# Pratt v. Government Employees Insurance Company

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 2, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105490

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 2, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

AMBAR PRATT, F/K/A AMBAR
TORRES, AS ASSIGNEE OF MARISE S.
EASON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:18-cv-1607-T-36AEP

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.
___________________________________/

ORDER
This cause comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment,
(Doc. 35), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum
of Law, (Doc. 36). Both motions are ripe for the Court’s review. (Docs. 40, 41, 43, 44, 86, 87).
The Court, having considered the parties’ submissions and being fully advised in the premises,
will grant Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Undisputed Facts1
This action arises from a multiple-vehicle accident involving Ambar Pratt f/k/a Ambar
Torres, as assignee of Marise S. Eason (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. 39 ¶1). On November 10, 2006, Marise
S. Eason (“Eason”), while operating a vehicle, rear-ended another vehicle driven by Josh Hajipour,
in which Plaintiff, Jessica Hajipour, and Jaclynne McCrary (“McCrary”) were passengers. Id. As

1 The Court has determined the undisputed facts based on the Joint Stipulation of Agreed Material
Facts. (Doc. 39).
a result of this rear end collision, the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger collided with
another vehicle, which was driven by Michael Zapolski (“Zapolski”). This multiple-vehicle
accident caused injuries or potential injures to many individuals, including Plaintiff, Zapolski, Josh
Hajipour, Jessica Hajipour, Jason Ortiz, and Shane Richardson. Id. The accident also resulted in

McCrary’s death. Id.
At the time of the accident, Government Employees Insurance Company (“Defendant”)
insured Eason and his wife under an automobile liability insurance policy, policy number 4044-
39-32-15 (the “Policy”), which provided bodily injury liability limits in the amount of $25,000 per
person and $50,000 per occurrence. Id. at ¶2.
Nearly one month after the accident, on December 7, 2006, Eason reported the accident to
Defendant for the first time. Id. at ¶3. On the same day as Eason’s notification of the accident,
Defendant began an investigation and assigned Leslie Sinclair (“Sinclair”), a claims examiner, to
handle the claim. Id. at ¶4. On December 8, 2006, Sinclair obtained Eason’s recorded statement as
part of Defendant’s investigation of the accident. Id. at ¶5. During his recorded statement, Eason

claimed that he was driving a vehicle for his employer, Atlantic Tower Services (“ATS”), at the
time of the accident, not the vehicle insured under the Policy. Id. Hartford Fire Insurance Company
(“Hartford”), as ATS’s insurer, hired attorney Teresa Jones (“Jones”) to represent Eason and ATS.
Id. at ¶6. When Sinclair contacted Jones on December 8, 2006, Jones advised that the accident had
resulted in one fatality and several injured parties. Id. Jones also reported that Hartford had
received a policy limits demand for $1 million on behalf of McCrary. Id.
Less than one week later, Sinclair obtained another recorded statement from Eason, in
which he explained that he drove his co-worker’s ATS vehicle during the night of the accident
because the co-worker was too inebriated to drive. Id. at ¶7. Defendant decided to provide coverage
for the accident on December 14, 2006. Id. at ¶8. On the same day, Sinclair sent a certified letter
to Eason, which: (1) set forth the available limits under the Policy; (2) advised that the claims
arising from the accident would exceed the Policy’s limits; (3) informed Eason of his right to seek
legal counsel regarding any personal liability that may arise from the claims, as well as his right

to contribute any personal funds to the settlement of the claims; (4) informed Eason of the claims
being presented by Plaintiff, McCrary, Zapolski, Josh Hajipour, and Jessica Hajipour; and (5)
advised that these claims against Eason could exceed Hartford’s $1 million policy limits. Id. at ¶9.
Also on December 14, 2006, attorney Joseph Kissane (“Kissane”) notified Defendant that Hartford
had received a second demand for the Hartford policy’s limits from attorney Dominic Fariello
(“Fariello”), who represented Plaintiff, Josh Hajipour, and Jessica Hajipour. Id. at ¶10. When
Kissane advised Sinclair that he intended to schedule a global settlement conference to resolve the
claims against ATS and Eason, Sinclair advised him of her desire for a representative of Defendant
to be involved in any global settlement conference. Id.
On the next day, December 15, 2006, Defendant authorized settlement authority for the

entire $50,000 bodily injury liability per occurrence limit and advised Jones that it was offering
this amount to contribute towards the settlement of all the claims. Id. at ¶12. A few days later, on
December 20, 2006, Fariello sent a time-sensitive demand letter to Defendant on behalf of
Plaintiff, Josh Hajipour, and Jessica Hajipour. Id. at ¶13. In the letter, Fariello demanded the
$50,000 per occurrence bodily injury policy limits within fifteen days of the date of the letter—
January 4, 2007—to settle the injury claims of Plaintiff, Josh Hajipour, and Jessica Hajipour. Id.
Fariello emphasized in the letter that he directed the demand to Defendant and its “insured Marise
S. Eason alone and no other party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
On December 21, 2006, Mark Sugden, Defendant’s regional claims manager,
recommended that Defendant refer the case to its staff counsel for representation of Eason and
coordination of a global settlement conference to resolve the injury claims against Eason. Id. at
¶14. Jones also advised Defendant that Hartford had tendered its $1 million policy limits to

McCrary’s estate in exchange for a release of ATS and Eason, thereby exhausting Hartford’s
available policy limits. Id.
On December 26, 2006, Sinclair sent a letter to Eason, enclosing a copy of Fariello’s
demand letter, advising him that Defendant had retained counsel with the Law Office of James
Pratt on Eason’s behalf and that ATS had settled with McCrary’s estate for the Hartford policy’s
$1 million limits. Id. at ¶16. Sinclair also requested that the retained counsel coordinate a global
settlement conference to try to settle all claims. Id. Consequently, on the same day, attorney Cosmo
Bloom (“Bloom”) of the Law Office of James Pratt sent a letter to Fariello, on which Eason was
copied, which stated, in relevant part:
On behalf of its insured, Mr. Eason, GEICO believes that the most
fair and equitable way of resolving the claims herein is to coordinate
a global settlement conference. Due to the number of individual
claimants and the law firms involved, and the coincidence of the
holiday period, it would be greatly appreciated if the deadline
presented by your clients could be extended in order to permit the
scheduling of the global settlement conference.
Id. at ¶17.
Fariello agreed to extend the deadline for Defendant to respond to his demand on behalf of
Plaintiff, Josh Hajipour, and Jessica Hajipour from January 4, 2007, to January 10, 2007. Id. at
¶18. Sinclair advised Eason of this extension and Defendant’s plan for a global settlement
conference on December 27, 2006. Id.
On December 29, 2007, prior to the January 10, 2007 deadline for Defendant to respond,
Plaintiff terminated Fariello’s representation of her. Id. at ¶19. On January 3, 2007, Fariello
informed Defendant via letter that he no longer represented Plaintiff. Id. at ¶20. Fariello also
“withdrew [Plaintiff’s] demand” and, “based on the change in circumstances,” requested
Defendant to “tender[] its policy limit liability coverage of $25,000.00/$50,000.00 . . . for [Josh
Hajipour and Jessica Hajipour] collectively at $25,000.00 per claimant.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Fariello further advised that “[t]his will be [Defendant’s] only opportunity to settle
the claims of Josh Hajipour and Jessica Hajipour within [Defendant’s] policy limits” and that
demand was directed to Defendant and Eason “alone and no other party.” Id.
On January 4, 2007, Dee Setchel (“Setchel”), an attorney with the Law Office of James
Pratt, wrote on behalf of Defendant to all claimants, including Plaintiff, that Defendant had
scheduled a global settlement conference for January 8, 2007. Id. at ¶21. Setchel explained that
Defendant had authorized her to “tender the aggregate policy limits of $25/50 in full and complete
settlement of all claims against Marise S. Eason arising from the 11/10/2006 accident.” Id. Since
“that total amount may not be sufficient to fully compensate the parties,” Setchel explained, she
scheduled the settlement conference “to equitably distribute the settlement proceeds.” Id.

Attorney Ken Whalen (“Whalen”) responded to Setchel’s letter on January 4, 2007,
advising Setchel that he represented Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶22. Whalen objected to the scheduled global
settlement conference and requested that Defendant postpone the conference until Whalen was
able to obtain information regarding the available insurance coverages, as well as the injuries and
damages of the other parties. Id. Whalen requested Setchel to provide him with statutory insurance
disclosures, insurance coverage information, and an outline of the injuries sustained by the parties
before any settlement conference. Id. On January 5, 2007, Setchel advised Whalen that the global
settlement conference would proceed as scheduled, but that he could call into the conference by
telephone if he was unable to attend in person. Id. at ¶23. Setchel also explained the known
insurance coverages to Whalen and provided Whalen with an outline of the alleged injuries to the
other parties. Id.
The global settlement conference was held on January 8, 2007. Id. at ¶24. Whalen attended
on behalf of Plaintiff; Fariello attended on behalf of Josh Hajipour and Jessica Hajipour; attorney

Dick Greco attended on behalf of Zapolski; Jones attended on behalf of ATS and Eason; and
Kissane attended on behalf of Hartford. Id. Defendant’s staff counsel represented both Eason and
ATS at the conference. Id. On January 9, 2007, Setchel sent a check for $25,000, which represented
the per person Policy limits, to Whalen on behalf of Defendant, along with a proposed release of
Eason, Eason’s wife, and ATS. Id. at ¶25. This offer was for “full and final settlement of
[Plaintiff’s] claim,” and was “conditioned upon [Plaintiff] executing a mutually acceptable release
of all claims and demands.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Setchel’s letter advised, “A
proposed release is attached.” Id. A second global settlement conference was held on January 24,
2007, which Setchel attended on Eason’s behalf. Id. at ¶24 n.3. ATS’s contribution of additional
settlement funds, outside of insurance, toward a global settlement served as the basis for holding

this second conference. Id.
On January 28, 2010, Plaintiff’s current counsel filed a negligence action against Eason
(the “Underlying Action”). Id. at ¶26. Upon receipt of the lawsuit, Defendant retained attorney
James Thompson (“Thompson”) to defend Eason in the Underlying Action. Id. Eason testified that
Defendant provided him with competent counsel in the Underlying Action. Id. On September 15,
2016, Plaintiff and Eason agreed to a “Stipulated Final Judgment” in the amount of $1 million (the
“Stipulated Final Judgment”), which the state court entered. Id. at ¶27. Defendant was not a party
to the Stipulated Final Judgment. Id. Thereafter, on April 5, 2018, Plaintiff and Eason entered into
a “Joint Stipulation and Agreement,” (the “Joint Stipulation and Agreement”) to which Defendant
was not a party. Id.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action in state court on May 31, 2018, (Doc. 1-1), and Defendant

thereafter timely removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff brings one claim of
common law bad faith against Defendant, alleging that Defendant did not perform its fiduciary
duties in numerous ways, such as failing to evaluate the claims arising from the accident in a timely
and appropriate manner, failing to take timely and appropriate actions to minimize the risk of
Eason’s exposure to an excess judgment, and failing to accept the offer from Plaintiff and the
Hajipours promptly when Defendant knew, or should have known, that the injuries sustained by
Plaintiff and the Hajipours would substantially exceed the Policy’s limits. (Doc. 31 ¶28). Plaintiff
further alleges that Defendant’s breaches caused Eason’s exposure to the excess legal liability in
the judgment in the Underlying Action, which Defendant is legally required to satisfy fully to cure
the damage incurred by Eason as a result of Defendant’s breaches and failure to settle Plaintiff’s

claim. Id. at ¶30.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s common law bad faith claim. (Doc.
35 at 1–2). Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on her claim, seeking certain legal rulings
from the Court. (Doc. 36 at 2). The parties filed supplemental briefing, and the Court held oral
argument, on causation and damages. (Docs. 86, 87, 92).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
burden of stating the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating
the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Hickson Corp. v. N.
Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). That burden can be discharged if the

moving party can show the court that there is “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
When the moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324. Issues of
fact are “genuine only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence present, could find for the
nonmoving party,” and a fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. But, a party cannot
defeat summary judgment by relying on conclusory allegations. See Hill v. Oil Dri Corp. of Ga.,

198 F. App’x. 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment should be granted only if “the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The court need consider only
the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the
standard applied when only one party files a motion, but simply requires a determination of
whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed.
Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). The Court must
consider each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose
motion is under consideration. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[c]ross-motions for
summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless
one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.”
United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bricklayers Int’l Union,

Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975)). Cross-motions may, however,
be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties
as to the controlling legal theories and material facts. Id. at 1555–56.
III. ANALYSIS
In moving for summary judgment, Defendant first argues that, as a matter of law, it did not
act in bad faith. (Doc. 35 at 17). Defendant contends that no reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant acted in bad faith in its handling of Plaintiff’s bodily injury claim against Eason, it
fulfilled its duty of good faith to Eason, and Plaintiff was unwilling to settle her claim against
Eason. Id. at 1–2, 18–23. Plaintiff, on the other hand, seeks certain legal rulings based on allegedly
undisputed facts, such as requesting the Court to find that ATS was not insured under the Policy

and that Defendant’s January 9, 2007 offer required ATS to be released. (Doc. 36 at 2).
But the threshold issue in this bad faith action is the requisite causal connection between
the claimed damages and the alleged bad faith. Indeed, to prevail in a bad faith case, there must be
a “causal connection between the damages claimed and the insurer’s bad faith.” Perera v. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 903–04 (Fla. 2010). Without this causal connection, Plaintiff’s
bad faith claim fails. Therefore, the Court begins its analysis with this issue. Defendant argues in
its Motion for Final Summary Judgment that the Court should enter summary judgment in its favor
because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff failed to obtain an excess judgment or its functional
equivalent. (Doc. 35 at 23). Plaintiff contends, both in her response thereto and in her Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, that the Stipulated Final Judgment is valid and caused by Defendant’s
bad faith failure to settle. (Docs. 36 at 11; 41 at 18). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
agrees that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff did not obtain an excess
judgment or its functional equivalent.

A. Excess Judgment and Functional Equivalents
A causal connection between the claimed damages and the insurer’s bad faith must exist
in order for a party to prevail in a bad faith action. Perera, 35 So. 3d at 903–04. “Under ordinary
circumstances, a third party must obtain a judgment against the insured in excess of the policy
limits before prosecuting a bad-faith claim against the insured’s liability carrier.” Cunningham v.
Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994). “Causation is a prerequisite for the
claim: for an insured to bring a bad faith claim, the injured party must first win an excess
judgment.” Cawthorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 791 F. App’x 60, 64 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing
Cunningham, 630 So. 2d at 181–82).2 Thus, “causation is proved with an excess judgment, which
is a judgment above the insurance policy limits.” Id.; see also Cunningham, 630 at 181 (“[T]he

essence of a third-party bad-faith cause of action is to remedy a situation in which an insured is
exposed to an excess judgment because of the insurer’s failure to properly or promptly defend the
claim.”). This rule, referred to as the “excess judgment rule,” prevents courts from deciding cases
without jurisdiction, as a case or controversy does not exist before an excess judgment. Cawthorn,
791 F. App’x at 64.

2 Unpublished decisions of the Eleventh Circuit are not binding precedent, but may be cited as
persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
“An excess judgment is defined as the difference between all available insurance coverage
and the amount of the verdict recovered by the injured party.” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v.
Jennings, 731 So. 2d 1258, 1259 n.2 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Cawthorn, 791 F.
App’x at 64 (“[A] judgment is an excess judgment when the amount of the verdict recovered by

the injured party is greater than all the available insurance coverage.”) (emphasis in original). A
“verdict” is defined as “[a] jury’s finding or decision on the factual issues of a case.” Verdict,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
However, “[a]n excess judgment . . . is not always a prerequisite to a bad-faith action.”
Perera, 35 So. 3d at 899. Three recognized exceptions exist under Florida law, which are treated
as “functional equivalents” of an excess judgment. Id. (citing Perera, 35 So.3d at 899). As such,
when one of these “functional equivalents” applies, “an insured can show causation based on a
stipulation of damages rather than an excess judgment.” Id. The Supreme Court of Florida has not
foreclosed the possibility that other “functional equivalents” to excess judgments may exist. See
Perera, 35 So.3d at 899 (“We turn now to an examination of the recognized circumstances under

Florida case law that may be relevant to this case . . . .”) (emphasis added); Cawthorn v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., No. 6:16-cv-2240-Orl-28GJK, 2018 WL 1996835, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27,
2018) (Antoon, J.) (“Perera does not foreclose the possibility that other alternatives may qualify
as the functional equivalent of an excess judgment.”), aff’d, 791 F. App’x at 60.
The first recognized functional equivalent of an excess judgment involves an excess
carrier’s “bad-faith claim against a primary insurer by virtue of equitable subrogation under certain
circumstances where the primary insurer has not acted in good faith.” Perera, 35 So. 3d at 900. In
other words, an excess carrier incurs damages as a result of the primary carrier’s alleged bad faith
and brings a bad faith claim against the primary insurer on the basis of equitable subrogation.
“Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, an excess insurer has the right to ‘maintain a cause
of action . . . for damages resulting from the primary carrier’s bad faith refusal to settle the claim
against their common insured.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison Assurance Co.¸600
So. 2d 1147, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)).

Second, Cunningham agreements constitute another recognized functional equivalent of
an excess judgment. Perera, 35 So. 3d at 899 (citing Cunningham, 630 So. 2d at 182). Cunningham
agreements “involve the situation where there is not a previous excess judgment but an insurer and
a third-party claimant enter into an agreement and stipulate to try the bad-faith issues first.” Id.
The parties to a Cunningham agreement also “stipulate that if no bad faith is found, the thirty-party
claimant will settle for the policy limits, thus protecting the insured from exposure to an excess
judgment.” Id.
Coblentz agreements constitute the third recognized functional equivalent of an excess
judgment. Perera, 35 So. 3d at 900. Coblentz agreements stem from the former Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals’ holding in Coblentz v. American Surety Co. of New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.
1969).3 “Coblentz agreements arise when the insurance company fails to defend the insured and,

3 In Coblentz, an insurer ultimately determined that it was not obligated to defend the insured in a
state court action against the insured and withdrew its defense of the insured. 416 F.2d at 1060.
The insured subsequently retained other counsel and entered into a jury trial waiver, along with a
stipulation of facts and testimony, which resulted in the state court entering judgments for the
plaintiff totaling $50,000. Id. at 1061. The plaintiff procured the issuance of a writ of garnishment
against the insurer after the entry of the state court judgments. Id. The insurer contended that the
judgment did not obligate it to pay anything because the judgment did not obligate the insured to
pay anything. Id. at 1063. On appeal, the former Fifth Circuit recognized that, based upon the
pleadings, the insurer was obligated to undertake the insured’s defense. Id. Further, the insurer’s
decision to leave the insured to his own defenses barred the insurer from subsequently complaining
about the form of the judgment. Id. Indeed, the former Fifth Circuit recognized that, as a result of
the insurer’s decision not to defend the insured, “consent[ing] to the entry of a judgment that could
be satisfied only from public liability insurance policies covering [the insured] at the time of the
incident rather than from his own asserts” was in the insured’s “best interest.” Id.
in response, the insured and the injured third party agree to settle the suit and allow the injured
third party to sue the insurance company on a theory of bad faith.” Cawthorn, 791 F. App’x at 64
(citing Coblentz, 416 F.2d at 1063). Unlike Cunningham agreements, Coblentz agreements lack
the insurer’s participation. Schultz v. Gov’t Emps. Ins Co., No. 1:15-cv-172-MW/GRJ, 2018 WL

7185324, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2018). The Supreme Court of Florida has explained:
The opportunity for a settlement without the agreement of the
insurer traditionally has occurred where an insurer breaches its duty
to defend, leaving the insured “to its own devices” to settle the case
or proceed to trial. In those circumstances, the insured is left
unprotected and may enter into a reasonable settlement agreement
with the third-party claimant and consent to an adverse judgment for
the policy limits that is collectable only against the insurer.
Perera, 35 So. 3d at 900.
“Florida courts have also extended the reasoning of Coblentz to allow agreements by the
insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits against an insurer who wrongfully refuses to
defend and acts in bad faith.” Id. “Where an injured party wishes to recover under a Coblentz
agreement, ‘the injured party must bring an action against the insurer and prove coverage, wrongful
refusal to defend, and that the settlement was reasonable and made in good faith.’” Chomat v. N.
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 919 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Quintana v. Barad, 528 So. 2d
1300, 1301 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)). Thus, the insurer’s failure to defend is a central feature of
Coblentz agreements. The claimant also “must ‘assume the burden of initially going forward with
the production of evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing of reasonableness and lack of
bad faith, even though the ultimate burden of proof will rest upon the carrier.’” Id. (quoting Steil
v. Fla. Physicians’ Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)).
B. Application
Preliminarily, the Policy provides, in relevant part:
3. ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION OF THE INSURED
The insured will cooperate and assist us, if requested:
. . .
(b) in making settlements;
(c) in the conduct of suits; and
(d) in enforcing any right of contribution or indemnity against any
legally responsible person or organization because of bodily injury
or property damage; and
. . .
Only at his or her own cost will the insured make a payment, assume
any obligation or incur any cost other than for first aid to others.
4. ACTION AGAINST US
No suit will lie against us:
(a) unless the insured has fully complied with all the policy’s terms
and conditions, and
(b) until the amount of the insured’s obligation to pay has been
finally determined, either
(i) by a final judgment against the insured after actual trial;
or
(ii) by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and us.
A person or organization or the legal representative of either, who
secures a judgment or written agreement, may then sue to recover
up to the policy limits.
(Doc. 31-1 at 7) (original emphasis removed).
On August 25, 2016, Thompson provided Defendant with draft copies of the Stipulated
Final Judgment and the Stipulation for Final Judgment. (Docs. 35-34 at 1–6). Thompson described
these documents as “the offer of Plaintiff to resolve this case short of a trial.” (Doc. 35-34 at 1).
Thompson advised Defendant that he looked forward to hearing from Defendant. Id. The copy of
the Stipulated Final Judgment provided by Thompson to Defendant is identical to the court-
executed copy of the same document, which Plaintiff provided. (Docs. 31-3; 35-34 at 3–4).
Similarly, Thompson’s provided copy of the Stipulation for Final Judgment is identical to the
partially executed copy of the same document, as provided by Plaintiff, and neither party objects
that these submitted copies are not representative of the final versions of the document. (Docs. 35-

34 at 5–6; 36-5 at 1–2).
Under the terms of the Stipulation for Final Judgment, Plaintiff and Eason would agree to
settle the Underlying Action to “avoid the expense and uncertainties of a jury trial” and the entry
of a judgment. (Doc. 36-35 at 1). To that end, the Stipulation for Final Judgment provided that the
settlement would resolve any claims by Plaintiff against Eason in the Underlying Action, except
taxable costs and attorney’s fees, and the total amount of the stipulated settlement agreement would
be $1 million. Id. The Stipulation for Final Judgment also provided that, prior to entering into the
stipulation, Eason had “confirmed with” Defendant that he was “not violating the terms and
conditions of” the Policy, “specifically the clauses involving voluntary assumption/payment and
lack of cooperation.” Id. at 2. Execution of the Stipulation for Final Judgment would not assign

any of Eason’s rights, claims, or causes of action that Eason had against Defendant arising out of
or related to the Underlying Action; Eason made such assignment in the Joint Stipulation and
Agreement, executed by Plaintiff and Eason over one-and-a-half years later. (Doc. 31-4 at 2).
Finally, the Stipulated Final Judgment would enter judgment in the Underlying Action against
Eason, providing that Plaintiff shall recover $1 million from Eason, pursuant to the “Stipulation
for Final Judgment entered into by the parties.” (Doc. 35-34 at 3–4).
Thompson subsequently inquired whether there was “any word” from Defendant regarding
“the stipulated judgment” and informed Defendant that “Eason is asking that we demand that
[Defendant] allow him to enter into the stipulation. (Doc. 35-34 at 7). On September 14, 2016,
Daniel Anthony (“Anthony”), a claims examiner of Defendant, responded to Thompson as
follows:
GEICO tried to resolve this claim with [Plaintiff] for the full
available policy limits of $25,000. [Plaintiff] refused to settle and
filed suit. GEICO has assigned your firm to defend its insured.
GEICO will continue to honor its obligation to defend. GEICO will
not, however, agree to allow your client to enter into agreements
involving extra-contractual issues. It is our understanding that your
desire is to end this case by entry of a consent judgment for One
Million Dollars ($1,000,000) in favor of [Plaintiff] and against your
client, Mr. Eason. If our understanding is correct, GEICO agrees not
to raise policy defenses of voluntary payment or failure to cooperate
if your client wishes to consent to a judgment against him in the
amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000). To be clear, GEICO
does not agree that [Plaintiff’s] claim has a value equal to or greater
than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000). GEICO leaves to you and
your client the determination of whether agreeing to a judgment in
this amount is in your client’s best interests.
(Doc. 35-35 at 1).
It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Eason agreed to, and the state court entered, the Stipulated
Final Judgment in the Underlying Action, which was in the amount of $1 million. (Doc. 39 ¶27).
The court-executed copy of the Stipulated Final Judgment demonstrates that it was entered on
September 15, 2016. (Doc. 31-3 at 2). The parties likewise agree that Defendant was not a party
to the Stipulated Final Judgment. (Doc. 39 ¶27). Indeed, the Stipulated Final Judgment does not
mention Defendant. (Doc. 31-3 at 1–2). Additionally, the Stipulation for Final Judgment did not
provide a place for Defendant to sign and, as Plaintiff conceded during oral argument, Defendant
did not sign the document. The parties agree that Pratt and Eason entered into the Joint Stipulation
and Agreement in 2018, (Doc. 39 ¶27), in which Eason granted an assignment of certain rights,
claims, actions, or causes of action that Eason had against Defendant which arose out of or in any
way related to the subject matter of the Underlying Action, (Doc. 31-4 at 2). While the parties
stipulate that Defendant was not a party to the Stipulated Final Judgment, they disagree as to
whether Defendant agreed to the Stipulated Final Judgment.
On these facts, the Court now examines the existence of an excess judgment or its
functional equivalent.

1. Excess Judgment
Defendant argues that the parties do not dispute that the Underlying Action lacked a trial
and an excess jury verdict. (Doc. 35 at 24). Defendant also argues that a stipulated judgment cannot
constitute an excess verdict to establish damages in a third-party bad faith claim. Id. As previously
noted, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in Cawthorn that, “in this context,” a “judgment is a final
decision—a verdict—reached by a factfinder. A judgment is an excess judgment when the amount
of the verdict recovered by the injured party is greater than all the available insurance coverage. A
consent judgment, on the other hand, is akin to a private contract, one that is simply acknowledged
and recorded by a court.” Cawthorn, 791 F. App’x at 65 (emphasis in original) (citation and
footnote omitted). Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that Florida courts have used “judgment”

and “verdict” interchangeably, the court nonetheless observed that Florida courts construe
“judgment” narrowly in this context, as demonstrated by the carving out of specific functional
equivalents, instead of deeming all consent judgments to be sufficient. Id. at 65 n.1. Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that Florida courts would find a consent judgment to
constitute a “judgment” in this narrow context, explaining that adopting this argument would
“carv[e] out a fourth exception to the excess judgment rule.” Id. at 65.
Here, the Stipulated Final Judgment does not constitute an excess judgment. First, the
Stipulated Final Judgment does not represent the difference between the amount of a verdict and
all available insurance coverage. Indeed, a verdict was not rendered in the Underlying Action
because Plaintiff and Eason settled the action and stipulated to the entry of the $1 million judgment
against Eason. Significantly, Plaintiff has not argued, through its briefing or during oral argument,
that a verdict was rendered in the Underlying Action. Further, even when considering any
interchangeable use of “verdict” and “judgment,” the Court is not persuaded that this type of

consent judgment is one that Florida courts would recognize as the requisite type of “judgment”
in this narrow context where, as discussed further below, the parties agree that Defendant did not
fail to defend Eason and Defendant, through Anthony, explained that it did not agree to Eason’s
entry into an agreement involving extra contractual issues.
In her supplemental briefing, Plaintiff argues that the Stipulated Final Judgment serves as
the requisite type of judgment to bring this bad faith claim.4 Plaintiff asserts that a judgment
entered upon consent or stipulation has “the same legal force and effect as any other judgment.”
(Doc. 86 at 2). Plaintiff highlights that the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that consent
judgments are entitled to the same preclusive effect as any other judgment issued by a Florida
court. Id. On this basis, Plaintiff argues that the Stipulated Final Judgment “constitutes an element

of damage[s] as if it were the product of a jury verdict” since the two are “legally equivalent.” Id.
(emphasis added). As such, during oral argument, Plaintiff argued that “a consent judgment is, for
all intents and purposes, the same as a judgment by jury trial.”
A consent judgment is a judicially approved contract. Arrieta-Gimenez v. Arrieta-Negron,
551 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1989); Cawthorn, 791 F. App’x at 65 (“A consent judgment, on the

4 In responding to Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the fact
that the Stipulated Final Judgment was the product of a stipulation rather than a jury verdict is “of
no moment” because “claimants and insureds commonly stipulate to judgments which are
enforceable against insurers under so-called Coblentz Agreements.” (Doc. 41 at 18). This argument
fails to explain the existence of the requisite excess judgment, and the inapplicability of Coblentz
agreements is discussed herein.
other hand, is akin to a private contract, one that is simply acknowledged and received by a
court.”). Notably, a consent judgment is entitled to the same preclusive, res judicata effect as any
other judgment because it is technically a judgment. Arrieta-Gimenez, 551 So. 2d at 1186.
However, while consent judgments may carry the same preclusive effect as any other judgment,

the inquiry is whether a consent judgment constitutes an excess judgment for a bad faith action,
not whether a consent judgment broadly constitutes a judgment. Plaintiff’s cited authority on this
point is devoid of any analysis of excess judgments in bad faith cases, nor does the authority stand
for the proposition that a consent judgment constitutes the type of “judgment” that Florida courts
have recognized as sufficient in the context of this action.
Plaintiff further argues that Cawthorn is distinguishable, thereby purportedly supporting
her argument that the Stipulated Final Judgment is sufficient. (Doc. 86 at 2). In Cawthorn, the
plaintiff sustained significant injuries while traveling in a car driven by Ledford, which was owned
by Ledford’s father’s business, Bob Ledford’s RV & Marine, Inc (“Bob’s RV”). Id. at 61. At the
time of the accident, Bob’s RV was covered by two policies provided by the insurer: a $1 million

Garage Liability Policy and a $2 million Commercial Umbrella Policy, totaling $3 million of
coverage. Id. at 61. Ledford was a scheduled driver on the Garage Liability Policy. Id. at 62. In
relevant part, after the plaintiff sued Ledford and Bob’s RV, the plaintiff’s attorney sent a proposed
settlement agreement to Ledford and Bob’s RV, which required a $33 million consent judgment
against Ledford, the plaintiff’s covenant not to execute the judgment against Ledford, and tender
by the insurer of $3 million policy limits to settle claims against Bob’s RV. Id. The proposed
settlement agreement contained signature lines for the plaintiff, Bob’s RV, Ledford, and the
insurer. Id. A representative of the insurer responded that the insurer would be willing to pay the
full $3 million to the plaintiff while continuing to provide a defense for Ledford, but, as to any
future consent judgment against Ledford, that would be solely up to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s
counsel, and Ledford’s counsel. Id. As such, the plaintiff and Ledford continued the settlement
discussions without the insurer and executed the final agreement. Id. at 62–63. The final agreement
did not contain a signature line for the insurer, and there was no evidence that the insurer saw the

agreement. Id. at 63.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the consent judgment constituted
an excess judgment because final verdicts and consent judgments were indistinguishable in third-
party bad faith claims. Id. at 65. The court explained that the cited authority was unpersuasive
because only one case mentioned whether the defendant-insurer was a party to the consent
judgment and that case was “inapposite” because the defendant-insurer was a party to the consent
judgment. Id.
Here, Plaintiff argues that, unlike Cawthorn, Defendant agreed to the resolution of the
Underlying Action by entry of the Stipulated Final Judgment. (Doc. 86 at 2). Plaintiff points out
that Defendant, through Anthony, agreed not to raise the Policy defenses of voluntary payment or

failure to cooperate if Eason desired to have a consent judgment in the amount of $1 million
entered against him. Id. Plaintiff contends that this agreement was in accordance with the Policy,
which requires a final judgment after a trial, or the written agreement of Eason, Plaintiff, and
Defendant, before a suit will lie against Defendant. Id. at 3. Plaintiff classifies Defendant’s
representations as demonstrating that Defendant “participated in the consent judgment,” which,
according to Plaintiff, served as the basis for the Eleventh Circuit finding the plaintiff’s submitted
authority in Cawthorn as “inapposite.” Id. at 4.
Under Florida contract law, “the acceptance of an offer which results in a contract must be
absolute and unconditional, identical with the terms of the offer, and in the mode, at the place, and
within the time expressly or impliedly stated within the offer.” Cheverie v. Geisser, 783 So. 2d
1115, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In determining whether a settlement agreement is enforceable,
“the evidence must clearly demonstrate that there was mutual agreement to the material settlement
terms.” Id. at 1118. Further, a party’s assent “is manifested through written or spoken words, or

inferred in whole or in part from the parties conduct.’” L&H Const. Co., Inc. v. Circle Redmont,
Inc., 55 So. 3d 630, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
“[t]he party seeking enforcement must show that the opposing party assented to the agreement.”
Cawthorn, 2018 WL 1996835, at *8 (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 532 So. 2d 1109, 1109 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1988)).
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s purported acceptance of the offer relayed by
Thompson was absolute and unconditional or identical with the terms of the offer. Plaintiff latches
on to one portion of Anthony’s response to Thompson to claim that Defendant agreed to the entry
of the Stipulated Final Judgment. However, when read in its entirety, and in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, Anthony’s response simply does not demonstrate Defendant’s acceptance of

the Stipulated Final Judgment or the Stipulation for Final Judgment. Anthony, on behalf of
Defendant, expressly rejected Eason’s entry into any agreement involving extra-contractual issues,
stating that Defendant would not allow Eason to enter into any agreements involving extra-
contractual issues. As the $1 million amount of the then-proposed Final Stipulated Judgment
exceeded the Policy limits, the judgment would constitute an extra contractual issue.
Anthony also pointed out that Defendant had honored its obligation to provide a defense
for Eason and that Eason was Thompson’s client. Thus, although Anthony advised that Defendant
would not raise policy defenses if Eason desired to consent to a judgment against him in the amount
of $1 million, Anthony emphasized that the decision of whether Eason’s agreement to the entry of
this $1 million judgment was in Eason’s best interests would be left to Thompson and Eason, as
Thompson’s client. Anthony reiterated that Defendant had attempted to resolve the claim for full
available policy limits and had retained Thompson to defend Eason after the lawsuit was filed.
Anthony stressed that Defendant did not agree that the value of Plaintiff’s claim equaled, or

exceeded, $1 million and that Defendant would continue to honor its obligation to defend Eason
in the Underlying Action. Anthony’s response does not clearly demonstrate the existence of
Defendant’s mutual agreement to the material settlement terms. Florida law provides that “one
who is not a party to a settlement agreement cannot be bound by its terms.” Ahern v. Odyssey Re
(London) Ltd., 788 So. 2d 369, 371–72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). It is undisputed that Defendant was
not a party to the Stipulated Final Judgment and did not sign the Stipulation for Final Judgment.
As such, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant accepted the terms of the Stipulated Final
Judgment or the Stipulation for Final Judgment.
Further, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant otherwise assented to the Stipulated
Final Judgment or the Stipulation for Final Judgment. The Policy provides that a suit may not lie

against Defendant “until the amount of the insured’s obligation to pay has been finally determined”
by a final judgment against Eason after actual trial or by a written agreement of Eason, Plaintiff,
and Defendant. (Doc. 31-1 at 7). Plaintiff argues that Defendant complied with this requirement
of the Policy when Anthony advised that Defendant agreed not to raise policy defenses if Eason
and Thompson determined that it was in Eason’s best interest to enter into the Stipulated Final
Judgment. However, Plaintiff has failed to offer any substantive argument as to how the Court
should interpret this section of the Policy, including the final determination of Eason’s “obligation
to pay” or the type of “written agreement” required therein.
Additionally, Anthony’s response that Defendant would not raise the voluntary payment
or the failure to cooperate Policy defenses does not demonstrate that Defendant assented to a
stipulated judgment in excess of the Policy limits, especially in light of Defendant’s express
rejection of allowing Eason to enter into an agreement for extra-contractual issues and objection

to the value of the proposed Stipulated Final Judgment.5 Anthony’s explanation that the
determination of whether Eason’s entry into the proposed Stipulated Final Judgment was in his
best interests “differs from stating an insured may enter into a specific settlement agreement or
consent judgment and thereby bind the insurer.” Cawthorn, 2018 WL 1996835, at *9. Even if the
Court were to find that Anthony’s response constituted the requisite written agreement by Plaintiff,
Defendant, and Eason, Plaintiff fails to explain how such an agreement could provide a legal basis
for considering a consent judgment a “judgment,” as narrowly defined in this context. And, as
previously mentioned, Defendant did not sign the Stipulation for Final Judgment. “[A]n insurer is
not bound by an unauthorized settlement notwithstanding the terms of its policy” requiring the
insurer’s consent to settle. Schultz, 2018 WL 7185324, at *6; see also Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.

Frankel Enters., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[A]n insurer cannot be bound
by an unauthorized settlement when it has not refused to defend, even if it denies coverage.”);
Cawthorn, 2018 WL 1996835, at *10 (“Only Coblentz agreements allow the insured and third-
party claimants to determine an insured’s excess exposure independently.”). As Plaintiff admitted
during oral argument that she relies on only Anthony’s communication, she has failed to point to
any other words or conduct demonstrating Defendant’s assent.

5 To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s agreement not to raise the voluntary payment
or failure to cooperate Policy defenses constitutes a waiver and Defendant cannot now rely on such
defenses, Defendant does not rely on the defenses to challenge the bad faith claim. Instead,
Defendant challenges the bad faith claim, in part, on the grounds that the requisite excess judgment
or functional equivalent are absent.
Finally, Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Cawthorn to establish the requisite excess
judgment is unavailing. Although the Eleventh Circuit distinguished a cited case on the basis that
the insurer in that case was a party to the consent judgment, thereby making the case inapposite,
Plaintiff has failed to establish here that Defendant was a party to the Stipulated Final Judgment
or the Stipulation for Final Judgment.6 Defendant appointed Thompson to defend Eason in the

Underlying Action. Thompson’s actions in the defense of Eason cannot be said to bind Defendant.
See Cawthorn, 2018 WL 1996835, at *9 (“And an insurer cannot be bound by the actions of an
appointed attorney over which it had no control.”).
In sum, the question is whether the Stipulated Final Judgment constitutes an excess
judgment. Defendant has shown that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that there was not
an excess judgment in the Underlying Action: the Stipulated Final Judgment does not represent
the difference between a verdict and all available insurance coverage. There was no verdict in the
Underlying Action. Florida courts construe “judgment” narrowly, and the Court is unpersuaded
that the type of consent judgment here is one that Florida courts would recognize as the requisite

type of “judgment.” Finding a consent judgment such as the Stipulated Final Judgment to be an
excess judgment would carve out an additional exception to the excess judgment rule. No
reasonable jury could find that Defendant agreed to the Stipulation Final Judgment or the
Stipulation for Final Judgment. Nonetheless, as demonstrated above, an excess judgment is not
always a prerequisite to a bad faith action. The question accordingly becomes whether this action

6 The case distinguished by the Eleventh Circuit in Cawthorn mentions only in passing, without
further explanation or analysis, that a stipulated judgment in excess of the policy limits was
“entered by agreement among” the injured party, the insured, the insured’s husband, and the
insurer. Gutierrez v. Yochim, 23 So. 3d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
presents a “functional equivalent” to an excess judgment. Accordingly, the Court turns to the
functional equivalents.
2. Cunningham Agreements and Excess Carrier
The Court easily dispenses with two of the functional equivalents. First, the Stipulation for

Final Judgment—the agreement between Eason and Plaintiff in the Underlying Action—does not
present a scenario in which an excess carrier brings a bad faith claim against a primary insurer by
virtue of equitable subrogation. Next, the Stipulation for Final Judgment is not akin to a
Cunningham agreement because the agreement is not one in which Defendant, as the insurer, and
Plaintiff, as the third-party claimant, stipulated to try bad-faith issues first. Further, the Stipulation
for Final Judgment did not provide that Plaintiff would settle for the Policy limits if no bad faith
was found. Accordingly, these two functional equivalents are inapplicable.
3. Coblentz Agreements
Having recognized that the Stipulated Final Judgment does not constitute an excess
judgment and having dispensed with two of the three recognized functional equivalents, the Court

must examine whether the Stipulation for Final Judgment constitutes a Coblentz agreement. For
the reasons set forth below, the agreement does not constitute a Coblentz agreement.
As described above, Coblentz agreements arise when an insurer fails to defend the insured
and, thereafter, the insured and the injured party agree to settle the suit and allow the injured third-
party to file a bad faith lawsuit against the insurer. Contending that the agreement is not a Coblentz
agreement, Defendant highlights that it complied with its duty to defend and retained Thompson
on Eason’s behalf in the Underlying Action. (Doc. 35 at 4). Indeed, the parties do not dispute that
Defendant retained Thompson on Eason’s behalf in the Underlying Action upon Defendant’s
receipt of the lawsuit or that Eason testified that Defendant provided him with competent defense
counsel in the Underlying Action.
Plaintiff admits in her response to Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment that
the Underlying Action’s judgment resulted from a stipulation between the parties, rather than a

verdict, but asserts that the lack of verdict is “of no moment,” as “claimants and insureds
commonly stipulate to judgments which are enforceable against insurers under so-called Coblentz
[a]greements.” (Doc. 41 at 18). Plaintiff claims that “Coblentz [a]greements are typically entered
into where the insurer denies coverage,” yet also claims that Defendant did not deny coverage to
Eason. Id. During the final minutes of oral argument, Plaintiff argued that “this is really a Coblentz
agreement arrived at by contracting of the parties.”
Plaintiff’s attempts to argue that the Stipulation for Final Judgment constitutes a Coblentz
agreement are unavailing. Critically, the parties agree that: Defendant made the decision to provide
coverage for the accident on December 14, 2006; upon Plaintiff’s filing of the Underlying Action,
Defendant hired Thompson to defend Eason in the Underlying Action upon receipt of the lawsuit;

and Eason testified that Defendant provided him with competent defense counsel in the Underlying
Action. Anthony’s response to Thompson also clearly emphasized that Defendant would continue
to honor its obligation to provide a defense for Eason, which Plaintiff does not dispute. Plaintiff
admits on the first page of her supplemental briefing that Defendant provided counsel to defend
Eason against her claims. (Doc. 86 at 1). Coblentz agreements discourage insurers from breaching
the duty to defend and leaving insureds to their “own devices” to settle the case or proceed to trial.
Perera, 35 So. 3d at 900. Plaintiff does not claim that this occurred here. Because it is undisputed
that Defendant did not fail to defend Eason in the Underlying Action, the agreement in the instant
action does not constitute a Coblentz agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no genuine dispute of material fact that an excess judgment or functional
equivalent, which serves as the requisite causal element for a bad faith claim, is absent. Because
this causal element is absent, Plaintiff's bad faith claim necessarily fails, and the Court need not
examine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Defendant acted in bad
faith. Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for
Final Summary Judgment is due to be granted. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is due to be denied, as moot.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of
Law (Doc. 36) is DENIED.
3. The Clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant Government
Employees Insurance Company and against Plaintiff Ambar Pratt, F/K/A Ambar
Torres, as assignee of Marise S. Eason.
4. The Clerk is further directed to terminate all pending motions and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on July 2, 2020.

Chak tare aut anda Ma TA pi ye □□
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge
Copies to:
Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105490. Public record. Not legal advice.