# Emrit v. Universal Music Group

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105681

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105681

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding district court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend where pro se plaintiff’s “long history of bringing vexatious claims against former patients and insurance providers suggests the appearance of bad faith”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

RONALD SATISH EMRIT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:19-cv-2562-T-33SPF

UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP,
ISLAND DEF JAM GROUP,
ESTATE OF SHAKIR STEWART,
and RICK ROSS,

Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants Island Def Jam Group, Rick Ross, and Universal
Music Group’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 60), filed on July
23, 2020. Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit responded on
August 10, 2020. (Doc. # 65). For the reasons that follow,
the Motion is granted as set forth herein.
I. Background
Emrit is no stranger to federal court. Since 2013, Emrit
has filed hundreds of pro se cases in federal courts across
the country — including multiple cases in the Middle District
of Florida — and has been designated as a vexatious litigant
in multiple districts. See Emrit v. Universal Music Grp., No.
3:19-CV-05984-BHS, 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4,
2019)(“Plaintiff has a history of abusing the IFP privilege
and Plaintiff has been acknowledged as a vexatious litigator
in at least six district courts. The Ninth Circuit has also
entered a pre-filing review order against Plaintiff. Further,
a search of the Pacer electronic case database for cases filed
under the name Ronald Satish Emrit shows Plaintiff has filed
approximately 375 cases or appeals in the federal court
system.”)(citations omitted), report and recommendation
adopted, No. C19-5984 BHS, 2019 WL 6251192 (W.D. Wash. Nov.

22, 2019); Emrit v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 20-CV-
265-CAB-KSC, 2020 WL 731171, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13,
2020)(“A PACER search reveals that Plaintiff has filed over
250 federal lawsuits since 2013, including 31 so far in 2020.
These complaints have been filed in courts ranging from the
District of Hawaii to the District of Nebraska to the District
of Massachusetts.”).
Emrit, proceeding pro se, brought this action on October
10, 2019. (Doc. # 1). He alleges that “all four Defendants
have committed substantial copyright infringement in which
the Defendants have used the same ‘original works of
authorship’ that [he] has used in one of his songs copyrighted

with the Library of Congress.” (Id. at 1). Emrit claims that
his brother-in-law told him in July 2019 that “the recording
artist Rick Ross had been using the same background beat in
his song ‘Billionaire’ (off of his ‘Skrilla’ album) as [Emrit]
uses in his song ‘Dilemma’ off of [Emrit’s] album ‘Welcome to
Atlantis.’” (Id. at 2). Based on this allegedly unauthorized
use, Emrit seeks to hold Defendants liable for copyright
infringement, conversion, tortious interference with business
relations, and tortious interference with contracts. (Id. at
10-16).
Less pertinent allegations in the complaint include that

Emrit “briefly attended Morehouse College in the spring
semester of 1996,” “attended the University of Memphis in
1997 as a graduate student trying to obtain a Master’s Degree
in Science [] in the field of Biology,” and “worked at the
Memphis Animal Shelter.” (Id. at 3-4). Emrit also notes that
the “original CEO of Island Def Jam Group was Russell Simmons,
i.e. a mogul and entrepreneur who is now contemplating
becoming a ‘flight risk’ from prosecution in the state of New
York . . . as he is trying to travel to Bali in Indonesia
which has no extradition treaty with the United States.”
(Id.). Finally, in his prayer for relief, Emrit requests a
judgment for $250,000 and asks the Court to “mandat[e] that

[he] be signed to a ‘360 deal’ with Island Def Jam Group
and/or Universal Music Group [] with a controlled composition
clause, cross-collateralization clause, and Minimum Delivery
and Release Commitment (MDRC), and certainly not a ‘demo
deal.’” (Id. at 16-18).
Emrit was granted permission to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. # 7). Soon after filing this case, Emrit filed
three other substantively identical cases against the same
four Defendants in the Central District of California, the
Western District of Washington, and the District of Hawaii.
See Universal Music Grp., 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (“Here,

Plaintiff initiated this same lawsuit by filing the same
complaint, naming the same Defendants, in both the Central
District of California and the Middle District of Florida.”);
see also Emrit v. Universal Music Grp., No. CV 19-00670 HG-
KJM, 2019 WL 7759129, at *1 (D. Haw. Dec. 18, 2019), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CV 19-00670 HG-KJM, 2020 WL
465018 (D. Haw. Jan. 28, 2020).
Subsequently, Emrit was designated as a vexatious
litigant in the Middle District of Florida. See Emrit v.
DeVos, No. 8:20-cv-773-T-60TGW (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020)(Doc.
# 11). Another copyright infringement case against music
business entities that Emrit filed in this District before he

was designated a vexatious litigant was dismissed without
leave to amend on April 23, 2020. See Emrit v. Horus Music
Video Distr., No. 8:19-cv-2531-T-60JSS, 2020 WL 1955330, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020). That Order explained that
“Emrit’s complaint is ‘conclusory and patently frivolous’
where he fails to draw any connection between his legal claims
and the factual allegations of his complaint.” Id.
Emrit’s vexatious litigant status is well-deserved.
Since the initiation of this case, Emrit has filed numerous
frivolous motions. (Doc. ## 11, 15-19, 21, 27-30, 39-40, 45-
46). And he has continued to do so despite warnings from this

Court. For example, on March 6, 2020, the Court advised:
“Emrit’s motions waste scarce judicial resources and do
nothing to advance Emrit’s claim. The Court warns Emrit that
continued filing of multiple meritless motions will not be
tolerated by the Court and could result in the imposition of
sanctions.” (Doc. # 36 at 5). Again, on April 7, 2020, the
Court “encourage[d] Emrit to cease filing meritless motions.”
(Doc. # 47).
Emrit has ignored these warnings and continued his
frivolous filings, including:
• (Doc. # 56)(another “motion in limine to introduce

extrinsic evidence,” including evidence to “show that
[Emrit] went to school with Dan Quayle’s sons Tucker and
Ben and therefore [Emrit] has had the best of schooling
in his life including earning a Bachelor’s Degree (B.A.)
from Brown University (Ivy League)”);
• (Doc. # 58)(a notice of change of address in which Emrit
announces that he (i) has moved to Maryland for the
summer, (ii) recently met a videographer through
Craigslist, (iii) has previously traveled to Buenos
Aires, Argentina, and (iv) is “interested in obtaining

a ‘carta de invitacion’ for a woman named Solans from
Las Tunas, Cuba through the Treasury Department Office
of Foreign Assets Control”);
• (Doc. # 66)(a motion to compel discovery asking the Court
to, among other things, “take judicial notice that
[Emrit] was a Democratic presidential candidate in 2016,
2020, and [] will again be a presidential candidate in
2024” and that Emrit “had litigated 12 lawsuits against
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a pro se
plaintiff”);

• (Doc. # 67)(a motion for issuance of subpoena noting,
among other things, that he “has already spoken with
attorney Griffin Klema, Tampa, FL-based attorney that
represents Rick Ross which involves a conflict of
interest and perhaps imputed disqualification for any
attorney with his law firm to be a zealous advocate on
behalf of [Emrit] with regards to this copyright
dispute”);
• (Doc. # 68)(a motion for hearing stating, among other
things, that Emrit “was a presidential candidate in 2016
and 2020 and [he] plans to run again for president in
2024” and asking the Court to “take judicial notice that

the applicable laws in campaign finance law are the
McCain-Feingold Act, Ethics in Government Act, and
Federal Election Campaign Act”);
• (Doc. # 69)(a motion for declaratory judgment asking,
among other things, that the Court assign Emrit’s
licensing and publishing rights in his upcoming album to
Defendants if the Court “agree[s] that there is enough
legal detriment and bargained-for-exchange pursuant to
the Peppercorn Theory of Consideration”);
• (Doc. # 70)(a motion for directed verdict asking the

Court to, among other things, order Universal Music
Group and Island Def Jam Group to “finance [Emrit’s]
next album ‘Rough Draft of Publicity Stunts’” and to
take judicial notice that Emrit sued “Ewing Brothers
Towing at Clark County District Court at 200 Lewis Avenue
in Las Vegas, Nevada because [his] laptop with his music
[] had allegedly been stolen from the trunk” of his car);
• (Doc. # 71)(Emrit’s second motion for summary judgment
arguing, among other things, that “the board of
directors for Disney/ABC/ESPN is violating the Business
Judgment Rule and could be subjected to a stock-holder
derivative action or Chapter 11 Reorganization by

opening up Disney World in Orlando, Florida and trying
to promote the ‘Bubble’ for the NBA so that ESPN can
have something to discuss notwithstanding the fact that
the world and America are currently going through a
COVID-19/Coronavirus pandemic”);
• (Doc. # 72)(a motion for preliminary injunction asking
the Court to, among other things, take judicial notice
that Emrit “has had over 12 lawsuits and appeals against
the FBI nationwide and that [Emrit] was a Democratic
presidential candidate in 2016 and 2020”);

• (Doc. # 73)(a motion to compel arbitration arguing,
among other things, that Emrit “is more marketable as a
recording artist than corny, tacky [] artists such as
Gucci Mane, Kevin Gates, Travis Scott, Cardi B, Doja
Cat, and Tekashi-69, who will not even be a footnote to
history and do not compare to legendary artists such as
Marvin Gaye and John Lennon”);
• (Doc. # 74)(a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, filed even though this case is still in the
pleading stage);
• (Doc. # 75)(a motion for default judgment against all

Defendants, filed even though Emrit knows that three
Defendants have filed the instant Motion to Dismiss);
• (Doc. # 78)(a notice of intent to file a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court in which Emrit notes
his various mental health conditions and informs the
Court of his attempt “to obtain a fiancé or K-1 visa for
his fiancé Mary from Kharkiv, Ukraine”);
• (Doc. # 79)(a motion for joinder of five additional
defendants because Emrit suspects that one of these
entities is a “Performing Rights Organization (PRO) with

which ‘Rick Ross’ is in privity of contract (by signing
an IRS Form W-9)”).
Now, Island Def Jam Group, Ross, and Universal Music
Group seek dismissal of the complaint. (Doc. # 60). Emrit has
responded (Doc. # 65), and the Motion is ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this
Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint
and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff
with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the
complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901
F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,

[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “The scope of review
must be limited to the four corners of the complaint” and
attached exhibits. St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334,
1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
Additionally, motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may attack
jurisdiction facially or factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp.,
323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). Finally, a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction may be filed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
III. Analysis
Defendants raise many grounds for dismissal of the
complaint.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
First, Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over Universal Music Group. The Court agrees.
Courts use a two-part analysis to determine whether
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper. Lockard v.
Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1998). The first
step involves determining whether the forum state’s long-arm
statute provides a basis for jurisdiction. Id. Then, the Court
must determine whether there are sufficient minimum contacts
between the forum state and the defendant to satisfy due
process. Id.
The general jurisdiction provision of the Florida long-
arm statute provides: “A defendant who is engaged in
substantial and not isolated activity within this state,

whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or
otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state, whether or not the claim arises from that
activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). As the Eleventh Circuit
has explained, “[t]he reach of this provision extends to the
limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fraser v. Smith, 594
F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, “[w]ith respect to
general jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute,” the
Court “need only determine whether the . . . exercise of
jurisdiction over [Universal Music Group] would exceed

constitutional bounds.” Id.
Concerning due process, courts may assert general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations “to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)(quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp.
& Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945)). However, “only a
limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a
defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.”
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). “A

corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place
of business are ‘paradigm all-purpose forums.’” Carmouche v.
Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.
2015)(quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “Outside of these
two exemplars, a defendant’s operations will be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation
at home in that State only in an exceptional case.” Waite v.
All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir.
2018)(quotation omitted).
The complaint in this action fails to support the
exercise of general jurisdiction over Universal Music Group.

The complaint expressly alleges that Universal Music Group’s
principal place of business is in Santa Monica, California.
(Doc. # 1 at 3). The Complaint does not set forth Universal
Music Group’s state of incorporation. Accordingly, the Court
cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Universal Music
Group on the basis of its principal place of business or state
of incorporation. Moreover, nothing in the complaint suggests
that this is an “exceptional case” where Universal Music
Group’s activities in Florida are “so substantial and of such
a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.”
Waite, 901 F.3d at 1317.
Indeed, Emrit failed to address the personal

jurisdiction argument in his response at all and thus has
conceded that personal jurisdiction does not exist for
Universal Music Group. See Melendez v. Town of Bay Harbor
Islands, No. 14-22383-CIV, 2014 WL 6682535, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 25, 2014)(striking demand for punitive damages because
plaintiff “wholly fail[ed] to address this argument in her
Response [], and therefore concedes the point”); Brady v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-CV-62199-RNS, 2014 WL 1377830, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2014)(“Brady effectively concedes that his
strict product liability claims must be dismissed; he fails
to address this argument in his opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss.”); Glass v. Lahood, 786 F. Supp. 2d 189, 210 (D.D.C.
2011)(“[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a
dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments
raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments
that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” (citation
omitted)), aff’d, No. 11-5144, 2011 WL 6759550 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 8, 2011). Thus, general jurisdiction over Universal
Music Group does not exist.
Emrit has also failed to establish specific personal
jurisdiction. Florida’s long-arm statute provides in relevant
part:
(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who personally or through
an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this
subsection thereby submits himself or herself and,
if he or she is a natural person, his or her
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state for any cause of action arising
from any of the following acts:
1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or
carrying on a business or business venture in
this state or having an office or agency in
this state.
2. Committing a tortious act within this state.
3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a
mortgage or other lien on any real property
within this state.
. . .
6. Causing injury to persons or property within
this state arising out of an act or omission
by the defendant outside this state, if, at or
about the time of the injury, either:
a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or
service activities within this state; or
b. Products, materials, or things processed,
serviced, or manufactured by the defendant
anywhere were used or consumed within this
state in the ordinary course of commerce,
trade, or use.
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a).
If the long-arm statute is satisfied, the Court must
next determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction
over Universal Music Group comports with due process. To make
this determination, the Court must apply a three-part test
examining whether (1) the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or
relate to” at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the
forum; (2) the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state;
and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355
(11th Cir. 2013).
Again, Emrit has failed to address the personal
jurisdiction argument in his response and thus has conceded
that specific jurisdiction does not exist for Universal Music

Group. See Melendez, 2014 WL 6682535, at *7. Furthermore, as
Defendants correctly explain, the complaint “fails to allege
a single incident or action connecting [Universal Music
Group] to the forum jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions
set forth in Florida’s long-arm statute,” such as an
allegation that Universal Music Group “transacted business in
the State of Florida,” “contracted to supply services or
conduct business in the State of Florida,” “caused tortious
injury in [] Florida by virtue of an act or omission in the
forum or outside the forum,” or “engaged in a persistent
course of conduct, derived substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed, or rendered any services in [] Florida.”

(Doc. # 60 at 20). The Court lacks specific jurisdiction over
Universal Music Group.
Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Universal Music Group, all claims against Universal Music
Group are dismissed without prejudice.
B. Shotgun Complaint
Next, Defendants argue the complaint should be dismissed
as a shotgun complaint.1 The Court agrees.
“A defendant served with a shotgun complaint should move
the district court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) or for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule

12(e) on the ground that the complaint provides it with
insufficient notice to enable it to file an answer.” Paylor
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (11th Cir.
2014)(footnotes omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has “identified four rough types or
categories of shotgun pleadings”: (1) “a complaint containing
multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of

1 Defendants argue at one point in their Motion that the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the copyright
infringement claim because Emrit has not alleged he
registered his copyright. (Doc. # 60 at 13-15). While
Defendants are correct about the importance of a registered
copyright as a precondition to suit, they are incorrect that
the registration issue is a jurisdictional problem. See Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010)(“Section
411(a)’s registration requirement is a precondition to filing
a claim that does not restrict a federal court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.”). Thus, there are no subject matter
jurisdiction issues for the Court to resolve.
all preceding counts”; (2) a complaint that is “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint
that does “not separat[e] into a different count each cause
of action or claim for relief”; and (4) a complaint that
“assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible
for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the
claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015).
“The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun
pleadings is that they fail to . . . give the defendants
adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
Here, the complaint asserts each count against all four
Defendants without alleging which Defendant committed which
acts. For example, in count three, the complaint alleges “all
four of the defendants in the present case at bar should be
held liable for the tortious interference with business
relations.” (Doc. # 1 at 15). In short, the complaint lumps
all four Defendants together without differentiating between

them and their conduct. Thus, the complaint is the fourth
type of shotgun complaint identified in Weiland and must be
dismissed.
C. Leave to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave
to amend should be freely given when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court “need not, however, allow
an amendment (1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment

would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3)
where amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d
1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
Given Emrit’s history of filing vexatious and harassing
lawsuits (including multiple duplicates of this action), as
well as his numerous frivolous and vexatious filings in this
case, the Court will not grant Emrit leave to file an amended
complaint. See Papadopoulos v. Amaker, No. 12-CV-3608 DLI
RLM, 2013 WL 3226757, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013)(declining
to sua sponte grant a pro se litigant leave to amend, even
though courts usually give pro se litigants leave to amend at
least once, “in light of Plaintiff’s extensive litigation

history, in this district and others, and the frivolous nature
of certain allegations”); Brett v. Garcia, No. 6:15-cv-638-
ORL-40, 2015 WL 3404490, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 26,
2015)(declining to grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint based on his “long history of filing frivolous
suits in the Middle District of Florida” and other districts
and “the lack of any basis in the complaint to conclude that
Plaintiff could state a cognizable cause of action in an
amended complaint”).
Leave to amend should not be granted because Emrit is
proceeding in bad faith. See Gianetti v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of CT., Inc., 351 F. App’x 520, 522 (2d Cir.
2009)(finding district court did not abuse discretion in
denying leave to amend where pro se plaintiff’s “long history
of bringing vexatious claims against former patients and
insurance providers suggests the appearance of bad faith”).
As Emrit well knows, “[f]rivolous, bad faith claims consume
a significant amount of judicial resources, diverting the
time and energy of the judiciary away from processing good
faith claims.” Emrit v. Simon, No. 17-CV-4605 (SRN/SER), 2017
WL 11483901, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2017)(citation omitted),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-4605 (SRN/SER),
2017 WL 11483905 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2017).

The Order designating Emrit a vexatious litigant in this
District held — and this Court agrees — that Emrit is
“obviously not proceeding in good faith”; rather, Emrit is a
“savvy and experienced pro se litigant” who “understand[s]
the legal system’s reluctance to sanction [him] and use[s] it
to [his] advantage.” Emrit v. DeVos, No. 8:20-cv-773-T-60TGW
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020)(Doc. # 11 at 7); see also Universal
Music Grp., 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (“The Court finds the
Proposed Complaint is frivolous and malicious as it is part
of Plaintiff’s ongoing and persistent pattern of abusing the
IFP privilege by filing vexatious, harassing, and duplicative

lawsuits.”); Emrit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C 13-5951 SBA, 2014 WL
3841015, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014)(dismissing case with
prejudice as “sanction for [Emrit’s] intentional and bad
faith conduct,” including “intentionally misrepresent[ing]
his financial condition and litigation history in bad
faith”).
It is clear that Emrit has filed this action — and others
— against Defendants in a bad faith attempt to force Universal
Music Group to give him a record deal. See, e.g., (Doc. # 1
at 18)(asking in the complaint’s prayer for relief that the
Court “mandat[e] that [Emrit] be signed to a ‘360 deal’ with
Island Def Jam Group and/or Universal Music Group [] with a

controlled composition clause, cross-collateralization
clause, and Minimum Delivery and Release Commitment (MDRC),
and certainly not a ‘demo deal’”); (Doc. # 11 at 1)(Emrit’s
first motion for preliminary injunction in this case,
requesting the Court “issue the equitable remedy of specific
performance and/or an injunction mandating that [Universal
Music Group] sign [Emrit] to a ‘360 deal’ as a commercial
recording contract as opposed to the procedurally and
substantively unconscionable ‘demo deal’”); Emrit v. Indep.
Music Awards, IMA, 605 F. App’x 103, 104 n.1 (3d Cir.
2015)(“On appeal, Emrit also requests specific performance or

injunctive relief in the form of a commercial recording
contract with Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, or
Sony BMG to produce the seven music videos he submitted to
the contest.”); Emrit v. YouTube, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-2245-GPC-
JLB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015)(Doc. # 1 at 12)(stating in
complaint against seven defendants, including Universal Music
Group, that Emrit was “requesting the equitable remedy of an
injunction or specific performance mandating that [he] be
offered a commercial recording contract by either [Universal
Music Group], Sony BMG, or WMG in the form of a ‘360 deal’”).
The Court cannot condone such harassing conduct.
Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
(1) Defendants Island Def Jam Group, Rick Ross, and
Universal Music Group’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 60) is
GRANTED.
(2) Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit’s complaint (Doc.
# 1) is dismissed as to the claims against Universal
Music Group for lack of personal jurisdiction. All other
claims in the complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
(3) The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
17th day of August, 2020.

lagi 9n. Munenby Cree
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105681. Public record. Not legal advice.