# Louis v. Milton Transportation, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 20, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105548

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 20, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105548

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “vague and conclusory allegations” “are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

MAXO LOUIS and INASE
FRANCOIS,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 2:20-cv-6-FtM-29NPM

MILTON TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
a Pennsylvania Corporation,
BTR, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation, and WILLIAM
DAVIS,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendants’
Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc.
#20) filed on April 23, 2020. After being ordered to do so,
plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. #22) on May 26, 2020. For the
reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
I.
A. Parties
Plaintiffs Maxo Louis and his wife Inase Francois are
residents of Lee County, Florida. (Doc. #5, ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants
Milton Transportation, Inc. and BTR, Inc. are Pennsylvania
corporations with their principal places of business in that state.
(Doc. #1, ¶¶ 6-7.) Finally, defendant William Davis is an
1
individual domiciled in Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 8.)
A. Factual Background
According to the allegations in the Complaint, Louis was
operating his motor vehicle in New Hampshire on August 2, 2018.
(Doc. #5, ¶ 11.) At approximately 8:13 a.m., Davis, who was
operating a semi-tractor-trailer vehicle, collided with the rear
and side of Louis’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 13.) Due to the accident,
Louis has sustained serious personal injuries and significant
financial damages. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) The Complaint alleges Davis
was an employee of Milton and BTR, and that Milton and BTR are the
registered owners of the tractor trailer. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)
B. Procedural Background
In December 2019, plaintiffs initiated this action by filing

a Complaint for Damages in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth
Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida. (Id. p. 1.) The
Complaint contains the following three claims: (1) negligent
operation of a motor vehicle against Milton and BTR; (2) negligent
operation of a motor vehicle against Davis; and (3) loss of
consortium against all three defendants. (Id. pp. 2-5.) The first

1
As part of their Response, plaintiffs suggest Davis has died
since the accident. (Doc. #22, pp. 4-5.) Given the Court’s
conclusion that this case will be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address
that this matter.
two claims are alleged by Louis, while the third claim is alleged
by Francois. (Id.)
On January 6, 2020, defendants removed the case to this Court

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332. (Doc. #1.) The same day, defendants filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the case should
be dismissed because the only connection to Florida is plaintiffs’
residency. (Doc. #3, p. 1.) In response, plaintiffs argued the
Court could exercise personal jurisdiction or, alternatively,
allow for evidentiary discovery related to defendants’ business
ties with Florida. (Doc. #16, p. 5.) The Court granted the latter
request, denying the motion without prejudice and permitting
plaintiffs to conduct factual discovery on the personal
jurisdiction issue within forty-five days of the Court’s Order.
(Doc. #17, p. 2.) The Court also permitted plaintiffs to file an

amended complaint within sixty days, and defendants to file a
renewed motion to dismiss within fourteen days of the amended
complaint or the expiration of the time to file an amended
complaint. (Id.)
No amended complaint was subsequently filed and on April 23,
2020, defendants filed the Renewed Motion to Dismiss currently
before the Court. (Doc. #20.) In the motion, defendants argue
they do not have sufficient contacts with Florida to permit the
Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the matter. (Id.
p. 3.) In their Response, plaintiffs acknowledge that their
previous opposition to dismissal was based on defendants’ prior
assertion that they were registered to do business in Florida and

had appointed agents for service of process. (Doc. #22, pp. 1-
5.) However, because defendants have since stated this was an
erroneous assertion, plaintiffs request the motion be denied with
prejudice, but the case transferred to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Id. pp. 5-6.)
II.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
This Court has previously described the personal jurisdiction
requirements as follows:
To hear a case, a federal court must have
jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the action
and the parties to the action. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). Absent either, “the
court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Id.

A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if:
(1) personal jurisdiction is authorized under the forum
state’s long-arm statute and (2) the exercise of such
jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process.
Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1203
(11th Cir. 2015); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d
1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008). The exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with due process if the non-
resident defendant has established “certain minimum
contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
The plaintiff “bears the initial burden of alleging
in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima
facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v.
Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). A prima
facie case is established if the plaintiff alleges
enough facts to withstand a motion for directed
verdict. SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.
1997) (citation omitted). “First, the plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts in [its] complaint to initially
support long arm jurisdiction before the burden shifts
to the defendant to make a prima facie showing of the
inapplicability of the statute.” Future Tech. Today,
Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If the defendant sustains
its burden by raising “a meritorious challenge to
personal jurisdiction” “through affidavits,
documents[,] or testimony,” the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd.,
94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff is then
required to “substantiate the jurisdictional allegations
in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof,
and not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the
complaint.” Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at
1247 (citation omitted).

Pennisi v. Reed, 2018 WL 3707835, *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018)
(footnote and marks omitted). If the plaintiff’s complaint and
the defendant’s evidence conflict, “the district court must
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Thomas v. Brown, 504 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.
1990)).
Defendants argue (1) plaintiffs have alleged insufficient
facts to bring this action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm
statute, and (2) defendants do not have sufficient contacts with
Florida to satisfy due process requirements. (Doc. #22, pp. 4-
13.) The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute

Florida’s long-arm statute authorizes general and specific
personal jurisdiction. § 48.193(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. Section
48.193(2) addresses the exercise of general personal jurisdiction,
providing that “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and
not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is
wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim
arises from that activity.” In contrast, “specific personal
jurisdiction authorizes jurisdiction over causes of action arising
from or related to the defendant’s actions within Florida and
concerns a nonresident defendant’s contacts with Florida only as
those contacts related to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Louis

Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). Based on the language in the Complaint,
it appears plaintiffs are asserting both general and specific
jurisdiction for each defendant. (Doc. #5, ¶ 7.) Accordingly,
the Court will address each assertion as it applies to each
defendant.
a. General Jurisdiction
“Although no connexity is required for general jurisdiction,
the ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ requirement means
‘continuous and systematic general business contact with
Florida.’” Gazelles FL, Inc. v. Cupp, 2018 WL 7364591, *5 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (quoting Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd.,

739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). For general jurisdiction
to apply, the non-resident defendant’s affiliations with a state
must be “so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially
at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
127 (2014) (marks and citations omitted).
Having reviewed the allegations in the Complaint, the Court
finds plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to
establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction over any of
defendants. The Complaint alleges Milton and BTR operate “an
interstate trucking and transportation business in the State of
Florida,” and actively “transact business throughout Florida,
including Lee County.” (Doc. #5, ¶¶ 4-5.) However, Milton and

BTR are both Pennsylvania corporations (id.), and the allegations
in the Complaint are insufficient to show that these defendants
have “continuous and systematic general business contact with
Florida.” See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (“[O]nly a limited set of
affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-
purpose jurisdiction there. For an individual, the paradigm forum
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (citations
and marks omitted)); Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d
429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (“It is . . . incredibly difficult to
establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of

incorporation or principal place of business”).
The Complaint’s allegations regarding Davis are even less
sufficient than those regarding Milton and BTR. While the
Complaint generally alleges all the defendants engage in
“substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida (Doc. #5,
¶ 7), the allegations specifically as to Davis simply state he is
a Pennsylvania resident who caused the vehicular accident in New
Hampshire in the course of his employment for Milton and BTR (id.
¶ 6.) The Court finds these allegations insufficient given that
“[a] plaintiff has an especially heavy burden in seeking to
establish general jurisdiction.” In re Amtrak Sunset Ltd. Train
Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala., on Sept. 22, 1993, 923 F. Supp. 1524,

1528 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
Because the Complaint’s allegations regarding all three
defendants are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of
general jurisdiction, the Court will turn to the Complaint’s

alternative allegation of specific jurisdiction.
b. Specific Jurisdiction
Florida’s long-arm statute provides a variety of ways in which
a defendant can subject themselves to personal jurisdiction,
including by “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on
a business or business venture in this state or having an office
or agency in this state.” § 48.193(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. In the
Complaint, the plaintiffs allege jurisdiction is appropriate

because the defendants “are actively engaged in business” in
Florida. (Doc. #5, ¶ 7.) The Court will assume for purposes of
this Opinion and Order that this is an assertion of specific
jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1.
To establish that a defendant is “carrying on a business” for
purposes of section 48.193(1)(a)1., “the activities of the
defendant must be considered collectively and show a general course
of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit.” Future
Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1249. Factors relevant, but not
dispositive, to this analysis include the presence and operation
of an office in Florida, the possession and maintenance of a
license to do business in Florida, the number of Florida clients

served, and the percentage of overall revenue gleaned from Florida
clients. Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A.,
421 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
From the outset, it is clear that section 48.193(1)(a)1. does
not apply to Davis, who, as an employee of Milton and BTR, is not
“carrying on a business” within Florida. Furthermore, the Court
finds that the allegations related to Milton and BTR are
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of specific
jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1. The Complaint alleges
that Milton and BTR actively “transact business throughout
Florida, including Lee County.” However, this allegation, by
itself, is insufficient. See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314,

1318 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting “vague and conclusory allegations”
“are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction”); Am. Registry, LLC v. Hanaw, 2014 WL 12606501, *8
(M.D. Fla. July 16, 2014) (“Plaintiff also alleges that Levy and
Showmark Media ‘conduct business within this judicial district.’
This allegation is conclusory and cannot serve as the basis for
personal jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). In reviewing the
Complaint, the Court finds there are no allegations applicable to
the factors discussed above. Accordingly, the Court finds that
plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of specific
jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1. over any of the
defendants. See Gazelles, 2018 WL 7364591, *9 (“In this case, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie
[case] that § 48.193(1)(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over
the Defendants. In the Amended Complaint, there are no allegations
that Defendants have an office in Florida, a license to do business
in Florida, any Florida clients, nor any information regarding the
percentage of overall revenue received from Florida residents.”);
Am. Registry, LLC, 2014 WL 12606501, *8 (“Due to the absence of
factual allegations showing a general course of business activity
in Florida, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plead a
prima facie case of jurisdiction against Levy under Fla. Stat. §
48.193(1)(a)(1).”).
2. Minimum Contacts

The Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to plead
2
a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction under Florida’s long-
arm statute moots the issue of whether defendants have sufficient
contacts to satisfy due process concerns. See Madara v. Hall, 916
F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Only if both prongs of the
analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”); Goldberg v.
U.S., 2014 WL 2573060, *6 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (“Because the
Court determines that Goldberg failed to allege sufficient facts
to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statue, it is unnecessary to address
whether minimum contacts exist.”). Nonetheless, even if the
Complaint’s allegation of specific jurisdiction under section
48.193(1)(a)1. was sufficient as to Milton and BTR, the Court finds

2
If plaintiffs had sufficiently pled general jurisdiction
over the defendants, the minimum contacts analysis would have been
unnecessary. See Bioderm, Inc. v. Medexus, Inc., 2006 WL 8440122,
*6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2006) (“The due process requirement of
minimum contacts is determined by application of the continuous
and systematic contacts standard. Since Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)
governing general jurisdiction incorporates this high standard,
the Court concludes that Defendant maintained minimum contacts
with Florida to satisfy due process requirements.” (citation
omitted)).
these defendants lack the minimum contacts with Florida necessary
to satisfy due process.
In specific personal jurisdiction cases, the Court applies

the following three-part due process test: (1) whether the
plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” at least one of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident
defendant “purposefully availed” himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefit of the forum state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1355
(citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so,
“a defendant must make a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of
jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc.
v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Here, the Court need not make it past the first prong of the
analysis. See Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F. 3d 1307,
1313 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Because we conclude that the
plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to at least one
of Union Carbide’s contacts with Florida, we need not address
whether Union Carbide purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in Florida or whether the exercise of
jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”). In determining whether a plaintiff’s
claims arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with the

forum state, the Court “look[s] to the ‘affiliation between the
forum and the underling controversy,’ focusing on any ‘activity or
. . . occurrence that [took] place in the forum State.’” Id. at
1314 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct.
1773, 1780 (2017)). From the allegations in the Complaint, it is
clear plaintiffs’ injuries and claims arise from a vehicle accident
that occurred in New Hampshire, and therefore do not “arise out of
or relate to” any of the defendants’ contacts with Florida.
Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to establish the minimum
contacts required for personal jurisdiction and dismissal is
required.
B. Transfer

As an alternative to dismissal, plaintiffs request the case
be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc.
#22, p. 6.) Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought or to any district or
division to which all parties have consented.” “In this Circuit,
a court lacking personal jurisdiction of the defendant may transfer
the case under either [§] 1404(a) or [§] 1406(a).” Roofing & Sheet
Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982,
992 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982). As the party requesting the transfer,

it is plaintiffs’ burden “of persuading the trial court that
transfer is appropriate and should be granted,” Am. Aircraft Sales
Int’l, Inc. v. Airwarsaw, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351 (M.D.
Fla. 1999), and “the decision whether to transfer a case is left
to the sound discretion of the district court,” Roofing & Sheet
Metal Servs., Inc., 689 F.2d at 985. As plaintiffs have failed to
offer any argument as to why this matter should be transferred
rather than dismissed, the Court finds they have failed to meet
their burden under section 1404(a). See Interim Healthcare, Inc.
v. Interim Healthcare of Se. La., Inc., 2020 WL 3078531, *16 (S.D.
Fla. June 10, 2020) (“[A]lthough Defendants mention in the heading
of their Motion to Dismiss that the case should be transferred

pursuant to § 1404(a), they present no arguments regarding the
issue of transfer. Thus, the Court will not address the issue of
transfer pursuant to § 1404(a).”).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction (Doc. #20) is GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice to filing such claims in a jurisdiction in which
personal jurisdiction can be asserted against the defendants.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 20th day of
July, 2020.

Z tkteol
JOHN E. STEELE
SHMIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:
Parties of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105548. Public record. Not legal advice.