doc. #331, p. 14.)
Mr. Wyban explains how the name “locked pairs” is “highly
inaccurate” because there is nothing locked in any way, and he
discusses this issue with respect to Mr. Massad’s expert opinion
in stating that the “locked pair concept that single family cannot
be used to establish a breeding program is a gross misunderstanding
of basic genetics.” (Doc. #331-5, pp. 5-7.) The Court finds Dr.
Wyban’s testimony would be helpful to the jury in explaining this
concept since it is discussed frequently, and it can provide
perspective on how shrimp breeders may protect germplasm. See

McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1298-99 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591)
(“the expert testimony must be 'relevant to the task at hand,' .
. . i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the
case.”) (quotations omitted).
Next, Plaintiff seeks to exclude Dr. Wyban’s discussion of
Mr. Massad’s “slot machine metaphor” because Dr. Wyban’s testimony
agrees with Mr. Massad in sum and substance on this issue and it
would not be helpful to the jurors, or could cause confusion. (Doc.
#331, p. 15.) Defendants respond that Dr. Wyban’s testimony and
report on this matter was not merely an issue of semantics, as Dr.
Wyban substantively criticized Mr. Massad’s knowledge of breeding
and the metaphor because it incorrectly suggests that genetics is

completely up to chance and luck. (Doc. #331-5, p. 6; Doc. #341,
p. 16.) The Court agrees with Defendants, and finds that Dr.
Wyman’s opinion would be helpful to the jury in that it concerns
matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay
person. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262-63.
Lastly, Plaintiff seeks to exclude Dr. Wyban’s testimony
about Primo’s alleged poor reputation in the broodstock industry
because it is unsubstantiated, unsourced industry gossip, which
would not be helpful since it is well within the capacity of a
juror to understand. (Doc. #331, p. 17.) The Court agrees.
Dr. Wyban copied and pasted a posting from an “online shrimp

list” that sets forth certain opinions about Primo, from which Dr.
Wyban concluded that Primo has a very negative image in the shrimp
industry. (Doc. #331-5, p. 8.) This posting, however, does not
require expert testimony as a jury would be capable of reading the
post and analyzing it without any expert analysis, nor does it
appear to be relevant to the issues of this case. See In re 3M
Combat Arms, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47275, at *33 (finding that
expert's recitation of events and internal documents is not helpful
to the trier of fact because they are devoid of any expert
analysis); see also McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1298-99 (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 591) (“the expert testimony must be 'relevant to the
task at hand,' … i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect

of the case.”). Therefore, “[s]uch evidence is properly presented
through fact witnesses and documentary evidence, not expert
testimony.” In re 3M Combat Arms, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47275, at
*33. The Court therefore finds this portion of Dr. Wyban’s expert
opinion is not admissible.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendants American Mariculture, Inc., American Penaeid,
Inc., and Robin Pearl’s Motion to Limit or Exclude Expert
Testimony By Dr. Lian Gan (Doc. #328) is GRANTED.
2. Defendants American Mariculture, Inc., American Penaeid,

Inc., and Robin Pearl’s Motion to Limit or Exclude Expert
Testimony By Carlos F. Massad (Doc. #329) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
3. Defendant American Mariculture, Inc.’s Motion to Limit or
Exclude Expert Testimony of Granvil D. Treece (Doc. #330) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
4. Plaintiff TB Food USA, LLC’s Motion to Partially Exclude The
Testimony of Experts Dr. Roger W. Doyle and Dr. James Wyban
(Doc. #331) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 26th day of
October, 2021.

—_— . 2, _ f
MMAA ) = Pe
JGHE E. STEELE
5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108754. Public record. Not legal advice.