# Adorjan v. Armor Correctional Health Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · September 2, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105788

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** September 2, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105788

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating Monell “is meant to limit § 1983 liability to ‘acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered’”; adding that “[t]here are, however, several different ways of establishing municipal liability under § 1983”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ANDREW A. ADORJAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-943-J-34JBT

ARMOR CORR. HEALTH INC.,

Defendant.
_______________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Andrew Adorjan, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
by mailbox rule on August 19, 2020, when he filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1), while also seeking to proceed in forma pauperis
(Motion; Doc. 2). Adorjan names Armor Correctional Health Inc. (Armor) as the sole
defendant. He asserts Armor was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As relief, Adorjan
requests compensatory and punitive damages.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at
any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. Additionally, the Court
must read a plaintiff's pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). "A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact." Bilal v.
Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898
F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). "Frivolous claims include claims 'describing fantastic or
delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.'" Bilal,
251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)). Additionally,
a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a plaintiff has little or no

chance of success. Id.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal
law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d
1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit "requires proof of an
affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation” in § 1983 civil rights cases. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986). More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th
Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). As
such, "'conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.'" Rehberger v. Henry Cty., Ga., 577 F.
App'x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
In the Complaint, Adorjan alleges that ten days before his arrest on December 6,
2019, he fell and broke his right wrist and an emergency room doctor put a temporary
splint on his arm. Complaint at 8. Once arrested, Armor, the company the Duval County
Jail contracted with to provide medical care, sent him to Shands Hospital for x-rays and
a new temporary splint. Id. The doctor at Shands advised Adorjan that he needed an MRI
and should be seen by an orthopedic surgeon within three days. Id. However, Adorjan
contends that Armor “callously disregarded the E.R. Doctor’s orders.” Id. On December
16, 2019, Adorjan had another x-ray performed in the jail’s medical center. Id. at 8-9.

According to Adorjan, a doctor saw him four days later on December 20, 2019, and,
without examining him, told Adorjan he would need to see a specialist. Id. at 9. Several
days later, Adorjan asserts he slipped and fell in a puddle and reaggravated his wrist
injury, causing severe pain. Id. Correctional officers took him to a nurse who took his
temperature and blood pressure, told him he would eventually be seen by a physician,
and then sent him back to his dormitory. Id. However, Adorjan contends he never received
a follow-up appointment concerning his slip and fall. Id. On January 17, 2020, Armor sent
Adorjan back to Shands where the emergency room doctor threw his splint into the trash
and told him that Armor should have sent him back to the hospital much sooner so his

arm could be put in traction. Id. at 9-10. Following an x-ray, the emergency room doctor
informed Adorjan that his wrist was healing. Id. at 10. Adorjan did not receive a cast or
new splint and was given no further treatment. Id. Adorjan maintains that due to the lack
of care he received his right wrist is dysfunctional and lacks mobility, several fingers are
numb, and he suffers from pain every day. Id.
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties
on [jail] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials
must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and
must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984)). “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an

objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct.” Oliver v. Fuhrman,
739 F. App'x 968, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289
(11th Cir. 2004)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Under the objective component, a prisoner must allege
a condition that is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth
Amendment. Id. The challenged condition must be extreme
and must pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the
prisoner’s future health or safety. Id. The Eighth Amendment
guarantees that prisoners are provided with a minimal
civilized level of life’s basic necessities. Id.

Under the subjective component, a prisoner must
allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state
of mind that constituted deliberate indifference. Id. This
means the prisoner must show that the prison officials: (1) had
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)
disregarded that risk; and (3) displayed conduct that is more
than mere negligence. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245
(11th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 969-70. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's
interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
As it relates to medical care, “[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’”
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). The Eleventh circuit has explained that
To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, [a plaintiff] must
show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants'
deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation
between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v.
Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir.2009). To
establish deliberate indifference, [a plaintiff] must prove “(1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard
of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]
negligence.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152,
1158 (11th Cir.2010) (alteration in original). The defendants
must have been “aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exist[ed]” and then actually draw that inference. Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir.2003) (quotation
omitted).

Easley v. Dep’t of Corr., 590 F. App’x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2014). “For medical treatment
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be ‘so grossly incompetent,
inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental
fairness.’” Nimmons v. Aviles, 409 F. App'x 295, 297 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d
1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Grossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute
deliberate indifference, as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less efficacious
course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem). However, the law is
well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of corrections
officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) ("As we held in Daniels, the protections
of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by
lack of due care by prison officials."). A complaint that a physician has been negligent "in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment." Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176
(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
has noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a constitutional deprivation from a
prison physician's failure to subordinate his own professional judgment to that of another
doctor; to the contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’
does not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App'x 892, 897

(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether
governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of
treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an
appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag,
61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Although Armor is not a governmental entity, “[w]here a function which is
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state … is performed by a private entity, state
action is present” for purposes of § 1983. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d
700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Indeed,

“when a private entity . . . contracts with a county to provide
medical services to inmates, it performs a function traditionally
within the exclusive prerogative of the state” and “becomes
the functional equivalent of the municipality” under section
1983. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997).
“[L]iability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d
1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Craig v. Floyd Cty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); see Denham v. Corizon
Health, Inc., Case No. 6:13-cv-1425-Orl-40KRS, 2015 WL 3509294, at *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla.
June 4, 2015) (“[W]hen a government function is performed by a private entity like
Corizon, the private entity is treated as the functional equivalent of the government for
which it works.”) (citation omitted), aff’d (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017).
Where a deliberate indifference medical claim is brought against an entity, such as
Armor, based upon its functional equivalence to a government entity, the assertion of a
constitutional violation is merely the first hurdle in a plaintiff’s case. This is so because
liability for constitutional deprivations under § 1983 cannot be based on the theory of
respondeat superior. Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335

F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)); see Denno v. Sch. Bd. Of Volusia Cty., 218
F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). Instead, a government entity may be liable in a § 1983
action “only where the [government entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at
issue.” Cook ex. rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1116
(11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that an official policy
or custom of the government entity was the “moving force” behind the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94
(1978).
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments can be held liable for

constitutional torts caused by official policies. However, such liability is limited to “acts
which the [government entity] has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). Under the directives of Monell, a plaintiff also must
allege that the constitutional deprivation was the result of “an official government policy,
the actions of an official fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or
practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Denno, 218 F.3d
at 1276 (citations omitted); see Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.
2016) (stating Monell “is meant to limit § 1983 liability to ‘acts which the municipality has
officially sanctioned or ordered’”; adding that “[t]here are, however, several different ways
of establishing municipal liability under § 1983”).
“A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the [government entity] or created
by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the
[government entity].” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to “’distinguish acts of the
[government entity] from acts of employees of the [government entity], and thereby make
clear that [governmental] liability is limited to action for which the [government entity] is
actually responsible.’” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329 n.5 (quotation and citation omitted).
Indeed, governmental liability arises under § 1983 only where “’a deliberate choice to
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’” by governmental
policymakers. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 483-84). A government entity rarely will have an officially-adopted policy that
permits a particular constitutional violation, therefore, in order to state a cause of action

for damages under § 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government entity
has a custom or practice of permitting the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330;
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A custom is an act “that has
not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,” but that is “so widespread
as to have the force of law.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404 (1997) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “custom” as “a
practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law” or a “persistent
and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d at 489. Last, “[t]o hold the [government
entity] liable, there must be ‘a direct causal link between [its] policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262,
1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Because Armor’s liability under § 1983 would
be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for providing
medical care and services to inmates, Adorjan must plead that an official policy or a
custom or practice of Armor was the moving force behind the alleged federal

constitutional violation.
Upon review, and as this Court has previously advised Adorjan,7 he has neither
identified an official Armor policy of deliberate indifference nor an unofficial Armor custom
or practice that was “the moving force” behind any alleged constitutional violation. Armor
cannot be held liable based on any alleged conduct of or decisions by its employees
simply because they were working under contract for Armor to provide medical care to
inmates. Adorjan’s factual allegations relating solely to alleged individual failures in his
medical care are simply insufficient to sustain a claim that there is either a policy to deny
medical care to inmates or a practice or custom of denying adequate medical care, much

less that the practice was so widespread that Armor had notice of violations and made a
“conscious choice” to disregard them. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th
Cir. 1998). In consideration of the above analysis, the Court finds that Adorjan has failed
to establish a claim that Armor violated his Eighth Amendment rights, and this action is
due to be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is

7 See Case No. 3:20-cv-525-J-34JBT (Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice;
Doc. 3).
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminating any pending motions, and closing the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 2nd day of September, 2020.

United States District Judge

Jax-8
c: Andrew A. Adorjan #J59402

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105788. Public record. Not legal advice.