# Delta T, LLC v. Dan's Fan City, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · May 27, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107639

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** May 27, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

DELTA T, LLC d/b/a
BIG ASS FAN COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:19-cv-1731-VMC-SPF

DAN’S FAN CITY, INC., and
TROPOSAIR, LLC,

Defendants.
______________________________/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff
Delta T, LLC’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 163) and Defendants
Dan’s Fan City, Inc., and TroposAir, LLC’s Motion in Limine
(Doc. # 165), both filed on April 13, 2021. The parties
responded to each Motion on April 27, 2021. (Doc. ## 166;
168). With leave of Court, Defendants replied to their Motion
on May 4, 2021 (Doc. # 171), and Delta T sur-replied on May
7, 2021. (Doc. # 180). For the reasons set forth below, both
Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
This is a patent case that arose out of Defendants’
alleged infringement of three of Delta T’s patented designs
of a modern residential ceiling fan. (Doc. # 65 at ¶¶ 8, 20).
Delta T initiated this suit in the District of Maryland on
December 14, 2018. (Doc. # 1). Following transfer to this
Court on July 17, 2019, the case proceeded through discovery.
(Doc. # 30). The case is currently scheduled for trial during
the June 2021 trial term. (Doc. # 99 at 3).
Now, all parties move to exclude the introduction of
various arguments and evidence at trial. (Doc. ## 163; 165).
All parties have responded. (Doc. ## 166; 168). Defendants
replied to their Motion (Doc. # 171), and Delta T filed a

sur-reply. (Doc. # 180). The Motions are now ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
“A motion in limine presents a pretrial issue of
admissibility of evidence that is likely to arise at trial,
and as such, the order, like any other interlocutory order,
remains subject to reconsideration by the court throughout
the trial.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06–
md–1769–ACC-DAB, 6:07–cv–15733–ACC-DAB, 2009 WL 260989, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). “The real purpose of a motion in
limine is to give the trial judge notice of the movant’s
position so as to avoid the introduction of damaging evidence
which may irretrievably effect the fairness of the trial.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court has the power
to exclude evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly
inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“A motion in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve
substantive issues, to test issues of law, or to address or
narrow the issues to be tried.” LSQ Funding Grp. v. EDS Field
Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citing
Royal Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07–80172–
CIV, 2008 WL 2323900, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008)). “Denial
of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all

evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at
trial.” In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Instead, denial of the motion
means the court cannot determine whether the evidence in
question should be excluded outside the trial context.” Id.
“The court will entertain objections on individual proffers
as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within
the scope of a denied motion in limine.” Id.
District courts have broad discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence, and the appellate court will not
disturb this Court’s judgment absent clear abuse of
discretion. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th

Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273,
1285 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Inherent in this standard is the firm
recognition that there are difficult evidentiary rulings that
turn on matters uniquely within the purview of the district
court, which has first-hand access to [] evidence and is
physically proximate to testifying witnesses and the jury.”).
III. Analysis
Both Delta T and Defendants move to exclude certain
evidence and arguments from trial. (Doc. ## 163; 165). The
Court will address each Motion in turn.
A. Delta T’s Motion in Limine

Delta T seeks to exclude seven categories of evidence or
argument from trial, some stipulated to by the parties, and
others disputed. (Doc. # 163).
1. Double Patenting Invalidity Defense
First, Delta T argues that “Defendants should be
precluded from claiming invalidity as they have no witnesses
competent to testify in that regard.” (Doc. # 163 at 3).
Specifically, Delta T contends that Defendants have no expert
designer capable of testifying as to their double patenting
defense. (Id. at 3-4). In reply to their own Motion in Limine,
Defendants now state that they are “no longer pursuing [their]
double patenting defense.” (Doc. # 171 at 2). Therefore, the

Motion is granted as to this requested relief and Defendants
are precluded from making a double patenting defense.
2. Expert Testimony

Next, the parties stipulate that the Court exclude the
following two categories of evidence, both relating to expert
testimony: (1) “all experts from offering any direct
testimony that is not contained within the four corners of
their respective reports,” and (2) “introduction or offering
[of] expert opinion testimony from any witness who has not
provided a written report required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).” (Doc. # 163 at 4-5; Doc. # 166 at 3).
In accordance with Rule 26 and the parties’
stipulations, the Motion is granted as to this requested
relief. All experts required to provide written reports under
Rule 26 are “precluded from providing any direct testimony as
to opinions, and any facts or evidence in support of those
opinions . . . not expressly included in their reports.” (Doc.
# 163 at 4; Doc. # 166 at 3). The Court also excludes the
“introduction or offering [of] expert opinion testimony from
any witness who has not provided a written report required by
[Rule] 26(a)(2)(B).” (Doc. # 163 at 5; Doc. # 166 at 3).
3. Expense Deductions
Next, Delta T moves to preclude Defendants’ witnesses

Mark Topolski and Stephen Oscher “from testifying about
expense deductions from net profits [that] are not tied
specifically to Vogue fan sales.” (Doc. # 163 at 5).
Defendants intend to calculate the amount of fixed costs
associated with the sale of the Vogue fan by multiplying their
total fixed costs by the ratio of Defendants’ Vogue fan sales
to their total sales. (Id. at 5-8). Delta T argues that this
“across-the-board” calculation is inadmissible because
Defendants have not demonstrated that their “overhead (or
other comparable expenses) would have been any different had
they not been selling the infringing goods.” (Id. at 6, 8

(emphases omitted)). Defendants respond that it is for “the
jury [to] decide which expenses should be considered in
determining [Defendants’] net profits” and that Delta T may
challenge the calculation at trial. (Doc. # 166 at 5).
Design patent infringers are “liable to the [patent]
owner to the extent of his [or her] total profit[.]” 35 U.S.C.
§ 289. The patent owner bears the burden of proving damages.
BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d
1214, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “If the plaintiff satisfies this
burden of production, the burden of production then shifts to
the defendant to come forward with evidence . . . of a
different profit calculation, including any deductible

costs.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK, 2017 WL 4776443, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2017).
However, “[n]either case law nor logic provides a clear
rule for the proper treatment of fixed expenses in computing
an award for profits.” Chico’s Fas, Inc. v. Clair, No. 2:13-
cv-792-SPC-DNF, 2015 WL 2455501, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 24,
2015) (quoting Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d
1166, 1172 (6th Cir. 1980)). Delta T has provided no authority
requiring that Defendants’ calculation of fixed costs be
excluded because it is based on an “across-the-board”
calculation, and the Court does not find this calculation

prejudicial, confusing, or misleading at this juncture.
Accordingly, the Motion is denied as to this requested relief.
4. Size, Finances, and Location of the Parties
Next, Delta T moves to preclude Defendants “from
presenting any argument, evidence, testimony, or suggestion
of a ‘David and Goliath’ nature, such as comparing the
relative size, financial strength, or geographical locale of
the companies.” (Doc. # 163 at 8). Defendants respond that
they intend to introduce such facts relating to Dan’s Fan
City and TroposAir, although they do not expect “[a]t this
point” to “make an argument that the jury should find in
[Defendants’] favor because Delta T is significantly larger

than [Defendants].” (Doc. # 166 at 5).
The Court agrees with Defendants that it cannot decide
at this stage whether evidence relating to the parties’ size,
finances, or location is inadmissible. Where the parties are
located may very well be relevant to the case. Or, Defendants’
finances may be relevant to determining their profits.
Accordingly, the Motion is denied at this juncture insofar as
it seeks to exclude evidence of the parties’ sizes, finances,
or geographic locations.
Still, “the relative wealth of the parties should not be

the focus of the trial,” and to the extent Defendants attempt
to compare the parties’ wealth or size to make a “David and
Goliath” argument, Delta T may re-raise this objection at
trial. Unicolors, Inc. v. H & M Hennes & Mauritz L.P., 2:16-
cv-02322-AB (SKx), 2017 WL 11489792, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
15, 2017). The Court makes the same determination with regard
to the parties’ geographic locations. See Pappas v. Middle
Earth Condo. Ass’n, 963 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 1992) (“There
is no doubt whatever that appeals to the regional bias of a
jury are completely out of place in a federal courtroom.”).
5. Dr. Rene Befurt’s Expert Testimony
Next, Delta T seeks to preclude Defendants’ expert, Dr.

Rene Befurt from testifying “in contravention of Delta T’s
expert’s testimony as it relates to infringement.” (Doc. #
163 at 10). Specifically, Delta T argues that Dr. Befurt
should not be permitted “to testify regarding the ultimate
issues of the validity of the patents in suit or their
infringement.” (Id.). Dr. Befurt’s testimony was subject to
a separate Daubert motion, which was granted in part and
denied in part. (Doc. ## 164; 188). There, the Court excluded
Dr. Befurt’s expert opinion and testimony “to the extent he
opines that [Delta T’s expert, Charles] Mauro’s surveys are
faulty because of the specific prior art included in the

surveys or because they did not include specific prior art.”
(Doc. # 188 at 15). However, the Court determined that “Dr.
Befurt may testify as to survey design methodologies
generally, as well as the other purported design flaws in Mr.
Mauro’s surveys.” (Id.).
Given that Defendants concede that Dr. Befurt will only
opine on the flaws in Mr. Mauro’s surveys, the Motion is
granted as to this requested relief. (Doc. # 166 at 6-8). Dr.
Befurt’s expert testimony is excluded to the extent he opines
on the validity of Delta T’s patents, or on the ultimate legal
issue of Defendants’ infringement.
6. Affirmative Defenses

Lastly, Delta T moves to preclude Defendants “from
testifying or presenting proof as to certain affirmative
defenses.” (Doc. # 163 at 11). Delta T argues that “Defendants
should not be permitted to argue or testify or submit any
evidence beyond their equitable defenses of waiver,
acquiescence, laches and/or estoppel.” (Doc. # 163 at 12).
Defendants do not appear to challenge this but argue in
response to Delta T’s Motion that they should also be able to
present evidence as to double patenting. (Id.; Doc. # 163 at
8-10). However, as previously noted, in reply to their own
Motion in Limine, Defendants shift their position, stating

they are “longer pursuing [their] double patenting defense at
trial.” (Doc. # 171 at 2). Accordingly, the Motion is granted
to the extent Defendants seek to present evidence of a double
patenting defense.
Regarding Defendants’ equitable defenses, Delta T also
moves to exclude “any testimony or evidence . . . beyond what
was testified to by Topolski in his 30(b)(6) deposition.”
(Doc. # 163 at 12). Defendants respond that “a Rule 30(b)(6)
witness is not required to testify as to the facts supporting
a party’s legal contention.” (Doc. # 166 at 9).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) requires a
corporate party to designate one or more representatives “who

consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the
matters on which each person designated will testify.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). “The persons designated must testify
about information known or reasonably available to the
organization.” Id. “A corporation has an affirmative duty to
provide a witness who is able to provide binding answers on
behalf of the corporation.” QBE Ins. v. Jorda Enters., Inc.,
277 F.R.D. 676, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2012). However, “absolute
perfection is not required of a [Rule] 30(b)(6) witness.”
Jarvis v. Carnival Corp., No. 16-CV-23727-MORENO/TURNOFF,
2017 WL 6987754, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2017) (citing QBE

Insurance, 277 F.R.D. at 691). “The mere fact that a designee
could not answer every question on a certain topic does not
necessarily mean that the corporation failed to comply with
its obligation.” Id. “The rule provides for a variety of
sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with its Rule
30(b)(6) obligations,” including “preclusion of testimony.”
QBE Insurance, 277 F.R.D. at 690.
Here, Delta T argues that Defendants should be precluded
from introducing any testimony or evidence regarding their
equitable affirmative defenses other than the testimony
offered at Mr. Topolski’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (Doc. #
163 at 11-12). However, the Court is not in a position to

make such a determination at this juncture. “[A]lthough a
corporation is ‘bound’ by Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, it is not
precluded from offering additional – perhaps even
contradictory – testimony at trial.” Am. K-9 Detection
Servs., Inc. v. Rutherfoord Int’l, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-1988-
RBD-TBS, 2016 WL 7183365, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2016)
(citation omitted); see also In re: 3M Combat Arms Earplug
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:19-md-2885, 2021 WL 918214, at *7
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2021) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not
addressed whether the testimony of a Rule 30(b)(6)
representative constitutes a judicial admission, with

conclusive effect, or merely an evidentiary admission, which
can be contradicted or explained at trial. . . . Every other
circuit to consider the issue has treated 30(b)(6) testimony
as an evidentiary admission that is binding in the sense that
it can be used against the corporation, but not in the sense
that it precludes the [corporation] from [later] correcting,
explaining, or supplementing that testimony.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The Court will be in a much better position to rule on
such objections in the trial context, with the benefit of
knowing precisely what testimony Delta T is objecting to.
Therefore, the Motion is denied without prejudice as to this

relief.
B. Defendants’ Motion in Limine
Defendants seek to exclude two categories of evidence or
testimony from trial. (Doc. # 165).
1. Commercial Embodiments of Delta T’s Patents
First, Defendants move to exclude “[a]ny evidence or
testimony concerning Delta T’s alleged commercialization of
the patents in suit,” arguing that the fans embodying the
patents are irrelevant, “potentially prejudicial,” might
confuse the jury, and are precluded by Delta T’s conduct

during the course of discovery. (Doc. # 165 at 2-7). However,
Defendants concede there should be one exception to this
exclusion as some of the commercial embodiments are included
in the file history of the ‘004 Patent. (Id. at 8). Delta T
responds that Defendants are “incorrect in arguing [that]
commercial embodiments cannot be used in infringement
analysis” and that “there is no discovery bar to relying on
the embodiments.” (Doc. # 168 at 3, 5).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, “[i]rrelevant
evidence is not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402. “Evidence is
relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b)

the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.
R. Evid. 401. But not all relevant evidence is admissible.
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), “[a] party
who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) – or who has
responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or
request for admission – must supplement or correct its

disclosure or response . . . in a timely manner if the party
learns that in some material respect the disclosure or
response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to
the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). “The burden of establishing that [a
party] failed to provide information pursuant to Rule 26(e)
rests with . . . the party seeking the . . . exclusion.”
Johnson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:12-cv-618-JES-
CM, 2014 WL 1930392, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2014). “If a
party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule
[26(e)], the party is not allowed to use that information .

. . to supply evidence . . . at trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c)(1). “The burden of establishing that a failure to
disclose was substantially justified or harmless rests on the
nondisclosing party.” Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 318 F. App’x
821, 824 (11th Cir. 2009).
Here, Delta T made clear during discovery that it would
not seek to introduce the physical fans: “Finally, presenting
samples of the actual Haiku fans to the finder of fact would
be inappropriate since comparing Haiku products to Vogue
products is not the proper test for design patent

infringement.” (Doc. # 168-1 at 3). Delta T should not now be
able to introduce the physical fans. Additionally, the
physical Haiku and L-Series fans are not pertinent to the
issue of infringement. As Delta T concedes, “[i]nfringement
is to be determined by comparing the asserted claims to the
accused device, and not by comparing the accused device to a
preferred or commercial embodiment of the patentee’s claimed
invention.” Orthoarm, Inc. v. Forestadent USA, Inc., 682 F.
Supp. 2d 978, 981 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (citing Martin v. Barber,
755 F.2d 1564, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); (Doc. # 168 at 3).
Given the test for patent infringement, introduction of
the physical fans for this purpose would likely confuse the

jury, thereby unduly prejudicing Defendants. Orthoarm, 682 F.
Supp. 2d at 981 (“[T]he Court believes that allowing admission
of the commercial embodiment in this case creates too great
a potential for jury confusion and improper comparison
between the commercial embodiment and the accused device.”).
Contrary to Delta T’s position, the Court does not find that
these issues are remedied by the fact that Defendants could
have purchased the fans in question, or that they possibly
previously possessed said fans. (Doc. # 180 at 3 (“[A]lthough
Delta T does not currently have explicit evidence that
Defendants . . . had a physical Haiku fan in their possession,

this can be inferred from the email correspondence between
Furn Fan and Defendants[.] . . . Indeed, Delta T purchased
Defendants’ Vogue Fan in 2016. Further, Delta T’s Fans are
widely available in the marketplace.” (emphases omitted))).
Therefore, the Motion is granted to the extent that Delta
T seeks to introduce the physical Haiku and L-Series fans at
trial. See Hako-Med USA, Inc. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., No.
8:06-cv-1790-VMC-AEP, 2009 WL 10671312, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 26, 2009) (“A plaintiff’s commercial embodiment of its
patent cannot be relied on to determine whether a defendant’s
product infringes the patent. The patent case requires
comparison between only the allegedly infringing product and

the subject patent. . . . To the extent Plaintiffs wish to
introduce the Exhibits to compare Plaintiffs’ product to
Defendants’ product in support of the patent claims,
Defendants’ Motion is valid. However, determining whether
commercial embodiments are relevant to explain the patent, to
rebut possible claims, or to establish a timeline requires a
factual context not currently available.”).
However, with regard to other forms of the commercial
embodiments, such as photographs, the Court is not in a
position to determine whether such evidence is admissible.
The parties do not specifically brief the admissibility of

other forms of commercial embodiment of the patents, nor is
the Court certain within what context or for what purpose
such evidence would be introduced.1
The Court does note, however, that there does not appear
to be discovery-related or other potential unfair prejudice
as to the discussion of commercial embodiments generally.
Indeed, in an April 27, 2020, response to Defendants’ second
set of interrogatories, Delta T stated: “Delta T admits that
the ‘757 patent protects the Haiku. . . . Delta T admits that
the ‘027 patent protects the L-Series fan.” (Doc. # 168-1 at
1-2). And, Delta T’s expert included in his report: “I have

1. One such context may be Defendants’ concession as to the
commercial embodiments allegedly referenced as prior art in
the file history of the ‘004 Patent, which the parties do not
appear to dispute. (Doc. # 165 at 8).
been asked to provide my opinions concerning whether Delta
T’s design patents, identified below, covering their Haiku
and Haiku L-series ceiling fans are infringed by
[Defendants’] Vogue ceiling fan.” (Doc. # 153 at 3 (emphasis
added)). Thus, Defendants were on notice of Delta T’s position
that the Haiku and L-Series fans constituted the commercial
embodiments of Delta T’s patents. Accordingly, the Motion is
denied without prejudice to the extent Defendants seek to
introduce any and all evidence of the commercial embodiment

of the patents, and they may re-raise this objection at trial.
2. Promotion or Sales of Delta T’s Products
Second, Defendants move to exclude “[a]ny evidence or
testimony concerning Delta T’s promotion or sales of products
allegedly embodying the designs of the patents in suit,
including Delta T’s Haiku and L-Series fans.” (Doc. # 165 at
2). Defendants argue that such evidence is “wholly
irrelevant” because the parties have stipulated that “Delta
T is not seeking lost profits on sales of the Haiku and L-
Series fans” and because Defendants “will not raise the
defense of patent invalidity based on obviousness,” the test
of which includes a weighing of commercial success. (Doc. #

165 at 8-9). Defendants also argue that such evidence would
be highly prejudicial and confusing to the jury. (Id. at 9).
Delta T responds that Delta T’s “advertising, marketing, and
marketplace sales success” are “relevant to, at least,
whether this is an exceptional case or not for attorney’s
fees.” (Doc. # 168 at 6). And, they contend they are relevant
to Defendants’ double patenting defense. (Id. at 8).
To the extent that Delta T argues this evidence is
relevant to an award of attorney’s fees, the Court agrees
with Defendants that the determination of attorney’s fees is
a question for the judge, not the jury. See AIA Am., Inc. v.

Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, 866 F.3d 1369, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“[R]equests for attorney’s fees under [Section] 285
are equitable and do not invoke the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial. . . . [T]he district court was not foreclosed
from making additional findings about AIA’s state of mind,
intent, and culpability.”); see also Elan Pharms., LLC v.
Sexton, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1125 (D. Kan. 2019) (“Thus, an
award of attorneys’ fees under [Section] 285 is a post-trial
decision for the judge rather than an element of damages to
be proved at trial.”). None of the cases cited by Delta T
require a court to present the issue of willfulness to the
jury when it goes only toward fees and not damages. (Doc. ##

168; 180). Therefore, the Motion is granted insofar as Delta
T seeks to introduce evidence of Delta T’s promotion or sales
to demonstrate that this constitutes an exceptional case
warranting attorney’s fees.
Regarding Delta T’s argument that this evidence is
relevant to rebut Defendants’ double patenting defense,
Defendants state that they are “no longer pursuing” this
defense. (Doc. # 171 at 2). In the event that Plaintiffs seek
to introduce this information for another purpose, the Court
will be in a better position to determine its admissibility
within the trial context.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Plaintiff Delta T, LLC’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 163)
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
(2) Defendants Dan’s Fan City, Inc., and TroposAir, LLC’s
Motion in Limine (Doc. # 165) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
27th day of May, 2021.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107639. Public record. Not legal advice.