# Goodwin v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 16, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108421

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 16, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

LIDIA GOODWIN,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 6:20-cv-1291-MCR

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.
__________________________________/

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an
administrative decision denying her application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Following an administrative hearing
held on May 29, 2019, the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued
a decision on July 8, 2019, finding Plaintiff not disabled from April 8, 2017,
the alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2018, the date last
insured. (Tr. 21-59.) Based on a review of the record, the briefs, and the
applicable law, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

1 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 17.)
I. Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings
are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
390 (1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have

reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that
the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards
v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932
F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence

as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to
the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord
Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must
scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the

Commissioner’s factual findings).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the ALJ
did not offer sufficient justification for finding Plaintiff’s testimony regarding
her symptoms from asthma (shortness of breath and coughing) and

rheumatoid arthritis (chronic joint pain and stiffness) to be inconsistent with
the evidence. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to meaningfully address
any of the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), including Plaintiff’s
daily activities, medications, and their side effects. Further, Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ erred in concluding that her irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”)
was not a severe impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation
process,2 and in failing to account for the symptoms associated with this
impairment (such as inflammation, abdominal pain, diarrhea, and dizziness)

and any resulting limitations (such as the need to be off task) in the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment.
Defendant responds that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints that were inconsistent with other substantial evidence,

found her IBS to be non-severe in accordance with the regulations and
Eleventh Circuit case law, and relied on the testimony of a Vocational Expert
(“VE”) to find that Plaintiff was not disabled.
A. The ALJ’s Decision

2 The Commissioner employs a five-step process in determining disability.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis,

degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, asthma with lung nodules
and interstitial changes, anemia, chronic eczematoid otitis externa and
conductive hearing loss, vertigo, chronic rhinitis, adjustment disorder,
depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 23.) The ALJ

then found that Plaintiff’s IBS, gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”),
insomnia, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, and cataract were non-severe
impairments because they did not significantly limit Plaintiff’s ability to
perform basic work activities. (Id.) The ALJ stated that he considered all

of Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments, including the non-severe
ones, in assessing the RFC. (Id.)
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
RFC to perform a reduced range of light work,3 as follows:

With her right upper extremity, the claimant can frequently
operate hand controls and reach in all directions, including
overhead. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She
can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She
can have occasional exposure to humidity, wetness, dust, odors,
fumes, pulmonary irritants, extreme cold, extreme heat, and
vibration. She can work in moderate noise levels. She can have

3 By definition, light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds; it
requires a good deal of walking, standing, or sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); SSR 83-10.
no exposure to hazards, such as unprotected heights and moving
machinery. She can perform simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks. She can make simple work-related decisions. She can
have occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the
general public.

(Tr. 25.) In making this finding, the ALJ “considered all symptoms and the
extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the
requirements of 20 CFR [§] 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p.” (Id.)
The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the statements by
her husband, the objective medical findings, and the records and opinions of
treating, examining, and non-examining sources. (Tr. 26-31.) The ALJ
addressed the subjective complaints as follows:
Prior to the hearing, the claimant reported she has limited range
of motion in her arms and shoulders. She also experiences pain
and stiffness in her joints with inflammation. She stated she
cannot lift more than 10 pounds. She experiences fatigue,
anxiety, and anger. She stated she is unable to work on a task
for long periods. She cannot stand for long periods. She stated
she has difficulty dressing, bathing, and carrying [sic] for her
hair. She stated she does not prepare her own meals. She can
perform laundry and household chores. She stated [she] does
not go out alone or do any social activities. She reported
limitations completing tasks and concentrating . . . .

Thomas Goodwin, the claimant’s spouse, stated the claimant is
unable to work due to bone issues, a rotator cuff injury, and
arthritis. He stated that she exhibits limited range of motion
and has limitation standing or sitting. She must have
immediate access to restrooms. The claimant has difficulty
dressing, bathing, and caring for her hair due to difficulty lifting
her arms overhead and bending. He stated she is able to
prepare her own meals and [do] limited housework. The
claimant has limitations lifting, squatting, bending, standing,
reaching, walking, stating [sic], kneeling, hearing, using her
hands, climbing stairs, and concentrating . . . .

During a telephone call with a state agency disability examiner,
Mr. Goodwin reported the claimant experiences shortness of
breath at times without activity triggers. She uses an inhaler
which is helpful. . . .

. . .

At the hearing, the claimant testified she drives about once a
week, and goes to the doctor or to the supermarket. She stated
it is difficult to drive due to pain in her arms and limitations
lifting her arm. She stated she experiences swelling in her arms
every[]day. Her medication does not help much. She also
stated she has inflammation throughout her whole body. She
stated she has allergies, asthma, and problems with her small
intestine and immune system.

The claimant testified she has an inhaler and nebulizer for her
asthma. She stated she uses her nebulizer about twice a month.
She stated she is allergic to dust. She stated she has difficulty
sleeping due to anxiety. She denied doing any social activities.

The claimant testified she is able to do chores and cooking, but
this frequently causes inflammation throughout her entire body.
She stated she can only do chores for 15 minutes at a time, and
then rest for the remainder of the day. She stated she can sit for
about 20 minutes and stand for 45 minutes. She reported she
can walk up to 3 miles. She did not believe she can lift more
than a gallon of milk.

(Tr. 26, 29-30.)
Then, the ALJ found that while Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,
her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
those symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 30.) The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s

statements regarding her mental symptoms were inconsistent because she
“reported experiencing improvement with Lexapro.” (Id.) As to Plaintiff’s
physical impairments, the ALJ stated that the imaging scans of her lungs
showed the abnormalities had stabilized and “[h]er other impairments were

controlled with medication, as she did not require significant emergency
medical treatment.” (Id.)
The ALJ concluded that his RFC assessment was supported by
Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis and degenerative joint disease. (Tr. 31.)

The ALJ added:
The manipulative limitations are based on the changes in the
claimant’s right shoulder. The postural limitations are
consistent with the claimant’s arthritic pain. The environmental
limitations are based on the claimant’s rhinitis and asthma due
to her sensitivity to pulmonary irritants. The preclusion from
hazards is based on the claimant’s vertigo and hearing loss. Due
to the claimant’s anxiety and other mental impairments, the
claimant is limited to simple work tasks with only occasional
interaction with co-workers, superiors, and the general public.

(Id.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant
work. (Id.) However, at the fifth and final step of the sequential
evaluation, the ALJ determined, after considering Plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, RFC, and the VE’s testimony, that there were jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have
performed through her date last insured. (Tr. 32.) The representative

occupations were light-duty jobs with a Specific Vocational Preparation
(“SVP”) of 2. (Id.)
B. Analysis
Turning to the first issue, when a claimant seeks to establish disability

through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms, the
Eleventh Circuit’s three-part “pain standard” applies. Holt v. Sullivan, 921
F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). “If the ALJ decides not to
credit such testimony, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for

doing so.” Id.
The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms
the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3)
that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a
severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the
alleged pain.

Id.
Once a claimant establishes that her pain is disabling through
“objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that shows . . .
a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or other symptoms,” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), “all evidence
about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of pain or
other symptoms must be considered in addition to the medical signs and
laboratory findings in deciding the issue of disability,” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561.

See also SSR 16-3p4 (stating that after the ALJ finds a medically
determinable impairment exists, the ALJ must analyze “the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms” to determine
“the extent to which an individual’s symptoms limit his or her ability to

perform work-related activities”).
As stated in SSR 16-3p:
In considering the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
an individual’s symptoms, [the ALJ must] examine the entire
case record, including the objective medical evidence; an
individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information
provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other
relevant evidence in the individual’s case record.
. . .
In evaluating an individual’s symptoms, it is not sufficient for our
adjudicators to make a single, conclusory statement that “the
individual’s statements about his or her symptoms have been
considered” or that “the statements about the individual’s
symptoms are (or are not) supported or consistent.” It is also not
enough for our adjudicators simply to recite the factors described
in the regulations for evaluating symptoms.5 The

4 SSR 16-3p rescinded and superseded SSR 96-7p, eliminating the use of the
term “credibility,” and clarifying that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an
examination of an individual’s character.” SSR 16-3p.

5 These factors include: (1) a claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) any
precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication taken to alleviate the claimant’s pain or other symptoms;
(5) any treatment, other than medication, received by the claimant to relieve the
pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures (other than treatment) used to relieve the
determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the
weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with
and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the
individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the
adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.
. . .
In evaluating an individual’s symptoms, our adjudicators will not
assess an individual’s overall character or truthfulness in the
manner typically used during an adversarial court litigation.
The focus of the evaluation of an individual’s symptoms should
not be to determine whether he or she is a truthful person.
Rather, our adjudicators will focus on whether the evidence
establishes a medically determinable impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s symptoms and
given the adjudicator’s evaluation of the individual’s symptoms,
whether the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limit the
individual’s ability to perform work-related activities[.]

SSR 16-3p.
“[A]n individual’s attempts to seek medical treatment for symptoms
and to follow treatment once it is prescribed” will also be considered “when
evaluating whether symptom intensity and persistence affect the ability to
perform work-related activities.” Id. “[I]f the frequency or extent of the
treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with the degree of the
individual’s subjective complaints, or if the individual fails to follow
prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms, [the adjudicator] may
find the alleged intensity and persistence of an individual’s symptoms are

pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20
minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and (7) any other factors concerning
the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 16-3p.
inconsistent with the overall evidence of record.” Id. However, the
adjudicator “will not find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent with the

evidence in the record on this basis without considering possible reasons he
or she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the
degree of his or her complaints.” Id. In considering an individual’s
treatment history, the adjudicator may consider, inter alia, one or more of the

following:
• That the individual may have structured his or her
activities to minimize symptoms to a tolerable level by avoiding
physical activities or mental stressors that aggravate his or her
symptoms;
• That the individual may receive periodic treatment or
evaluation for refills of medications because his or her symptoms
have reached a plateau;
• That the individual may not agree to take prescription
medications because the side effects are less tolerable than the
symptoms;
• That the individual may not be able to afford treatment
and may not have access to free or low-cost medical services;
• That a medical source may have advised the individual
that there is no further effective treatment to prescribe or
recommend that would benefit the individual;
• That due to various limitations (such as language or mental
limitations), the individual may not understand the appropriate
treatment for or the need for consistent treatment.

Id.
Here, the ALJ found that while Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,
her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
those symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 30.) The ALJ explained that the imaging

scans of Plaintiff’s lungs showed the abnormalities had stabilized and “[h]er
other impairments were controlled with medication, as she did not require
significant emergency medical treatment.” (Id.)
The ALJ provided explicit and adequate reasons, supported by

substantial evidence, for his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
The ALJ properly noted that the chest CT scans over a period of time showed
that any abnormalities had stabilized. (Compare Tr. 435 (noting that a May
20, 2017 chest CT scan showed, inter alia, “[b]ilateral[,] chronic[-]appearing

peripheral groundglass/interstitial infiltrates consistent with chronic
interstitial lung disease,” “[b]ilateral[,] multiple pulmonary nodules
indeterminate,” “[m]ediastinal and hilar lymph nodes [that] could be reactive,
old granulomatous disease and less likely neoplastic,” and small hiatus

hernia) with Tr. 630 (noting that an August 28, 2017 chest CT scan showed
“[s]table noncalcified lung nodules when compared with prior outside study
[from] 05/20/17,” “[o]ther chronic lung changes . . . essentially unchanged,”
“[s]table lymph node prominence,” “[s]mall hiatal hernia,” and “[s]table low

attenuating lesions involving liver and left kidney which are sub[-]centimeter
and likely represent cysts”) and with Tr. 951-52 (noting that a March 16,
2018 chest CT scan showed: “1. Overall, no significant change in appearance
of the lungs on the prior CT exams. Multiple stable small pulmonary nodules
that measure up to 0.3 cm. Given the stability, these are considered probably

benign. . . . 2. Stable appearance of subpleural pulmonary scarring/fibrosis. 3.
Stable mildly enlarged mediastinal lymph nodes that measure up to 1.2
cm”).)
Despite the stability in the CT scan results, Plaintiff argues that the

treatment records are fully consistent with her testimony of residual
breathing problems, such as dyspnea and occasional cough. (See Tr. 584,
638, 640, 953.) Yet, the record indicates that Plaintiff’s asthma was mild,
intermittent, without complication, and adequately controlled with

Prednisone, and that her inhaler was helpful or not needed at all. (See Tr.
26-27, 50, 468, 471, 586, 611, 658-59, 662, 823-24, 827, 830, 834-35, 945, 947
(also noting that Plaintiff did not need an inhaler because she was taking
Prednisone every two to three weeks for her rheumatoid arthritis, which also

relieved her asthma).)
Substantial evidence in the record also supports the ALJ’s statement
that Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis was stable. (See, e.g., Tr. 329, 345, 349,
353, 357, 929.) Although Plaintiff regularly complained of pain and

stiffness, her examinations were generally normal and Dr. Jeffrey Elston’s
overall assessment was either good or very good.6 (Tr. 26-28, 490-91, 493,
620, 627, 672, 675, 678, 838, 852, 856, 860, 865, 877, 885, 895-96, 907-08, 916;

but see Tr. 483 & 873 (noting fair overall assessment).) Also, while Plaintiff
states that even after taking Tramadol and Norco she continued to
experience joint pain and stiffness, in her Supplemental Pain Questionnaire,
she reported that the medications helped with her pain. (Tr. 229.)

Additionally, the ALJ correctly observed that Plaintiff “did not require
significant emergency medical treatment” (Tr. 30), because for the relevant
period of time, the record shows only one emergency room visit―on May 20,
2017―for left-sided chest pain with radiation to the left arm. (Tr. 26, 421-

34.) Also, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not fail to consider
the side effects of her medications. (See Tr. 24 (assessing moderate
limitations in understanding, remembering or applying information due to
Plaintiff’s “fatigue and medication effects”); Tr. 29, 465 & 471 (noting that

“Lexapro was causing fatigue” and Zoloft “was making her feel more
anxious”); cf. Tr. 829 & 834 (noting that in January and February of 2018,
Plaintiff was doing well and was not having any problems with her
medications)7.)

6 It should be noted that Dr. Elston’s progress notes are partially illegible.

7 At her rheumatology exams, Plaintiff did not report any adverse drug
effects. (See Tr. 483, 627, 675, 852, 856, 860, 865, 873, 895, 907, 916.)
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s consideration of her testimony
regarding daily activities. (Tr. 26, 29-30, 51-53.) To the extent Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ did not adequately consider her daily activities, Plaintiff
is mistaken. (See Tr. 26, 29-30.) Further, to the extent Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ should have assessed greater limitations in light of her reported
daily activities, subjective complaints alone are insufficient to establish work-

related limitation or disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s
statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive
evidence of disability . . . .”). Here, the ALJ’s RFC assessment accounted for
Plaintiff’s impairments and any resulting limitations to the extent they were

supported by credible evidence. For example, while Plaintiff alleged that she
had difficulty dressing, bathing, and caring for her hair, the ALJ noted that
records from the Center for Behavioral Health described her as well-groomed
and clean. (Tr. 24, 26, 465, 468, 471, 474, 477, 542, 545, 548, 551, 554, 557,

560, 696, 700, 706, 712, 715.) Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did
not meaningfully address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) lacks
merit.
Plaintiff’s second argument also does not warrant a remand. In the

Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he finding of any severe impairment . . . is enough to
satisfy step two because once the ALJ proceeds beyond step two, he is
required to consider the claimant’s entire medical condition, including
impairments the ALJ determined were not severe.” Burgin v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 420 F. App’x 901, 902 (11th Cir. 2011). Therefore, even if the ALJ

erred by not finding Plaintiff’s IBS to be a severe impairment, the error is
harmless because the ALJ found at least one severe impairment. See Heatly
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 824-25 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(“Even if the ALJ erred in not indicating whether chronic pain syndrome was

a severe impairment, the error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that
[plaintiff] had a severe impairment: [sic] and that finding is all that step two
requires. . . . Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of
the impairments that should be considered severe.”).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative joint disease of the right
shoulder, asthma with lung nodules and interstitial changes, anemia, chronic
eczematoid otitis externa and conductive hearing loss, vertigo, chronic

rhinitis, adjustment disorder, depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety
disorder. (Tr. 23.) Although Plaintiff’s IBS was not listed among the severe
impairments, the ALJ did not ignore this impairment as he determined that
Plaintiff’s IBS, along with other non-severe impairments, did not

significantly limit Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. (Id.)
Moreover, the ALJ specifically stated that he considered all of Plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments, including the non-severe ones, in
assessing the RFC and his discussion of the evidence supports his statement.
(Id.)

For example, in determining the RFC, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s
testimony of having “problems with her small intestine and immune system”
(Tr. 29), and her husband’s statement that Plaintiff “must have immediate
access to restrooms” (Tr. 26). The ALJ also noted:

During a GI examination with William Mayoral, M.D., on May
25, 2017, the claimant reported left lower quadrant pain with
radiation to her left flank and left lower extremity, worsened by
physical activity and movement. She was not in acute distress.
Her blood pressure was 130/89. The claimant was started on a
trial of Librax with [C]lidinium 3F/20-23). Bloodwork collected
on May 26, 2017, indicated a normal sedimentation rate by
modified [W]estergren. Her Alsolase level was within normal
limits (Exhibit B6F/15-17).

At a follow[-]up examination with Dr. Mayoral on June 9, 2017,
he reviewed the claimant’s workup and imaging studies, which
ruled out [IBS], as well as other etiologies. The claimant stated
she did not experience relief after taking Librax for one week and
discontinued taking it.

(Tr. 26-27.) Further, as part of his discussion of Dr. Delgado’s examination
records, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was taking medications for GERD,
among other conditions. (Tr. 28.)
As shown by the ALJ’s decision, he adequately considered all of
Plaintiff’s impairments, both severe and non-severe, in combination. See
Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-14168, 572 F. App’x 949,
951-52 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[T]he ALJ stated that he evaluated
whether [plaintiff] had an ‘impairment or combination of impairments’ that
met a listing and that he considered ‘all symptoms’ in determining her RFC.

Under our precedent, those statements are enough to demonstrate that the
ALJ considered all necessary evidence.”). Furthermore, while the ALJ
considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments, he incorporated into the RFC
assessment only those limitations resulting from the impairments, which he

found to be supported by the record.
Moreover, the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
(See, e.g., Tr. 453 (noting that Dr. Mayoral’s diagnoses after Plaintiff’s
endoscopy and colonoscopy did not include IBS); Tr. 512 (assessing diarrhea,

GERD, and abdominal pain, but no IBS); Tr. 514, 516, 518, 520, 522, 524-27,
& 687-89 (noting that Plaintiff underwent “extensive workup[,] including
imaging studies, blood work and endoscopic intervention[,] [at Mayo Clinic,
as a result of] which IBD was ruled out, as well as[] other etiologies”; noting

that the possibility of IBS-D had been “discussed and entertained”; and also
noting intermittent abdominal pain radiating to her left flank and left lower
extremity, which was relieved only with Prednisone prescribed by her
rheumatologist); Tr. 534 (noting normal hepatobiliary scan with normal

ejection fraction); Tr. 692 (noting that a CT scan of the abdomen/pelvis from
June 21, 2017 showed “[n]o acute process and no suspicious finding,” and a

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small hiatal hernia); Tr. 486 (noting no GI complaints); see also Tr. 468
(reporting no incontinence); but see Tr. 527 (assessing GERD, IBS,

diverticular disease, and right upper quadrant abdominal pain).) In sum,
even if the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s IBS to be a non-severe
impairment, a remand is not warranted, because the ALJ considered all of
Plaintiff’s impairments, both severe and non-severe, in combination at

subsequent steps of the sequential evaluation process and his decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
III. Conclusion
The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh

the evidence, or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the
question is not whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on
de novo review; rather, the Court’s review is limited to determining whether
the ALJ’s findings are based on correct legal standards and supported by

substantial evidence. Based on this standard of review, the Court concludes
that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act for the time period in question is due to be affirmed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with

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this Order, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on September 16,
2021.

: MONTE C. RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108421. Public record. Not legal advice.