# Thompson v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106950

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

LOMACK THOMPSON

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 8:17-cv-3016-T-36AAS

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections,

Respondent.
/

O R D E R
This cause comes before the Court on Lomack Thompson’s petition for the writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) Thompson challenges his state conviction
for trafficking in hydrocodone. Upon consideration of the petition (Doc. 1), the response
(Doc. 9), and the reply (Doc. 12), and in accordance with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts, the petition will be DENIED.
Facts1
While working undercover Detective William Sims purchased thirty pills containing
hydrocodone from Thompson. The transaction was video recorded by Detective Sims.
During the transaction Detective Sims initiated a discussion with Thompson in which
Thompson agreed to sell Detective Sims more pills in the future. Thompson was ultimately
arrested and charged with trafficking between 14 grams and 28 grams of illegal drugs. A jury
convicted Thompson and he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of fifteen years

1 This factual summary derives from Thompson’s briefs on direct appeal and the record. (Respondent’s
Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 7, 24a, and 24b)
imprisonment. The state appellate court affirmed both Thompson’s conviction and sentence
and the denial of his state Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. (Respondent’s
Exhibits 9 and 22)
Standard of Review

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this
proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal
court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this
deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a
federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a
writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the
merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only
if one of the following two conditions is satisfied - - the state-
court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary
to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “involved an
unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant
the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable
application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

“The focus . . . is on whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal
law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect
one.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus
from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 526 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d
1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of
the state court decision that we are to decide.”). The phrase “clearly established Federal law”
encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the
relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. “The [AEDPA] modified
a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal
habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent
possible under law.” Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. A federal court must afford due deference to a
state court’s decision. “AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using
federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state
courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
181 (2011) (“This is a ‘difficult to meet,’ . . . and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating
state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt’
. . . .”) (citations omitted).
Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Thompson claims ineffective assistance of counsel, a difficult claim to sustain. “[T]he
cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel are few and far between.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (quoting Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)). Sims v. Singletary, 155
F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998), explains that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
governs an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:
The law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well
settled and well documented. In Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the Supreme
Court set forth a two-part test for analyzing ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. According to Strickland, first, the defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Strickland requires proof of both deficient performance and consequent prejudice. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697 (“There is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . .
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
one.”); Sims, 155 F.3d at 1305 (“When applying Strickland, we are free to dispose of
ineffectiveness claims on either of its two grounds.”). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” 466 U.S. at 690.
Strickland requires that “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 466 U.S. at 690.
Thompson must demonstrate that counsel’s alleged error prejudiced the defense
because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” 466
U.S. at 691. To meet this burden, Thompson must show “a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and

facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 466 U.S. at 690–91.
Thompson cannot meet his burden merely by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel
proved unsuccessful.
The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have
done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have
done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial
could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted
at trial . . . . We are not interested in grading lawyers’
performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial
process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 1992). Accord Chandler v. United States,
218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case,
could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable . . . .
[T]he issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is

constitutionally compelled.’”) (en banc) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) Thompson must prove that the state court’s decision was
“(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or (2) . . . based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” Sustaining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is very difficult because
“[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when
the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 106. See also Pinholster,
563 U.S. at 202 (a petitioner must overcome this “‘doubly deferential’ standard of Strickland

and [the] AEDPA”), Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“Double deference is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome, and it will be a rare case
in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court
is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.”), and Pooler v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 702
F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because we must view Pooler’s ineffective counsel claim
— which is governed by the deferential Strickland test — through the lens of AEDPA
deference, the resulting standard of review is ‘doubly deferential.’”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
191 (2013).
Ground One
In his sole ground for relief Thompson contends that “[t]he misconduct of law
enforcement purchasing hydrocodone pills took away the ability of the trial court to give the
accused a fair and impartial trial.” (Doc. 1 at 6) Thompson argues that the detective to whom

he sold the drugs was not charged with a crime although he “is equally guilty as the supplier
(the Defendant).” (Id.) Thompson argues that by allowing his case to proceed, the trial court
“abandon[ed] its neutral position as arbitrator between the laws of the state and in doing
so, . . . require[d] the court to become an advocate for the state and law enforcement [,] which
deprives the accused of a fair and impartial trial,” resulting in a violation of his federal
constitutional right to equal protection.
Thompson attaches to his petition five additional pages entitled “Brief Claim for
Relief” in which he states that “[i]n Defendant’s claim for relief I’m alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 18) Thompson alleges that “counsel should have

file[d] a pretrial motion to dismiss all charges based on the misconduct” of both he and the
detective to whom he sold the hydrocodone pills. (Doc. 1 at 19) Thompson argues that
counsel’s “failure to file [a] motion to dismiss fail[ed] to protect her client[’s] equal protection
rights” and “deprived the accused of due process of law.” (Doc. 1 at 19–20) Thompson also
argues that the detective’s alleged misconduct “manipulated the court when it came to the
sentencing guidelines” and that sections 893.13 and 893.135, Florida Statutes, “violate due
process as applied.” (Doc. 1 at 20) Finally, Thompson asserts that “counsel knew or should
have known her client could not receive a fair an[d] impartial jury.” (Doc. 1 at 21) He argues
that “when the government [is] a part of the wrongdoing[,] such conduct requires the jury to
show bias against the accused in order to convict which deprive[d] the accused [of] due
process of law to a fair trial.” (Id.)
Thompson’s allegations appear to be a combination of several grounds that he
presented to the state courts in either his direct appeal or in his state Rule 3.850 motions.

Affording the petition a generous interpretation, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and
to the extent that Thompson attempts to articulate several independent bases for relief,2 this
Court considers each allegation as follows:
Equal protection claim
To the extent that Thompson alleges that he was denied his federal rights to equal
protection and a fair trial because the detective to whom he sold the hydrocodone pills was
not charged with a crime, he cannot obtain relief. The state appellate court rejected this
ground in Thompson’s direct appeal. (Respondent’s Exhibits 2, 8, 10)
Thompson was charged with trafficking in illegal drugs under section 893.135, Florida

Statutes. (Respondent’s Exhibit 24a at 12) Section 893.135 includes an exception for law
enforcement officers as follows:
The provisions of subsections (1)-(8) are not applicable to the
delivery to, or actual or constructive possession for medical or
scientific use or purpose only of controlled substances by,
persons included in any of the following classes, or the agents or
employees of such persons, for use in the usual course of their
business or profession or in the performance of their official
duties:
. . . .
(h) Law enforcement officers for bona fide law enforcement
purposes in the course of an active criminal investigation.

2 See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (instructing “the district courts to resolve all
claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254”).
Accordingly, under state law, the detective was not subject to prosecution for purchasing the
drugs while performing his official duty. Thompson establishes neither a federal equal
protection violation nor a federal due process violation. Consequently, Thompson fails to
meet his burden of proving that the state court unreasonably applied controlling Supreme

Court precedent or unreasonably determined the facts by rejecting this ground on direct
appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (d)(2).
Ineffective assistance of counsel - failure to move to dismiss charges
Thompson alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not moving
to dismiss the charges against him. He argues that counsel “fail[ed] to protect her client[’s]
equal protection rights” and “deprived the accused of due process of law.” (Doc. 1 at 19–20)
When Thompson presented this ground to the state post-conviction court in his original Rule
3.850 motion he simply argued that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
filing “any pre-trial motions.” (Respondent’s Exhibit 11 at 3) The state post-conviction court

concluded that “it is unclear whether Defendant is alleging counsel should have only adopted
the pro se motions he attaches to his motion for postconviction relief, or whether Defendant
is alleging counsel should have filed additional pretrial motions.” (Respondent’s Exhibit 14
at 3) The court dismissed this ground and gave Thompson an opportunity to clarify his
allegations. In his amended Rule 3.850 motion Thompson asserted that his trial counsel
should have moved “to dismiss the charges that occurred after the . . . initial violation.”
(Respondent’s Exhibit 15 at 4) Thompson claimed that “[c]ounsel knew or should have
known that the Defendant could not and did not get a fair trial, therefore making it necessary
for counsel to file a motion to dismiss the case . . . based on sentencing manipulation
stemming from Detective Sims[’s] failure to arrest the Defendant on the initial charged
offense.” (Respondent’s Exhibit 15 at 5) The state post-conviction court again dismissed the
ground as facially insufficient.3 (Respondent’s Exhibit 16 at 5)
Thompson filed a second amended Rule 3.850 motion in which he alleged that “his
due process rights were violated by the outrageous conduct perpetrated by Detective Sims and

that trial counsel should have filed a motion to dismiss under two different theories. Number
one for entrapment. The second would be for sentencing manipulation. Both actions by LEO

3 The state post-conviction court concluded (Respondent’s Exhibit 16 at 5) (court’s record citation
omitted):

Defendant contends that his counsel should have argued that had the police
properly arrested Defendant after his first law violation, his subsequent law
violations would not exist. Defendant argues had his counsel raised this
motion to dismiss it is likely that his five other cases would have been
dismissed and he would have been sentenced to only three years [in] prison
with a three-year minimum mandatory sentence.
After reviewing the allegations, the court file, and the record, the Court notes
that:
If the actions of a law enforcement officer amount to a denial
of a defendant’s right to due process, dismissal of the charges
may be warranted.
. . . .
The rule applies regardless of the defendant’s predisposition
and serves to check outrageous police conduct. This rule is
narrowly applied and is limited to those instances where the
government’s conduct so offends decency or a sense of
justice that the judicial power may not be exercised to obtain
a conviction.
See State v. Taylor, 784 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
The Court finds that Defendant has failed to allege a facially sufficient claim.
Specifically, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to provide sufficient
facts supporting a defense of outrageous police conduct which should result
in a dismissal of the case or cases. As such, [this] [c]laim is dismissed without
prejudice to any right Defendant may have to file within sixty (60) days a
timely, properly sworn, facially sufficient claim. Spera, 791 So. 2d at 755.
violated defendant’s due process right under the Fla. and U.S. constitution.” (Respondent’s
Exhibit 17 at 4) Thompson appears to assert in his federal petition these same allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel that he presented to the state post-conviction court in the
second amended Rule 3.850.

The state post-conviction court denied this ground of ineffective assistance of counsel
as follows (Respondent’s Exhibit 18 at 4) (court’s record citations omitted):
[I]t appears, among other things, that Defendant is alleging his
trial counsel was ineffective for failure to raise a motion for
downward departure at sentencing based on sentence
manipulation by the police.
After reviewing the allegations, the court file, and the record, the
Court finds that to the extent that Defendant is alleging that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failure to file a motion for
downward departure during sentencing, the Court finds that
Defendant was sentenced pursuant to statutorily imposed
mandatory minimum sentences found in Section 893.135,
Florida Statutes, in each case. As such, the Court had no
authority to impose a downward departure. See Kelley v. State,
821 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). As such, any motion filed
by Defendant’s trial counsel in this regard would have been
meritless. Therefore, Defendant cannot demonstrate deficiency
or prejudice and [this claim] must be denied.
The Court further finds that to the extent that Defendant is
claiming that his counsel should have raised a pre-trial motion to
dismiss based on entrapment, the Court finds that this claim is
beyond the scope of Defendant’s original claim . . . and is now
untimely as a new claim and must be denied. See Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.850(e).
Furthermore, the Court finds that to the extent that Defendant is
attempting to argue that his counsel should have raised an
entrapment defense at trial, the Court finds that it previously
denied this claim in its February 3, 2016, Order.[4] As such, the
Court finds that it will not address these allegations again.

4 The state post-conviction court denied the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a
failure to raise an entrapment defense as follows (Respondent’s Exhibit 16 at 5–6) (court’s record citation
omitted):
To the extent that Thompson claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s failure under state law to either present an entrapment defense or move to dismiss
the charges based on sentence manipulation, he cannot obtain relief. “[A] state court’s
interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v.

Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)
(explaining that “[s]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law,” and federal courts
must abide by their rulings on matters of state law) (citations and footnote omitted).
“Although an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a federal constitutional claim, which
we consider in light of the clearly established rules of Strickland, when ‘the validity of the claim
that [counsel] failed to assert is clearly a question of state law, . . . we must defer to the state’s
construction of its own law.’” Will v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F. App’x 902, 908 (11th Cir.
2008) (citing Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 1984)). See also Herring v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The Florida Supreme Court

already has told us how the issues would have been resolved under state law had [the
petitioner’s counsel] done what [the petitioner] argues he should have done . . . . It is a
‘fundamental principle that state courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas
courts should not second-guess them on such matters.’”) (quoting Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d
1538, 1549 (11th Cir. 1997)).

In Claim Four Defendant alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failure to
raise a defense of entrapment at trial.

After reviewing the allegations, the court file, and the record, the Court finds
that Defendant’s claim lacks an adequate statement of facts to demonstrate a
lack of predisposition. See Jimenez v. State, 993 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
As such, no relief is warranted and Claim Four must be denied.
The basis for Thompson’s ground of ineffective assistance of counsel is counsel’s
failure to either move to dismiss the charges under state law or move for a downward
departure based on state sentencing guidelines. Both the state post-conviction court in
rejecting Thompson’s ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and the state appellate court

by affirming that rejection have answered the question of what would have happened if
counsel had performed as Thompson suggests. See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 932
(11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has already answered the
question of what would have happened had [the petitioner’s counsel] objected to the
introduction of [the petitioner’s] statements based on [state law] — the objection would have
been overruled . . . . Therefore, [the petitioner’s counsel] was not ineffective for failing to
make that objection.”). The state courts’ interpretation of state law is afforded deference.
Thompson establishes neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice from counsel’s
alleged error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–92.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Thompson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

based on counsel’s failure to argue a violation of federal law based on the alleged sentence
manipulation, Thompson is not entitled to relief. “[S]entencing factor manipulation focuses
on the government’s conduct . . . [and] ‘requires us to consider whether the manipulation
inherent in a sting operation, even if insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment
defense, . . . or due process claim, . . . must sometimes be filtered out of the sentencing
calculus.’” United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States
v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992)). “[T]o bring sting operations within the ambit
of sentencing factor manipulation, the government must engage in extraordinary
misconduct.” United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007). “Government-
created reverse sting operations are recognized and useful methods of law enforcement
investigation,” so “[t]he standard for sentencing factor manipulation is high.” Ciszkowski, 492
F.3d at 1271. “[The Eleventh Circuit] has never reduced a sentence on the basis of sentencing
factor manipulation, see United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2009), so

no binding precedent requires [the Eleventh Circuit] to countenance sentencing factor
manipulation as a legitimate defense.” United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir.
2017).
The record shows that counsel advised the judge at the sentencing hearing that she
inquired of Detective Sims about re-visiting Thompson for additional drug purchases
(Respondent’s Exhibit 24b, transcript of sentencing hearing at 12):
[COUNSEL]: Judge, we’re asking for the Court to impose a
15-year minimum mandatory. There are several cases that are
before the Court; however, these are cases where Detective Sims
admittedly went back on several occasions. I asked —
THE COURT: I know that and I wasn’t real happy with that
either.
[COUNSEL]: I asked him during deposition exactly what the
purpose was of him going back on several occasions —
THE COURT: And what did he say?
[COUNSEL]: Basically he said that Mr. Thompson was a link
between other individuals so he was trying to get to other people
through Mr. Thompson —
THE COURT: Oh.
[COUNSEL]: — so he had to keep the lines of communication
open through Mr. Thompson to get to other individuals.
Thompson presents no evidence of outrageous government conduct that would
implicate due process concerns. Thompson likewise presents no basis upon which counsel
could have successfully moved for either dismissal of the charges or a downward departure
based on sentencing manipulation. The fifteen-year sentence Thompson received was
mandatory under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(c). The state post-conviction court
cited Florida authority providing that a sentencing court cannot depart from this mandatory
term absent a recommendation from the State. See Kelley v. State, 821 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2002). The prosecutor made no such recommendation in Thompson’s case and, in fact,
asked for a twenty-year sentence based on Thompson’s prior convictions for drug possession
and delivery. (Respondent’s Exhibit 24b, transcript of sentencing hearing at 4) Thompson
fails to meet his burden of proving that the state court either unreasonably applied Strickland
or unreasonably determined the facts by rejecting this ground. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (d)(2).
Accordingly, Thompson’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment against Thompson and CLOSE this case.

DENIAL OF BOTH A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thompson is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability. A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to
appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court
must first issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Section 2253(c)(2) limits the issuing of
a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” To merit a certificate of appealability, Thompson must show that reasonable jurists
would find debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues
he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle
v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because he fails to show that reasonable jurists
would debate either the merits of the claims or the procedural issues, Thompson is entitled to
neither a certificate of appealability nor leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma
pauperis is DENIED. Thompson must obtain permission from the circuit court to appeal in
forma pauperis.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on February 22, 2021.

Chak □□□ AiJardia Mo Page ped □□
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge

Copies furnished to:
All parties of record including unrepresented parties, if any

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106950. Public record. Not legal advice.