# S.Y. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · May 10, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107500

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** May 10, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107500

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the above elements to three Florida tort claims
- noting that “an association’s devotion to ‘making money from repeated criminal activity’ . . . demonstrates an enterprise’s ‘common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct’” (citations omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

S.Y.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:20-cv-633-JES-MRM

WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS,
INC., LA QUINTA HOLDINGS,
INC., LA QUINTA PROPERTIES,
INC., COREPOINT LODGING,
INC., CPLG LLC, and LQ FL
PROPERTIES, LLC, n/k/a CPLG
FL PROPERTIES LLC,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendants
Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. and La Quinta Holdings Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. #14), and defendants CorePoint Lodging Inc., CPLG
L.L.C., and CPLG FL Properties L.L.C.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
#15), both filed on September 30, 2020. Plaintiff filed an
Opposition to each motion (Doc. #33; Doc. #34) on November 4, 2020,
to which the defendants filed a Reply (Doc. #41; Doc. #42) on
November 30, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the motions
are denied.
I.
The origins of this case began on October 30, 2019, when
plaintiff and another alleged victim of sex trafficking filed a
case in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and
for Collier County, Florida. See S.Y. et al v. Naples Hotel Co.
et al, Case No. 2:20-cv-118 (Doc. #1, p. 3). On December 31, 2019,
the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint which asserted ten
claims against over forty defendants. Id. at (Doc. #1, pp. 2-4).
The case was removed to federal court in February 2020. Id. at

(Doc. #1). On April 15, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a Second
Amended Complaint. Id. at (Doc. #85). On August 5, 2020, the
undersigned denied various motions to dismiss, but determined
severance of the parties was appropriate. S.Y. v. Naples Hotel
Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1258-59 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Following
the Court’s severance order, plaintiff and the other alleged victim
filed nearly thirty new actions against various defendants,
including this case.
The Complaint (Doc. #1) in this case was filed on August 19,
2020, and alleges that plaintiff S.Y., a resident of Collier
County, Florida, was a victim of continuous sex trafficking at a

certain La Quinta Inn & Suites by Wyndham Naples in Naples, Florida
(the La Quinta Hotel) between 2013 and February 2016. (Id. at ¶¶
2, 13, 22-24.) The Complaint alleges that during this time period
the La Quinta Hotel was operated by defendants La Quinta Holdings
Inc. (La Quinta Holdings), La Quinta Properties, Inc. (La Quinta
Properties), CorePoint Lodging Inc. (CorePoint), CPLG L.L.C.
(CPLG), and CPLG FL Properties L.L.C. (CPLG FL) as a franchisee of
defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (Wyndham). (Id. at ¶¶
25-32, 45, 53.)
The Complaint alleges the following six claims: (1) violation
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595; (2) violation of the Florida RICO
statute, § 772.104, Florida Statutes; (3) premise liability; (4)

negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (5) negligent
rescue; and (6) aiding and abetting, harboring, confining,
coercion, and criminal enterprise. (Id., pp. 34-55.) Counts One
through Four are asserted against each defendant, while Counts
Five and Six are asserted against La Quinta Holdings, La Quinta
Properties, CorePoint, CPLG, and CPLG FL. (Id.)
II.
The motions to dismiss raise numerous arguments as to why the
Complaint as whole, and each individual claim, should be dismissed.
The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. Shotgun Pleading

The Complaint identifies the defendants collectively as the
“La Quinta Defendants.” (Doc. #1, p. 1 introductory paragraph.)
Both motions argue that because the Complaint groups them together,
it should be dismissed as a shotgun pleading. (Doc. #14, pp. 4-
5; Doc. #15, pp. 4-5.)1

1 The page numbers refer to those generated by the Court’s
computer system upon filing (upper left-hand corner) and do not
One way in which a complaint may constitute an impermissible
shotgun pleading is if it “assert[s] multiple claims against
multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants
the claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015); see also

Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021). Such a
pleading fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of the
claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests,”
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323, and violates the requirement that a
plaintiff provide “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
The Complaint does indeed repeatedly refer to the defendants
collectively as the “La Quinta Defendants.” (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 2, 7,
17, 41, 43, 67, 69, 91, 95, 115, 122-25, 127-31, 138, 150, 155,
175, 227, 229, 244.) The failure to specify a particular defendant
is not fatal, however, when “[t]he complaint can be fairly read to

aver that all defendants are responsible for the alleged
conduct.” Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Complaint typically (but not always) alleges that “each and
every” such defendant was involved in the activity described in

always correspond with the page number at the bottom of the
document.
the particular paragraph of the Complaint. A fair reading of the
Complaint is that each of these defendants was involved in the
identified conduct attributed to the “La Quinta Defendants.” While
defendants may disagree that such allegations are accurate, that
dispute is for another day. The group allegations do not fail to
state a claim, Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2020), and
the Complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading.
B. Failure to State a Claim
The motions argue certain claims should be dismissed due to
plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a
complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations
must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. at 555; see also Edwards v.
Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without
adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,”
Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Factual allegations that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability fall short of being
facially plausible. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages
in a two-step approach: “When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
(1) Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act

Both motions challenge the one federal claim, the alleged
violation of the TVPRA set forth in Count One. (Doc. #14, p. 5;
Doc. #15, p. 5.) The TVPRA provides a civil remedy to victims of
certain types of human trafficking. The civil remedy portion of
the Act provides:
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this
chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator
(or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value from participation in a
venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an
appropriate district court of the United States and may
recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The phrase “a violation of this chapter”
refers to Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The
only violation of Chapter 77 relevant to this case is contained in
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), which provides in relevant part:
(a) Whoever knowingly –

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce .
. . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or
solicits by any means a person; or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value, from participation in a venture which has
engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph
(1),

knowing, or except where the act constituting the
violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless
disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2),
or any combination of such means will be used to cause
the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that
the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will
be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). To state a section 1595(a) claim in this
case, plaintiff must plausibly allege that she was a victim of a
criminal offense under section 1591(a), and then must plausibly
allege that defendant (1)”knowingly benefit[ted] financially or by
receiving anything of value,” (2) from participation in a venture,
(3) which defendant “knew or should have known has engaged in” sex
trafficking under section 1591(a). S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1255-
56 (citing A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 171, 181
(E.D. Pa. 2020)).
The motions argue the Complaint’s allegations are
insufficient to state a claim under section 1595(a), asserting
three pleading deficiencies. (Doc. #14, pp. 5-12; Doc. #15, pp.

5-12.)
(a) “Participation” in a “Venture”
The motions first argue that the Complaint lacks well-pled
allegations that the defendants participated in a “venture,” as
required by section 1595(a). (Doc. #14, pp. 6-10; Doc. #15, pp.
6-9.) Drawing on the definition of “venture” used in the criminal
portion of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(6)2, the motions assert
that a “venture” requires two or more individuals “associated in
fact.”3 (Doc. #14, p. 6; Doc. #15, p. 6.) Borrowing from the

federal RICO definition of “enterprise,” the motions argue that
“associated in fact” requires that persons must operate as a

2 “The term ‘venture’ means any group of two or more
individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.”
18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(6).
3 The motions note that the defendants are not seeking to
impute the definition of “participation in a venture” from the
criminal provision in section 1591(e)(4), but suggesting that the
Court should apply the definition of “venture” for section
1591(e)(6) and the ordinary meaning of the term as construed by at
least two appellate courts. (Doc. #14, p. 9 n.4; Doc. #15, p. 9
n.4.)
“continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” (Doc.
#14, pp. 6-7; Doc. #15, p. 6.) The motions continue that in the
context of a TVPRA claim against a hotel operator, the Complaint
must “at least” allege a “continuous business relationship between
the trafficker and the hotels such that it would appear that the
trafficker and the hotels have established a pattern of conduct or

could be said to have a tacit agreement.” (Doc. #14, p. 7; Doc.
#15, p. 7) (quoting M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 3d 959, 970 (S.D. Ohio 2019)); see also Doe v. Rickey Patel,
LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195811, 2020 WL 6121939, at *5 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 30, 2020)(“In order to plead Defendants participated in
a venture, Plaintiff must allege facts from which the Court could
reasonably infer the hotels could be said to have a tacit agreement
with the trafficker.” (marks omitted)). The motions conclude that
“[a] commercial relationship, such as a hotel owner renting a hotel
room, does not give rise to a reasonable inference that the
participants in such a relationship shared a common purpose or

otherwise ‘associated in fact.’” (Doc. #14, p. 7; Doc. #15, p.
7.)
Here, the Complaint alleges the defendants participated in a
venture “by engaging in a pattern of acts and omissions that were
intended to support, facilitate, harbor, and otherwise further the
traffickers’ sale and victimization of the Plaintiff S.Y.. for
commercial sexual exploitation by repeatedly renting rooms at La
Quinta Hotel to people” the defendants “knew or should have known
were engaged in sex trafficking.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 166.)4 The Complaint
also alleges why the defendants should have been on notice of the
sex trafficking and how they failed to prevent it. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-
16, 59-87, 120.) The Court finds the allegations in the Complaint

sufficient to allege participation in a venture under section
1595(a). See Doe, 2020 WL 6121939, at *5 (“The Court finds it
sufficient for Plaintiff to plead that Defendants participated in
a venture by renting rooms to individuals that knew or should have
known were involved in a sex-trafficking venture, including the
sex-trafficking victim.”); M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 971 (“This
Court finds Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show
Defendants ‘participated in a venture’ under § 1595 by alleging
that Defendants rented rooms to people it knew or should have known
where [sic] engaged in sex trafficking.”).
The motions also argue that “participation” in a venture

requires an allegation of an overt act in furtherance of the
venture, and that failure to prevent sex trafficking is not such
an overt act. (Doc. #14, p. 8; Doc. #15, p. 8.) The Court is not
convinced. S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (“In the absence of any
controlling authority, the Court concludes that actual

4 The motions cite the same paragraph but fail to recite the
complete sentence. (Doc. #14, p. 8; Doc. #15, p. 8.)
‘participation in the sex trafficking act itself’ is not required
to state a claim under section 1595. Accordingly, plaintiffs’
failure to allege such actual participation is not fatal to its
section 1595 claim under the TVPRA.”). The motions have not
identified any controlling authority to the contrary.
(b) Knowingly Benefited From Participating in Venture

The motions next argue that the Complaint insufficiently
alleges that the defendants knowingly benefitted from
participating in a venture that committed TVPRA crimes, with
knowledge of the causal relationship. (Doc. #14, p. 10; Doc. #15,
p. 10.) The motions assert that the allegation that the defendants
benefited from the operation of the La Quinta Hotel generally is
insufficient. (Id.)
The Complaint alleges the defendants knowingly benefited from
the sex trafficking of plaintiff “by receiving payment for the
rooms rented for Plaintiff S.Y. and her traffickers at the La
Quinta Hotel,” and by receiving “other financial benefits in the

form of food and beverage sales and ATM fees from those persons
who were engaging in sex trafficking.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 164.) As to
Wyndham as franchisor, the Complaint alleges it “received a
significant franchise fee and continuous royalties on the La Quinta
Hotel’s gross revenue,” while also exercising “ongoing and
systematic control over operations at the La Quinta Hotel.” (Id.
at ¶¶ 47, 117.) The Court finds such allegations sufficient to
satisfy the “knowingly benefitted” element. S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d
at 1257; Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc., 2020 WL 1244192,
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020); H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2019 WL
6682152, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019); M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at
965.
(c) Knew or Should Have Known that Venture was

Committing Sex Trafficking Crimes
Finally, the motions argue the Complaint fails to plausibly
allege that the defendants knew or should have known that the
“venture” was engaging in sex-trafficking crimes, i.e., that the
defendants knew or should have known that an adult plaintiff was
caused to engage in commercial sex by force, threats of force,
fraud, or coercion. (Doc. #14, pp. 10-12; Doc. #15, pp. 10-12.)
Rather, the motions argue, the Complaint only alleges that the
hotel staff did not interfere with plaintiff and witnessed indicia
of commercial sex activity. (Doc. #14, p. 10; Doc. #15, p. 10.)
The motions argue that the allegations do not give rise to a

reasonable inference that the defendants knew or should have known
about any forced commercial sex activity at the La Quinta Hotel.
(Doc. #14, p. 11; Doc. #15, p. 11.)
The Court disagrees with this argument. First of all,
“knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Can. v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1215 (11th Cir.
2018). Pleading “generally” is not without limits, and a complaint
must still comply with “the less rigid—though still operative—
strictures of Rule 8.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686–87. The Complaint
clearly satisfies this notice pleading standard.
Plaintiff has alleged that the following was “routine conduct
taking place at the La Quinta Hotel as a result of the human sex

trafficking enterprise”:
a. Plaintiff’s sex traffickers frequently rented rooms at the
hotel close to each other and near the exit;

b. Plaintiffs’ [sic] sex traffickers often paid cash for the
rooms at the La Quinta Hotel where the Plaintiff engaged
in commercial sex acts;

c. Plaintiff’s sex traffickers booked extended stays at the
La Quinta Hotel for themselves and for the Plaintiff on a
routine basis and on a rotating basis frequently
throughout the year;

d. Plaintiff and her sex traffickers would have few or no
luggage or personal possessions for these extended stays;

e. Plaintiff was confined in the rooms at the La Quinta Hotel
for long periods of time;

f. Plaintiff’s rooms and her sex traffickers’ rooms
consistently displayed "Do Not Disturb" signs on the doors
to the room where the Plaintiff was engaged in sex
trafficking acts;

g. Men (“Johns”) frequently entered and left the rooms at the
La Quinta Hotel where the Plaintiff was engaged in illegal
sex trafficking acts at all times of day and night;

h. The staff and customers at the La Quinta Hotel that was
owned, operated, managed, supervised, controlled and/or
otherwise held responsible by each and every La Quinta
Defendant saw that the rooms where the Plaintiff engaged
in commercial sex acts were messy, and contained sex and
drug paraphernalia, blood-stained linens and had an
unclean smell;

i. The rooms at the La Quinta Hotel were filled with evidence
of sex trafficking and drug use;

j. Plaintiff’s sex traffickers consistently refused
housekeeping services and otherwise would prohibit staff
from entering their rooms and the Plaintiff’s rooms;

k. Plaintiff and other sex trafficking victims would
frequently request clean towels and linens;

l. Plaintiff dressed in a sexually explicit manner and would
walk seen by the hotel staff in the hallways of the La
Quinta Defendant;

m. Excessively loud noises would consistently come from
Plaintiff’s rooms;

n. During nighttime hours, Plaintiff and her “Johns” would
create noise at the La Quinta Hotel and, upon information
and belief, would be a disturbance to other guests using
the hotel for their intended purposes; and

o. While at the hotel, the Plaintiff displayed clear signs of
physical abuse, diminished personal hygiene,
submissiveness and inappropriate attire.

(Doc. #1, ¶ 100.) Further, the Complaint alleges the defendants
“knew or should have known about the nature of the sex trafficking
venture at the La Quinta Hotel, including as they related to
Plaintiff S.Y.” due to the following:
a. Requests by the traffickers to rent rooms near exit
doors;

b. Cash payments for the rooms by the sex traffickers;

c. Refusal of housekeeping services by those persons
engaged in sex trafficking;

d. Excessive used condoms located in the rooms used for
sex trafficking;
e. Excessive requests for towels and linens in the rooms
used for sex trafficking;

f. Hotel staff observing Plaintiff S.Y. and her
traffickers in the hotel;

g. Plaintiff S.Y. being escorted by traffickers in and
around the hotel;

h. Operation of sex trafficking ventures out of the same
hotel room for multiple days or weeks in succession;

i. Multiple men per day coming and going from the same
rooms without luggage or personal possessions;

j. Hotel staff observing S.Y. in inappropriate clothing,
often in the same dirty clothing for extended periods
of time; and

k. Knowledge of police and EMS activity at the La Quinta
Hotel and at other locations near the La Quinta Hotel
that was related to commercial sex work.

(Id. at ¶ 165.)
The Court finds these allegations sufficient to reasonably
infer the defendants knew or should have known of the sex
trafficking venture. S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1257; A.B., 455 F.
Supp. 3d at 193-94; Doe S.W., 2020 WL 1244192, at *5-6; H.H., 2019
WL 6682152, at *3; M.A., 425 F. Supp 3d at 967-68.
Because the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to
state a claim under section 1595 of the TVPRA, the Court denies
the motions’ request for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
(2) Florida RICO Violation
Count Two of the Complaint asserts a claim against each
defendant under Florida’s civil RICO statute, section 772.104,
Florida Statutes. (Doc. #1, ¶ 168.) To state a claim under the
statute, plaintiff must allege plausible facts showing “(1)
conduct or participation in an enterprise through (2) a pattern of
[criminal] activity.” Horace-Manasse v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
521 F. App’x 782, 784 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lugo v. State, 845

So. 2d 74, 97 (Fla. 2003)).5
Each of the motions argue plaintiff has insufficiently pled
the enterprise element of her claim. (Doc. #14, pp. 12-14; Doc.
#15, pp. 12-14.) Florida’s RICO statute defines enterprise to
include a “group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity.” § 772.102(3), Fla. Stat. “[A]n association-in-
fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a
common purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948 (2009).
To sufficiently plead such an enterprise, “a plaintiff must allege
that a group of persons shares three structural features: (1) a
purpose, (2) relationships among those associated with the

enterprise, and (3) longevity sufficient to permit these
associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Cisneros v.

5 “Since Florida RICO is patterned after federal RICO, Florida
courts have looked to the federal courts for guidance in
interpreting and applying the act. Therefore, federal decisions
should be accorded great weight.” O’Malley v. St. Thomas Univ.,
Inc., 599 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); see also Cont’l 332
Fund, LLC v. Albertelli, 317 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1137 (M.D. Fla.
2018) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit applies federal RICO analysis
equally to Florida RICO claims.”).
Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020) (marks and
citations omitted). The motions argue the Complaint fails to
sufficiently allege a “common purpose” among the defendants. (Doc.
#14, pp. 13-14; Doc. #15, pp. 12-14.)
“The purpose prong contemplates ‘a common purpose of engaging
in a course of conduct’ among the enterprise’s alleged

participants.” Cisneros, 972 F.3d at 1211 (quoting United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). “An abstract common
purpose, such as a generally shared interest in making money, will
not suffice. Rather, where the participants’ ultimate purpose is
to make money for themselves, a RICO plaintiff must plausibly
allege that the participants shared the purpose of enriching
themselves through a particular criminal course of conduct.” Id.
(citations omitted).
Here, the Complaint alleges the defendants “associated with
each other and/or the Plaintiff S.Y.’s sex traffickers for the
common purpose of profiting off an established sex trafficking

scheme.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 175.) Plaintiff asserts this “association-
in-fact” constitutes an “enterprise” under Florida’s RICO statute,
and that the defendants conducted or participated in their
enterprises through a pattern of criminal activity, “related by
their common purpose to profit off an institutionalized sex
trafficking scheme.” (Id. at ¶¶ 175-76.) The Court finds these
allegations sufficient to allege the defendants “shared the
purpose of enriching themselves through a particular criminal
course of conduct.” Cisneros, 972 F.3d at 1211; see also United
States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 697-98 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting
that “an association’s devotion to ‘making money from repeated
criminal activity’ . . . demonstrates an enterprise’s ‘common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct’” (citations omitted));

Burgese v. Starwood Hotel & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 101 F. Supp.
3d 414, 424 (D. N.J. 2015) (on motion to dismiss Florida RICO
claim, court found that “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint can be read
to allege a ‘common purpose’ of furthering an institutionalized
prostitution scheme to increase profits for the participants,” and
that “[t]hese allegations, though thin, are sufficient for
purposes of this motion.”).
Each of the motions also argues the Complaint fails to
sufficiently plead the “pattern of criminal activity” element.
(Doc. #14, pp. 14-15; Doc. #15, pp. 14-15.) As previously stated,
“[i]n order to state a civil cause of action under the Florida

RICO Act, a plaintiff must allege a pattern of criminal activity.”
Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 569 F. App’x 669, 682 (11th
Cir. 2014) (citing §§ 772.103-104, Fla. Stat.). The statute’s
definition of “criminal activity” provides “that a particular
state law crime can serve as the predicate act for a RICO claim if
it is ‘chargeable by indictment or information’ and falls within
a series of specified provisions.” Id. (citing § 772.102(1)(a),
Fla. Stat.). “In order to establish a pattern of criminal activity,
the plaintiff must allege two or more criminal acts ‘that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods
of commission’ that occurred within a five-year time span.” Id.
at 680 (citing § 772.102(4), Fla. Stat.).
As noted by the motions (Doc. #14, p. 14; Doc. #15, p. 14),

plaintiff’s Florida RICO claim is predicated on the commission of
human trafficking crimes in violation of section 787.06, Florida
Statutes. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 177, 179); see also § 772.102(1)(a)15.,
Fla. Stat. (listing “human trafficking” under Chapter 787 among
the types of “criminal activity” covered by the Florida RICO
statute). This provision provides various punishments for “[a]ny
person who knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the facts,
engages in human trafficking, or attempts to engage in human
trafficking, or benefits financially by receiving anything of
value from participation in a venture that has subjected a person
to human trafficking.” § 787.06(3), Fla. Stat. Given the

similarity between this language and the TVPRA’s civil liability
provision, the motions argue the Florida RICO claim fails “for the
same reasons that Plaintiff failed to state a TVPRA claim.” (Doc.
#14, p. 15; Doc. #15, p. 15.) The Court has, however, determined
plaintiff’s TVPRA claim is sufficiently pled, and therefore
rejects the motions’ argument as to the Florida RICO claim.
(3) Premise Liability
Count Three of the Complaint asserts a claim of premise
liability against each defendant. (Doc. #1, ¶ 187.) A premise
liability claim is a form of negligence action. “The elements for
negligence are duty, breach, harm, and proximate cause; the
additional elements for a claim of premises liability include the

defendant’s possession or control of the premises and notice of
the dangerous condition.” Lisanti v. City of Port Richey, 787 So.
2d 36, 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Plaintiff alleges the defendants
owed her a variety of duties, that they breached these duties, and
that as a direct and proximate result, she suffered bodily injury.
(Doc. #1, ¶¶ 195-209.) Plaintiff also alleges the defendants had
actual or constructive knowledge of sex trafficking occurring on
the premises, that they knew or should have known the risk of such
criminal conduct taking place would be unreasonably high without
appropriate precautions, and that they had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous conditions plaintiff was in. (Id. at

¶¶ 200-02.)
(a) Statute of Limitations
The motions argue the premise liability claim should be
dismissed because it is barred by the relevant statute of
limitations. (Doc. #14, p. 19; Doc. #15, pp. 18-19.) Under
Florida law, the statute of limitations for negligence claims is
four years. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
A statute of limitations bar is “an affirmative defense, and
. . . plaintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative
defense in [their] complaint.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “A
dismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations
grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the

complaint that the claim is time-barred.” United States ex rel.
Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081, 1085 (11th Cir.
2018) (marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges the sex trafficking occurred at the La
Quinta Hotel “from approximately 2013 to 2014” and then “[f]rom
approximately 2015 to February 2016.” (Doc. #1, ¶ 88.) The
motions argue that because the Complaint was filed in August 2020,
the premise liability claim is time barred. (Doc. #14, p. 19;
Doc. #15, pp. 18-19.)
“Under Florida law, the statute of limitations begins to run
when the cause of action accrues.” Carnival Corp. v. Rolls-Royce

PLC, 2009 WL 3861482, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009) (citing §
95.031, Fla. Stat.). “A cause of action accrues when the last
element constituting the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1),
Fla. Stat. “Under the continuing tort doctrine, the cause of
action accrues when the tortious conduct ceases.” Effs v. Sony
Pictures Home Entm’t, Inc., 197 So. 3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA
2016) (emphasis and citation omitted). “A continuing tort is
established by continual tortious acts, not by continual harmful
effects from an original, completed act.” Id. at 1245 (marks,
emphasis, and citation omitted).
Here, plaintiff alleges she was a repeat victim of sex
trafficking at the La Quinta Hotel between 2013 and February 2016.
(Doc. #1, ¶ 88.) The Court finds such allegations sufficient to

invoke the continuing tort doctrine. See Nat’l Sourcing, Inc. v.
Bracciale, 2018 WL 6172430, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2018)
(finding allegation that a defendant’s actions “continued to this
day” inferred continuous tortious conduct, thereby making it
plausible for the plaintiffs to assert the continuing tort doctrine
as a basis to toll the statute of limitations). Accordingly, the
Court finds that plaintiff’s premise liability claim did not accrue
until February 2016, and therefore she had until February 2020 to
file a complaint asserting premises liability.
(1) Wyndham
Plaintiff met this deadline by filing her First Amended

Complaint against Wyndham on December 31, 2019. S.Y. et al v.
Naples Hotel Co. et al, Case No. 2:20-cv-118 (Doc. #3). While the
Court determined severance of the parties was appropriate in the
original action, S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1259, and this Complaint
was filed in August 2020, it appears that the December 2019 date
is applicable for statute of limitations purposes under the
relation-back provisions of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Relation back is a legal fiction employed to salvage
claims that would otherwise be unjustly barred by a
limitations provision. See McCurdy v. United States, 264
U.S. 484, 487, 44 S.Ct. 345, 346, 68 L.Ed. 801 (1924);
Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (11th Cir. 1993).
Under Rule 15, a claim in an amended complaint relates
back to the filing date of the original complaint if it
“asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted
to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(B). When the facts in the original complaint do
not put the defendant “on notice that the new claims of
negligence might be asserted,” but the new claims
instead “involve[ ] separate and distinct conduct,” such
that the plaintiff would have to prove “completely
different facts” than required to recover on the claims
in the original complaint, the new claims do not relate
back. Moore, 989 F.2d at 1132.

Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, since it is not apparent from the face of the
Complaint that the claim is time-barred, dismissal based upon the
statute of limitations affirmative defense is not appropriate.
For the same reasons, the Court rejects the argument that
plaintiff’s negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim
against Wyndham is also barred by the four-year statute of
limitations. (Doc. #14, p. 19.)
(2) La Quinta Holdings, CorePoint, CPLG, and CPLG FL
La Quinta Holdings, CorePoint, CPLG, and CPLG FL also argue
the premise liability claim is barred because the Complaint was
filed in August 2020. (Doc. #14, p. 19; Doc. #15, pp. 18-19.)
These defendants were not named in the December 2019 First Amended
Complaint to which a severance was granted.
Instead of responding directly to the argument, plaintiff
requests the Court permit discovery to occur rather than dismiss
the claims. (Doc. #33, pp. 33-37; Doc. #34, pp. 34-37.) Plaintiff
suggests the claims may relate back to the December 31, 2019 First

Amended Complaint, the date she first identified the La Quinta
franchise and named Wyndham as a defendant. (Doc. #33, p. 34;
Doc. #34, p. 34.) For example, plaintiff argues that the other
defendants may have been notified by Wyndham when the suit was
originally filed pursuant to the terms of the
franchisor/franchisee agreements. See Brown v. VCNA Prestige
Concrete Prods., Inc., 2014 WL 1293266, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31,
2014) (stating that to find a complaint relates back under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a plaintiff adds a formerly
unnamed defendant, “the proper party must have received notice of
the action such that it will not be prejudiced.”).

As noted, plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative
defense in her complaint. La Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845. It is not
apparent from the face of the Complaint that the claim is time-
barred because the Court cannot determine that plaintiff’s premise
liability claim does not relate back to the First Amended Complaint
or is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling.6 Therefore,
the motion to dismiss is denied at this stage of the proceedings.
Plaintiff’s request for discovery is moot since discovery will be
available in due course.
To the extent La Quinta Holdings, CorePoint, CPLG, and CPLG

FL seek dismissal of the other negligent claims on the same grounds
(Doc. #14, p. 19; Doc. #15, pp. 18-19), the Court’s ruling applies
to those claims as well.
(b) Failure to State a Claim
Both motions argue the premise liability claim is
insufficiently pled, first arguing the claim fails because it does
not allege the defendants possessed or controlled the La Quinta
Hotel. (Doc. #14, p. 15; Doc. #15, p. 15.) The Court disagrees.
As noted, a premise liability claim requires a defendant possess
or control the premises at issue. Lisanti, 787 So. 2d at 37.
Here, the Complaint alleges the defendants were the “owners,

operators, managers, supervisors, controllers and innkeepers” of
the La Quinta Hotel, and that Wyndham exercised control over the
means and methods of how the other defendants conducted business

6 “The doctrine of equitable tolling was developed to permit
under certain circumstances the filing of a lawsuit that otherwise
would be barred by a limitations period.” Machules v. Dep’t of
Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 1988); see also Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Nationwide Equities Corp., 304 So. 3d 1240, 1243–44
(Fla. 3d DCA 2020); § 95.051, Fla. Stat.
at the hotel. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 32, 118.) While the defendants may
dispute these allegations, the Court must accept them as true at
this stage of the proceedings and finds them sufficient to allege
the defendants had sufficient control of the La Quinta Hotel for
premise liability purposes.
Next, the motions argue there could be no duty to protect

plaintiff from the criminal conduct of third parties because such
conduct was not foreseeable. (Doc. #14, pp. 15-16; Doc. #15, pp.
15-16.) The Court disagrees with this argument as well.
“Under Florida law, a business owes invitees a duty to use
due care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.
This includes the duty to protect customers from criminal attacks
that are reasonably foreseeable.” Banosmoreno v. Walgreen Co.,
299 F. App’x 912, 913 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Foreseeability can be shown by two alternative means.
First, a plaintiff may demonstrate that a proprietor
knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on
his premises that was likely to cause harm to a patron.
Second, a plaintiff can show that a proprietor knew or
should have known of the dangerous propensities of a
particular patron.

Id. (marks, citations, and footnote omitted). Such knowledge must
only be pled generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
The Complaint contains sufficient allegations that sex
trafficking was occurring at the La Quinta Hotel and that the
defendants knew or should have known of it. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 59-65,
101-10, 165.) The Complaint also contains sufficient allegations
to support a claim of an agency relationship between Wyndham and
the other defendants, and any factual challenge to such a
relationship is premature. (Id. at ¶¶ 114, 116); Cain v. Shell Oil
Co., 994 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1252 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1995). Accordingly, the
Court finds the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to

satisfy the notice pleading requirements.
Finally, the motions assert generally that the premise
liability claim lacks “any allegation supporting causation.”
(Doc. #14, p. 16; Doc. #15, p. 16.) The Court disagrees. The
Complaint alleges the defendants were on notice of the sex
trafficking occurring at the La Quinta Hotel and not only failed
to prevent it, but knowingly turned a blind eye to it in exchange
for increased profits. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 64, 66-81, 264.) The
Complaint also alleges that as a result of the defendants’ actions,
plaintiff suffered various injuries and damages. (Id. at ¶ 209.)
The Court finds this sufficient to allege proximate cause.

Accordingly, the Court denies the motions’ request to dismiss the
claim as insufficiently pled.
(4) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention
Count Four of the Complaint asserts a claim of negligent
hiring, supervision, and retention against each defendant. (Doc.
#1, ¶ 210.) “To state a claim under Florida law for negligent
hiring, supervision and/or retention, a plaintiff must establish
that the employer owed a legal duty to the plaintiff to exercise
reasonable care in hiring and retaining safe and competent
employees.” Clary v. Armor Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 2014 WL
505126, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2014) (citations omitted).
“Florida law also holds employers liable for reasonably
foreseeable damages resulting from the negligent training of its

employees and agents.” Id. (citing Lewis v. City of St.
Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001)). “For an
employer to owe a plaintiff a duty, the plaintiff must be in the
zone of risk that was reasonably foreseeable to the employer.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege
facts that would establish a nexus between the plaintiff
and the tortfeasor’s employment from which a legal duty
would flow from the defendant-employer to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must then establish that the defendant-
employer breached that duty and that the breach caused
him damage.

Id. (citations omitted).
The Complaint alleges each La Quinta Hotel defendant was in
control of the hiring, instructing, training, supervising, and
terminating of the hotel employees, and that each defendant had a
duty to make an appropriate investigation of the employees. (Doc.
#1, ¶¶ 220-21.) The Complaint further alleges that the defendants
knew or should have known that hotel employees were “allowing
criminals to rent rooms for prostitution and drug dealing,”
“failing to either identify and/or report the human sex trafficking
and foreseeable harm” of plaintiff, and “failing to refuse
continued lodging services to human sex traffickers.” (Id. at ¶¶
223-25.) The Complaint concludes that the defendants were
negligent in their hiring, employment, supervision, and
termination decisions regarding the employees, and that the sex
trafficking of plaintiff was a foreseeable and direct result. (Id.

at ¶¶ 226-30.)
Each of the motions seeks dismissal of the negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention claim based on pleading deficiencies.
(Doc. #14, pp. 16-17; Doc. #15, pp. 16-17.) The motions argue
that the claim fails because the Complaint lacks sufficient factual
allegations that the defendants (1) knew or should have known of
any unfit employees and (2) hired or employed any of the employees
at issue. (Doc. #14, p. 17; Doc. #15, p. 17); see also Bright v.
City of Tampa, 2017 WL 5248450, at *8 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2017)
(“When an employer fails to take a corrective action against an
employee because the employer had no notice of problems with the

employee’s fitness, the employer is not liable under Florida law
for negligent supervision or retention.”). The Court disagrees.
The Complaint sufficiently alleges facts suggesting sex
trafficking was occurring at the hotel, that the employees knew of
it and failed to prevent it, that due to their control over the
employees, each defendant knew or should have known of it, and
that the defendants had control of the hiring of the employees.
(Doc. #1, ¶¶ 92-114, 217-27.) The Court finds such allegations
sufficient at this stage of the proceedings.
(5) Negligent Rescue
Count Five of the Complaint asserts a claim of negligent
rescue against La Quinta Holdings, La Quinta Properties,
CorePoint, CPLG, and CPLG FL. (Doc. #1, ¶ 231.) The Complaint

alleges these defendants, as the owners and operators of the La
Quinta Hotel, had a duty to keep the premises safe and prevent
foreseeable criminal activity, as well as a duty “to make safe a
dangerous condition at the La Quinta Hotel and to rescue their
[sic] hotel guests, specifically Plaintiff S.Y., from the peril
they [sic] created.” (Id. at ¶¶ 237, 240, 246.) The Complaint
alleges that by various acts and omissions, these defendants
breached these duties and that the continuous sex trafficking of
plaintiff was the direct and foreseeable result. (Id. at ¶¶ 242-
44, 248-49, 251.) The motions argue the negligent rescue claim
should be dismissed because it is insufficiently pled. (Doc. #14,

pp. 17-18; Doc. #15, pp. 17-18.)
There is no common law duty to rescue a stranger. Estate of
Ferguson v. Mascara, 2010 WL 11558195, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 7,
2010) (citing Bradberry v. Pinellas Cty., 789 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th
Cir. 1986)). “A well-established exception to this rule, however,
provides that an innkeeper is ‘under an ordinary duty of care to
[a guest] after he knows or has reason to know the [guest] is ill
or injured.’” De La Flor v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., L.L.C, 2013
WL 148401, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2013) (quoting L.A. Fitness,
Int’l, LLC v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)); see
also Abramson v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 480 F. App’x 158,
161 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Generally, there is no duty to affirmatively
assist an injured person unless a special relationship, such as

that between an innkeeper and its guests, exists between the
parties.” (citation omitted)).
The motions argue the negligent rescue claim should be
dismissed because it is insufficiently pled under the “rescue
doctrine.” (Doc. #14, p. 17; Doc. #15, p. 17.) Under Florida
law, the rescue doctrine holds a tortfeasor liable for injuries to
a third party who is hurt in attempting to rescue the direct victim
of the tortfeasor. Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1070
(11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “The basic precept of this
doctrine ‘is that the person who has created a situation of peril
for another will be held in law to have caused peril not only to

the victim, but also to his rescuer, and thereby to have caused
any injury suffered by the rescuer in the rescue attempt.’”
Menendez v. W. Gables Rehab. Hosp., LLC, 123 So. 3d 1178, 1181
(Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting N.H. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 730 So. 2d
700, 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
As plaintiff correctly argues in response (Doc. #33, p. 32;
Doc. #34, pp. 32-33), the rescue doctrine is not implicated by
plaintiff’s negligent rescue claim. See Krajcsik v. Ramsey, 2017
WL 3868560, at *2 n.4 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2017) (“The rescue doctrine
is related to, but separate from, the affirmative duty to rescue
an imperiled party that the courts impose on persons in some
situations.”). Accordingly, because the rescue doctrine is not
applicable, the motions’ request for dismissal based on the

doctrine is denied.7
(6) Aiding and Abetting, Harboring, Confining, Coercion and
Criminal Enterprise
Finally, Count Six of the Complaint asserts a claim of aiding
and abetting against La Quinta Holdings, La Quinta Properties,
CorePoint, CPLG, and CPLG FL. (Doc. #1, ¶ 252.) The Complaint
accuses these defendants of “aiding and abetting unlawful activity
including unlawful confinement, imprisonment, assault and battery
by [plaintiff’s] sex traffickers and ‘Johns.’” (Id.) The motions
argue that the claim must be dismissed because it fails to

articulate a cognizable, independent cause of action, and purports
to assert multiple claims in a single count. (Doc. #14, pp. 18-
19; Doc. #15, p. 18.) The Court disagrees.

7 The motions also suggest hotels only have a limited duty to
render aid to a guest it knew or should have known was ill or
injured, and that the Complaint contains no plausible facts to
suggest the defendants knew plaintiff was in need of aid. (Doc.
#14, p. 18 n.5; Doc. #15, p. 18 n.5.) However, the Court finds
the Complaint contains sufficient allegations to satisfy this
requirement. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 101, 102, 247.)
Florida courts have recognized aiding and abetting the
commission of a tort as a standalone claim. See Gilison v. Flagler
Bank, 303 So. 3d 999, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (aiding and abetting
fraud); MP, LLC v. Sterling Holding, LLC, 231 So. 3d 517, 527 (Fla.
3d DCA 2017) (aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty). This
Court has previously listed the following elements that must be

alleged “to state a claim for aiding and abetting a common law
tort” under Florida law: “(1) an underlying violation on the part
of the primary wrongdoer; (2) knowledge of the underlying violation
by the alleged aider and abetter [sic]; and (3) the rendering of
substantial assistance in committing the wrongdoing by the alleged
aider and abettor.” Angell v. Allergan Sales, LLC, 2019 WL
3958262, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2019); see also Lawrence v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 455 F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying
the above elements to three Florida tort claims). These cases
demonstrate Florida recognizes a common-law claim of aiding and
abetting tortious conduct.

The Court finds plaintiff’s allegations are not impermissibly
vague and, to the extent they allege actual knowledge 8, are

8 “[A]llegations which demonstrate merely constructive
knowledge, recklessness or gross negligence cannot satisfy the
‘knowledge’ element of an aiding and abetting claim under Florida
law.” Angell, 2019 WL 3958262, at *9.
sufficient to state a claim. 9 Therefore, the Court denies the
motions’ request for dismissal.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED :
1. Defendants Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. and La Quinta
Holdings Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #14) is DENIED.
2. Defendants CorePoint Lodging Inc., CPLG L.L.C., and CPLG
FL Properties L.L.C.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15) is
DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 10th day of
May, 2021.

VA = DY,
JGHH E. STEELE
SHVICR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:
Parties of record

9 To the extent the motions suggest the claim fails to allege
sufficient facts to satisfy the “substantial assistance” element
(Doc. #14, pp. 18-19; Doc. #15, p. 18), the Court finds the
allegations in the Complaint sufficient. (Doc. #1, TI 92, 264-
66.)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107500. Public record. Not legal advice.