# Vandersnick v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 17, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107121

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 17, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107121

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that vague, conclusory, speculative, or unsupported claims cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

CHARLES VANDERSNICK,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5:18-cv-603-SPC-PRL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER1
Pending is Petitioner Charles Vandersnick’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition for habeas corpus relief (Petition; Doc. 1) constructively filed on
November 27, 2018.2 Vandersnick, a Florida prisoner, challenges his judgment
of conviction entered by the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Lake
County, Florida in case number 11-CF-002651-A-01. Petition at 1.

1 Disclaimer: Documents filed in CM/ECF may contain hyperlinks to other documents
or websites. These hyperlinks are provided only for users’ convenience. Users are cautioned
that hyperlinked documents in CM/ECF are subject to PACER fees. By allowing hyperlinks
to other websites, this Court does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third
parties or the services or products they provide on their websites. Likewise, the Court has
no agreements with any of these third parties or their websites. The Court accepts no
responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a
hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of
the Court.
2 Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court must apply the “mailbox rule” and
considers a prisoner's pleading filed on the date that he signs, executes, and certifies that he
delivered it to prison authorities for mailing. Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1341
(11th Cir. 1999).
Respondent3 filed a Response to the Petition (Response; Doc. 19), with exhibits
(Resp. Ex.). Respondent concedes the Petition is timely but submits that

Vandersnick is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Response as 7-12.
Vandersnick filed a reply (Reply; Doc. 22).
The Court having reviewed the record agrees that the Petition is timely
and finds that the pertinent facts are developed in the record. An evidentiary

hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127
S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (if the record refutes the factual allegations
in the petition or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court need not
hold an evidentiary hearing); see also Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834

F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct.
2245, 198 L.Ed.2d 683 (June 12, 2017). Based on a thorough review of the
record and controlling precedent, the Court denies the Petition.
I. Procedural Background

The State of Florida (“State”) charged Vandersnick by way of Amended
Information with attempted second-degree murder (count one) and aggravated

3 The Petition names both the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and the
Florida Attorney General as Respondents. (See Petition at 1). When a petitioner is
incarcerated and challenges his present physical confinement “the proper respondent is the
warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some
other remote supervisory official.” Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435, 124 S.Ct. 2711,
159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004). Here, the proper respondent is the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections. Id. The Florida Attorney General thus will be dismissed from
this action.
assault of a law enforcement officer (count two). Resp. Ex. A at 77. After a
trial, a jury found Vandersnick guilty as charged as to both counts. Id. at 110-

11. The trial court sentenced Vandersnick to ten years in prison as to count
one and three years in prison as to count two. Id. at 138-44. Vandersnick
appealed and Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal (“Fifth DCA”) per curiam
affirmed the judgment and sentence. Resp. Ex. E. Vandersnick filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus with the Fifth DCA alleging his appellate counsel was
deficient for failing to raise claims on direct appeal, Resp. Ex. F, which he later
amended, Resp. Ex. G. The Fifth DCA denied relief. Resp. Ex. J.
On December 3, 2015, Vandersnick filed a pro se motion for

postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850
(“Rule 3.850 Motion”). Resp. Ex. K. On December 28, 2015, Vandersnick
moved to amend his Rule 3.850 Motion. Resp. Ex. L. The postconviction court
granted the motion and dismissed his Rule 3.850 Motion without prejudice.

Resp. Ex. M. Vandersnick filed an amend motion for postconviction relief
(“Amended Rule 3.850 Motion”) on February 2, 2016. Resp. Ex. N. However,
on April 13, 2016, Vandersnick filed a pro se motion requesting the
postconviction court dismiss his Amended Rule 3.850 Motion and to instead

rule on the original Rule 3.850 Motion he filed. Resp. Ex. O. The
postconviction court granted the motion and reinstated the initial Rule 3.850
Motion. Resp. Ex. P. After the State responded to the Rule 3.850 Motion, the
postconviction court struck the Rule 3.850 Motion as legally insufficient and
directed him to file an amended motion. Resp. Ex. T. In response, Vandersnick

filed an amended motion (Second Amended Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. U.
In the Second Amended Rule 3.850 Motion he raised a number of grounds,
including a substantially similar claim as the claim he raises in the instant
Petition, that his counsel failed to investigate and advise him about the

possibility of an insanity defense. Id. at 26-34. The postconviction court denied
relief. Resp. Ex. V. On May 22, 2018, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the
denial of the Second Amended Rule 3.850 Motion without a written opinion.
Resp. Ex. Y.

On June 20, 2018, Vandersnick filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Resp. Ex.
Z. The postconviction court denied the motion on June 27, 2018. Resp. Ex. AA.
Vandersnick appealed and on October 9, 2018, the Fifth DCA per curiam

affirmed the denial of relief without issuing a written opinion. Resp. Ex. BB.
Vandersnick then filed the instant Petition.
II. Applicable Habeas Law
A. AEDPA

The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state
prisoner's habeas petition for federal relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Relief may not
be granted regarding a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless
the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet.
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014).
A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation,
qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson
v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). A state court's violation of
state law is not sufficient to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of
the “Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);
Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16, 131 S.Ct. 13, 178 L.Ed.2d 276 (2010).
“Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal
principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court when
the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin,
549 U.S. 70, 74, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (citing Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Habeas
relief is appropriate only if the state court decision was “contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of,” that federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A
decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either:

(1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme
Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when
faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144,
1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157

L.Ed.2d 263 (2003).
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of the
Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing
legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an

objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134, 125
S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th
Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle
from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should
apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406, 120 S.Ct.
1495). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of

the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct.
770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). “[T]his standard is difficult to meet because it
was meant to be.” Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2558, 201 L.Ed.2d
986 (2018) (quoting Harrison, 562 U.S. at 102, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quotation
marks omitted)).

Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must
remember that any “determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct[,]” and the petitioner bears “the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d
348 (2013) (“[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely
because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in
the first instance.”) (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293, 130 S.Ct. 841,

175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)); see also Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1146 (11th
Cir. 2018) (the court must presume that the State court's determination of a
factual issue is correct, and petitioner must rebut presumption by clear and
convincing evidence).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
AEDPA precludes federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, from
granting habeas relief unless a petitioner has exhausted all means of relief
available under state law. Failure to exhaust occurs “when a petitioner has

not fairly presented every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's
highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.” Pope v. Sec'y for
Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). The petitioner must apprise the state court of the
federal constitutional issue, not just the underlying facts of the claim or a

similar state law claim. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.
1998).
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part

test for determining whether a convicted person may have relief claiming his
counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel’s performance
was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This is a “doubly
deferential” standard of review that gives both the state court and the
petitioner’s attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557

(2011)).
The focus of inquiry under Strickland’s performance prong is
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In reviewing counsel’s performance, a court must

adhere to a strong presumption that “counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The
petitioner bears the heavy burden to “prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that counsel’s performance was unreasonable[.]” Jones v. Campbell,
436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must “judge the reasonableness

of counsel’s conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel’s conduct,” applying a “highly deferential” level of judicial scrutiny.
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Petitioner’s burden
to demonstrate prejudice is high. Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2002). Prejudice “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104
S.Ct. 2052.
III. Discussion
In the Petition, Vandersnick raises a single ground for relief. According

to Vandersnick, his trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate,
prepare, and present an insanity defense. Petition at 4. Vandersnick
maintains that he informed his trial counsel on numerous occasions of his
mental health history, which included being Baker Acted and diagnoses of
“psychosis, delirium with associated tremors, visual hallucinations, suicide

attempts, bipolar disorder, antisocial personality disorder, suicidal ideations,
and severe depression.” Id. at 5. He also told trial counsel about his treatment
history that included psychotropic drugs and that he had previously been
acquitted of multiple charges by reason of insanity. Id. Despite this

information, Vandersnick contends that his counsel refused to investigate or
even discuss an insanity defense. Id. at 5-6.
Respondent argues that Vandersnick’s claim is unexhausted. Response
at 9-12. Although Vandersnick raised this issue in his Second Amended Rule

3.850 Motion, Respondent contends that the postconviction court denied this
claim as legally insufficient, and, on appeal, Vandersnick did not raise a
constitutional issue. Id. In his Reply, Vandersnick does not address
exhaustion. Instead, he requests the Court hold an evidentiary hearing

because he cannot get access to a psychiatric report from his pre-trial
psychiatric examination. Reply at 1-2, 4-5. He further asserts that his
attorney lied to him when counsel said he had not received the pre-sentence
investigation report. Id. at 2-6.

As previously mentioned above, Vandersnick raised a substantially
similar claim as ground six of the Second Amended Rule 3.850 Motion. In
denying relief on this claim, the postconviction court wrote:
Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate an insanity defense. While he
repeatedly claims that he had a past history of mental
illness, and that insanity was a viable defense, he does
not claim that he was actually insane at the time of
the offense as required. Lucky v. State, 979 So. 2d 353,
354 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Therefore, the claim is
legally insufficient.

Resp. Ex. V at 6. Vandersnick appealed and argued that this claim was legally
sufficient and not refuted by the record. Resp. Ex. W at 28-33. The Fifth DCA
per curiam affirmed the denial of this claim without a written opinion. Resp.
Ex. Y.
“A state court's rejection of a petitioner's constitutional claim on state
procedural grounds will generally preclude any subsequent federal habeas
review of that claim.” Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Eleventh Circuit has “established a three-part test to enable us to
determine when a state court’s procedural ruling constitutes an independent
and adequate state rule of decision.” Id. “First, the last state court rendering
a judgment in the case must clearly and expressly state that it is relying on
state procedural rules to resolve the federal claim without reaching the merits
of that claim.” Id. Second, “the state court’s decision must rest solidly on state
law grounds, and may not be ‘intertwined with an interpretation of federal
law.’” Id. (quoting Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Third, “the state procedural rule must be adequate, i.e., firmly established and
regularly followed and not applied ‘in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion.’”
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1156-57 (quoting Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313).

Under Florida law, to allege a facially sufficient claim that trial counsel
failed to investigate an insanity defense, a defendant must specifically allege
that he or she was insane at the time the criminal offense occurred. Turem v.
State, 220 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Luckey, 979 So. 2d at 354. Here,

the postconviction court clearly and expressly relied on this procedural rule to
resolve this claim. This decision is not intertwined with federal law. Moreover,
the pleading requirement is firmly established and regularly followed. See
Luckey, 979 So. 2d at 354 (citing cases as far back as 1981 for similar rulings).

Accordingly, based on this record, Vandersnick’s claim is unexhausted because
he did not properly raise this issue in state court. Vandersnick has neither
alleged cause and prejudice nor the existence of a miscarriage of justice to
overcome this procedural default. Accordingly, the Petition is due to be denied

as unexhausted.
Nevertheless, even if properly exhausted, Vandersnick is not entitled to
relief. To establish an insanity defense under Florida law, a defendant must
have had a mental infirmity, disease, or defect at the time of the commission

of the offense and because of that condition the defendant either did not know
what he or she was doing or its consequences or the defendant did not know
what he or she was doing was wrong. § 775.027(1), Fla. Stat. In order to give
this ground context, a review of the record is necessary.

Vandersnick testified on his own behalf at trial. According to his
testimony, he and the victim were binge drinking the week leading up to the
incident. Id. at 160-65. The day of the incident, Vandersnick contended that
the victim had been drinking all night and was yelling at him that she wanted

to die so she could see her father, who had recently died, and mother and
brothers. Id. at 166-70. Vandersnick testified that this was normal behavior
for her, she would be belligerent and then docile, asking to be killed. Id. at
170. Eventually the victim went to sleep and Vandersnick said he felt

depressed because she had asked him to kill her and because they were both
alcoholics. Id. at 171-72. Vandersnick stated that he had two to three glasses
of wine after she fell asleep and that he began thinking about his love for her,
her wishes to die, and her alcoholic condition, which led him to attempt to kill

her while she slept. Id. at 172-74. Vandersnick could not follow through with
the strangulation and he backed off of the victim. Id. at 173. He testified that
he felt “[t]errible” during his attempt to kill her and he stopped because “[i]t
was wrong.” Id. at 174-75. Vandersnick later called the police and told them

he wanted them to shoot him because he felt terrible for what he had tried to
do to the victim. Id. at 175-76. According to Vandersnick, he had been
depressed for four years but was off his medication at the time of the incident.
Id. at 186. Once arrested, police transported Vandersnick to the hospital
where he was later Baker Acted because he posed a danger to himself or to

others. Id. at 115-16.
The State introduced at trial a recording of the 911 call Vandersnick
made following his strangulation of the victim. Resp. Ex. B at 63-73. During
that call, Vandersnick told the operator he needed police to come to his

residence. Id. at 63-64. He said he was drunk and that he tried to kill his wife
but that she was okay now. Id. at 64-65. Vandersnick asked the operator
repeatedly to tell the police to shoot him when they arrived because he wanted
to die. Id. at 65-68. Dispatch attempted to take his mind off of suicide and

began talking with him, a tactic Vandersnick recognized and told the officer on
the line to stop trying it. Id. at 71. Dispatch told Vandersnick to talk to the
officers that had arrived at the scene, but he refused, stating “[t]hey really
want to take me to jail, and I’m not going to jail.” Id. at 72-73.

The State also played a recorded telephone conversation between
Vandersnick and his mother they had while he was in jail. Id. at 118-28.
During the conversation, Vandersnick stated that he attempted to kill the
victim because she begged him to kill her so she could be with her deceased

dad, mom, and brothers. Id. at 119. Vandersnick admitted to his mom that
the alcohol was to blame for his actions and that he tried to commit suicide
three times in the last two weeks. Id. at 122-23. He told his mother that he
wanted to talk with the victim in hopes of convincing her not to press charges
so that he could get released. Id. at 123-24.

Notably during his sentencing, Vandersnick described his remorse and
told the trial court, under oath, that “I deliberately chose to do wrong.” Resp.
Ex. A at 199. He also discussed how the victim had a history of being an
alcoholic with rage problems who would constantly ask Vandersnick to kill her.

Id. at 204-06. Vandersnick testified that he attempted to kill her because of
the rage she displayed and because she had asked him. Id. at 206.
Based on this record, an insanity defense was not a viable defense.
Vandersnick has alleged in the Petition that in the past he suffered from

various mental health issues without alleging he was actually insane at the
time of the offense. Instead, he speculates about what could be in a psychiatric
report and relies on an alleged statement from the examining psychiatrist that
he would keep Vandersnick out of prison. As Vandersnick does not allege he

was actually insane at the time of the incident, his claim is speculative. As
such he is not entitled to federal habeas relief. See Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d
1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that vague, conclusory, speculative, or
unsupported claims cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).

Furthermore, as described above, Vandersnick called the police and admitted
he committed the offense. The 911 call demonstrated that Vandersnick was
lucid and understood what he had done, the consequences of his actions, and
that they were wrong. Moreover, he specifically testified that he stopped
strangling her because he knew what he was doing wrong, and he felt terrible

about it. Vandersnick’s own actions during the incident and his statements
and testimony afterward bely his argument that an insanity defense would
have been successful. Accordingly, even if counsel presented an insanity
defense, there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have

been different. In light of the above analysis, the Petition is due to be denied.
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement
to appeal a district court's denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather,

a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (COA). “A [COA]
may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a
petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)),
or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further,” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S.Ct. 1029,
154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citations omitted). Vandersnick has not made the
requisite showing here and may not have a certificate of appealability on his
Petition.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. The Florida Attorney General is DISMISSED as a named
Respondent.
2. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE, and this
action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability. Because
the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not warranted,
the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any motion to
proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such termination
shall serve as a denial of the motion.
4, The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Petition
with prejudice and dismissing this case with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court
is also directed to close this case and terminate any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, this 17+ day of March, 2021.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jax-8
C: Charles Vandersnick #D40335
Counsel of record
17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10107121. Public record. Not legal advice.