# Boyd v. Decker

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108258

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108258

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

THADDEUS BOYD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:20-cv-2817-WFJ-SPF

SERGEANT DECKER,
CLASSIFICATION SPECIALIST PAOLLILIO,
LIEUTENANT BOWMAN,
DEPUTY BRINSON,
DEPUTY DEBOY,
DEPUTY DICE,
SERGEANT HASTINGS,
CLASSIFICATION SPECIALIST MCWILLIAMS,
SERGEANT SERRANO,
CAPTAIN MOYER,
SERGEANT LOFTUS,
DEPUTY RENAKER,
DETECTIVE BELVIS,
SERGEANT TROUTMAN,
MICHAEL F. ANDREWS,
CORPORAL ANDREWS,
BOB GUALTIERI,
DEPUTY BRINSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT BEAM,
STACY MCNALLY,
JUAN SALVADIR,

Defendants.
____________________________________/

ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff Thaddeus Boyd’s Amended
Civil Rights Complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleges violations
of his First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Mr. Boyd is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se.
I. Legal Background

A. Section 1915
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal courts must conduct an initial screening of
civil suits brought by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or its
employee to determine whether they should proceed. Upon review, a court is
required to dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, in the following

circumstances:
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.---On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint---
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring dismissal of a complaint in an in forma
pauperis proceeding under the same circumstances). A complaint is frivolous if it is
without arguable merit either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.
Civ. P. See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language
of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)”).
Additionally, courts must read a plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519–520 (1972).
B. Section 1983

“[S]ection 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred by
the Constitution and federal statutes.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901
F.2d 989, 997 (11th Cir. 1990). To successfully plead a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
allege two elements: “(1) that the act or omission deprived plaintiff of a right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
(2) that the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of law.” Id. at

996–97. Thus, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under the color of law
or otherwise showed some type of state action that led to the violation of the
plaintiff’s rights. Id.
II. Analysis
Mr. Boyd alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was a

pretrial detainee at the Pinellas County jail. His allegations are rambling, disjointed,
incomplete, and lack sufficient detail. Construing the Amended Complaint liberally,
Mr. Boyd appears to allege that he arrived at the Pinellas County jail on June 23,
2020. He was being held in an area named Delta 1, when an unidentified officer
unlawfully conducted a line up, arrested him, and confiscated his phone. He was

placed in “red-dot” confinement. On July 7, 2020, at 12:30 a.m., an unnamed
person spit on him.
In a series of incomplete sentences, Mr. Boyd appears to allege that he
attempted several times to file a grievance about both his “red-dot” confinement and
the spitting incident. He alleges that various officers either prohibited him from
grievances or denied the grievances outright.
Mr. Boyd alleges that he suffered a spinal injury, post traumatic stress,
extreme paranoia, frequent headaches, and joint pain. He contends that he has not

received his medications and that inmates constantly pick on him. Mr. Boyd seeks
to recover: (1) $100,000 for being placed on “red-dot” confinement; (2) $50,000 for
being labeled a predator; (3) $50,000 for pain and suffering; and (4) an apology for
the mistreatment he received.
A. Defendants

Mr. Boyd names 21 defendants in his Amended Complaint.1 Seventeen of
those defendants are officers, deputies, sergeants, lieutenants, and other jail
personnel who allegedly participated in the violation of Mr. Boyd’s constitutional
rights. His factual allegations mostly consist of a list of incomplete sentences and

notations. Although he names numerous defendants, he does not identify which
defendant is responsible for which constitutional violation. He fails to allege clearly
who conducted the line-up, arrested him, and confiscated his phone. He fails to
identify who spit on him or who placed him in “red-dot” confinement.
The allegations concerning Mr. Boyd’s attempts to file grievances are similarly

incomplete and disjointed. He fails to describe clearly who prohibited him from
filing grievances or who denied the grievances that form the basis of the alleged

1 In his original Complaint, Mr. Boyd named an additional defendant, Sergeant Franjesivic. In his
Amended Complaint, he no longer names Sergeant Franjesivic as a defendant. Therefore, no claims
remain pending against this defendant, and the Clerk has terminated this defendant from the docket
sheet.
constitutional violations. Consequently, Mr. Boyd’s claims against the following 17
defendants are dismissed: Sergeant Decker, Classification Specialist Paollilio,
Lieutenant Bowman, Deputy Brinson, Deputy Deboy, Deputy Dice, Sergeant

Hastings, Classification Specialist McWilliams, Sergeant Serrano, Captain Moyer,
Sergeant Loftus, Deputy Renaker, Detective Belvis, Sergeant Troutman, Corporal
Andrews, Deputy Brinson, and Administrative Assistant Beam.
Mr. Boyd also names as a defendant Pinellas County Public Defender Stacey
McNally. He asserts no specific allegations against McNally; however, documents

filed with his Amended Complaint show that McNally formally represented him.
“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”
Polk County v. Dobson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). To the extent that any of Mr.
Boyd’s allegations are based on McNally’s actions while “performing a lawyer’s

traditional functions,” those claims are dismissed. See Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865,
875 (11th Cir. 2011) (“State public defenders do not act under color of state law, even
when appointed by officers of the courts.”).
Mr. Boyd also names as a defendant Assistant State Attorney Juan Salvadir.

He asserts no specific allegations against Salvadir; however, supporting documents
show that Salvadir represents the State of Florida in the criminal prosecution of Mr.
Boyd. “[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from
the prosecutor’s function as an advocate. Such absolute immunity extends to a
prosecutor’s acts undertaken in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or
for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Hart
v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To the extent
that Mr. Boyd’s allegations are based on Salvadir’s actions while performing his

prosecutorial duties, those claims are dismissed.
Mr. Boyd also names as a defendant Judge Michael F. Andrews. From the
supporting documents it appears that Judge Andrews presides over Mr. Boyd’s
pending criminal prosecution. Judges have immunity under federal law when they
act in their judicial capacity, Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted):
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages
for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts
are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her
jurisdiction. Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting
in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act
complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the
events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3)
the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and
(4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the
judge in his judicial capacity.

Mr. Boyd alleges that he “wrote to Judicial Qualifications to [re]move Judge
Andrews from [his] case.” Civ. Doc. 6 at 12. Beyond this incomplete allegation, he
alleges no facts to establish that Judge Andrews acted outside his judicial capacity.
To the extent that Mr. Boyd’s allegations are based on Judge Andrew’s actions in his
capacity as the presiding judge over his criminal prosecution, those claims are
dismissed.
Mr. Boyd also names as a defendant Pinellas County Sheriff Bob Gualtieri.
To establish a § 1983 claim against a defendant in the defendant’s supervisory
capacity, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant instituted a custom or policy
[that] result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or . . . directed [his]

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully
and failed to stop them from doing so.” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1331
(11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Mr. Boyd alleges no facts about Sheriff
Gualtieri’s role in the alleged incidents giving rise to his claims. He also alleges no
policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations. Consequently,

any claim against Sheriff Gualtieri is dismissed.
B. Claims
In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Boyd invokes his rights under the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. However, he fails

to identify or describe the alleged constitutional violations with specificity. He has
not clearly delineated any claim for relief or provided specific facts in support of any
of his claims.
1. First Amendment
The typical First Amendment claim by a prisoner involves a prisoner being

punished for filing a grievance or a lawsuit concerning the conditions of his
imprisonment. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). To state
such a claim, a prisoner must establish that: (1) his speech or act was constitutionally
protected; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected
speech; and (3) there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the
adverse effect on the speech. Id. A prisoner’s filing of a grievance concerning the
conditions of his imprisonment is protected speech under the First Amendment. Id.
The adverse action that the inmate suffers as a result of the prison official’s alleged

retaliation must be such that it “would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness
from engaging in such speech[.]” Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir.
2008). The second element of the cause of action thus requires “an objective
standard and a factual inquiry.” Id. at 1277. The third element “asks whether the

defendants were subjectively motivated to discipline because [the prisoner]
complained of some of the conditions of his confinement.” Id. at 1278.
Mr. Boyd alleges that he filed, or attempted to file, grievances concerning his
“red-dot” classification and the spitting incident. Such conduct may constitute
protected speech. However, he alleges no facts to establish the second or third

elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim. Consequently, this claim must be
dismissed.
2. Third Amendment
The Third Amendment provides: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in

a manner to be described by law.” U.S. Const. amend. III. Mr. Boyd alleges no
facts to establish a plausible basis for relief under the Third Amendment. This claim
must be dismissed.
3. Fourth Amendment
“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of
an arrest.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002). Mr. Boyd’s
allegations concern events that occurred after he was arrested, while he was pretrial

detainee. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, and this claim must
be dismissed.
4. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment governs the conduct of federal actors, not state actors.

Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037, 1041 (11th Cir. 1989). All of the
defendants Mr. Boyd names in his Amended Complaint are state actors, not federal
actors. Consequently, the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable, and this claim must be
dismissed.
5. Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

U.S. Const. amend VI. To the extent Mr. Boyd alleges a violation of his right to a
speedy trial, “[t]he sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right [is] dismissal
of the charges.” Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 968, __, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1615
(2016). To the extent he attempts to allege he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, there is no provision in the law for money damages for such a claim. Stark
v. Eighth Judicial Circuit, No. 1:19-cv-258-MW-GRJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143685,
at *8 (N.D. Fla. July 1, 2020). Mr. Boyd alleges no facts to establish a plausible basis

for relief under the Sixth Amendment. Consequently, this claim must be dismissed.
6. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment provides a freedom from cruel and unusual
punishments, and it “serves as the primary source of protection against excessive

force after conviction.” Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.
2019) (citations omitted). Mr. Boyd’s allegations concern events that occurred before
conviction, while he was pretrial detainee. Consequently, the Eighth Amendment is
inapplicable, and this claim must be dismissed.
7. Fourteenth Amendment

Because Mr. Boyd is a pretrial detainee at the Pinellas County jail, his claims
arise under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
Eighth Amendment. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).
His allegations, although vague, primarily concern his placement in “red-dot”
confinement and the spitting incident. Construing the allegations liberally, Mr. Boyd

may intend to assert a claim for an unconstitutional condition of confinement. To
state that claim, Mr. Boyd must allege an “extreme deprivation” and an official’s
“deliberate indifference.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
The deprivation must be “sufficiently serious to constitute a denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). “To be deliberately
indifferent a prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Purcell v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005).

“Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners. It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of
another that translates into a constitutional liability.” Id. (citations and alterations
omitted).

Mr. Boyd vaguely alleges that he was placed in “red-dot” confinement and
that an unnamed person spit on him. He fails to describe the conditions of “red-dot”
confinement much less establish that such conditions denied him a basic human need
under contemporary standards of decency. Also, he fails to identify the person who
spit on him and fails to show how the incident resulted in a deprivation of a

constitutional right. He alleges no facts to establish a prison official’s deliberate
indifference to his needs or safety. Consequently, a claim based on an
unconstitutional condition of confinement must be dismissed.
Also, Mr. Boyd may intend to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. To state this claim, a prisoner “must show: (1) a serious

medical need; (2) a defendant’s deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation
between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207,
1220 (11th Cir. 2016). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l
Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Mr. Boyd
vaguely alleges that he has been denied his medications, although he supports this
allegation with no details. Mr. Boyd fails to allege sufficient facts to establish these

elements. Therefore, a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
must be dismissed.
C. Leave to Amend
If Mr. Boyd wishes to proceed with his claims, he must file a Second

Amended Complaint. The factual allegations must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must give “the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and provide “more than labels and
conclusions [or] a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. More than conclusory and vague allegations are required
to state a cause of action under § 1983. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556–57
(11th Cir. 1984). In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Boyd must identify each
claim for relief, clearly state relevant facts that support each claim, and explain the
involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violations.

Also, Mr. Boyd must clarify whether he sues each defendant in his or her
official or individual capacities. “For liability purposes, a suit against a public
official in his official capacity is considered a suit against the local government entity
he represents.” Owens v. Fulton Cnty, 877 F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989). To
state a claim, Mr. Boyd must allege that “the moving force of the constitutional
violation” was an official policy, custom, or practice adopted by Pinellas County.
See Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020).
To the extent that Mr. Boyd intends to bring a claim involving the grievance

process, he is cautioned that a jail official’s failure to process a grievance, without
more, is not actionable under § 1983. “[A] prisoner does not have a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in an inmate grievance procedure.” Thomas v. Warner, 237
F. App’x 435, 437–38 (11th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, a plaintiff’s allegations “that
prison officials failed to comply with the prison’s voluntary grievance procedures

does not state a due process claim.” Id. at 438.
Finally, Mr. Boyd’s supporting documents show that he faces criminal charges
in state court. To the extent he contests the constitutionality of these charges, Mr.
Boyd is cautioned that “a federal court may not interfere with ongoing state criminal

proceedings except in the most extraordinary circumstances.” Lawrence v. Miami-
Dade State Attorney, 272 F. App’x 781, 781–82 (11th Cir. 2008). “Under the Younger
abstention doctrine, to justify federal intervention, a petitioner must show manifest
bad faith and injury that is great, immediate, and irreparable, constituting
harassment of the plaintiff in the exercise of his constitutional rights, and resulting in

a deprivation of meaningful access to the state courts.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. Mr. Boyd’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
2. If Mr. Boyd wishes to amend his complaint to remedy the noted

deficiencies, he shall file a Second Amended Complaint by September
29, 2021.
a. To amend his complaint, Mr. Boyd should complete a new civil
rights complaint form, titling it “Second Amended Complaint.” The
Second Amended Complaint must include all of Mr. Boyd’s claims.

It may not refer back to, or incorporate, the original Complaint or
the Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint
supersedes the Amended Complaint. Malowney v. Fed. Collection
Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).
b. The Second Amended Complaint will be subject to initial screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
c. If Mr. Boyd fails to file a Second Amended Complaint by September
29, 2021, or to seek an extension of time to do so, this order
dismissing his Amended Complaint without prejudice will become a
final judgment. “[A]n order dismissing a complaint with leave to

amend within a specified time becomes a final judgment if the time
allowed for amendment expires without the plaintiff [amending his
complaint or] seeking an extension. And when the order becomes a
final judgment, the district court loses ‘all its prejudgment powers to
grant any more extensions’ of time to amend the complaint.” Auto.
Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d
707, 720-21 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-
Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1994)).
3. Mr. Boyd must notify the Court of any change of address. Mr. Boyd’s
failure to comply will result in the dismissal of this case without further
notice.
4, The Clerk is directed to mail to Mr. Boyd both a copy of this order and
the standard civil rights complaint form.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 30, 2021.
lieth,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Plaintiff, pro se

15

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108258. Public record. Not legal advice.