# The Hanover Insurance Company v. J&S Promotions, LLC

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 29, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107823

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 29, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107823

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the rules of contract interpretation under federal maritime and Florida law are identical
- concluding that state law governed the effect of Ocean Reef’s breaches of the captain and crew warranties

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

THE HANOVER INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:19-cv-835-JES-NPM

J&S PROMOTIONS, LLC, JAMES
F. SMITH, and STANNY R.
PARK,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Final Judgment (Doc. #53) filed on December 1, 2020.
Defendants J&S Promotions, LLC and James F. Smith filed a Response
in Opposition (Doc. #55) on December 15, 2020, to which Plaintiff
filed a Reply (Doc. #59) on January 5, 2021. Defendant Stanny R.
Park (Park) has not filed a response to the motion, although she
was provided notice of the time to respond (Doc. #54) and of the
date and time of oral argument (Doc. #64). The Hanover Insurance
Company filed a Notice of Filing Underwriting Affidavit (Doc. #66)
on May 11, 2021. The Court heard oral arguments on May 12, 2021.
(Doc. #67.) With the permission of the Court (Doc. #68), the
parties (other than defendant Park) filed supplemental memoranda
on May 17, 2021. (Docs. ##71, 72.)
On November 20, 2019, the Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover)
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. #1) seeking
determinations of rights and responsibilities under an insurance
policy issued by Hanover to defendant J&S Promotions, LLC (J&S or
the Named Insured), whose president and sole member is defendant
James F. Smith (Smith). (Id. at ¶ 3.) The determinations relate to

the existence of coverage for bodily injury and property damage
allegedly resulting from the grounding of the insured yacht upon
a coral reef on or about December 28, 2017 (the Grounding
Incident). (Id., introductory paragraph.) Hanover seeks
declarations that for various reasons no coverage is available
under the policy for such injury or damage. For the reasons set
forth below, the Complaint is dismissed in part for lack of
jurisdiction and the motion for summary judgment as to the
remaining counts is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is

satisfied that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if
the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party.” Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us,
Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). A fact is “material”
if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A
court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). In ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, the Court views all evidence and draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d
767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).
Disputes involving marine insurance policies typically fall
within a district court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 and Article 3, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.
AIG Centennial Ins. Co. v. O'Neill, 782 F.3d 1296, 1302 & n.6 (11th
Cir. 2015); Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Giragosian, 57 F.3d
50 54 (1st Cir. 1995).1 See also (Doc. #1, ¶ 7.) “Article III of

1 Such disputes may also be brought under the district court's
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but the Complaint fails
to adequately allege the citizenship of the individual defendants
because it refers only to residency, not citizenship. (Doc. #1,
¶¶ 4, 5, 8). See Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir.
1994). Contrary to the assertion in the Complaint (Doc. #1, ¶ 8),
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a basis for
federal jurisdiction but is procedural only. See Patel v. Hamilton
Med. Ctr., Inc., 967 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2020); see also
Household Bank v. JFS Group, 320 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003).
Despite the agreement in the Final Pretrial Stipulation (Doc. #75,
pp., 1, 10-11), the parties may not consent to jurisdiction on a
basis which does not exist.
the Constitution limits federal courts' jurisdiction to certain
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568
U.S. 398, 408 (2013). This does not include every sort of dispute,
but only those “historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693, 700 (2013). See also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct.

792, 798 (2021). An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the
litigation. Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2020);
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016), as revised
(Feb. 9, 2016). “In our system of government, courts have ‘no
business’ deciding legal disputes or expounding on law in the
absence of such a case or controversy.” Already, LLC v. Nike,
Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90 (2013).
A claim for a declaratory judgment under the federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2202(a), requires the same
type of case-or-controversy under Article III. MedImmune, Inc.

v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). “In all cases
arising under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the threshold question
is whether a justiciable controversy exists”. Atlanta Gas Light
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d 409, 414 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted). “Basically, the question in each case is
whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal
& Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). “[A]ctions for declaratory
judgment on insurance coverage are generally not justiciable until
there has been at least a threat of a claim or lawsuit.”
Progressive Mountain Ins. Co. v. Middlebrooks, 805 F. App’x. 731,

734 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Plaintiff must establish
a case-or-controversy as to each claim separately. Griffin v.
Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1483 (11th Cir. 1987). Even if there is a
case or controversy, the Court has discretion not to exercise its
jurisdiction. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1311–12 (11th Cir.
2017).
II.
Hanover issued Hanover Yacht Policy No. IHP D262113 00 (the
Policy) with an insured period of May 5, 2017 to May 5, 2018. (Doc.
#1-2, p. 2.)2 The Policy applies to a 78-foot long, 2010 Marlow
78 Explorer motor yacht named “Quality Time” (the Insured Yacht).

(Id.) The Named Insured on the Policy is J&S. (Id.) In addition,
Smith qualifies as an Insured with respect to the liability
insurance provided in Section II because he was operating the

2 The page numbers refer to those generated by the Court’s
computer system upon filing (upper left-hand corner) and do not
always correspond with the page number at the bottom of the
document.
Insured Yacht with the permission of J&S when the Grounding
Incident occurred. (Doc. #1-2, p. 35.)
The Policy includes two coverage parts: Section I relates
to first-party property coverage, while Section II relates to
liability coverage. (Id., pp. 38-47). The Policy contains the
following relevant insuring agreement relating to damages:

We will pay damages caused by an occurrence to
which this coverage applies and for which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay,
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of the insured yacht and which results in
bodily injury, property damage, or pollution.
(Doc. #1-2, pp. 43 (emphasis in original).) The Policy also
contains the following relevant insuring agreement relating to
medical payments for bodily injuries:
We will pay the necessary medical expenses
resulting from a bodily injury to you or
others from an occurrence which occurs while
in, upon, boarding, or dis-embarking the
insured yacht . . ..
(Doc. #1-2, pp. 45 (emphasis in original).) Additional provisions
of the Policy will be discussed as necessary to resolve specific
issues.
According to Smith’s deposition (Doc. #53-4), on December 29,
2017, Smith, his wife, and five other persons (Brian Frye, Melissa
l/n/u, Lauren Kasper, Johnny Conser, and Stanny Parks) boarded the
Insured Yacht in Fort Myers, Florida. (Id., p. 7.) The group
intended to make the 5-6 hour trip to Dry Tortugas National Park,
stay there overnight on the Insured Yacht, then travel
approximately 70 miles east to Key West, and stay there for a
couple of days before returning to Fort Myers. (Id., pp. 9-10, 33-
34.) Although the original plan was to make the 105-mile trip in
the daylight, the party got a late start from Fort Myers due to
Ms. Park’s late arrival. (Id., pp. 9-10.)

Smith piloted the Insured Yacht upon their afternoon
departure from Fort Myers. (Id., p. 13.) About 40 miles outside
the Tortugas, Smith realized it was going to get dark before they
would arrive. (Id., p. 12.) Smith decided to continue at a very
slow speed overnight, so as to arrive the next morning. (Id.)
During this nighttime journey, the Insured Yacht was alternatively
operated by Smith and his wife and by Frye and Conser, in two-hour
shifts. (Doc. #53-4, pp. 13-15.) None of the individuals operating
the Insured Yacht during this time, or at any time during the trip,
was the Captain as defined and identified in the Policy. (Id., pp.
28-31, 34-35.)

In the morning of December 30, 2017, while Smith was operating
the Insured Yacht, it arrived at the Dry Tortugas National Park.
(Id., p. 5.) The Insured Yacht had been towing a dinghy through
the night, but upon arrival Smith and his crew put the dinghy on
board the Insured Yacht. (Id., p. 18.) As the Insured Yacht pulled
into the boundaries of the port, the crew offloaded the dinghy.
(Id., p. 17.)
At about 9:00 a.m. the Insured Yacht either ran aground on a
coral reef while approaching the channel into the Dry Tortugas
National Park, or “bumped” a rock, causing little or no damage to
the Insured Yacht.3 (Id., pp. 15-19, 25.) The dinghy was not tied
to the Insured Yacht at the time of the Grounding Incident, having
been disconnected moments before by Conser or Frye, or both. (Doc.

#53-4, pp. 18-19.) Additional facts will be discussed as necessary
to resolve specific issues.
III.
In the Complaint, Hanover requests a judgment declaring that
“there is no coverage under the Policy for any loss, liability,
damages, bodily injury, property damage or injury or damage of any
type in connection with the Grounding Incident.” (Doc. #1, p.
12.) Hanover now asserts it is entitled to summary judgment as
to the requested declaratory judgment (Doc. #53, pp. 15-16), while
defendants oppose the merits of the summary judgment motion and
assert the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Affirmative

Defense Six. See (Docs. #42, p. 9; #55.) The Court first
addresses each count of the Complaint to determine if there is a
case or controversy as to that count.

3 Both versions are referred to as the Grounding Incident,
although the factual variation is not material to the resolution
of the summary judgment motion.
A. Count VI – First Party Claims For Damage to Insured Yacht
Defendants argue there is no case-or-controversy as to Count
VI, and they are correct. In Count VI, Hanover seeks a declaration
that there is no “First Party Property Coverage for Damage to
Insured Yacht.” (Doc. #1, p. 11.) Hanover asserts that post-
loss or post-occurrence obligations required the Named Insured to

give prompt notice of losses, submit a proof of loss statement,
permit Hanover to inspect the damaged property, and not incur any
expense without Hanover’s prior approval. (Id. at ¶ 52.) Hanover
asserts that Smith and J&S breached these obligations by failing
without excuse to report the loss until more than four months
after the Grounding Incident, failing without excuse to
submit a signed sworn proof of loss statement, depriving
Hanover of any opportunity to inspect the damage prior to
the Insured having the damage repaired, and incurring
repair expenses without first obtaining Hanover’s approval, all of
which prejudiced Hanover. (Id. at ¶ 54.) Because of these breaches,

Hanover asserts the first party property coverages of Section I of
the Policy are null and void. (Id. at ¶ 53.)
The record establishes that there is no case or controversy
as to first-party claims. The Insureds have not made a claim
under the Policy (Doc. #1, ¶ 25), and any claim would now be far
beyond the one-year period set forth in the Policy. (Doc. #1-2, p.
50.) There is simply no controversy between Hanover and its
Insureds: Hanover says the Insureds cannot file a first-party
claim based on the Grounding Incident, and the Insureds do not
intend to file such a claim. Accordingly, Count VI of the
Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
B. Count V – Untimely Notice of Loss or Occurrence

In Count V Hanover seeks a declaration that there is no
coverage because the Insured provided untimely notice of loss or
of the occurrence. (Doc. #1, p. 11.) Hanover asserts that the
Policy requires the Insured to give prompt notice of loss or
occurrence to Hanover, or to the Insured’s agent or broker, “as
soon as reasonably possible”. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 48.) Hanover asserts
that Smith and J&S violated this condition by failing without
excuse to give notice of the loss and occurrence until more than
four months after the Grounding Incident, and that this delay
prejudiced Hanover. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Because such notice is a
condition precedent to coverage, Hanover asserts that the non-

compliance results in the coverages of the Policy being null and
void. (Id. at ¶ 48.)
The Policy contains certain post-loss or post-occurrence
responsibilities with which the Named Insured must comply “[i]n
case of a loss or an occurrence to which this insurance may apply
or if you and any insured person are sued in connection with a
loss or an occurrence which may be covered under this policy, . .
..” (Doc. #1-2, p. 49 (emphasis in original).) To the extent
Count V seeks a declaratory judgment as to First-Party claims, it
fails to state a case or controversy for the same reasons which
apply to Count VI, and is dismissed without prejudice to that
extent. To the extent Count V seeks a declaratory judgment as to
third party claims, the jurisdictional discussion below applies.

C. Counts I through IV, Portion of Count V – Third Party
Claims
Counts I through IV of the Complaint relate to coverage of
potential claims by third parties. Defendants argue that there
is no case or controversy relating to these counts because there
has been no third-party claim filed with Hanover or any lawsuit
filed by any claimant. (Doc. #55, pp. 10-12.) Hanover responds
that the undisputed facts are sufficient to establish a case or
controversy for all third-party coverage issues. (Doc. #59, pp.
4-7.)
Hanover identifies two relevant potential third-party

claimants. (Doc. #53, ¶¶ 17-18.) The National Parks Service (NPS)
sent Smith a letter dated June 14, 2018, asserting that its
preliminary investigation determined that the Grounding Incident
injured park resources, including coral reef habitat. (Doc. #1-
4, p. 2.) The letter stated that Smith may be liable under federal
law for response costs and damages. (Id.) Subsequent
correspondence from the NPA demanded more than $85,000 in damages.
(Doc. #59, Ex. 1.) The NPS has not filed any legal action to
pursue this matter. The NPS is not a party to this lawsuit,
however, and therefore will not be bound by its outcome. As to
the NPS, the current lawsuit seeks at best only a non-binding
advisory opinion. “[F]ederal courts do not issue advisory
opinions.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297, 2021 U.S. LEXIS

3401, *17 (June 25, 2021). Therefore, there is no case or
controversy as to any of the counts based on NPS’s potential claim.
Counts I through V are dismissed without prejudice to the extent
they are premised on a possible claim by the NPS.
The attorney for Park sent Hanover’s agent a letter dated
April 23, 2018, asserting a claim against J&S for a traumatic brain
injury caused by the Grounding Incident. (Doc. #1-3, pp. 2-3.)
In her Answer to the Complaint, Park stated she “has made a claim
for damages arising from the December 28, 2017 [Grounding]
[I]ncident.” (Doc. #17, ¶ 5.) In her deposition, Park claimed
damages of $150,000, for which a demand was made. (Doc. #53-6,

pp. 20, 28-29.) Park has not filed a lawsuit arising from the
Grounding Incident, although the applicable statute of limitations
has not expired.4 The Court finds that Hanover has established a

4 Contrary to the Smith Defendants’ argument, simply waiting
for the statute of limitations to expire will not necessarily
eliminate the existence of a case or controversy. A complaint
need not negate a statute of limitations defense. La Grasta v.
First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, most statutes of limitations are subject to
case or controversy as to those counts relating to Parks. Hanover
has established that a third-party claim has been made by Parks
and that there is at least a threat of a lawsuit. See
Middlebrooks, 805 F. App’x. at 734. Therefore, there is a case or
controversy between the Defendants and Hanover based upon Park’s
third-party claim as to Counts I, II, III, IV, and a portion of V.

IV.
The Court will address the merits of each count for which a
case or controversy has been established.
A. Count I: Employment of a Full-Time Captain
In Count I of the Complaint, Hanover asserts that the Policy
contains a Captain Warranty which is a condition precedent to
coverage. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 15, 27; Doc. #53, pp. 12-13.) This Captain
Warranty, Hanover argues, required that a captain be employed on
a full-time basis to work solely on the Insured Yacht, and
specifically named Shane Wrey as that captain. (Doc. #53, pp. 12-
13.) Hanover asserts that the Captain Warranty was violated because

Smith and J&S failed to employ a captain on a full-time basis to
work solely on the Insured Yacht. (Id., p. 13.) Count I seeks a
declaration that because of this Policy violation “the coverages

statutory and equitable tolling, e.g. Fedance v. Harris, No. 20-
12222, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 18399, at *8 (11th Cir. June 21, 2021),
making such a potential defense fluid for someone such as Parks
who claims brain injury.
of the Hanover Policy are null and void.” (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 27-30.)
At oral argument, counsel for Hanover stated that Hanover was not
attempting to rescind the Policy. (Doc. #69, p. 14.) Rather,
Hanover is asserting that the Policy was null and void only for
the Grounding Incident, not claims involving other occurrences.
(Id., pp. 14-16.)

The record reflects that an undated Yacht Insurance Quotation
by Hanover provided that one of the Special Terms and Conditions
was that “[o]ne part-time paid captain” and “[o]ne part-time paid
crew Only” was required. (Docs. #1-2, p. 21; #66-1, p. 25.) The
Hanover Yacht Insurance Binder effective May 5, 2017, similarly
provided that one of the Special Terms and Conditions was that
“[o]ne part-time paid captain” and “[o]ne part-time paid crew only”
was required. (Docs. #1-2, p. 19; #66-1, p. 27.) The Policy’s
Declaration Page identifies the Captain as “SHANE WREY” and the
“Number of Crew (including Captain: 2 PARTTIME INCLUDING THE
CAPTAIN”. (Doc. #1-2, p. 3.)

The Policy, however, contains a different requirement, that
of a full-time captain. The Policy contains the following
“Captain Warranty” provision:
GENERAL CONDITIONS AND EXCLUSIONS APPLICABLE
TO ALL COVERAGES
CAPTAIN WARRANTY
You warrant that the captain;
1. will be employed by you on a full time basis
and shall work solely on the insured yacht;
2. shall be in command of the insured yacht at
all times when it is underway; and
3. may not, under any circumstances, have
other employment as a captain for any other
yacht or watercraft.
If any condition of this warranty is not fully
complied with, the coverages provided by this
policy are null and void.
(Doc. #1-2, p. 47 (emphasis in original).) The Policy defines
“Captain” as “the person approved by us and employed as the full
time captain of the insured yacht.” (Id., p. 35 (emphasis in
original.) The Declarations Page identifies the approved Captain
as “Shane Wrey.” (Id., p. 3.)5
The language of the Policy concerning the employment of a
full-time Captain is clear and unambiguous. The Named Insured
warranted that it would employ a captain on a full-time basis,

5 The Smith Defendants’ Fourth Affirmative Defense asserts
that the Policy contains ambiguities which must be construed
against Hanover. (Doc. #42, p. 9.) However, the Smith Defendants
have repeatedly stated that they were not asserting that the
Captain Warranty was ambiguous. (Doc. #55, p. 7; Doc. #69, p. 21;
Doc #75, p. 7.) It is generally not for the Court to raise an
issue which has not been asserted by a party. “In our adversarial
system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party
presentation. As this Court stated in Greenlaw v. United States,
554 U.S. 237, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 171 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2008), ‘in both
civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal ...,
we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign
to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present.’” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579
(2020).
that the captain would work solely on the Insured Yacht, and that
the captain would not have employment as a captain for another
yacht or watercraft. The Policy specifically identified who that
captain was to be – Shane Wrey.
The undisputed facts show a clear violation of this portion
of the Captain Warranty. J&S and Smith hired a Captain only on an

as-needed, part time basis. (Doc. #53-4, pp. 35-36.) While this
was initially Shane Wrey, it later became someone else. (Id.)
Contrary to the Smith Defendants’ First Affirmative Defense and
argument (Doc. #55, pp. 12-14), the presence of three experienced
sailors on board the Insured Yacht does not create a material issue
of disputed fact as to Count I. The portion of the Captain Warranty
at issue in Count I concerned the full-time employment of a
Captain, not the operation of the vessel with or without a captain.
The issue remains as to the effect of the breach of the
Captain Warranty on coverage. Because disputes involving marine
insurance policies fall within a district court's admiralty

jurisdiction, federal maritime law controls. GEICO Marine Ins.
Co. v. Shackleford, 945 F.3d 1135, 1139 (11th Cir. 2019). In the
absence of an established or entrenched federal admiralty rule,
however, the Court relies on state law. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co.
of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d 1161, 1168 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2021); Quintero v. Geico Marine Ins. Co., 983 F.3d 1264, 1270–
71 (11th Cir. 2020). As the Eleventh Circuit has stated:
Marine insurance is a curious legal creature,
bearing the markings of both the state common
law of contracts and the federal common law of
admiralty. Although the Admiralty Clause of
the United States Constitution vests the
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear
maritime-contract cases, “it does not follow
... that every term in every maritime contract
can only be controlled by some federally
defined admiralty rule.” Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313, 75
S.C t. 368, 370, 99 L. Ed. 337 (1955). In the
absence of a “judicially established federal
admiralty rule,” we rely on state law when
addressing questions of marine insurance. Id.
at 314, 320–21, 75 S. Ct. at 370, 373–74.
AIG Centennial Ins. Co. v. O'Neill, 782 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir.
2015). The language of the Policy conforms with this law: “This
policy shall be construed in accordance with the General Maritime
Law or Admiralty Rule. If no General Maritime Law or Admiralty
Rule applies than the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
will apply.” (Doc. #1-2, p. 51.)
Hanover asserts that federal maritime law applies, and
results in a lack of coverage because the Policy became null and
void due to the violation of the Captain Warranty. (Doc. #53, pp.
9-12.) In general, the strict compliance often required by a
Captain Warranty is not considered entrenched in admiralty law.
See Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d at 1168 (recognizing that to
hold that all express warranties in maritime insurance contracts
must be strictly construed in the absence of some limiting
contractual provision would “eviscerate Wilburn Boat and its
holding that there is no established federal maritime rule
requiring strict fulfillment of all warranties in marine insurance
policies.”). Looking at the specific warranty in this specific
Policy, however, establishes that the Captain Warranty is clear
and unambiguous as to the effect of a breach: “If any condition of
this warranty is not fully complied with, the coverages provided

by this policy are null and void.” (Doc. #1-2, p. 47.) Federal
maritime law, Florida law, and Massachusetts law would all enforce
such plain language in a contract. See, e.g., F.W.F., Inc. v.
Detroit Diesel Corp., 308 F. App'x 389, 392 (11th Cir. 2009)
(stating that the rules of contract interpretation under federal
maritime and Florida law are identical); S & S Packing, Inc. v.
Spring Lake Ratite Ranch, Inc., 702 F. App'x 874, 878 (11th Cir.
2017)(“Florida courts enforce contracts according to their plain
terms when those terms are unambiguous.”); A.L. Prime Energy
Consultant, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass. 419, 428,
95 N.E.3d 547, 556 (2018) (“Our precedent instructs courts to

examine how a contract, by its plain language, defines the parties'
rights.”).
Accordingly, the Court determines that there is a case or
controversy as to Count I, and that Hanover is entitled to a
declaratory judgment that there is no coverage under the Policy as
to claims by third parties arising from the Grounding Incident
because the failure to hire a full-time captain as required by the
Policy renders the Policy null and void as to this occurrence.
B. Counts II and III: Lack of Captain When Yacht Was Underway
& During Nighttime Operation
In Count II, Hanover seeks a declaration that there is no
coverage because there was no captain in command when the Insured

Yacht was underway during the trip to the Dry Tortugas. (Doc. #1,
¶¶ 32-36; Doc. #53, pp. 13-14.) Hanover argues that the Captain
Warranty and the General Change Endorsement are conditions
precedent to coverage, but that Smith and J&S violated these
provisions by permitting persons, other than Captain Shane Wrey,
to operate the Insured Yacht during the multi-day, overnight trip,
which increased the risk of loss in connection with the operation
of the Insured Yacht. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 32-33; Doc. #53, pp. 13-14.)
As a result, Hanover argues that coverages of the Policy are null
and void. (Doc. #1, ¶ 34; Doc. #53, p. 14.)
In Count III, Hanover seeks a declaration that there is no

coverage based upon the nighttime operation of the Insured Yacht
without a Captain on board. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 38-41; Doc. #53, p. 14.)
Hanover asserts that the General Change Endorsement prohibits
operation of the Insured Yacht at night unless the Captain is on
board. (Doc. #1, ¶ 38; Doc. #53, p. 14.) Hanover asserts that Smith
and J&S violated the condition by operating the Insured Yacht on
the night of December 29, 2019 without Captain Shane Wrey aboard,
which increased the risk of loss in connection with the operation
of the Insured Yacht. (Doc. #1, ¶ 40; Doc. #53, p. 14.) Because
this condition precedent was not complied with, Hanover asserts
that the coverages of the Policy are null and void. (Doc. #1, ¶
39; Doc. #53, p. 14.)
The Captain Warranty not only requires the employment of a

full-time captain (specifically Shane Wrey), but provides that the
captain “shall be in command of the insured yacht at all times
when it is underway; . . .” (Doc. #1-2, p. 47.) The Policy contains
an endorsement, however, which supersedes this portion of the
Captain Warranty and allows the owner to operate the Insured Yacht
on day trips – i.e., “from sunrise to sunset” - without Captain
Wrey’s presence. (Doc. #1-2, p. 12.) The endorsement provides:
GENERAL CHANGE ENDORSEMENT
Effective 05/05/2017 it is hereby agreed that:
PERMISSION IS GRANTED FOR OCCASIONAL OWNER
OPERATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS;
OWNER MAY OPERATE THE VESSEL WITHOUT THE
CAPTAIN ABOARD FOR DAY TRIPS ONLY
OWNER MAY OPERATE THE VESSEL FROM SUNRISE TO
SUNSET, NO OPERATION AT NIGHT UNLESS CAPTAIN
IS ABOARD
NO TOWING OF TENDERS UNLESS CAPTAIN IS ABOARD
WARRANTED THREE (3) EXPERIENCED INDIVIDUALS
ABOARD AT ALL TIMES WHILE UNDER WAY
OWNER WILL USE CAPTAIN FOR TRIPS LONGER THAN
DAY TRIPS
ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN
UNCHANGED
(Id.)
The record is undisputed that the Insured Yacht was operated
at night without Captain Wrey (or any licensed captain) on board
during a trip which was more than a day trip. (Doc. #53-4, pp. 7-
12, 35-37.) This is a clear violation of the Endorsement. Contrary
to the First Affirmative Defense, nothing in the Endorsement
provides that the presence of three experienced persons on board
allows operation of the Insured Yacht at night or on trips longer
than a day. Since “all other terms and conditions [of the Captain
Warranty] remain unchanged,” the effect of these breaches is that
the Policy is null and void for the Grounding Incident occurrence.

Accordingly, the Court determines that there is a case or
controversy as to Counts II and III, and that Hanover is entitled
to a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage under the
Policy as to claims by third parties arising from the Grounding
Incident because the failure to have a captain in command of the
Insured Yacht and the operation of the Insured Yacht at night
without a captain renders the Policy null and void as to this
occurrence.
C. Count IV: Towing Tender Without Captain Aboard
In Count IV, Hanover seeks a declaration that there is no
coverage because the Insured Yacht towed a Tender without the
Captain on board. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 43-46; Doc. #53, p. 14.) Hanover
asserts that Smith and J&S violated this condition by towing a
Tender, i.e., a dinghy or smaller vessel on the night of December
29, 2019, without Captain Shane Wrey on board the Insured Yacht,
which increased the risk of loss in operation of the Insured Yacht.
(Doc. #1, ¶ 45; Doc. #53, p. 14.) Because this condition was

violated, Hanover asserts the coverages of the Hanover Policy are
null and void. (Doc. #1, ¶ 44; Doc. #53, p. 14.)
The General Change Endorsement of the Policy precludes the
towing of a “tender” unless the captain is on board. (Doc. #1-2,
p. 12.) A “tender” is defined as “any watercraft owned by you
[the insured] and is normally carried on board the [insured] vessel
. . ..” (Doc. #1-2, p. 36 (emphasis in original).) It is
undisputed that during the trip to the Dry Tortugas the Insured
Yacht towed a dinghy. (Doc. #53-4, p. 18.) It is also undisputed
that at the time of the incident the dinghy was not being towed.
(Id., pp. 18-19.)

The summary judgment record does not establish any connection
between the towing and the Grounding Incident. The record does
not establish that the improper towing was an independent breach
of the Captain Warranty (apart from the lack of the captain as
alleged in Counts II and III) which renders the Policy null and
void. As to this component of the Captain Warranty, federal
maritime law includes state law. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996
F.3d at 1169 (concluding that state law governed the effect of
Ocean Reef’s breaches of the captain and crew warranties). The
Policy directs that the State law to be applied is that of
Massachusetts. (Doc. #1-2, p. 51.) Massachusetts law, however,
directs that the Court apply the law of the State that the parties
to the Policy understood would be the principal location of the

insured risk, unless some other State has a more significant
relationship. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Narragansett Elec. Co.,
90 Mass. App. Ct. 123, 125-26, 57 N.E.3d 18, 20-21 (2016). Here,
that state is Florida. The insured is domiciled in Florida, which
is generally sufficient. Onebeacon Am. Ins. Co., 57 N.E.3d at 20-
21. In addition, the vessel was kept in Florida, as permitted by
the Policy (Doc. #1-2, p. 2), and the occurrence at issue began in
Florida. Under Florida law, a breach which does not increase the
hazard does not void an insurance policy. Fla. Stat. § 627.409(2).
While Count IV alleges that the towing “increased the risk of loss”
(Doc. #1, ¶ 45), the facts submitted by Hanover do not establish

without dispute such an increased hazard. Therefore, summary
judgment is not available as to Count IV.
D. Count V: Notification of Third-Party Claims
As discussed earlier, Count V seeks a declaration that there
is no coverage because the Insured provided untimely notice of
loss or of the occurrence. (Doc. #1, p. 11.) Hanover asserts that
the Policy requires the Insured to give prompt notice of loss or
occurrence to Hanover, or to the Insured’s agent or broker, “as
soon as reasonably possible”. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 48.) Hanover asserts
that Smith and J&S violated this condition by failing without
excuse to give notice of the loss and occurrence until more than
four months after the Grounding Incident, and that this delay
prejudiced Hanover. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Because such notice is a

condition precedent to coverage, Hanover asserts that the non-
compliance results in the coverages of the Policy being null and
void. (Id. at ¶ 48.)
The Policy contains certain post-loss or post-occurrence
responsibilities with which the Named Insured must comply “[i]n
case of a loss or an occurrence to which this insurance may apply
. . ..” (Doc. #1-2, p. 49 (emphasis in original).) This includes
giving notice of a claim “as soon as reasonably possible.” (Id.)
The Court finds that the record does not support a summary judgment
as to the unreasonableness of notice or any resulting prejudice.
E. Affirmative Defenses

The Smith Defendants also assert that there are five
affirmative defenses which have not been rebutted. (Doc. #55, pp.
3-4, 11-15.) Affirmative Defenses One, Four, and Six have been
discussed above. Concerning Defendants’ Second Affirmative
Defense, whether Plaintiff has suffered any prejudice due to the
Smith Defendants untimely notice remains to be an issue as to any
counts for which summary judgment was denied or to the extent such
counts were not dismissed due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. As to Affirmative Defense Eight, there is no
requirement that the claim or demand to an insurance company be
attached to the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Final Judgment (Doc. #53) is
DISMISSED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART.
(a) As to Count I:
(1) Count I is dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to the extent it is premised
on a possible claim by the National Parks Service.
(2) Count I sets forth a case or controversy as to a
declaratory judgment based on the claim of Stanny R.
Parks.
(3) Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Hanover as
to Count I. Hanover is entitled to a declaratory judgment

that there is no coverage under the Policy as to claims
by third parties arising from the Grounding Incident
because the failure to hire a full-time captain as
required by the Policy renders the Policy null and void
as to this occurrence.
(b) As to Count II:
(1) Count II is dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to the extent it is premised
on a possible claim by the National Parks Service.
(2) Count II sets forth a case or controversy as to a
declaratory judgment based on the claim of Stanny R.

Parks.
(3) Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Hanover as
to Count II. Hanover is entitled to a declaratory
judgment that there is no coverage under the Policy as
to claims by third parties arising from the Grounding
Incident because the failure to have a captain in command
of the Insured Yacht renders the Policy null and void as
to this occurrence.
(c) As to Count III:
(1) Count III is dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to the extent it is premised

on a possible claim by the National Parks Service.
(2) Count III sets forth a case or controversy as to a
declaratory judgment based on the claim of Stanny R.
Parks.
(3) Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Hanover as
to Count III. Hanover is entitled to a declaratory
judgment that there is no coverage under the Policy as
to claims by third parties arising from the Grounding
Incident because the operation of the Insured Yacht at
night renders the Policy null and void as to this
occurrence.
(d) As to Count IV, summary judgment is denied.
(e) As to Count V:

(1) Count V is dismissed without prejudice for a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent it is
premised on potential first-party claims.
(2) Count V is dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to the extent it is premised
on a possible claim by the National Parks Service.
(3) Summary judgment as to Count V is denied to the
extent Count V is premised on potential third party
claims.
(f) As to Count VI: Count VI is dismissed without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. The Clerk shall withhold entry of judgment pending
resolution of Counts IV and V.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 29th day
of June, 2021.

JGHN E. STEELE
SHEIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107823. Public record. Not legal advice.