# Haegele v. Judd

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 29, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106584

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 29, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTINA HAEGELE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:19-cv-2750-T-33CPT
GRADY JUDD, et al.,

Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendants Sheriff Grady Judd, Reginald Green, and Joseph
Hicks’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 99), filed on
October 21, 2020. Plaintiff Christina Haegele, individually
and as personal representative of the estate of Chance
Haegele, responded on November 18, 2020. (Doc. # 113). Sheriff
Judd, Green, and Hicks replied on December 3, 2020. (Doc. #
118). Haegele filed a sur-reply on December 15, 2021. (Doc.
# 126). The Motion is granted as set forth below.
I. Background
Chance Haegele was a twenty-year old man with mental
health issues, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and
depression. (Doc. # 99-9 at 74:4-12). He had been
involuntarily committed under the Baker Act numerous times,
such that the Polk County Sheriff’s Office was aware of his
mental health issues. (Id. at 32:8-38:22; Doc. # 112-19; Doc.
# 112-20; Doc. # 112-21).
On the night of March 20, 2018, the date of the shooting,
Chance had been drinking alcohol he obtained from a neighbor.
(Doc. # 99-9 at 50:17-51:20). He made social media posts that
appeared suicidal in tone. (Doc. # 99-2 at 1-2). Specifically,
he posted on Facebook, “I do not want to live.” (Id. at 2).
He also sent through a social media application a photo of

himself with the following text: “Tell me why the fuck I
shouldn’t kill myself. Life is so fucking boring. I don’t
wanna work for the rest of my life. We are so irrelevant in
the grand scheme of the universe. I’m never gonna fall in
love again. Nobody wants a trailer boy.” (Id. at 1).
An acquaintance of Chance’s, Christian Morales, saw
Chance’s social media posts and called the Polk County
Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. # 99-3 at 7:12-8:9; Doc. # 99-4).
Morales informed the Sheriff’s Office operator that Chance
had said that he had killed his mother — Plaintiff Christina
Haegele (hereinafter, Haegele) — and wanted to kill himself.
(Doc. # 99-4 at 2:5-9, 5:8-13, 6:1-11; Doc. # 99-3 at 8:18-

9:11; Doc. # 99-5 at 1).
A Sheriff’s Office operator called Chance about what
Morales had said. (Doc. # 99-6). Chance denied having killed
his mother or being suicidal. (Id.). Rather, Chance told the
operator his apparently suicidal messages were about his
disappointment over his poor performance during a video game.
(Id.). The operator also spoke with Haegele to confirm she
was alive. (Id.). The operator called a second time to ask
Chance for his address. (Doc. # 99-7).
A Sheriff’s Office operator then dispatched Deputy Adrin

McGough to Chance’s address. (Doc. # 99-5 at 2). Other
deputies were dispatched to the scene as backup, including
Deputy Hicks and Deputy Green. (Id.).
Haegele called 911 and advised the operator that Chance
had taken her shotgun, that the shotgun didn’t have any
bullets in it, and that Chance wanted the cops to shoot him.
(Doc. # 99-8 at 2:5-25; Doc. # 99-5 at 2; Doc. # 99-9 at
55:25-56:4). Indeed, Haegele testified that she told 911 that
Chance had “got [her] shotgun” and “probably want[ed] [the
police] to shoot him.” (Doc. # 99-9 at 55:25-56:4). The 911
operator relayed this information to a Sheriff’s Office
operator. (Doc. # 99-8 at 2:2-3:4; Doc. # 99-5 at 2).

Deputy McGough arrived first out of the three, at which
point Haegele approached him and stated that Chance had
removed a shotgun from her room. (Doc. # 99-10 at 7:20-8:10).
According to Haegele, she told Deputy McGough that the gun
was unloaded. (Doc. # 99-9 at 55:6-8). Deputy McGough took a
protective shield from his patrol car and then saw Chance
sitting in a neighbor’s yard while holding the shotgun. (Doc.
# 99-10 at 8:11-9:19). Deputy McGough saw Haegele run towards
Chance. (Id. at 9:15-23).
Deputy Green arrived second out of the three, and grouped
together with other deputies on scene when he arrived. (Doc.

# 99-11 at 7:8-8:5). Someone said that they had seen Chance,
at which point Deputy Green saw Chance and Haegele at the end
of the road. (Id. at 8:6-8:16).
Deputy Hicks arrived last of the three, while the group
of deputies, including McGough and Green, were already
walking down the street towards a disturbance at the end of
the road. (Doc. # 99-12 at 8:5-9:23).
At the end of the road, Haegele had approached Chance
and attempted to wrestle the shotgun away from him. (Doc. #
99-11 at 8:6-9:4; Doc. # 99-10 at 9:20-23, 10:14-11:3; Doc.
# 99-9 at 56:21-57:25, 83:5-21). Chance ultimately took
control of the shotgun and fled with it. (Doc. # 99-11 at

8:18-9:20, 10:2-22; Doc. # 99-10 at 11:4-16, 11:25-12:7; Doc.
# 99-9 at 57:10-19). According to Hicks, after the struggle,
Haegele told Deputy Hicks that she did not know if Chance had
found the bullets for the shotgun. (Doc. # 99-12 at 10:4-9).
But Haegele testified that, immediately after her struggle
with Chance, she told an officer that the shotgun was
unloaded. (Doc. # 99-9 at 57:19-23).
The deputies on scene began to search the surrounding
residential area in pursuit of Chance. (Doc. # 99-10 at 12:13-
20; Doc. # 99-12 at 10:4-10:13; Doc. # 99-11 at 9:17-20). At
some point during the search, Deputies Green and Hicks decided

to check in-between the residences together. (Doc. # 99-12 at
12:11-13:4; Doc. # 99-11 at 14:2-20). Deputies Green and Hicks
walked in-between the residences, working their way back to
where Chance had fought with Haegele over the shotgun. (Doc.
# 99-12 at 13:5-10; Doc. # 99-11 at 14:20-25).
While Chance was fleeing from the officers after the
struggle, Chance sent two pictures of himself through a social
media application: one shows Chance armed with a shotgun and
is captioned “Coming after me with ARs”; the other is
captioned “They’re gonna take me away tonight.” (Doc. # 99-2
at 3-4; Doc. # 99-13 at 27:19-29:23).
While the deputies were searching for Chance, Haegele

called her nephew, Scott Staten, Jr., who recorded their phone
conversation. (Doc. # 99-14 at 13:1-9, 13:24-14:11; Doc. #
99-15). On that call, Haegele stated that Chance “beat [her]
up”, “kicked [her] in [her] fucking ribs”, and “fucked up
[her] arm and . . . kicked [her] in the ribs.” (Doc. # 99-15
at 4:10, 12-13, 5:5-6). Also, when asked whether the shotgun
had bullets, Haegele first responded, “No, I never let him
know where the bullets were” but then stated, “Yeah, but you
know what? Who knows if he did find them, you know what I
mean?” (Id. at 5:23-6:4).
While working their way back in-between the residences,

Deputies Green and Hicks encountered Chance standing next to
a shed and a bush tall enough to obscure Chance’s face next
to that shed. (Doc. # 99-11 at 17:6-18:3, 18:17-22, 19:5-8;
Doc. # 99-12 at 37:18-38:9, 38:21-39:12). Deputy Green
testified that Chance was standing with his back to the shed
and had his head turned to the left. (Doc. # 99-11 at 17:15-
18:11). He further testified that, at this time, Chance was
holding the shotgun pointed towards the ground. (Id. at 18:14-
16).
Upon seeing Chance with the shotgun, Deputy Green issued
repeated verbal commands to “Put it down. Put it down. Don’t
move.” (Doc. # 99-12 at 13:23-14:3; Doc. # 99-11 at 19:1-4).

Deputy Hicks testified that, when Deputy Green began to issue
verbal commands and Chance began to move out of the bush,
Deputy Hicks moved towards Deputy Green and saw Chance. (Doc.
# 99-12 at 15:24-16:4, 16:20-17:4, 19:22-20:3, 22:20-24,
38:21-39:12, 39:20-40:4). Both deputies testified that,
instead of putting down the shotgun, Chance turned his head
toward Deputy Green and stepped out from behind the bush,
away from the shed, and toward Deputy Green. (Doc. # 99-11 at
17:5-14, 18:23-25, 19:5-8; Doc. # 99-12 at 20:4-15, 26:10-
24, 38:15-20). Deputy Green was standing in front of Chance
with Chance facing him directly. (Doc. # 99-11 at 19:22-

20:5).
According to Deputy Green, Chance raised the shotgun up
from its lowered position and pointed the shotgun at him.
(Id. at 17:5-14, 18:23-18:25). Deputy Hicks likewise
testified that, when he saw Chance move out of the bush toward
Deputy Green, he saw that Chance had “something long and
black” in his hand that “came up” as Chance “lunged” toward
Deputy Green. (Doc. # 99-12 at 20:5-22, 26:20-24). And, in
his interview after the shooting, Deputy Hicks stated that
when Chance “emerged from the bushes” Chance “had something
in his hand,” but Deputy Hicks did not see clearly that it
was a shotgun until later. (Doc. # 112-14 at 183-184).

As Chance was moving toward Deputy Green and beginning
to raise the shotgun, Deputy Green testified that he continued
to give verbal commands to Chance. (Doc. # 99-11 at 19:12-
16, 19:22-20:9). Chance continued moving toward Deputy Green
and raising the shotgun. (Doc. # 99-11 at 18:23-25, 19:12-
16; Doc. # 99-12 at 20:16-21:5).
Once Chance had aimed the shotgun at Deputy Green, both
Deputies Green and Hicks were “in well-founded fear for
[their] safety and the safety of others.” (Doc. # 99-17 at 6-
7; Doc. # 99-12 at 27:21-28:9). Deputy Green stated in his
interview after the shooting that he thought “it was over and

he was going to get shot.” (Doc. # 99-17 at 6). Both Deputy
Green and Deputy Hicks discharged their firearms at Chance.
(Doc. # 99-11 at 19:20-21, 21:1-4, 22:1-6; Doc. # 99-12 at
21:13-18). Although Deputy Hicks testified in his deposition
that he did not know who fired first (Doc. # 99-12 at 19:20-
21), he said during his interview on the night of the shooting
that Deputy Green fired first. (Doc. # 112-14 at 181). Deputy
Green fired twelve shots, and Deputy Hicks fired five shots.
(Id. at 30). Chance ultimately died from his wounds. (Doc. #
112-13 at 9).
Deputies Hicks and Green were not the only surviving
witnesses to the shooting. A resident of the neighborhood,

Jacqueline Walsh, watched the shooting from her bedroom
window. (Doc. # 99-16 at 15:13-16, 16:13-22, 19:6-9, 32:25-
33:11). When asked what she saw, Walsh testified:
A: I saw Chance stand there with the gun and the
officers that were right outside the window asking
him to put the weapon down. They told him three or
four times to put the weapon down, and he did not.
He picked up the weapon, aiming it at them, and
they opened fire.
Q: I heard you say that Chance was standing
there. Was he standing?
A: Yes, he was standing.
Q: He wasn’t crouching or lying on the ground or
sitting down?
A: No, sir, he was standing.
Q: What did Chance do with the gun in his hand?
A: He raised it and pointed it at the officers.
(Id. at 16:13-17:7).
Ultimately, the investigation revealed that the shotgun
was, in fact, unloaded. (Doc. # 112-14 at 33). The autopsy
report explains that Chance was struck nine times and includes
details of each gunshot wound. (Doc. # 112-13). As numbered
by the autopsy report, bullet 1 entered Chance’s right upper
back and the “direction of the wound path with respect to the
standard anatomic position is to the left, downward and back
to front.” (Id. at 3). Bullet 2 entered Chance’s left upper
back and the “direction of the wound path with respect to the
standard anatomic position is to the left and back to front.”
(Id. at 4). Bullet 3 entered Chance’s right upper back and
the “direction of the wound path with respect to the standard
anatomic position is to the left and downward.” (Id.). Bullet
4 grazed Chance’s left upper back. (Id.). Bullet 5 entered
Chance’s left lower torso and the “direction of the wound
path with respect to the standard anatomic position is to the
left.” (Id. at 4-5). Bullet 6 entered Chance’s right buttock
and the “direction of the wound path with respect to the
standard anatomic position is to the right, downward and back

to front.” (Id. at 5). Bullet 7 entered “the anterior aspect
of the right thigh” and the “direction of the wound path with
respect to the standard anatomic position is to the right and
front to back.” (Id.). Bullet 8 entered “the anterolateral
aspect of the left thigh” and the “direction of the wound
path with respect to the standard anatomic position is to the
right.” (Id. at 5-6). Finally, bullet 9 entered the
“posteromedial aspect of the left thigh” and the “direction
of the wound path with respect to the standard anatomic
position is to the left, downward and back to front.” (Id. at
6).
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy, Dr. Vera

Volnikh, explained that the standard anatomic position is
when a person is “standing straight up with the palm of [his]
hands in the front.” (Doc. # 112-8 at 7:1-6). She testified
that “nobody ever is [in] that anatomic position when they
get shot.” (Id. at 7:5-6).
Before performing the autopsy, Dr. Volnikh had been
provided a brief summary of the shooting by the Polk County
Sheriff’s Office, which stated that Chance had pointed a
shotgun at a deputy and the deputy fired on Chance. (Id. at
19:3-19). When she was asked whether her autopsy findings
gave her “any reason to question” the summary she received,

Dr. Volnikh responded:
Not really, because he has some of the wounds in
the - in the front of the leg, especially in front
of the leg, and then I guess he’s turning and he
has on the side and some of in the back. So, no, I
didn’t have any reason to believe that that’s
something that it’s not the way that they describe
it to me.
(Id. at 22:25-23:10).
When she was asked whether the gunshot wounds were
“consistent with crouching,” Dr. Volnikh testified “It[]
could be crouching. It[] could be bending. I am not sure if
it’s just crouching.” (Id. at 26:5-13). And, when she was
asked whether any of the bullet wounds in Chance’s back ended
with an exit wound out the front of the chest, she responded:
A: We have the bullet that[] [goes] lateral. It’s
go from right to left and back to front, but, again,
it’s kind of laterally they go, but no exit. I don’t
believe there’s exit in the front. We have two
bullets — no, there’s no exit in the front. From
these three wound in the back you’re talking about?
Q: Yes.
A: No. We have two bullets and one grazed wound,
which is just graze the skin, you know, right to
left. And the other will go from right to left too.
One go just under the skin, kind of hitting the
wing bone. The other is going kind of back to front,
but also to the left. So they all come from right
to left. So mostly he — wherever his left side is
exposed to the deputy and they’re firing at some
point, because some of the wound, like I say, it’s
anterior or on the left, which is lateral.
(Id. at 25:7-23)(emphasis added).
After the shooting, Sheriff Judd held a press conference
during which he stated that “Deputies did what they should
have done. . . . We weren’t able to stop an unfortunate set
of events.” (Doc. # 112-23 at 24). A news article reflects
that Sheriff Judd has made statements in support of deputies
involved in other shootings. (Doc. # 112-25). For example,
Sheriff Judd is quoted as saying “We don’t choose to shoot
people, people choose for us to shoot them. . . . We’re
distraught for the family as well. But the bottom line is we
go home at the end of our shift, and if people decide to
attack us, beat us, try to take guns, we’re going to shoot
ya.” (Id. at 9).
Ultimately, neither Green nor Hicks were disciplined for
the shooting. (Doc. # 112-24 at 16:16-20).
Haegele, individually and on behalf of Chance’s Estate,
initiated this case on November 5, 2019. (Doc. # 1). Haegele’s
second amended complaint contains the following counts:
wrongful death pursuant to Florida Statute § 768.16 et seq.
(the Florida Wrongful Death Act, the “FWDA”) against (I)
Sheriff Judd, (II) Green, and (III) Hicks; and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 excessive force claims against (IV) Sheriff Judd, (V)
Green, and (VI) Hicks. (Doc. # 44).
Defendants seeks entry of summary judgment on all

claims. (Doc. # 99). Haegele has responded (Doc. # 113), and
Defendants have replied. (Doc. # 118). With the Court’s
permission, Haegele has filed a sur-reply. (Doc. # 126). The
Motion is ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996)(citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995)(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to

be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s
response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his
conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034

(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Analysis
A. Section 1983 Claims against Deputies
Deputies Green and Hicks argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity for the Section 1983 excessive force
claims against them. (Doc. # 99 at 9-19).
“Qualified immunity affords complete protection to
government officials sued individually,” Terrell v. Smith,
668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012), except in cases where
“the law preexisting the defendant official’s supposedly
wrongful act was already established to such a high degree
that every objectively reasonable official standing in the

defendant’s place would be on notice that what the defendant
official was doing would be clearly unlawful given the
circumstances.” Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2002). Qualified immunity “protect[s] from suit ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the
federal law.’” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002)(quoting Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187
(11th Cir. 2001)).
In order to establish a defense of qualified immunity,
a government official must first demonstrate that he or she
was acting within his or her discretionary authority. See

Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2003). Haegele
does not appear to challenge that Hicks and Green were acting
in their discretionary authority at the time of the shooting.
(Doc. # 113 at 12-13).
“Once the defendants establish that they were acting
within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not
appropriate.” Lumley v. City of Dade City, 327 F.3d 1186,
1194 (11th Cir. 2003). The Court follows a two-part analysis
in determining whether qualified immunity applies. Vinyard v.
Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). The first part
asks “whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true,

establish a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002)(internal quotation marks
omitted)). The second part asks “whether the right was clearly
established.” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001)(internal quotation marks omitted)). “Both elements .
. . must be satisfied for an official to lose qualified
immunity.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2010).
Haegele “must establish qualified immunity is not
appropriate because the facts when viewed in the light most
favorable to [her] show that [Deputies Hicks and Green]

violated a constitutional right.” Benson v. Gordon Cnty., 479
F. App’x 315, 317 (11th Cir. 2012)(citing Mercado v. City of
Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005)). “At summary
judgment, [the Court] cannot simply accept the officer’s
subjective version of events, but rather must reconstruct the
event in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
determine whether the officer’s use of force was excessive
under those circumstances.” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647
F.3d 1272, 1288 (11th Cir. 2011)(citing Vinyard, 311 F.3d at
1347–48 as “evaluating, at summary judgment, the allegedly
excessive force under the facts as described by the plaintiff,
notwithstanding the defendant-officer’s different version of

events”).
Although “the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily
carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion,” it remains that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the plain
right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course
of an arrest.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197. “The inquiry into
whether this right was violated requires a balancing of the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the

governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865-66 (2015)(internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
In determining reasonableness, a court “look[s] at the
fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and
facts, and balance[s] the risk of bodily harm to the suspect
against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to
eliminate.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th
Cir. 2009)(citation omitted). The reasonableness of the force
used “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989)). A court’s “calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id.
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Courts evaluate several factors, such as “the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1305-
06 (11th Cir. 2009)(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Other
factors include “(1) the need for the application of force,
(2) the relationship between the need and amount of force
used, and (3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Vinyard,
311 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197-98). The need-
for-force criterion “is measured by the severity of the crime,
the danger to the officer, and the risk of flight.” Lee, 284
F.3d at 1198. “And in deadly force cases we are to determine
whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the
suspect posed a threat of ‘serious physical harm’ to the

officer or others, and whether the officer had given the
suspect a warning about the use of deadly force, if doing so
was feasible.” Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1229
(11th Cir. 2020). “Not all of the factors are relevant to all
excessive force cases.” Id.
Here, Haegele has not established a constitutional
violation. Taking all the facts in the light most favorable
to Haegele, Chance was standing and raising the shotgun at
Deputy Green when Deputies Green and Hicks fired at him,
resulting in his death.
The evidence from the autopsy report and Dr. Volnikh’s

deposition do not create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Chance was “cowering” in the bush when he
was shot, as Haegele maintains. While certain entrance wounds
are on Chance’s back, those wound paths were in a lateral
trajectory, meaning from Chance’s side. (Doc. # 112-13). Dr.
Volnikh testified that these wounds “all come from right to
left” and suggested this had to do with Chance’s side being
exposed to a deputy during the shooting. (Doc. # 112-8 at
25:7-23). And, while four of the nine wounds also have a
downward trajectory in relation to the standard anatomic
position, five wounds do not have a downward trajectory. (Doc.
# 112-13). Dr. Volnikh testified that the wounds with downward

trajectories could be consistent with “crouching” or
“bending.” (Doc. # 112-8 at 26:5-13). But she also testified
that the autopsy results did not give her any reason to
question the summary of the shooting she was given — that
Chance stood and raised a shotgun at a deputy when he was
shot — and noted a wound in the front of Chance’s leg. (Id.
at 22:25-23:10).
Nor do the select crime scene photographs submitted by
Haegele — which she cited twice in passing but failed to
actually discuss in her response (Doc. # 113 at 5, 9) — rebut
the deputies’ testimony, as Haegele now claims in her sur-

reply. (Doc. # 126 at 5-7). Sadly, these photos depict
Chance’s body lying on the ground near a bush with his feet
near the base of the bush, which is in turn in front of a
shed. (Doc. # 112-15). They do not suggest that Chance was
crouched in between the bush and the shed during the shooting,
rather than standing near the bush. In short, the autopsy
report, Dr. Volnikh’s testimony, and the select crime scene
photographs do not raise a genuine issue of material fact
about whether Chance was cowering and crouching in a bush
during the shooting.
While Haegele has attempted to point out discrepancies
between Deputy Hicks’ interview on the night of the shooting

and his deposition, the Court does not find the two versions
of events inconsistent. Regardless, even disregarding Deputy
Hicks’ statements and testimony, there is still the sworn
testimony of two witnesses — Deputy Green and Ms. Walsh —
that Chance was standing and facing deputies at the time of
the shooting. (Doc. # 99-11 at 17:5-19:21; Doc. # 99-16 at
16:13-17:7). Furthermore, both testified that, despite
commands to drop the weapon, Chance raised the shotgun before
Deputies Green and Hicks fired. (Doc. # 99-11 at 17:5-14,
18:23-18:25; Doc. # 99-16 at 16:13-17:7).
In short, the deputies here had witnessed Chance engage

in a forceful struggle with Haegele for the shotgun, then
flee through a residential neighborhood. When Deputies Green
and Hicks did encounter him, he refused to comply with orders
to drop the shotgun and actually raised the shotgun at Deputy
Green.
Under these circumstances, Deputies Green and Hicks
reasonably feared for their safety and the safety of others
in the area. Shooting Chance — an armed man who threatened
law enforcement with a deadly weapon — was not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. See Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d
1158, 1168 (11th Cir. 2009)(“[T]he escalation into deadly
force was justified by Garczynski’s refusal to comply with

the officers’ commands. After identifying themselves, the
officers repeatedly ordered Garczynski to show his hands.
They also repeatedly commanded him to drop the phone and then,
after he raised a gun to his head, to drop his gun. Instead
of obeying these commands, Garczynski swung the gun from his
head in the direction of the officers, at which point they
fired. The officers reasonably reacted to what they perceived
as an immediate threat of serious harm to themselves.”);
Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 185 (11th Cir. 1997)(“At least
where orders to drop the weapon have gone unheeded, an officer
is not required to wait until an armed and dangerous felon

has drawn a bead on the officer or others before using deadly
force.”). Nor was it excessive force for the deputies to shoot
Chance nine times to dispel the threat. See Jean-Baptiste v.
Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 821–22 (11th Cir. 2010)(“A police
officer is entitled to continue his use of force until a
suspect thought to be armed is ‘fully secured.’” (citation
omitted)).
Additionally, that Haegele had informed deputies that
Chance’s shotgun was unloaded does not change the result. The
deputies were not required to take Haegele’s word for it and
wait for Chance to fire on them before using deadly force.
See Id. at 821 (“[T]he law does not require officers in a

tense and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a
suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.”
(quoting Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 2007))).
The reasonableness of the deputies’ decision not to treat the
shotgun as unloaded is underscored by the fact that, despite
her representations to deputies, Haegele herself was unsure
if the shotgun was loaded. (Doc. # 99-15 at 5:23-6:4). Again,
the “calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments — in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force

that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490
U.S. at 396–97. While the fact that the shotgun was unloaded
renders Chance’s death all the more tragic, it does not
support that Deputies Green and Hicks acted unreasonably when
they fired their weapons.
Similarly, Chance’s mental health struggles and suicidal
ideation do not convert Deputies Green and Hicks’ actions
into a constitutional violation. See Shaw v. City of Selma,
884 F.3d 1093, 1101 (11th Cir. 2018)(“The shooting of a
mentally ill man was tragic, as such shootings always are,
but tragedy does not equate with unreasonableness.”);
Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1170 (11th Cir. 2009)(affirming

qualified immunity for officers who fatally shot a suicidal
man).
Because there was no constitutional violation, Deputies
Green and Hicks are entitled to qualified immunity for the
Section 1983 claims against them, Counts V and VI. The Motion
is granted as to these counts.
B. Section 1983 Claim against Sheriff Judd
It is well-established that “a municipality may not be
held liable under [Section] 1983 solely because it employs a
tortfeasor.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Rather, to recover damages from

Sheriff Judd under Section 1983, Haegele must show: “(1) that
[Chance’s] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the
municipality had a custom or policy that constituted
deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3)
that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v.
Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2004)(citing City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Because the Court concludes that Deputies Green and
Hicks did not violate Chance’s constitutional rights, the
Section 1983 custom or policy claim against Sheriff Judd
fails. See Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir.
1996)(“[A]n inquiry into a governmental entity’s custom or

policy is relevant only when a constitutional deprivation has
occurred. Since we have determined that Deputy Watson’s
conduct did not cause the Rooneys to suffer a constitutional
deprivation, we need not inquire into Volusia County’s policy
and custom relating to patrol vehicle operation and
training.”); see also Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1170–71
(“Garczynski failed to show that any of the named individual
police officers deprived him of his constitutional rights by
using excessive or deadly force. Absent a constitutional
violation, we need not explore whether PBSO’s policies
regarding crisis intervention training violated Garczynski’s

constitutional rights. Accordingly, we affirm summary
judgment in favor of Sheriff Bradshaw.”); Willis v. Mock, 600
F. App’x 679, 685 (11th Cir. 2015)(“Here, neither Captain
James nor Sergeant Turner violated Willis’s constitutional
rights. So Willis’s claim against the City of Apalachicola
fails. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment to the city.”).
Summary judgment is granted for Sheriff Judd on the
Section 1983 claim against him, Count IV.
C. Wrongful Death Claims
The Section 1983 claims provided the sole source of
federal jurisdiction in this case, as the parties do not meet

the requirements of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Rather, the Court concludes that supplemental
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supplies the only
remaining basis for jurisdiction over the FWDA claims.
“The dismissal of [a plaintiff’s] underlying federal
question claim does not deprive the [c]ourt of supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Baggett v.
First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th
Cir. 1997). “Indeed, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court has
the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims, where the

[c]ourt has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, but [the court] is not required to dismiss the
case.” Id. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged
district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when,
as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to
trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th
Cir. 2004).
The FWDA claims depend on determinations of state law.
“[S]tate courts, not federal courts, should be the final
arbiters of state law.” Ingram v. School Bd. of Miami–Dade
Cnty., 167 F. App’x 107, 108 (11th Cir. 2006). Furthermore,
the Court finds that principles of judicial economy and comity

weigh in favor of the Court declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims.
Accordingly, because the Court grants Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment with regard to the federal claims, and
diversity jurisdiction does not exist, the Court in its
discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the FWDA claims. See Nagy v. Taylor Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
No. 5:16-CV-70-MTT, 2017 WL 4448579, at *14 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 5,
2017)(“[B]ecause Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the federal law claims, the Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort

claims.”). The FWDA claims, Counts I, II, and III, are
dismissed without prejudice so they may be reasserted in state
court.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendants Sheriff Grady Judd, Reginald Green, and
Joseph Hicks’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 99) is
GRANTED to the extent set forth herein.
(2) The Florida Wrongful Death Act claims, Counts I, II, and
III, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE so that they may be
reasserted in state court.
(3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendants and against Plaintiff Christina Haegele,
individually and as personal representative of the
estate of Chance Haegele, for Counts IV, V, and VI.
(4) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
29th day of December, 2020.

lini? tr. Musnerby CnoeFh
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ'COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106584. Public record. Not legal advice.