# Moody v. Williams

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 1, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106490

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 1, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106490

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “that overcrowding is not necessarily a violation of a federal right.”
- finding no constitutional violation where two additional inmates were placed in the plaintiff’s cell such that it was at double capacity
- finding plaintiff did not prove that he had an objectively serious medical need where he never sought medical treatment for the alleged injuries even though he was free to do so
- holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JESSE E. MOODY, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:18-cv-661-J-34JRK

MIKE WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants.
________________________________

ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Jesse Moody, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
on May 17, 2018, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Complaint; Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Moody names the following individuals as
Defendants: (1) Sheriff Mike Williams; (2) Mike Bruno, Director of Operations of the Duval
County Jail (Jail); (3) T.S. Morris, Jail Chief; and (4) Lieutenant M. Forbrich. He asserts
that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights when they subjected him to a
variety of unlawful jail conditions from May 2016 through July 2017, and ignored his pleas
for corrective action. Moody seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as
declaratory relief.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 62).
In support of the Motion, Defendants submitted the following exhibits (Mot. Ex.): (A)
Morris’ declaration; and (B) transcript of Moody’s deposition. Moody filed a response to
the Motion; see Plaintiff’s Brief in Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Response; Doc. 70), with the following exhibits (Resp. Ex): (A) Moody’s
declaration; (B) Florida Model Jail Standards; and (C) Williams’ answers to Moody’s
interrogatories. Defendants filed a brief in reply. See (Reply; Doc. 75). This motion is ripe
for review.
II. Moody’s Allegations
In his verified Complaint,1 Moody asserts that he was a pretrial detainee at the Jail

from May 8, 2016, until March 21, 2017, when he became a convicted and sentenced
state prisoner still housed at the Jail until he was transferred to the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC) on July 31, 2017. Complaint at 11. He avers that while he was
housed at the Jail, Defendants violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteen Amendment by
subjecting him to the following unlawful conditions: (1) an inadequate grievance
procedure;2 (2) an extra bunk in each cell; (3) deficient air circulation; (4) an insufficient
number of showerheads; (5) no daily cleaning of the showers; (6) faulty plumbing; (7) foul
toilet odors; (8) rodent and insect infestation; (9) no access to a water fountain; (10) no
pillow or pillowcase; (11) no window to the outside world;3 and (12) no access to

televisions, radios, or newspapers. Id. at 4-10. According to Moody, he complained about
the sub-par conditions in grievances submitted to Defendants, but they failed to take
corrective action. Id. at 11. Moody maintains that the “combined effect” of him “suffering

1 See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)
("The factual assertions that [the plaintiff] made in his amended complaint should have
been given the same weight as an affidavit, because [the plaintiff] verified his complaint
with an unsworn written declaration, made under penalty of perjury, and his complaint
meets Rule 56's requirements for affidavits and sworn declarations.").
2 On October 25, 2018, the Court partially granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss
as to Moody’s due process claims related to the Jail’s grievance procedures. See Doc.
19.
3 Moody asserts that he was moved to a dormitory that had windows on March 21,
2017. See Complaint at 11.
under the 12 unlawful conditions of confinement on a daily basis created a substantial
risk to his health and safety” and caused him to experience the following ailments:
“frequent moods of deep depression, constant thoughts of suicide, heightened levels of
anxiety, bodily ailments, throat soreness, headaches, and physical pain in his neck and
knees.” Id. at 13.

III. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 instructs that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion
for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule
56(c)(1)(A).4 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d

739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913,
919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s

4 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010 Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The
language of subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing development
of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[‘s] notes are not binding, they
are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 Fed. Appx. 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir.
2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable
and applies here.
position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate
of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating
to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact

to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991). “When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the
moving party need not ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material
negating the opponent’s claim,’ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), in order to discharge this initial responsibility.”
Gonzalez v. Lee Cty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). Instead, the
moving party simply may demonstrate “that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.
“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then

go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines
the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,
a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
Of course, “pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, “a pro se litigant does not

escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that
there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary
judgment.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Although courts
show leniency to pro se litigants, courts “will not serve as de facto counsel or ‘rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed.
Inst., 307 Fed. Appx. 296, 298 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (overruled in part on other grounds as
recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).
IV. Applicable Law

With respect to the appropriate analysis in a conditions of confinement case
involving a pretrial detainee, the Eleventh Circuit “historically” has “treated convicted
prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims and pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment
claims identically.” White v. Cochran, No. 16-17490-G, 2017 WL 6492004, at *2 (11th Cir.
Nov. 27, 2017) (citation and footnote omitted). Notably, the Eleventh Circuit has
explained:
The Supreme Court stated in Kingsley v. Hendrickson[5] that
the language of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause “differs, and the nature of the claims often

5 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).
differs.” 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473-76 (2015) (adopting a different
test to evaluate pretrial detainees' excessive-force claims than
the test used to evaluate convicted prisoners' excessive-force
claims). However, we recently stated that Kingsley “is not
squarely on point with and does not actually abrogate or
directly conflict with” precedent outside of the context of an
excessive-force claim. See Dang ex rel Dang v. Sheriff,
Seminole Cty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017)
(quotations omitted).

White, 2017 WL 6492004, at *2 n.1. While the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
pretrial detainees, see Nam Dang by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla.,
871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017), the standard for providing basic human needs and
a safe environment to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.; see Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 n.1
(11th Cir. 2013) (“Regardless of the particular taxonomy under which we analyze the
case, however, the result is the same, because ‘the standards under the Fourteenth
Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth.’”) (citation omitted); Johnson v.
Bessemer, Ala., City of, 741 F. App’x 694, 699 n.5 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, involving a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim, “does not undermine
our earlier Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference precedents”).
The Eleventh Circuit has described the requirements for an Eighth Amendment
violation as follows:
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but
neither does it permit inhumane ones ....” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).[6] Thus, in its prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” the Eighth Amendment requires that prison
officials provide humane conditions of confinement. Id.
However, as noted above, only those conditions which
objectively amount to an “extreme deprivation” violating

6 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
contemporary standards of decency are subject to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at
1000.[7] Furthermore, it is only a prison official's subjective
deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm
caused by such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at
1974 (quotation and citation omitted); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303,
111 S.Ct. at 2327.[8]

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eighth Amendment also
requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27
(1984)). However, not every injury that a prisoner suffers as a result of a prison condition
necessarily equates to a constitutional violation. See Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1333. Only
injuries that occur as a result of a prison official's deliberate indifference rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
To survive summary judgment in a case alleging deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff must “produce sufficient evidence of (1)
a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants'
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Carter
v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1331 (footnote omitted); see Johnson, 2018 WL 3359672, at *3
(stating that, to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must satisfy (1) the
objective component; (2) the subjective component, i.e., that the prison official acted with
deliberate indifference; and (3) the causation requirement). A plaintiff who claims
deliberate indifference must prove: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm;
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Melton v.

7 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
8 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citations and footnote
omitted); see Scott v. Miami Dade Cty., 657 F. App'x 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating
that “a plaintiff must allege facts that would allow a jury to conclude that: the defendant
actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm” (subjective
component), and “the defendant disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in

an objectively reasonable manner” (objective component)).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of harm as follows:
Proof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal more
than does proof of negligence: “To be deliberately indifferent
a prison official must know of and disregard ‘an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.’” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319-20 (emphasis
supplied) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114
S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).[9]

In other words, a plaintiff in [Moody]'s position must show not
only that there was a substantial risk of serious harm, but also
that [Defendants] “subjectively knew of the substantial risk of
serious harm and that [they] knowingly or recklessly
disregarded that risk.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (alteration
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).[10] Whether
prison officials had the requisite awareness of the risk “is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a
factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981 (citation omitted).
At the same time, the deliberate indifference standard - and
the subjective awareness required by it - is far more onerous
than normal tort-based standards of conduct sounding in
negligence: “Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from
attack does not justify liability under [§] 1983.” Brown v.

9 Purcell v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005).
10 Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
And needless to say, to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, [a plaintiff] must adduce specific evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find in his favor; “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [his] position
will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at
2512.

Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis deleted).
V. Analysis and Conclusions
In the Motion, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for
three reasons. First, none of Moody’s claims, individually or taken together as a whole,
establish a constitutional violation. Motion at 2. Second, Defendants assert that they are
entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. Id. Third, they contend that the
record contains no evidence establishing liability against Defendants in their official
capacities. Id. Defendants also maintain that Moody is not entitled to compensatory or
punitive damages because he failed to establish that he suffered more than de minimus
physical injury. Id. at 11-12. The Court will address these arguments separately.
A. Whether Moody Established Constitutional Violations
In the Motion, Defendants argue that Moody has failed to provide any evidence
that they denied him adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or
personal safety. Id. at 14. Defendants aver that Moody’s complaints about the prison
conditions at the Jail do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. Id. According
to Defendants, “[a]t best, the record evidence demonstrates that the conditions at the [the
Jail] were unpleasant or even uncomfortable for Plaintiff,” but “[t]he record contains no
evidence of any objective constitutional violation.” Id. at 16. Additionally, Defendants
contend that there is no record evidence to suggest that they acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind to have been deliberately indifferent to the conditions of Moody’s
confinement or that other than Forbrich they were even aware of these alleged conditions.
Id. at 16-18. Defendants also note that Moody never required medical treatment for any
of his alleged injuries. Id. at 17. The Court analyzes Moody’s prison condition claims
below.

Overcrowding - Extra Bunks, Lack of Shower Heads, and Poor Air Circulation
In the Complaint, Moody alleges there was an “unlawful extra bunk in each cell” in
violation of the Florida Model Jail Standards (FMJS) which prescribe the square feet per
person per cell. Complaint at 5. Moody maintains that the Jail cells were designed to
house only two people but the addition of the third bunk resulted in a “lack of mobility,
lack of sufficient purified air, increased conflicts between the Plaintiff and others in the
cell, and limited use of the cell’s facilities and storage that caused the Plaintiff to
experience breathing problems and elevated levels of anxiety.” Id. at 12. Likewise, Moody
asserts that there were insufficient shower heads per person as required by the FMJS.

Id. at 5. According to Moody, due to the overcrowding he “was not always able to take a
shower” and was faced with “a serious risk to his safety because of frequent physical
confrontations with other detainees over shower usage.” Id. at 12. Moody also asserts
that the Jail had inadequate air circulation because there was only an exhaust duct in
each cell that took air out of the cell and the only vents pumping air in were located outside
the cells in the dormitories. Id. at 6. He maintains that the FMJS requires “a certain amount
of cubic feet of air circulation per person in sleeping area cells,” but that the Jail was not
in compliance with this regulation. Id. Moody believes the cells should have both an
exhaust and air vent. Id. Due to this alleged poor circulation, Moody asserts that he
suffered frequent headaches, unwanted serious safety risks, and breathing and sinus
issues. Id. at 12.
Defendants argue in the Motion that it is undisputed that the total inmate capacity
for the Jail was 3,092 inmates and the Jail never exceeded that capacity, and, therefore,
the Jail was not overcrowded. Motion at 14. Moreover, they argue that overcrowding

alone is not a constitutional violation and Moody has failed to present any probative
evidence that he was denied reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
medical care, or personal safety because of the alleged overcrowding. Id. Defendants
argue that the Jail “was found to have adequate ventilation at all times Plaintiff was
incarcerated” and that Moody has provided no evidence to suggest otherwise. Motion at
3. In support, they cite to the June 8, 2017 inspection report reflecting the same. Motion
at 3; Mot. Ex. A. Moody argues in his Response that Defendants “have not presented
dispositive evidence that mechanical ventilation systems provided a minimum of 10 cubic
feet of purified re-circulated air per minute for each detainee in the cells of [the Jail].”

Response at 3. Moody contends that exhibit three of Morris’ declaration, Mot. Ex. A, states
that at the time of the June 8, 2017 inspection, the maximum rated capacity was 2,189
detainees, but that same report also listed the average daily population for the preceding
twelve-month period at 2,423 detainees. Id. at 2. As such, Moody argues that Defendants’
own exhibit refutes their contention that the Jail was not overcrowded and contradicts
Morris’ declaration that the Jail has the capacity to hold 3,092 detainees. Id. at 3.
To the extent Moody relies on the FMJS, the Court notes that even if jail “conditions
may well fall short of the Florida Model Jail Standards,” the Court’s “limited authority does
not extend to the question whether the defendants have comported themselves in
accordance with state law; that is a question for another day, and probably for another
court.” Saunders v. Sheriff of Brevard Cty., 735 F. App'x 559, 565 (11th Cir. 2018). Instead
this Court must focus solely on “the rights that the United States Constitution guarantees,
and whether the [Jail] fell short of constitutional requirements . . . .” Id. In other words, a
violation of the FMJS will not support a constitutional violation unless it creates an

inhuman condition. Overcrowding in a cell, or a prison generally, does not violate the
Eighth Amendment unless it leads to violence or the deprivation of essential food, medical
care, or sanitation. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981); see also Parrish v.
Alabama Dept. of Corr., 156 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting “that
overcrowding is not necessarily a violation of a federal right.”); Evans v. St. Lucie County
Jail, 448 F. App’x 971, 975 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding no constitutional violation where two
additional inmates were placed in the plaintiff’s cell such that it was at double capacity).
“[A] prisoner's mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment.”
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).
Moody testified in his deposition11 that overcrowding was his biggest issue with the

conditions at the Jail. Mot. Ex. B at 19. He stated that the Jail had an extra third bunk in
his cell and that three people, including himself, slept in his cell. Id. at 20, 32. Moody

11 Moody provided a declaration in support of his Response to the Motion, some
of which contains statements that contradict his earlier deposition testimony. See Resp.
Ex. A. “When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate
the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create
such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously
given clear testimony.” Van T. Junkins & Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656,
657 (11th Cir. 1984). Moody has not explained why his contradictory declaration
statements should be considered over his unambiguous deposition testimony.
Accordingly, to the extent Moody’s declarations conflict with his deposition testimony, the
Court finds the deposition testimony to be credible and will rely on that testimony in
analyzing the merits of his claims. See id.
admitted he suffered no physical injuries from the overcrowding and stated that it was
“more so a mental thing as far as just being in a cell with too many people.” Id. at 32.
Moody also testified that he suffered no physical injury related to the amount of shower
heads but that he did suffer mental and emotional pain because it was stressful for him
to not take a shower at a certain time as he did not want to miss showers. Id. at 43. When

asked to explain, Moody asserted that the stress arose from the potential of “getting in a
conflict with dudes about taking a shower.” Id. at 34. However, Moody never sought nor
received psychological treatment for his stress. Id. at 34-35. Moody maintained at his
deposition that the air quality at the Jail was poor. Motion Ex. B at 29. He stated that the
recycled air caused sinus problems for him. Id. at 28-30. However, Moody admitted he
never submitted a sick call request for his sinus issues and never received a medical
diagnosis that those sinus issues were caused by the air in the Jail. Id. at 30-31.
The June 8, 2017 inspection report reflects a maximum rated capacity of 2,189
detainees, with an average daily population for the preceding twelve months of 2,423

detainees. Mot. Ex. A at 54. However, this report also states that at the time of the
inspection there was a population of 1,958 detainees. Id. Regardless of this discrepancy,
the Court finds Moody has failed to establish a constitutional violation because he has not
demonstrated that, even assuming the Jail was overcrowded, that he was deprived of
essential food, medical care, or sanitation or that he was subjected to violence.
At best, Moody has described conditions that resulted in his discomfort, which is
insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Each inmate in the cell had a mattress
and access to sanitation supplies. Moody suffered no serious medical condition, either
physical or mental, particularly in light of the fact that he never sought medical attention
for his alleged medical needs. See Daniel v. U.S. Marshall Service, 188 F. App’x 954,
962 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding plaintiff did not prove that he had an objectively serious
medical need where he never sought medical treatment for the alleged injuries even
though he was free to do so). Based on Moody’s testimony and the record available to
the Court, it is evident that at the time of the alleged incidents Moody did not believe the

emotional and mental stress resulting from the conditions at the Jail posed a serious risk.
Regarding showers, he complains that he was unable to take a shower when he wanted
to do so. However, he admits he was not deprived of the ability to shower rather he was
not allowed to take a shower on the schedule he wanted. This is hardly a constitutional
violation because Defendants afforded him the opportunity to shower and provided him
with cleaning supplies if he felt the conditions of a shower on a specific day were such
that it needed cleaning. Moody’s inability to shower at a specific time chosen by him is
insufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Likewise, Moody’s complaints
concerning air circulation do not show a constitutional violation. The alleged failure of the

air circulation to comport with the FMJS is not the same as saying the conditions of his
confinement are inhumane. Moody admits that there are vents throughout the Jail and
exhaust pipes taking air out of the cells. Although there may not be vents inside the cells,
he does not allege that the heating and cooling system was inoperable only that he was
not receiving fresh air pumped directly into his cell. The Court finds this is not an inhumane
condition of confinement. The inspection reports Defendants provided demonstrate that
the HVAC system itself operated normally and that it was in compliance with FMJS
standards. Mot. Ex. A at 39-40. In light of the record evidence, the Court finds Moody has
failed to satisfy the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim and, therefore,
the Motion is due to be granted as to these claims.
Unsanitary Showers, Faulty Plumbing, and Foul Odors
According to Moody, Defendants did not clean the showers daily. Complaint at 7.
Although the Jail provides cleaning supplies for the toilets in their cells, the “detainees in

general population were not permitted to handle the chemicals that were required to clean
the showers.” Id. Moody maintains that the FMJS requires that showers be cleaned every
day, but Defendants failed to comply with that regulation. Id. Moody asserts that the lack
of daily cleaning exposed him to harmful diseases and germs, which caused him “to suffer
and endure frequent bodily ailments and was a serious risk to his health and safety.” Id.
at 12. Additionally, Moody contends that the Jail had foul odors, so much so that he had
to place a paper bag over the toilet to act like a lid “in an attempt to block the foul odor
that continually emitted from the toilet.” Id. at 8. Additionally, Moody asserts that the toilets
in the holding cells smelled especially bad but he did not have the option to cover the

toilet. Id. Moody maintains that these odors caused him to suffer frequent headaches,
sore throats, and sinus problems. Id. at 12. Moody avers that the Jail had a faulty
plumbing system that compelled him and other inmates “to place a constructed device
over the water sprout [sic] in the cells to prevent water from shooting out onto the floor.”
Id. at 7. Additionally, he states that many of the sinks in the cells were clogged and did
not drain properly. Id. at 7. Moody alleges that on November 8, 2016, one of the devices
he used to contain the water leaks fell off, causing water to spill onto the floor, which in
turn caused Moody to slip and hit his knee on the toilet. Id. at 7, 12.
In the Motion, Defendants contend that it is undisputed that during the period of
Moody’s detention in the Jail that the dorms and showers were cleaned regularly and that
he, along with all other detainees, were provided with cleaning chemicals and supplies,
including deodorizer. Motion at 15. Moreover, Defendants assert that Moody could have
requested the “harsher chemicals” used to clean the shower weekly if wanted to do

additional cleaning. Id. As such, they maintain that the Jail was not so unsanitary to create
a constitutional violation. Id. Defendants also argue in the Motion that “it is undisputed
that Plaintiff had only 3 plumbing related issues in his cell during the relevant timeframe,”
and while these incidents may have resulted in temporarily unsanitary conditions, these
isolated incidents do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 14. Moreover,
Defendants characterize the issue with the sink leaking when both hot and cold water are
used as a “self-imposed plumbing issue” that does not violate the Constitution. Id. at 14-
15.
In his Response, Moody avers that he was neither provided with enough cleaning

supplies to clean the showers daily nor did Defendants clean the showers daily as
required by Florida law. Response at 4. According to Moody, Morris’ statement in her
declaration about the usage of cleaning chemicals on each floor is conclusory because
she did not present facts that these chemicals were actually used to clean Moody’s cell
or dormitory. Id. Moreover, Moody argues that the fact Morris attached the sanitation
policies to her declaration only shows what should have been done, not what was actually
done while he was housed in the Jail. Id. Regarding the odors, Moody again reiterates
that the toilets and holding cells smelled bad and that the issue was never addressed
while he was in the Jail. Id. at 5. Moody also contends that Defendants admit through
their exhibits that there was a “plethora of plumbing issues” around the time Moody was
in the Jail. Id. at 4.
According to Moody’s deposition testimony, the toilets in the Jail constantly
smelled like feces and the holding cells used while awaiting court dates smelled
particularly bad. Mot. Ex. B at 24, 46-50. Moody maintains that the odors caused him

runny noses, headaches, and sinus and breathing problems, id. at 45-46, although he
never sought treatment for these conditions while at the Jail, id. at 45, 50. He testified that
during his various periods of incarceration throughout his life he had been housed in at
least ten other prisons or jails, but none of them had the foul odors that he smelled in the
Jail. Id. at 46-48. In his deposition, Moody admitted that the showers were cleaned twice
a week, but he believed they should have been cleaned every day because vomit or blood
would sometimes be in the showers. Id. at 22-23. Notably, Moody acknowledged that the
Jail provided detainees with cleaning supplies, but said those supplies were not given
every day. Id. at 27.

Additionally, Moody testified that when someone in the cell next to his would flush
the toilet, the feces from that toilet would appear in the toilet in his cell. Id. at 27. However,
they were only allowed to flush their toilet twice in a thirty-minute span. Id. at 32.
Additionally, Moody asserted that the sink in his cell leaked when he would turn on the
hot and cold water at the same time. Id. at 38-39. So much so, that he had to place a
Styrofoam cup over the “sprockets” to keep the water from spilling out onto the floor. Id.
One day, water pressure shot the cup off and water began to shoot out all over the floor
and as he tried to fix it, he slipped and hit his right knee into the toilet. Id. at 40-42. Moody
stated that he did not seek medical attention for the pain in his knee while at the Jail and
waited ten months before requesting treatment once he was transferred to prison. Id. at
43-44. He testified that he never needed anything stronger than Ibuprofen to handle the
pain and that medical staff in the prison took an x-ray but determined Moody did not need
an MRI. Id. at 43-45. Notably, Moody stated that before his detention in the Jail, he had
injured his right knee, and he acknowledged that it was possible the aches and pain he

feels in his knee are related to his previous injury. Id. at 75-76.
Concerning the conditions of the shower, the Court finds the evidence does not
support Moody’s contention that the showers were unsanitary such that their condition
violated his constitutional rights. Moody admits the showers were cleaned twice a week
and that he was provided with cleaning supplies he could have used if he thought the
cleanliness of the shower was not up to his personal standards. Based on these facts, it
cannot be said that Defendants deprived of him of the right to take a clean shower or that
the shower conditions posed a substantial risk to Moody’s health. Likewise, Moody’s claim
concerning the smell from the toilets and the alleged faulty plumbing does not amount to

a constitutional violation. As to the condition of the toilets and the smell they created, the
Eleventh Circuit has previously held in an unpublished opinion that “having to use a toilet
which lacks proper water pressure and occasionally overflows is unpleasant but not
necessarily unconstitutional,” and “[a]ny unsanitary conditions caused by the toilet here
were mitigated by the provision of cleaning supplies to [the plaintiff].” Alfred v. Bryant, 378
F. App'x 977, 980 (11th Cir. 2010). The Court finds this opinion persuasive and analogous
to the instant case. It is undisputed that Defendants provided Moody with cleaning
supplies regularly. Similarly, Moody does not allege that his toilet was unable to flush
away the feces, only that they were limited in the amount of times they could flush the
toilet. Thus, although there may have been a temporary moment in which feces remained
in the toilet, Moody could have flushed it within a reasonable time frame. As such,
Defendants provided Moody with a means to mitigate any unsanitary condition that could
have arose from the plumbing issues.
Regarding Moody’s alleged slip and fall incident with the sink, the Court finds these

allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. “[S]lippery floors constitute
a daily risk faced by members of the public at large.” Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028,
1031 (10th Cir. 2004). Indeed, the slippery conditions caused by the sink cannot be
considered extreme nor do they pose an unreasonable risk of serious injury. Moody’s
claim that Defendants knew the floor was wet and failed to properly clean it does not
establish conduct that constitutes more than mere negligence. See Winston v. Aducci-
Washington, Case No. 7:17-cv-01099-VEH-SGC, 2018 WL 2272940, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Apr.
19, 2018) report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:17-cv-01099-VEH-SGC, 2018 WL
2266955 (N.D. Ala. May 17, 2018) (collecting cases finding slip and fall accidents failed

as a matter of law to state a federal claim); Davis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 5:07-cv-279-
RS-EMT, 2008 WL 539057, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2008) (“Courts have regularly held
that slip and fall accidents do not give rise to federal causes of action.”). Indeed, Moody
has alleged nothing more than ordinary lack of due care, which is insufficient to establish
a deliberate indifference claim. Additionally, the Court finds that Moody’s decision not to
seek medical attention for the ailments allegedly caused by these conditions
demonstrates that he did not have a serious medical condition. See Daniel, 188 F. App’x
at 962. Accordingly, in light of the above analysis, the Court finds that the Motion is due
to be granted as to Moody’s claims concerning these conditions because he failed to
establish that these conditions objectively amounted to an “extreme deprivation” violating
contemporary standards of decency.
Rodent and Insect Infestation
Moody alleges in the Complaint that he observed cockroaches in the floor drains
and gnat-like insects flying inside the dormitories, particularly in the holding cells.

Complaint at 8. He also avers that there were unknown types of insects in the sleeping
areas. Id. Moody asserts that he suffered unidentified “bodily ailments” and the situation
“created a serious risk to his health and safety.” Id. at 12. In the Motion, Defendants argue
that it is undisputed that the Jail had regular pest control. Motion at 15. Moody counters
in his Response that Defendants provided no “detailed facts that [the Jail] was free of
vermin during the Plaintiff’s stay at [the Jail].” Response at 5.
In his deposition, Moody testified that he personally observed roaches and big
gnat-like insects flying around the Jail. Motion Ex. B at 51. Moody was unaware if they
ever bit him, but testified they buzzed around him. Id. at 53. He acknowledged that officials

had the Jail sprayed for insects but asserted that he would continue to see insects every
day. Id. at 51-53. Specifically, he testified that he would see a few roaches a day but quite
a few gnats, about ten a day. Id. at 53-54. Additionally, Moody stated that he saw either
a mouse or a rat twice while he was in confinement on the sixth floor of the Jail for twenty
days. Id. at 52-53. However, he testified that he was not really concerned about the
rodents and was mainly worried about the insects. Id. at 53. According to Moody, he never
suffered physical injuries from the insects or rodents, but it left him with emotional injuries.
Id. at 54. However, he also testified that he has never been diagnosed with an emotional
injury or needed treatment for his emotional issues arising from his interaction with the
insects. Id. at 54.
Rodents and insects are something the general public deals with on a regular basis
in their own homes. Moody’s allegations of seeing a mouse or a rat two times and hearing
the buzzing of ten gnats a day does not constitute “extreme deprivation” of basic human

needs. It is undisputed that the Jail had regular insect-control treatment. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Jail did not have a rodent and insect infestation that would amount to
a constitutional violation. Moreover, Moody did not seek treatment for any alleged injuries
arising from this condition; therefore, he has failed to establish the existence of an
objectively serious risk or medical need. See Daniel, 188 F. App’x at 962. As such, Moody
has failed to establish the existence of objectively unconstitutional condition of
confinement; therefore, the Motion is due to be granted as to this claim.
Lack of Safe Drinking Water
In the Complaint, Moody maintains that the Jail did not give him access to safe

drinking water from a water fountain. Complaint at 9. According to Moody, he “had no
other option but to drink from a shared sink and/or shower that contained bacteria of other
detainees’ excrements.” Id. When he grieved this matter, Forbrich responded that water
is not required to be filtered and that the Jail’s water source comes from an approved
existing public supply.” Id. Moody avers that as a result of drinking the Jail’s water from a
sink or shower he experienced constant throat soreness and “other undiagnosed health
problems,” which he does not identify. Id. at 12.
Defendants assert in the Motion that drinking from a sink instead of a fountain is
not a constitutional violation. Motion at 15. In his Response, Moody asserts that
Defendants did not provide him safe drinking water through a water fountain and that the
water tests from inside the Jail “do not cover the relevant time frame the Plaintiff was
housed inside of [the Jail].” Response at 5. Moreover, Moody contends that these water
tests did not use water samples from his cell or the showers he used. Id.
Moody testified in his deposition that the shower water caused skin issues for him

and the drinking water gave him sore throats every day. Mot. Ex. B at 24, 54-55.
Regarding the skin issues, Moody asserted that it was like ringworm, where a circular
rash would form on his back and legs. Id. at 36-37. According to Moody, there were no
water fountains in the Jail; instead, the inmates had to drink from the sinks in their cells
or from the showers. Id. at 24, 56. He specifically testified he did not drink out of the toilet.
Id. Despite his medical issues, Moody stated that he never submitted a sick call for
treatment and had never been diagnosed by a doctor with any issue related to the Jail’s
water or for his skin issue. Id. at 37, 55.
While the deprivation of drinking water for several days would be a denial of the

basic minimal necessitates of life, this is not what Moody has alleged in the Complaint or
what the evidence demonstrates. Moody admits he had access to drinking water via a
sink, as such he was not deprived of drinking water. The fact that the drinking water came
from a sink and not a fountain is immaterial to the Court’s constitutional analysis of this
claim. It is the fact that Moody had regular access to drinking water that controls here.
See Leonard v. City of Columbus, No. 4:10-CV-60-CDL-MSH, 2010 WL 3717251, at *6
(M.D. Ga. July 29, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:10-CV-60 CDL,
2010 WL 3716877 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2010) (finding no constitutional violation where
plaintiff had to obtain drinking water from a sink in a bathroom and not from a water
fountain). To the extent Moody contends the drinking water is unsafe, the evidence
reflects that the water the Jail provided was from the same source the general public used
for their drinking water and the local utility company tested the water in February of 2017
and found it to have an acceptable range of contaminants. Mot. Ex. A at 4. As such, it can
hardly be said that Moody was deprived of a basic human right when he received the

same quality of water that the public at large did. See Jinks v. Medlin, No. CV 313-068,
2015 WL 4716050, at *23 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2015), report and recommendation adopted,
No. CV 313-068, 2015 WL 5359558 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (finding no constitutional
violation where prison water was same water used by the local citizens and tested).
Moreover, Moody never sought medical treatment for his alleged injuries even though he
was free to do so; therefore, the Court finds he has failed to establish the existence of an
objectively serious risk. See Daniel, 188 F. App’x at 962. In light of the above, Moody has
failed to demonstrate the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim and,
therefore, the Motion is due to be granted as to these claims.

No Pillows
Moody alleges in the Complaint that Defendants failed to provide him with a pillow
and pillowcase, as required by the FMJS. Complaint at 9. According to Moody,
Defendants’ failure to provide these items “is proof that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the health of the detainees under their care.” Id. Moody maintains that he
suffered “constant neck cramps and sleeping disorders” because he did not have a pillow.
Id. at 13.
In the Motion, Defendants argue that lack of a separate pillow when a bed has a
built-in pillow does not violate the Constitution. Motion at 15-16. Moody contends in his
Response that he never admitted he was given a pillowcase and the built-in pillow is
merely a “raised cushion” that is not equivalent to a pillow. Response at 5-6. To the extent
Defendants argue the built-in pillow is considered best practice, Moody asserts that he
has a received a separate pillow with pillowcase in every other prison or jail in which he
has been housed. Id. at 6.

Moody testified in his deposition that he did not have a separate pillow with
pillowcase; however, he conceded that he received a mattress with a built-in pillow. Mot.
Ex. B at 20, 60. According to Morris, he wanted a separate pillow because the built-in
pillow was like “a raised cushion,” id. at 62, and the lack of a pillow exacerbated previous
neck and shoulder injuries, id. at 62-6. Although, he admitted he did not seek medical
treatment for this ailment while at the Jail. Id. at 64. While Moody did not have a separate
pillow with pillowcase, it is undisputed that there was a pillow built into the mattress, which
is the functional equivalent of a standalone pillow. Moody’s discomfort from not being able
to use a separate pillow does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Chandler, 379

F.3d at 1295 (“[A] prisoner's mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth
Amendment.”). Moreover, the fact Moody did not seek medical attention for his alleged
injuries also cuts against his allegations that the lack of pillows constituted an objectively
serious risk. See Daniel, 188 F. App’x at 962. Accordingly, this condition, when viewed
objectively, does not violate the Constitution and, therefore, the Motion is due to be
granted as to this claim.
Lack of Windows
In the Complaint, Moody asserts that many of the cells in the Jail either did not
have windows at all or, if they did, the window-view was obstructed, “which prevented
detainees from viewing the outside world.” Complaint at 10. According to Moody, the lack
of an outside view made his cell “comparable to a modern day dungeon.” Id. Moody
alleges that not having “views to the outside world caused the Plaintiff to experience
constant anxiety and sensory deprivation which lead to frequent thoughts of suicide and
perpetual moods of deep depression which also created a serious risk to the Plaintiff’s

health and safety.” Id. at 13.
Defendants assert in the Motion that lack of a window is not a constitutional
violation. Motion at 15. Particularly so because Moody is not complaining that his cell
lacked adequate light, merely that he did not have a view to the outside world. Id. In the
Response, Moody avers that his windowless dormitory from September 20, 2016, to
March 21, 2017, was similar to being housed in a dungeon. Response at 6. During this
period, he claims that his mental health deteriorated and he “was not allowed the
opportunity to participate in recreation a substantial amount of time during his stay . . . .”
Id.

In his deposition, Moody testified that the lack of windows in his cell led him to
have suicidal thoughts, but he never actually harmed himself. Mot. Ex. B at 64-66. Moody
acknowledged that jail records reflect that he was examined for his suicidal thoughts on
September 27, 2015. Id. at 64-65. However, other than that exam, he had no further
medical examinations and did not receive treatment for any psychological issues related
to the lack of windows. Id. at 66. Likewise, he is not currently receiving any psychological
treatment. Id. at 67. According to Morris’ declaration, Moody’s cell did not have a window
but all lighting in the cell worked and Morris states that Moody was afforded opportunities
to be outdoors during his recreation time. Mot. Ex. A at 5.
Based on these facts, the Court finds the lack of a window in Moody’s cell did not
violate the Constitution. Moody does not allege that he had no light in his cell, only that
he did not have access to natural light from within his cell. Indeed, the evidence
demonstrates that Moody’s cell had adequate lighting that passed inspection. Although
Moody may not have been able to participate in recreational activities a “substantial

amount of the time during his stay” he did have some access to it. As such, the Court
finds that the lack of a window in his cell did not deprive Moody of essential human needs.
See Poulin v. Jeter, No. 6:08-cv-299-ORL-31KRS, 2010 WL 3701384, at *10 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 15, 2010) (finding no constitutional violation where cell had no window, but had
adequate lighting otherwise and plaintiff could access the outdoors). Accordingly, Moody
has failed to establish the lack of a window amounted to an objectively unconstitutional
condition and the Motion is due to be granted as to this claim.
No Access to Television or other Media
Next, Moody complains that Defendants did not permit him access to televisions,

radios, and newspapers. Complaint at 10. He claims that Defendants’ policy of not
allowing detainees access to these materials “is an exaggerated response to a security
need . . . .” Id. In support, Moody asserts that other jails and prisons allow detainees and
inmates to have access to media. Id. Moody maintains that his knowledge that other
prisons allowed access to these materials while the Jail did not resulted in constant
anxiety and sensory deprivation that lead to frequent thoughts of suicide and perpetual
depression. Id. at 13. In the Motion, Defendants contend that the Jail’s failure to provide
television, radio, or newspaper is not a constitutional violation. Motion at 16. Moody
argues in his response, that Defendants admitted they did not provide him access to a
television, radio, or newspaper. Response at 6.
Moody testified during his deposition that inmates were not allowed access to a
television or radio. Mot. Ex. B at 20-22. Although, he acknowledges he had no
constitutional right to those things, id. at 67-68, Moody believes this lack of entertainment

in combination with his other allegations created unconstitutional prison conditions, id. at
68. Jails and prisons are not required under the Constitution to guarantee access to
television and other forms of media as these simply are not necessities of life and are
recreational in nature. As such, it cannot be said that not giving detainees access to these
constitutes a deprivation of a basic human necessity. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d
1495, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (“The Constitution does not require that prisoners, as
individuals or as a group, be provided with any and every amenity which some person
may think is needed to avoid mental, physical, and emotional deterioration.”); Elliott v.
Brooks, 188 F.3d 518, 518 (10th Cir.1999) (unpublished) (“There is no constitutional right

to watch television.”). Accordingly, Moody has failed to establish a constitutional violation
and, therefore, the Motion is due to be granted as to this claim.
Conditions Considered as a Whole
“Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in
combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually
enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such
as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with
a failure to issue blankets.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (emphasis in
original). However, “[n]othing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need
exists.” Id. at 305. The Court notes that “[i]nmates cannot expect the amenities,
conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th
Cir.1988).
Here, Moody has failed to establish that any one of the conditions about which he

complains by themselves are objectively unconstitutional conditions. These conditions did
not prohibit Moody from receiving constitutionally adequate shelter, food, security,
medical care, or sanitary conditions. Likewise, when considered as a whole Moody has
failed to demonstrate that these conditions worked in concert to deprive him of an
identifiable human need. Indeed, as discussed above, Moody has failed to show that he
was deprived of food, shelter, medical care, or sanitary conditions. In sum, Moody has
failed to produce sufficient evidence that these conditions, either considered alone or
cumulatively, posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him or amounted to the extreme
deprivation of basic human necessities. It follows then that Moody has not demonstrated

that Defendants had a subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm either if he cannot
establish the existence of an objectively serious risk. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is
due to be granted on this claim.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as to
claims brought against them in their individual capacities based on the doctrine of
qualified immunity. Motion at 18-22. According to Defendants, none of the conditions
Moody complains about can objectively be considered a constitutional violation. Id. at 19.
Moreover, even if Moody had established unconstitutional conditions of confinement,
Defendants maintain that these alleged violations were not clearly established. Id. As
such, Defendants contend qualified immunity shields them from individual liability in this
suit. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
The qualified-immunity defense reflects an effort to
balance "the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine resolves this balance by
protecting government officials engaged in discretionary
functions and sued in their individual capacities unless they
violate "clearly established federal statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks and brackets omitted).

As a result, qualified immunity shields from liability "all
but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating
the federal law." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2002). But the doctrine's protections do not extend to one
who "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).

To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first
demonstrate that he was acting within the scope of his or her
discretionary authority. Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109,
1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we have explained the term
"discretionary authority," it "include[s] all actions of a
governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the
performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his
authority." Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that
Defendant Officers satisfied this requirement, as they
engaged in all of the challenged actions while on duty as
police officers conducting investigative and seizure functions.

Because Defendant Officers have established that they
were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority,
the burden shifts to [the plaintiff] to demonstrate that qualified
immunity is inappropriate. See id. To do that, [the plaintiff]
must show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
him, the facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated
[Plaintiff's] constitutional right and that that right was "clearly
established ... in light of the specific context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition[,]" at the time of Defendant
officers' actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other
grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808. We may
decide these issues in either order, but, to survive a qualified-
immunity defense, [the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings.
Maddox, 727 F.3d at 1120–21 (citation omitted).

Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017). The Court notes that where the
alleged conditions are particularly egregious, a general constitutional law already
identified in decisional law may be applicable such that a reasonable officer would know
that the egregious conditions violate the Constitution. Taylor v. Riojas, No. 19-1261, 2020
WL 6385693, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2020).
Here, as the Court explained in greater detail above, none of the conditions Moody
complains of, either singularly or when considered as a whole, violate the Constitution.
Moreover, Moody has failed to demonstrate that any of these alleged constitutional
violations, in light of the context of this case, were clearly established. As such, the Court
finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Moody’s claims against them
in their individual capacities. The Motion, therefore, is due to be granted as to Defendants’
claims of entitlement to qualified immunity.
C. Official Capacity Liability
To the extent Moody sues Defendants in their individual capacity, they argue that
he is actually suing the city of Jacksonville (City). Motion at 22-23. Defendants argue that
Moody must therefore establish that a constitutional violation occurred, and that the City
had an official custom or policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional
violation. Id. Defendants also maintain that Moody has failed to establish any
constitutional violations and has likewise failed to demonstrate the City had a custom or
policy that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. Id.
A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is a suit against

the entity of which the officer is an agent. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776
(11th Cir. 1991). A government entity may be liable in a § 1983 action “only where the
[government entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex. rel. Estate
of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1116 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that an official policy or custom of the government
entity was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments can be held liable for
constitutional torts caused by official policies. However, such liability is limited to “acts

which the [government entity] has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). Under the directives of Monell, a plaintiff also must
allege that the constitutional deprivation was the result of “an official government policy,
the actions of an official fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or
practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Denno, 218 F.3d
at 1276 (citations omitted); see Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.
2016) (stating Monell “is meant to limit § 1983 liability to ‘acts which the municipality has
officially sanctioned or ordered’”; adding that “[t]here are, however, several different ways
of establishing municipal liability under § 1983”).
“A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the [government entity] or created
by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the
[government entity].” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to “’distinguish acts of the
[government entity] from acts of employees of the [government entity], and thereby make

clear that [governmental] liability is limited to action for which the [government entity] is
actually responsible.’” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329 n.5 (quotation and citation omitted).
Indeed, governmental liability arises under § 1983 only where “’a deliberate choice to
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’” by governmental
policymakers. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 483-84). A government entity rarely will have an officially-adopted policy that
permits a particular constitutional violation, therefore, in order to state a cause of action
for damages under § 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government entity
has a custom or practice of permitting the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330;

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A custom is an act “that has
not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,” but that is “so widespread
as to have the force of law.” Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. V. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404 (1997) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “custom” as “a
practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law” or a “persistent
and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d at 489. Last, “[t]o hold the [government
entity] liable, there must be ‘a direct causal link between [its] policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262,
1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Because Defendants official capacity liability
under § 1983 is the functional equivalent of a suit against the City, Moody must show that
an official policy or a custom or practice of the City was the moving force behind the
alleged federal constitutional violation.
Upon review, Moody has failed to establish the existence of a constitutional
violation. Moreover, Moody has neither identified an official City policy of deliberate

indifference nor an unofficial City custom or practice that was “the moving force” behind
any alleged constitutional violation. Moody’s factual allegations are simply insufficient to
sustain a claim that there is either a policy, practice, or custom of denying detainees their
constitutional rights. In consideration of the above analysis, the Court finds that Moody
has failed to establish a claim that Defendants are liable in their official capacities.
Therefore, the Motion is due to be granted on this issue.
D. Equal Protection Claims
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements of an equal protection claim
in a § 1983 suit as follows:

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the government to treat similarly situated people
alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). To
establish such a claim, a prisoner can allege that: “(1) he is
similarly situated with other prisoners who received more
favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was
based on some constitutionally protected interest, such as
race.” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir.2001)
(internal quotations omitted); Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob.
Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir.1986). If a suspect
classification, such as race, or a fundamental right is
implicated, a court must apply strict scrutiny to that claim. See
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506-07, 125 S.Ct. 1141,
1147, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (holding that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications
even in the prison context). [. . .] If the allegations do not
implicate a suspect class, then a court may evaluate only
whether there was a rational basis for how the plaintiff was
treated. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000).

Hernandez, 281 F. App’x at 867. The Court notes that “[e]ven arbitrary administration of
[prison regulations], without purposeful discrimination, does not violate the equal
protection clause.” E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
Moody has failed to allege or provide evidence that he is a member of a protected
class or that he was being treated differently because of his status as a member of a
protected class. Receiving the same treatment as other detainees in the Jail, even if the
conditions are different at other institutions does not establish a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause where there are no allegations or evidence that the alleged disparate
treatment was based on a protected class such as race, religion, or gender. See Jones,
279 F.3d at 946-47. Likewise, he has not proven he is a member of a “class of one.” See
Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). Moreover, Moody
has not proven the existence of discriminatory intent on part of Defendants. See E & T
Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114. Therefore, he has failed to show he is entitled to relief on his
Equal Protection claims and the Motion is due to be granted as to these claims.
In light of the above, it is
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 62) is GRANTED.
2. This case is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Williams,
Bruno, Morris, and Forbrich; dismiss this case; terminate any pending
motions; and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 1st day of December, 2020.

United States District Judge

Jax-8
C:
Jesse E. Moody, Jr. #X02438
Counsel of Record

35

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10106490. Public record. Not legal advice.