# Sanders v. Starling

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 20, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108070

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 20, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108070

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “prison regulations [are] 26 primarily designed to guide correctional officers in the administration of a prison” and “such regulations [are] not designed to confer rights on inmates”
- stating “[g]rossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute deliberate indifference …, as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem
- explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”
- emphasizing that a § 1983 plaintiff must prove the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER SANDERS,

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:19-cv-430-MMH-JBT
BRIAN STARLING, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Christopher Sanders, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action on April 16, 2019, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint
(Complaint; Doc. 1).1 In the Complaint, Sanders asserts claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the following Defendants: (1) Brian Starling; (2) Sean
Fogarty; (3) Lieutenant Woods; (4) Crystal Waite;2 (5) Carrie Reed; (6) Bryan
Allen; (7) Kelly Brown; (8) Warden Barry Reddish; (9) Mae Harrold; (10) Major

1 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite
the document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing
system.

2 The Court directed the Clerk to correct the name of Defendant C. Fox
to Crystal Waite. See Order (Doc. 107).
M. Honour; (11) Mitchell Mason; (12) Assistant Warden Lane; (13) A. Powell;
(14) John Doe 2; (15) Sharron Braziel-Marshall; (16) Lisa Tyre; (17) Tammy A.

Gibson; (18) Jeffery Beasley; and (19) Jonathan Aikin.3 Sanders alleges that
Defendants mistreated him from January 2017 through August 2017, at
Florida State Prison (FSP). As relief, he requests compensatory and punitive
damages. Additionally, he asks that the Court direct the Florida Department

of Corrections (FDOC) to terminate Defendants’ employment, and order the
State of Florida to revoke Defendants’ medical licenses. See Complaint at 9.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Crystal Waite and
Sharron Braziel-Marshall’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Motion;

Doc. 112). The Court advised Sanders that granting a motion to dismiss would
be an adjudication of the case that could foreclose subsequent litigation on the
matter and gave him an opportunity to respond. See Order (Doc. 6). Sanders
filed a response in opposition to the Motion. See Response to Defendants

Marshall and Waites’ Motion to Dismiss (Response; Doc. 116). Thus,
Defendants’ Motion is ripe for review.

3 The Court dismissed Sanders’ claims against Defendants John Doe 2,
Reed, Lane, Beasley, Aikin, Powell, Harrold, and Honour. See Orders (Docs.
111, 98, 83).

2
II. Plaintiff’s Allegations4
Sanders asserts that Defendant Waite violated his Eighth Amendment

right when she, among others, placed Sanders in a cold cell with a broken
window and no clothes or bedding. See Complaint at 10 (count 4). He also states
that Waite violated Sanders’ First Amendment right when she retaliated
against Sanders for witnessing and reporting the beating of inmate Dyshonty

Gordon, FDOC #166312. See id. (counts 5, 8). According to Sanders,
Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall violated his Eighth Amendment right
when they conspired with others to inflict physical and emotional harm on
Sanders, see id. (count 7); they failed to follow FDOC procedures and refused

to place Sanders on self-harm observation status (SHOS), see id. at 11 (counts
11, 13); they watched Sanders harm himself and failed to remove him from his
cell for medical treatment, see id. (count 12); they refused to file an incident
report to alert the administration about the abuse, and failed to document and

4 The Complaint is the operative pleading. In considering a motion to
dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true,
consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Miljkovic v.
Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations
and citations omitted). As such, the recited facts are drawn from the Complaint
and may differ from those that ultimately can be proved. Additionally, because
this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Waite and Braziel-Marshall, the Court’s recitation of the facts will focus on
Sanders’ allegations as to them.
3
treat Sanders’ injuries, see id. at 12 (counts 15, 16, 17); Waite, among others,
unlawfully sprayed Sanders with chemical agents, see id. at 10-11 (count 9);

and Braziel-Marshall jammed a lavage tube down Sanders’ throat until he spat
blood, see id. at 11, 13 (counts 14, 21), and also falsified documents to cover up
the abuse, see id. at 12 (count 18).
As to the underlying facts, Sanders asserts that he saw a cell extraction

team use excessive force against inmate Dyshonty Gordon on January 27,
2017, and reported the abuse in front of the handheld camera. See id. at 7. He
states that Defendant Waite moved away from “ear shot of the camera” and
told Sanders that “they had something” for him since he wanted to be a

witness. Id. at 7-8. He avers that officers placed him on property restriction on
January 28th for misuse of state property, which he denied. See id. at 8.
Sanders states that when Waite came to his cell with Captain Starling “to act
like they were doing Crisis Intervention Counseling,” Waite instead asked

Sanders if he would exit the cell. Id. at 8. According to Sanders, he showed
Waite a handful of pills (Tegretol 200mg), declared a mental health emergency,
and swallowed the pills in front of Waite and Starling. See id. at 14. He asserts
that Waite stated, “those are just Ibuprofen” and walked away rather than

asking that the officers remove Sanders from the cell. Id. Sanders avers that
officers sprayed him with chemical agents and assaulted him. See id. at 14-15.
4
According to Sanders, Waite performed a lavage in the medical clinic.
See id. at 15. He also states that Starling and Waite “had the cell extraction

team” beat Sanders in the medical clinic. See id. He maintains that Waite
refused to put him in a SHOS cell, and instead Waite, among others, assigned
him to a C-wing cell with a broken window where he suffered for three days in
freezing temperatures with no bedding and only boxer shorts. See id. at 15-16.

According to Sanders, he complained about staff abuse “throughout the
incident,” however, Waite refused to file an incident report. Id. at 16. According
to Sanders, a nurse treated Sanders’ “out of place” shoulder and head injuries
on January 29th, and put Sanders’ name on “the emergency list” to see a

doctor. Id. He asserts that he saw a doctor about his shoulder injury on
February 1, 2017. See id. at 17.
Next, Sanders alleges that officers, on Starling’s behalf, set him up for
abuse on April 23, 2017. See id. at 18. He states that officers assaulted him

and sprayed him with chemical agents. See id. He asserts that a nurse refused
to place him in a SHOS cell when she knew he had swallowed pills. See id.
According to Sanders, when officers placed him in a restraint chair, he “kicked”
one of them “in an attempt to defend” himself as they “clamped the shackles

down” on his ankles. Id. at 18-19. He states that officers assaulted him and

5
escorted him to B-wing, where they left him in a SHOS cell for three days with
injuries to his head, ankles, and wrist. See id.

Sanders also describes staff mistreatment in early May 2017,
culminating in him swallowing pills and the officers’ use of chemical agents on
May 8, 2017. See id. at 19-20. He maintains that two nurses performed a lavage
on him and jammed the tube down his throat until he spat blood. See id. at 21.

According to Sanders, instead of filing an incident report and placing him on
SHOS, one of the nurses told the officers to provide Sanders with a shower and
cell escort. See id. He states that he tried to hang himself in the shower. See
id. He avers that he was placed in a SHOS cell, and then returned to B wing.

See id.
Additionally, Sanders maintains that he declared a mental health
emergency and swallowed “a bunch of pills” on August 3, 2017, due to the
ongoing staff abuse. Id. at 22. He asserts that, in the medical clinic, Defendant

Braziel-Marshall “yanked” his nose back and “jammed” ammonia up his nose,
causing a nosebleed. Id. He also states that Braziel-Marshall unnecessarily
performed a lavage when he “was not refusing to drink the charcoal.” Id. He
states that Braziel-Marshall and another nurse jammed the tube down his

throat until he spat blood. See id. According to Sanders, an officer squeezed his
head and poked his eyes during the lavage, and accused Sanders of kicking a
6
sergeant. See id. He avers that Braziel-Marshall refused to place him on
SHOS. See id. He maintains that officers escorted him to a shower where they

sprayed him (presumably with chemical agents) and he tried to hang himself.
See id. at 23. He asserts that officers returned him to the emergency room
where Braziel-Marshall gave him an Emergency Treatment Order (ETO) shot.
See id. According to Sanders, officers “jumped” him as he left the emergency

room, and Braziel-Marshall “again jammed an ammonia” into his nose. See id.
III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual
allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see
also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.
2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint
should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further,
7
the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and
quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”
which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine
whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
8
Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto
counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837,
839 (11th Cir. 2011)5 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132
F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part
on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 706).

IV. Summary of the Arguments
Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall request dismissal of Sanders’
First and Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Motion at 6-23. They
assert that (1) Sanders fails to state plausible claims against them; (2)

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Sanders’ claims for
injunctive relief are moot because the FDOC transferred him from FSP to the
Reception and Medical Center; (4) the Court lacks the authority to direct the
FDOC to terminate Defendants’ employment or to order the State of Florida to

revoke Defendants’ medical licenses; and (5) Sanders’ compensatory and
punitive damages claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In his Response,

5 “Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive
authority.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as
persuasive authority.”).
9
Sanders maintains that he states plausible claims against Defendants Waite
and Braziel-Marshall, see Response at 2-8, and that Defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity, see id. at 8-9. He also argues that he is entitled
to compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. See id. at
9-10.
V. Law

A. Eighth Amendment

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(citations omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit “requires proof of an

affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the
alleged constitutional deprivation” in § 1983 cases. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802
F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted). More than
conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556 57 (11th Cir. 1984). As
10
such, “‘conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.’” Rehberger v.

Henry Cnty., Ga., 577 F. App’x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation
omitted). In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional
deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of
action against the defendant.

Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth
Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).

“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an
objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct.” Oliver v.
Fuhrman, 739 F. App’x 968, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Chandler v. Crosby,
379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Under the objective component, a prisoner must
allege a condition that is sufficiently serious to violate
11
the Eighth Amendment. Id.[ 6 ] The challenged
condition must be extreme and must pose an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner’s
future health or safety. Id. The Eighth Amendment
guarantees that prisoners are provided with a
minimal civilized level of life’s basic necessities. Id.

Under the subjective component, a prisoner
must allege that the prison official, at a minimum,
acted with a state of mind that constituted deliberate
indifference. Id. This means the prisoner must show
that the prison officials: (1) had subjective knowledge
of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and
(3) displayed conduct that is more than mere
negligence. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2003).

Oliver, 739 F. App’x at 969-70. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct
that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary
lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
As it relates to medical care, “[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eighth Amendment to prohibit ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners.’” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). The Eleventh Circuit has
instructed:
To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, [a
plaintiff] must show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2)

6 Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289.
12
the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need;
and (3) causation between that indifference and the
plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d
1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). To establish deliberate
indifference, [a plaintiff] must prove “(1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of
that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]
negligence.”[7] Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d
1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original).
The defendants must have been “aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and then actually draw
that inference. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245
(11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

Easley v. Dep’t of Corr., 590 F. App’x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2014). For medical
treatment to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be “‘so
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973
F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1505 (11th Cir.1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th
Cir. 1989) (stating “[g]rossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute
deliberate indifference …, as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less
efficacious course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem).

7 See Patel v. Lanier Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1188 n.10 (11th Cir. 2020)
(recognizing “a tension” within Eleventh Circuit precedent relating to the
“more than mere negligence” and “more than gross negligence” phrases and
stating that “no matter how serious the negligence, conduct that can’t fairly be
characterized as reckless won’t meet the Supreme Court’s standard”).
13
Notably, the law is well-settled that the Constitution is not implicated
by the negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348
(1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause,
whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care
by prison officials.”). A complaint that a physician has been negligent “in

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham v. Thomas,
654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[n]othing in our case law

would derive a constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to
subordinate his own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the
contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does
not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892,

897 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the
question of whether governmental actors should have employed additional
diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter
for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding

liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545
(11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
14
B. Qualified Immunity

With respect to qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed:

The qualified-immunity defense reflects an
effort to balance “the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The
doctrine resolves this balance by protecting
government officials engaged in discretionary
functions and sued in their individual capacities
unless they violate “clearly established federal
statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. City
of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation
marks and brackets omitted).

As a result, qualified immunity shields from
liability “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). But the
doctrine’s protections do not extend to one who “knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct.
2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted).

To invoke qualified immunity, a public official
must first demonstrate that he was acting within the
scope of his or her discretionary authority. Maddox v.
Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we
have explained the term “discretionary authority,” it
“include[s] all actions of a governmental official that
(1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of
15
his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his
authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it
is clear that Defendant Officers satisfied this
requirement, as they engaged in all of the challenged
actions while on duty as police officers conducting
investigative and seizure functions.

Because Defendant Officers have established
that they were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to [plaintiff]
to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
inappropriate. See id. To do that, [plaintiff] must show
that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him,
the facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated
[plaintiff’s] constitutional right and that that right
was “clearly established ... in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’
actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on
other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808.
We may decide these issues in either order, but, to
survive a qualified immunity defense, [the plaintiff]
must satisfy both showings. Maddox, 727 F.3d at 1120-
21 (citation omitted).

Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017); see King v. Pridmore,
961 F.3d 1135, 1142 (11th Cir. 2020). The Court notes that where the alleged
conditions are particularly egregious, a general constitutional law already
identified in decisional law may be applicable such that a reasonable officer
would know that the egregious conditions violate the Constitution. Taylor v.
Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020). In an action with multiple named defendants, each
16
defendant is entitled to an independent qualified immunity analysis as it
relates to his actions. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).

VI. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Cell Conditions – Count 4
Sanders asserts that Defendant Waite violated Sanders’ Eighth
Amendment right when she, among others, placed Sanders in a cold cell with
a broken window and no clothes or bedding on January 28, 2017. See
Complaint at 10, 15-16. He describes the circumstances (including swallowing
pills and a visit to the medical clinic for a lavage) that led to the cell
assignment. See id. at 14-16. According to Sanders, officers took Sanders to the

C-wing cell because Waite refused to put him in a SHOS cell. See id. at 15-16.
Defendant Waite maintains that Sanders fails to state a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim against her. See Motion at 6-7. She asserts that Sanders
“presents no factual support” for his assertion that she knew the cell had

subpar conditions. Id. at 6. Additionally, Waite argues that Sanders fails to
show a causal connection between her conduct and an Eighth Amendment
violation because she “has no control over cell assignments.” Id. at 7. In his
Response, Sanders states that Waite “allowed other defendants” to place him

in a “non-certified” freezing cell with no clothes or bedding. Response at 3-4.

17
According to Sanders, Waite had “the power to choose” the type of cell that best
suited Sanders’ needs. Id. at 4.

Even if Sanders satisfied the objective prong of a conditions-of-
confinement claim with respect to the alleged three-day exposure to subpar
conditions, he has not provided facts sufficient to satisfy the subjective prong.
Sanders provides no facts supporting an inference that Defendant Waite knew

of, yet disregarded, “a substantial risk of harm” to Sanders. Saunders v. Sheriff
of Brevard Cnty., 735 F. App’x 559, 564 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citation
omitted). Taking Sanders’ allegations as true, as the Court must, he provides
a detailed chronology of what transpired before officers escorted him to the C-

wing cell. Given those circumstances as described by Sanders, Waite was faced
with Sanders’ urgent medical needs when officers escorted him to the medical
clinic. As a medical professional, Waite was responsible for addressing
Sanders’ medical needs in the infirmary that day, which she did. See

Complaint at 15. Sanders fails to allege any facts suggesting that Waite had a
duty to escort Sanders to his C-wing cell and monitor the conditions of the cell
that he temporarily occupied.
To the extent Sanders is complaining about Waite’s SHOS decision and

the course of treatment chosen, such a complaint would be at most a claim of
negligence or a disagreement with Waite’s medical treatment choice, neither
18
of which is sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. See Brown v. McClure, 849 F. App’x 837, 841-42 (11th Cir. 2021)

(per curiam) (“As we have said, where a ‘prisoner has received some medical
attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment,’ we are
‘generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’”) (citing Hoffer, 973

F.3d at 1272). Notably, the next day (January 29th), Sanders saw another
nurse who attended to his medical needs related to a shoulder injury, not
ailments related to the cell conditions. See id. at 16. As such, Defendants’
Motion as to Sanders’ Eighth Amendment claim in count 4 against Defendant

Waite is due to granted.
B. First Amendment Retaliation – Counts 5 and 8
Sanders asserts that Defendant Waite retaliated against him for
reporting the alleged beating of another inmate. See Complaint at 10.

According to Sanders, the retaliatory measures included physical and
emotional harm and medical mistreatment. See id. Defendant Waite maintains
that Sanders fails to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim
against her. See Motion at 7-12. In his Response, Sanders asserts that he states

a plausible claim against her. See Response at 4-5.

19
As to a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Eleventh Circuit has
instructed:

[T]he First Amendment prohibits officials from
retaliating against prisoners for exercising their right
of free speech by filing lawsuits or grievances.
O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir.
2011) (per curiam). To prevail on a retaliation claim,
[the plaintiff] must establish that: “(1) his speech was
constitutionally protected; (2) [he] suffered adverse
action such that the [official’s] allegedly retaliatory
conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there
is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action
... and the protected speech.” Id. (second alteration in
original). Once the plaintiff establishes that protected
conduct was a motivating factor for the alleged harm,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show it would
have taken the same action without the protected
activity. Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059,
1063 (11th Cir. 2013).

Mpaka v. Jackson Memorial Hospital, 827 F. App’x 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 2020).
Here, even if Sanders’ speech was constitutionally protected and Waite’s
alleged retaliatory conduct likely would have deterred a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in such speech, Sanders’ assertions fail to establish the
required causal connection between the retaliatory action and the protected
speech. Sanders’ retaliation claim against Defendant Waite largely hinges on
the actions of others, such as corrections officials who allegedly used excessive
force against Sanders when he refused to exit his cell on January 28, 2017.
20
According to Sanders, Captain Starling placed Sanders on property restriction
and directed that other officers spray Sanders with chemical agents because

he had refused a strip search. See Complaint at 8, 14. Waite’s involvement was
limited to her role as a medical professional. According to Sanders, Waite
conducted crisis intervention counseling at Sanders’ cell front, asked Sanders
if he would exit the cell on his own, and performed a lavage to save his life

when officers brought him to the medical clinic. See id. at 14-15. These
allegations fail to support a plausible claim for retaliation against Waite. As
such, Defendants’ Motion as to Sanders’ First Amendment retaliation claims
in counts 5 and 8 against Waite is due to granted.

C. Conspiracy – Count 7
Sanders asserts that Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall violated
his Eighth Amendment right when they conspired with other prison staff
members to harm him. See Complaint at 10. Defendants maintain that

Sanders fails to state a plausible conspiracy claim against them. See Motion at
11-12. In his Response, Sanders generally asserts that Defendants worked
with others to inflict emotional and physical harm upon him. See Response.
“[T]he linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, which presupposes

communication.” Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956
F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992). Sanders need not “produce a ‘smoking gun’
21
to establish the ‘understanding’ or ‘willful participation’ required to show a
conspiracy, but must show some evidence of agreement between the

defendants.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283-84 (11th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469 (11th Cir. 1990))
(internal citation omitted). In the Complaint, Sanders provides no facts
suggesting that Waite and Braziel-Marshall reached an understanding or

agreement with other prison staff members to use excessive force against
Sanders and inflict emotional harm. As such, Defendants’ Motion as to
Sanders’ conspiracy claim in count 7 against them is due to be granted.
D. Chemical Spraying – Count 9

Next, Sanders asserts that Defendant Waite, among others, unlawfully
sprayed Sanders with chemical agents. See Complaint at 10-11. Defendant
Waite maintains that Sanders fails to state a plausible Eighth Amendment
claim against her because he provides no facts that Waite sprayed him with

chemical agents or directed someone else to do it. See Motion at 12.
Additionally, Waite states that Sanders does not allege that Waite was present
when prison security staff sprayed him with chemical agents. See id. In his
Response, Sanders asserts that Waite encouraged the cell extraction team to

beat him and failed to intervene when corrections officers abused him in the
medical clinic. See Response at 6.
22
Notably, Sanders provides no facts suggesting that Defendant Waite
sprayed Sanders with chemical agents or had the authority to direct the

extraction team to physically abuse Sanders. Sanders acknowledges that, after
trying to counsel Sanders, Waite returned to the medical clinic where she
attended to Sanders’ medical needs. As such, Defendants’ Motion as to
Sanders’ Eighth Amendment claim in count 9 against Defendant Waite is due

to be granted.
E. Eighth Amendment Medical (and Related) Claims
Sanders also asserts that Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall
violated his Eighth Amendment right when they failed to follow FDOC

procedures and refused to place Sanders in a SHOS cell, see Complaint at 11
(counts 11, 13); they watched Sanders harm himself and failed to remove him
from his cell for medical treatment, see id. (count 12); they refused to file an
incident report to alert the administration about staff abuse, and failed to

document and treat Sanders’ injuries, see id. at 12 (counts 15, 16, 17).
Additionally, he states that Waite performed a lavage on January 28, 2017,
and Braziel-Marshall used ammonia and conducted a lavage on August 3,
2017, see id. at 11, 13 (counts 14, 21). And, Sanders states that Braziel-

Marshall falsified documents to cover up staff abuse, see id. at 12 (count 18).

23
Sanders maintains that Waite and Braziel-Marshall mistreated him on
January 28th and August 3rd, respectively, after Sanders’ suicide attempts.

See id. at 15-16, 22-23. According to Sanders, on both occasions, officers
escorted him to the infirmary to have his stomach pumped because he had
swallowed pills. See id. at 14-15, 22. He complains that Waite was verbally
abusive, and said she would not place him on SHOS. See id. at 15. He states

that he again swallowed pills on April 23rd and May 8th, and blames other
nurses for similar conduct.8 He avers that, after he ingested pills on August
3rd, Braziel-Marshall placed ammonia up his nose, performed a lavage on him
by jamming the tube down his throat until he spat blood, and gave him an ETO

shot. See id. at 21-23. According to Sanders, Braziel-Marshall initially refused
his request for SHOS, but he was placed on SHOS that same day after he tried
to hang himself in the shower. See id. at 23. Defendants maintain that Sanders
fails to state plausible Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Motion at

13-21. In his Response, Sanders asserts that he states plausible Eighth
Amendment claims against them. See Response at 2-8.

8 Sanders makes similar assertions about other nurses who allegedly
mistreated him on April 23, 2017, and May 8, 2017, after his suicide attempts.
See Complaint at 18-21.
24
Sanders’ assertions relating to Waite and Braziel-Marshall’s provision of
medical care fail to state plausible Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claims against them. Accepting Sanders’ allegations in the Complaint, Waite
and Braziel-Marshall provided Sanders with immediate medical treatment
when he swallowed pills on January 28th and August 3rd, and Sanders was
ultimately placed on SHOS as a result of his suicidal tendencies. To the extent

Sanders is complaining about the lavage procedures and course of treatment
chosen as a result of his self-harm, such a complaint would be at most a claim
of negligence or a disagreement with Waite and Braziel-Marshall’s medical
treatment choice, neither of which is sufficient to state a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. See Brown, 849 F. App’x at 841-42. The
medical attention Sanders received from Defendants Waite and Braziel-
Marshall is not “so reckless or conscience-shocking as to constitute deliberate
indifference.” Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1278. Thus, taking Sanders’ allegations as

true, as this Court must, he fails to state plausible Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall.
Thus, Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted as to Sanders’ Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims in counts 11-14, 17, and 21 against

Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall.

25
As to any alleged verbal abuse or insulting gestures on the part of
Defendant Waite, such allegations do not state a claim of federal constitutional

dimension. See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Nor can Sanders’ assessment of Waite’s “bedside
manner” support “an inference of deliberate indifference.” Bismark, 213 F.
App’x at 897 (“While [plaintiff] objects to [defendant]’s apparently brusque

mannerisms, it is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a prison
physician to consult with a prisoner concerning a medical condition in an aloof
or unfriendly way. Much more is required.”) (citing Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d
1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)) (footnote omitted).

Next, Sanders complains that Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall
failed to file an incident report to alert the prison administration about the
abuse Sanders had encountered, and they refused to document his injuries.
See Complaint at 12, 16. He also asserts that Braziel-Marshall falsified

documents to cover up the abuse. See id. at 12. Section 1983 provides a cause
of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution or federal law, not for violations of prison regulations. 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Notably, a violation of departmental rules or policies, standing

alone, does not infringe upon an inmate’s constitutional rights. See Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (recognizing that “prison regulations [are]
26
primarily designed to guide correctional officers in the administration of a
prison” and “such regulations [are] not designed to confer rights on inmates”);

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970) (emphasizing that a §
1983 plaintiff must prove the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States).
As health care professionals, Waite and Braziel-Marshall are responsible

for providing medical care to inmates, such as Sanders, which they did. Taking
Sanders’ allegations as true, Waite and Braziel-Marshall, among other medical
personnel, focused their efforts on the emergencies at hand, which was
treatment of Sanders’ self-inflicted injuries on the four occasions Sanders

describes in the Complaint. Sanders provides no facts suggesting that Waite
and Braziel-Marshall witnessed abusive events that warranted the filing of
incident reports. Nor did Sanders provide any facts relating to his claims that
they failed to document his injuries to cover up ongoing staff abuse or that

Braziel-Marshall falsified documents. As such, Defendants’ Motion is due to be
granted as to Sanders’ Eighth Amendment claims in counts 15, 16, and 18
against Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall.
F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall assert that they are entitled to
qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Motion at 19-21.
27
In his Response, Sanders maintains that they are not entitled to qualified
immunity. See Response at 8-9. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity,

Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall may claim they are entitled to
qualified immunity from monetary damages in their individual capacities. As
to the underlying facts against each Defendant, Sanders asserts that
Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall mistreated him on January 28, 2017,

and August 3, 2017, respectively, when they attended to Sanders’ medical
needs after his suicidal gestures and failed to take measures to correct the
injustices that Sanders experienced when he repeatedly tried to harm himself.
Defendants were engaged in discretionary functions during the events at issue.

Thus, to defeat qualified immunity with respect to these Defendants, Sanders
must show both that Defendants committed a constitutional violation, and that
the constitutional right violated was clearly established. As the Eleventh
Circuit has instructed, the Court must “parse” the actions each Defendant

undertook, and “address the evidence as it pertains solely to him.” Alcocer, 906
F.3d at 952.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court has found that Sanders has
failed to state plausible Eighth Amendment claims against either Defendant

Waite or Defendant Braziel-Marshall or a plausible First Amendment claim
against Defendant Waite. Thus, Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall are
28
entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages in their individual
capacities as to Sanders’ Eighth Amendment claims against them.

Additionally, Defendant Waite is entitled to qualified immunity from monetary
damages in her individual capacity as to Sanders’ First Amendment claim
against her. As such, Defendants’ Motion as to their assertion of qualified
immunity with respect to Sanders’ First and Eighth Amendment claims is due

to be granted.9
In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendants Waite and Braziel-Marshall’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

112) is GRANTED, and Sanders’ First and Eighth Amendment claims in
counts 4-5, 7-9, 11-18, and 21 against them are DISMISSED.
2. The Clerk shall terminate Crystal Waite and Sharron Braziel-
Marshall as Defendants in the case.

9 The Court need not address Defendants’ assertions as to Sanders’
requests for injunctive and monetary relief. See Motion at 21-23. Nevertheless,
the Court notes that the FDOC transferred Sanders back to FSP. See FDOC
Corrections Offender Network, www.dc.state.fl.us/offenderSearch (last visited
July 7, 2021). Additionally, the Court neither has the authority to direct the
FDOC to terminate Defendants’ employment nor to order the State of Florida
to revoke Defendants’ medical licenses.
29
3. Defendants Brian Starling, Sean Fogarty, Lieutenant Woods,
Bryan Allen, Kelley Brown, Warden Reddish, Mitchell Mason, Lisa Tyre, and
Tammy Gibson filed Answers. See Docs. 60, 74, 81, 88. The Court, by separate
Order, will set deadlines for discovery and the filing of dispositive motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 19th day of July,
2021.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Jax-1 7/19
C:
Christopher Sanders, FDOC #R24565
Counsel of Record

30

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10108070. Public record. Not legal advice.