# State of Florida v. United States of America

> District Court, M.D. Florida · May 18, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107583

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** May 18, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:21-cv-541-CEH-SPF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al.,

Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Florida’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 4), filed on March 9, 2021. Plaintiff, the State of Florida, requests
the Court enter a preliminary injunction precluding the federal government from
implementing and enforcing interim immigration policies set forth in the Department
of Homeland Security’s January 20, 2021 Memo and the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s February 18, 2021 Memo. Defendants filed a response in
opposition. Doc. 23. The State of Florida filed supplemental exhibits to which the
Defendants responded with a declaration. Docs. 29, 30. The Court held a hearing on
the motion on April 13, 2021. Also pending is Florida’s unopposed motion to
supplement its motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 34), to which Defendants
responded (Doc. 36). Florida seeks to supplement its motion for preliminary injunction
with additional information and an exhibit, which the Court will grant. The Court,
having considered the motion, the response, the parties’ supplemental filings, heard
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises will deny Florida’s
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
I. BACKGROUND

The State of Florida (“Florida”) sues Defendants, the United States of America
(the “Government”), Alejandro Mayorkas in his official capacity as Secretary of the
United States Department of Homeland Security (“Mayorkas”), United States
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Troy Miller in his official capacity as

Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Miller”), U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), Tae Johnson in his official capacity as
Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“Johnson”), U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), Tracy Renaud in her official
capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“Renaud”),

and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) (collectively
“Defendants”), in a seven-count Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Doc.
1. In its Complaint, Florida seeks to enjoin the federal government from implementing
interim immigration enforcement policies as set forth in a DHS memorandum dated
January 20, 2021 (the “January 20 memo”) and an ICE memorandum issued February

18, 2021 (the “February 18 memo”). Id. According to Florida, these memos effectively
abandon the federal government’s duty to enforce immigration laws by failing to
detain and remove criminal aliens and by imposing a 100-day pause on the removal of
noncitizens, regardless of their criminal status.
A. Immigration Law Framework
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides a comprehensive

framework for enforcement of the immigration laws. The Secretary of DHS is
“charged with the administration and enforcement” of the immigration laws. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103 (a)(1). Congress specifies which noncitizens may be removed from the United
States and the procedures for doing so. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396
(2012). Specifically, immigration laws provide that noncitizens are subject to removal

if they were “inadmissible at the time of entry,” or they commit certain offenses or
meet other criteria for removal. Id. “A principal feature of the removal system is the
broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Id.
At issue here, Florida cites to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),1 which commands federal
immigration authorities to arrest all criminal noncitizens, and 8 U.S.C. § 1231

(a)(1)(A), which requires federal officials to remove a noncitizen from the United
States within 90 days after issuance of a final order of removal. In support of its request
for injunctive relief, Florida points to two recent memoranda wherein the Biden
Administration purportedly “seeks to post hoc veto much of the immigration scheme”:

1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), ICE shall take into custody any noncitizen who is inadmissible
for having committed any offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (specified criminal and related
grounds); deportable for having committed any offense covered under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) (specified criminal offenses, including aggravated
felonies as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); deportable under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (crime involving moral turpitude) for an offense in which the alien has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for at least one year; or, is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (national security related
grounds).
the “January 20 Memo” issued by DHS and the “February 18 Memo” issued by ICE.
Doc. 1, ¶ 4.
B. January 20, 2021 Memo

On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13993, Revisions
of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051.2 In
section 1 of the Executive Order, President Biden sets forth the following priorities
regarding immigration enforcement: “to protect national and border security, address

the humanitarian challenges at the southern border, and ensure public health and
safety.” 86 FR 7051, § 1. In so doing, President Biden directed “[t]he Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and

2 The effect of this Executive Order was to, among other things, repeal former President
Trump’s Executive Order No. 13768, which set forth the following immigration enforcement
priorities in January 2017:
DHS shall prioritize for removal those aliens described by the Congress in sections
212(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)(C), 235, and 237(a)(2) and (4) of the INA (8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(6)(C), 1225, and 1227(a)(2) and (4)), as well as
removable aliens who:
(a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense;
(b) Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has
not been resolved;
(c) Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense;
(d) Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in connection
with any official matter or application before a governmental agency;
(e) Have abused any program related to receipt of public benefits;
(f) Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not complied
with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or
(g) In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to
public safety or national security.

Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 FR 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
the heads of any other relevant executive departments and agencies [to] . . . take action,
including issuing revised guidance, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law,
that advances the policy set forth in section 1 of [the] order.” 86 FR 7051, § 2.

In response to the Executive Order, David Pekoske (“Pekoske”), as acting
secretary of DHS, issued a memorandum on January 20, 2021 to Miller (senior official
performing the duties of commissioner of CBP), Johnson (acting director of ICE), and
Renaud (senior official performing the duties of the director of USCIS). Doc. 1-3 (the
“January 20 Memo”). The January 20 Memo issued three directives: (1) conduct a

comprehensive review of enforcement policies and priorities; (2) provide interim civil
enforcement guidelines; and (3) institute an immediate 100-day pause on removals. Id.
at 3–5.
The comprehensive review of policies required the Chief of Staff to coordinate
a department-wide review of policies and practices concerning immigration

enforcement and thereafter develop recommendations to address various aspects of
immigration enforcement. The Chief of Staff was tasked with making
recommendations for the issuance of revised policies within 100 days from the date of
the January 20 Memo. Pending the issuance of revised policies, the Director of DHS
identified the following priorities of DHS:

1. National security. Individuals who have engaged in
or are suspected of terrorism or espionage, or whose
apprehension, arrest and/or custody is otherwise necessary
to protect the national security of the United States.
2. Border security. Individuals apprehended at the
border or ports of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter
the United States on or after November 20, 2020, or who
were not physically present in the United States before
November 20, 2020.
3. Public safety. Individuals incarcerated within
federal, state, and local prisons and jails released on or after
the issuance of this memorandum who have been convicted
of an aggravated felony as that term is defined in section
101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act at the
time of conviction, and are determined to pose a threat to
public safety.

Doc. 1-3 at 3. Notwithstanding the listing of priorities, the memo states that “nothing
in [the] memorandum prohibits the apprehension or detention of individuals
unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities.” Id. at 4. The final
dictate was an immediate 100-day pause3 on removal of any noncitizens with a final
order of removal, subject to certain exceptions,4 with the pause to go into effect no
later than January 22, 2021.
C. February 18, 2021 Memo
On February 18, 2021, Johnson issued a memorandum to all ICE employees
regarding interim guidance pertaining to civil immigration enforcement and removal
priorities. Doc. 1-4 (the “February 18 Memo”). The interim policies were to take effect
immediately and remain in effect until Mayorkas issues new enforcement guidelines

3 Of note, on January 26, 2021, a Southern District of Texas court entered a nationwide
temporary restraining order against the 100-day stay of removal, and on February 23, 2021,
the court converted its order to a preliminary injunction. See Texas v. United States, No. 6:21-
cv-3, 2021 WL 723856 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021).
4 Excluded from the pause are individuals who (1) engaged in or are suspected of terrorism or
espionage or otherwise pose a danger to national security; (2) were not physically in the
United States before November 1, 2020; (3) voluntarily agreed to waive any rights to remain
in the United States; or (4) the Acting Director of ICE determines removal is required by law.
Doc. 1-3 at 4–5. The Texas court’s injunction of the 100-day pause was acknowledged in the
February 18 Memo. Doc. 1-4 at 3 and n.3.
after consultation with leadership from ICE, USCIS, and DHS, which was anticipated
by mid-May 2021. Id. at 2. Johnson requested enhancements to the priorities set forth
in the January 20 Memo, which he outlined and included in the guidance provided in

the February 18 Memo. The revisions included authorization to apprehend presumed
priority noncitizens in at-large enforcement actions without advance approval;
inclusion of current qualifying members of criminal gangs and transnational criminal
organizations as presumed enforcement priorities; authorization to apprehend other
presumed priority noncitizens without prior approval; guidance to evaluate whether a

noncitizen who is not a presumed priority poses a public safety threat and should be
apprehended; the further delegation of approval authority; and the importance of
providing advance notice of at-large enforcement actions to state and local law
enforcement. Id. at 2–3.

The guidance from the February 18 Memo was to be applied to all civil
immigration and removal decisions including whether to issue a detainer or assume
custody of a noncitizen subject to a previously issued detainer; to issue, reissue, serve,
file or cancel a Notice to Appear; to focus resources only on administrative violations
or conduct; to stop, question, or arrest a noncitizen for an administrative violation; to

detain or release from custody subject to conditions; to grant deferred action or parole;
or when and under what circumstances to execute final orders of removal. Id. at 4. The
February 18 Memo sets forth the criteria for defining cases that are presumed to be
priorities. Id. at 5–6. The Memo clarifies, however, that “the interim policies do not
require or prohibit the arrest, detention, or removal of any noncitizen.” Id. at 4.
Consistent with the January 20 Memo, the priority categories identified in the
February 18 Memo were: (1) national security; (2) border security; and (3) public
safety. As it pertains to public safety, “[a] noncitizen is presumed to be a public safety

enforcement and removal priority if he or she poses a threat to public safety and:
1) he or she has been convicted of an aggravated felony as
defined in section 1101(a)(43)5 of the INA; or
2) he or she has been convicted of an offense for which an
element was active participation in a criminal street gang,
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 521(a), or is not younger than 16
years of age and intentionally participated in an organized
criminal gang or transnational criminal organization to
further the illegal activity of the gang or transnational
criminal organization.

Doc. 1-4 at 5–6 (emphasis in original). Officers may consider factors such as
seriousness and recency of criminal activity when determining whether an individual
poses a threat to public safety. Officers may also take into consideration mitigating
factors such as family circumstances, health and medical factors, evidence of
rehabilitation, ties to the community, and whether the individual has potential
immigration relief available. Id. at 6. For those individuals not meeting the criteria of
a presumed priority, officers should obtain preapproval before civil enforcement or
removal action. Id.
D. Litigation
Following Defendants’ issuance of the January 20 and February 18
Memoranda, Florida sued Defendants arguing it is being irreparably harmed because

5 The term “aggravated felony” is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The memo incorrectly
references section 101(a)(43). The correct section has been used in this order.
of ICE’s refusal, in violation of law, to take custody of criminal noncitizens in the State
of Florida, resulting in their release into Florida. Florida sues Defendants under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) for agency action alleged to be in excess of

authority (Count 1), arbitrary and capricious agency action under the APA (Count 2),
failure to provide notice and comment as required by the APA (Count 3), violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (Count 4), violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (Count 5), violation
of the take care clause (Count 6), and violation of the separation of powers (Count 7).
Doc. 1. Florida seeks an order from this Court setting aside the January 20 and

February 18 Memos as unlawful, issuance of preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief enjoining Defendants from enforcing the January 20 and February 18 Memos,
issuance of declaratory relief declaring the January 20 and February 18 Memos are
ultra vires and unconstitutional, postponing the effective date of the January 20 and
February 18 Memos, and awarding Florida attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 27.

E. Florida’s Motion and the Government’s Response
In its motion for preliminary injunction, Florida argues it will be irreparably
harmed by the enforcement of the policies in the January 20 and February 18 Memos,
ICE’s refusal to take custody of criminal noncitizens in the State of Florida, and the

resulting release of criminal noncitizens into Florida communities. Doc. 4. Florida
argues it has standing to seek the requested relief and that the increasing number of
criminal noncitizens released into Florida will cause a variety of harms. Florida
contends that this Court may review the agency actions in the memos and further
argues the memos exceed DHS’s and ICE’s statutory authority and are contrary to
law. Florida submits that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims and that the
balance of equities and public interest favor preliminary injunctive relief.
In support of its motion, Florida cites to numerous examples of ICE detainers

being withdrawn or lifted for criminal noncitizens whom, Florida argues, should be
taken into custody upon their release and removed. Docs. 4-1; 4-2; 29-1. Instead, ICE’s
refusal to act because of the interim policies’ new guidance has resulted in criminal
noncitizens being released into Florida, which Florida submits directly contradicts the
dictate of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), which requires “when an alien is ordered removed,

the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of
90 days.”
Defendants oppose Florida’s motion for preliminary injunction. Doc. 23.
Defendants submit that Florida’s motion seeks to have this Court dictate where DHS
should focus its limited resources. Defendants argue that Florida lacks standing

because it is unable to show it is under a threat of actual and imminent injury. Id. at
14–17. Further, Defendants argue the agency actions are not subject to judicial review
and that Florida is unlikely to prevail on the merits of its claims. According to
Defendants, the balance of equities and public interest disfavor a preliminary
injunction because the requested relief interferes with the federal government’s

discretionary judgment as to where it should dedicate its resources. Id. at 32.
Generally, Defendants respond that every administration has to implement
some priority scheme. Admittedly, DHS is unable to arrest, detain, and remove all
noncitizens unlawfully in the United States. Hence, the need for priorities, but the
establishment of priorities does not prohibit the arrest or detention of any noncitizen.
And, indeed, the January 20 and February 18 Memos state such.
Defendants urge that the Memoranda at issue are agency actions which are

discretionary and therefore not subject to judicial review under the APA. Although
Florida claims the statutory provisions’ use of “shall” removes the Government’s
discretion when it comes to removal of criminal aliens, Defendants respond that the
word “shall” in section 1226(c)(1) does not mean covered individuals will be arrested
immediately following their release. Doc. 23 (citing Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969

(2019)).
Regarding the specific noncitizens whose detainers have been lifted and whom
ICE purportedly refuses to take into custody, Defendants submit that at least five of
the individuals are either not removable or are not subject to section 1226(c) at this
time. Defendants explain that at least some of the noncitizens were not convicted of

any crimes in Florida that are classified as “aggravated felonies,” as defined by 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Defendants further state they have issued detainers for two of
the individuals and, admittedly, lifted a third detainer on another noncitizen in error.
See Doc. 23-4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party seeking entry of a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the moving party
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party;
and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Forsyth Cty.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted

unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four
requisites.” Am. C.L. Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198
(11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The entry of a preliminary injunction is “the
exception rather than the rule, and plaintiff must clearly carry the burden of

persuasion.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1179 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Texas v.
Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. 100-day Pause
At the hearing, the parties agreed the 100-day pause was no longer a focal issue

in the instant litigation because of the Texas court’s entry of a nationwide injunction,
which the United States did not appeal. Doc. 32 at 4–5. As a practical matter, the 100-
day pause would have expired of its own accord by the end of April 2021 before an
appeal of the injunction could have been heard. Thus, the issue of the 100-day pause
is moot as to the instant motion and the motion is due to be denied on this basis.

B. Standing
“The constitutionally minimum requirements for standing are three-fold.” Am.
C.L. Union of Fla., 557 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v.
Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1159 (11th Cir. 2008)).
First, the plaintiff must have suffered, or must face an
imminent and not merely hypothetical prospect of suffering,
an invasion of a legally protected interest resulting in a
“concrete and particularized” injury. Second, the injury
must have been caused by the defendant’s complained-of
actions. Third, the plaintiff’s injury or threat of injury must
likely be redressible by a favorable court decision.

Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). In discussing the
injury requirement, the Supreme Court elaborates that it must be “actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Regarding the causal connection, the Court explains “the injury has
to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’” Id. The
third constitutional minimum for standing requires the injury to be likely to be
redressable by a favorable decision, as opposed to merely speculative. Id. at 561
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Florida contends that three theories support its standing here to challenge the
prioritization scheme in the January 20 and February 18 Memos. Citing Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 US 497 (2007), Florida first contends that its standing to challenge the
Government’s immigration policies, is grounded in its entitlement to “special
solicitude.” Thus, Florida argues that “a litigant to whom Congress has ‘accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests,’—here, the right to challenge agency
action unlawfully withheld, § 7607(b)(1)—‘can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’” Id. at 517–18. Florida submits
its standing is predicated on its entitlement to protect its quasi-sovereign interests
where it is otherwise unable to do so because “the removal process is entrusted to the
[sole] discretion of the Federal Government,” Arizona v United States, 567 U.S. 387,
409 (2012); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the

entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to
Congress[.]”).
Defendants respond that although the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion recognized
a special solicitude for states, there nevertheless must still be some concrete actual

injury. The Supreme Court recognized the “special position and interest of
Massachusetts,” and noted that “States are not normal litigants for the purposes of
invoking federal jurisdiction.” Massachusetts, 549 US at 518. The Court went on to
discuss the injury requirement stating, “[t]he harms associated with climate change are
serious and well recognized” and that the “EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate

greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’
and ‘imminent.’” Id. at 521 (citations omitted). Thus, despite Florida’s “special
position” here, the analysis still requires demonstration of an actual and imminent
harm.
Florida argues the release, instead of removal, of criminal noncitizens

irreparably harms Florida. In support, Florida provides the Court with national
statistics on recidivism among released prisoners. Doc. 4-11. Thus, Florida argues a
second basis to support its standing is the resulting increase in criminal noncitizens
released in Florida that will cause irreparable harm to Florida. Specifically, Florida
argues the increase in criminal noncitizens will cause an increase in crimes in Florida
which, in turn, will require Florida to expend considerable resources. Florida cites to
higher expenses associated with increased state law enforcement, mental health and
substance-abuse programs, and crime victims’ assistance programs.

Defendants respond that Florida’s claimed injuries are speculative. Because
DHS prioritizes those noncitizens who pose the greatest risk (e.g., those who are
terrorist threats, those who have committed aggravated felonies, and those involved in
gang-related activities), Defendants argue this does not necessarily translate into a
decrease in overall enforcement actions nor an increase in criminal activity. Florida,

on the other hand, argues that it does result in a decrease in enforcement activity, citing
to an ICE email produced in another case discussing the expected impact of the interim
enforcement priorities resulting in a fifty percent decrease in “book ins” compared to
historical numbers. Doc. 34-2. Florida argues this is borne out by recent data showing
current ICE interior enforcement—which is at issue in this litigation—has plummeted.

Doc. 34 at 3. Florida contends this defeats Defendants’ argument that the memos
merely represent a reallocation of resources instead of reflecting the reality that the
interim policies have resulted in a drastic reduction in interior immigration
enforcement. Id. at 4. As pointed out by the Government, however, the evidence

proffered by Florida speaks to a reduction in enforcement against noncitizens generally,
regardless of whether they are covered by section 1226(c) or whether or not they reside
in Florida, making the data unpersuasive on the instant motion. See Doc. 36.
Moreover, the Government urges that the mere threat of possible future
criminal conduct and the costs incurred by Florida as a result are too tenuous to
constitute a concrete, cognizable injury.6 The Court agrees and finds the opinion in
Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015) to be informative on this point. In
Arpaio, the County Sheriff challenged the constitutionality and validity of the Deferred

Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans (DAPA) programs. The effect of the programs was to deprioritize removals
of non-dangerous individuals to allow federal agencies to focus their limited resources
on removing dangerous criminals. Id. at 14. The Sheriff sued the President and other

federal officials “seeking a declaration and preliminary injunction that DACA and
DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., namely the
President’s constitutional duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ U.S.
Const. art. II, § 3, and the non-delegation doctrine.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 18.
The district court dismissed the Sheriff’s complaint finding he failed to allege a

cognizable injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing. Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F.
Supp. 3d 185, 192, 207 (D.D.C. 2014). In affirming the lower court’s finding that the
Sheriff lacked standing, the appellate court held that although “the Sheriff’s Office’s
expenditures of resources on criminal investigation, apprehension, and incarceration
of criminals are indeed concrete, . . . Sheriff Arpaio lacks standing to challenge DACA

and DAPA because any effects of the challenged policies on the county’s crime rate

6 Defendants also argue that to the extent the State of Florida points to the injuries suffered
by its citizens who fall victim to a criminal noncitizen as a basis to demonstrate the State’s
standing is unavailing. An increase in crime does not equate to an injury to the State. States
generally may not bring suit on behalf of their citizens against the federal government. See
Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1209 (11th Cir. 1989).
are unduly speculative.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19. There, the court held that Sheriff
Arpaio presented a non-justiciable “generalized grievance,” as opposed to a
particularized injury. Id. at 18. Thus, it concluded the Sheriff’s allegations that DACA

and DAPA will cause unlawful immigration to increase were “conjectural and
conclusory.” Id. at 21.
The Arpaio court further held that even if it were to “ignore the disconnect
between the challenged policies and the increased law enforcement expenditures that

Sheriff Arpaio predicts, his reliance on the anticipated action of unrelated third parties
makes it considerably harder to show the causation required to support standing.” Id.
at 20. Although it is not impossible to find standing in a case that turns on third-party
conduct, “it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” Id. at 20 (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted). Florida’s analysis here

similarly relies on predictions of future criminal conduct by released noncitizens and
the potential for increased expenditures that follow the anticipated increase in crime.
Even assuming that application of the interim policies results in decreased interior
immigration enforcement, whether the challenged interim policies will thereafter
result in an increase in criminal activity in Florida requires stacking assumptions and

is speculative. Further, the possibility that future economic injury will result is the type
of speculative injury the D.C. Circuit rejected in Arpaio as a basis for establishing
standing.
At the hearing on the instant motion, however, Florida clarified that it not only
claims standing exists based on the fact that potential future criminal conduct will
result in increased forthcoming expenses to the State. Rather, Florida offers a third
basis for standing, evidenced by the expenses incurred by Florida due to criminal
noncitizens re-entering society on supervised release. Florida contends it is incurring

actual costs for released noncitizens being under community supervision that Florida
would not normally incur if the federal government would fulfill its duty and take
custody of the criminal noncitizens and institute their removal as required by law. The
probation costs to the State for overseeing these noncitizens on supervised release are
concrete and particularized injuries that are fairly traceable to the federal government’s

withdrawal of retainers on noncitizens that they would have otherwise taken into
custody. The Court finds that such concrete injury satisfies both the requirements of
an actual and imminent injury and a causal connection to Defendants’ conduct.
Whether such injury is redressable by a favorable ruling, however, is not as
clear. Defendants argue that every administration must, by necessity, institute some

prioritization scheme. Therefore, even if the interim priorities were enjoined,
Defendants submit a different scheme would have to be implemented and may not
satisfy Florida nor redress its alleged injury. But that is not the test for determining
redressability. The opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA is instructive on the matter,
recognizing a State’s special solicitude in the standing analysis. 549 U.S. at 520. As

the Supreme Court explained, in a procedural rights challenge such as this, the litigant
vested with that procedural right “has standing if there is some possibility that the
requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that
allegedly harmed the litigant.” Id. at 518 (citations omitted). Under this standard, the
Court concludes that redressability is likely met because there is some possibility that
Florida’s challenges will cause the United States to reconsider its immigration
enforcement policies.

The Court is aware the policies at issue are interim policies that, by their nature,
are going to be reconsidered and evaluated by Defendants, notwithstanding this
litigation. Nevertheless, the redressability element of standing, albeit not eliminated in
this context, is considered relaxed, see id. at 517–18 (not requiring the “normal”
standards be met for redressability), and thus, Florida is able to satisfy the

redressability element. As Florida has satisfied the elements of injury, traceability, and
redressability, Florida establishes its standing on the instant motion.
C. Review of Agency Action
Florida argues the January 20 and February 18 Memos are agency actions

reviewable by this Court under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) because
the APA creates a “basic presumption of judicial review.” Doc. 4 (quoting Dep’t of
Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2019)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review

thereof.”). Florida requests, pursuant to 5 U.S.C § 705, that the court “postpone the
effective date of action” taken by the Defendant agencies “pending judicial review.”
Under 5 U.S.C. § 704, the APA allows challenges only to “final agency action.”
Section 704 states:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the
final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required
by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the
purposes of this section whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory
order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency
otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority.

5 U.S.C. § 704.
Defendants argue that the interim policies here are not final agency action, and
therefore not subject to judicial review. The Court agrees with Florida that the
“interim” label alone does not necessarily make the actions nonfinal. See U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2016) (the ability to revise an
agency action based on new information “is a common characteristic of agency action,
and does not make an otherwise definitive decision nonfinal”); Sackett v. E.P.A., 566
U.S. 120, 127 (2012) (“The mere possibility that an agency might reconsider in light
of ‘informal discussion’ and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make
an otherwise final agency action nonfinal.”). But, by their terms, the prioritization
scheme here is short-term guidance with the anticipation of new guidelines within 90
days of February 18, 2021. See Doc. 1-4 at 2. Moreover, what makes an agency action
“final” has been described as an action that “determines rights or obligations” from
which “legal consequences flow.” Sackett, 566 U.S. at 126 (internal punctuation and
citations omitted). The immigration prioritization scheme outlined in the January 20
and February 18 Memos do not determine anyone’s legal rights. The Memos do not
change any person’s legal status; they do not prohibit enforcement of any law; they do
not determine any legal benefits; and they do not change prior agency action. The

interim memoranda provide guidance and specifically confirm they do not create any
right or benefit. See Docs. 23-1 at 5; 23-2 at 8.
The Supreme Court has outlined several factors for courts to consider in
determining whether an agency action is final: “(1) whether the agency action
constitutes the agency’s definitive position; (2) whether the action has the status of law

or affects the legal rights and obligations of the parties; (3) whether the action will have
an immediate impact on the daily operations of the regulated party; (4) whether pure
questions of law are involved; and (5) whether pre-enforcement review will be
efficient.” Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).

(citing FTC v. Standard Oil of Calif., 449 U.S. 232, 239–43 (1980)). Applying these
factors to the interim immigration enforcement policies at issue here, the Court cannot
conclude that the Memos constitute the agency’s definitive position. Clearly, the
interim policies are a work in progress as evidenced by the additions to the policies
from the January 20 Memo to the February 18 Memo. Moreover, the February 18

Memo indicates that the Secretary is continuing to get input from the leadership of
ICE, CBP, and DHS. The guidelines are just that; they are not statutes and do not
have the status of law as they constitute a prioritization and not a prohibition of
enforcement. The policies do not change anyone’s legal status nor do they prohibit the
enforcement of any law or detention of any noncitizen. The prioritization scheme does
not necessarily have a direct day-to-day impact on Florida, although certainly an
indirect impact can be claimed. Regarding the challenge to these interim policies, the
challenge is more likely to create piecemeal litigation and therefore be less efficient.

As noted previously, the interim policies were only intended for an approximate 90-
day period. Thus, the Court concludes that the prioritization scheme that is at issue7
does not constitute final agency action reviewable under the APA.
Even if the Court were to conclude the agency action is final reviewable action,
the Court agrees with Defendants that the memoranda reflect discretionary agency

decisions related to the prioritization of immigration enforcement cases, which are
presumptively not subject to judicial review. Although Florida relies on what it claims
is the mandatory statutory language of sections 1226 and 1231 that state DHS “shall”
engage in certain enforcement actions, the fact is the memoranda in no way prohibit
any enforcement action. Instead, the January 20 and February 18 Memos focus and

prioritize the cases of immigration enforcement given the resources available in light
of what DHS deems most pressing. The prioritization scheme does not prohibit any
enforcement action.
The issues before this Court differ from those recently before the Texas District
Court on related matters. The 100-day pause addressed by that court dealt with

inaction—referred to as a pause—on the part of Defendants. While Florida claims that
the prioritization scheme constitutes a similar wholesale abdication of the federal

7 Per the parties’ representations at the hearing, the 100-day pause is no longer at issue on the
instant motion.
government’s duties, such is not the case. The ordering of priorities is not a refusal to
act, but rather is a specific choice to act as it relates to certain matters over others.
Here, Florida simply disagrees with the choices made by the Biden Administration as
to the priorities. It 1s undisputed, however, that “[a]n agency generally cannot act
against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.” Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985). Thus, there must necessarily be a prioritization.
And the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he agency is far better equipped than the
courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”
Id.
Having concluded that the agency action at issue here is not subject to judicial
review, the Court need not address the merits of Florida’s APA claims. Accordingly,
it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Florida’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to Amend its Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 34) is GRANTED.
2. Florida’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on May 18, 2021.

□□□ lene Ldwarda Mp TDs gl ell
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge

Copies to:
Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any

23

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107583. Public record. Not legal advice.