# Carter v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Duval County)

> District Court, M.D. Florida · June 16, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105280

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 16, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105280

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JAMES ROY CARTER,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 3:18-cv-809-J-39JBT

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
James Roy Carter, a petitioner proceeding pro se, challenges
his state court (Duval County) conviction for carjacking through
his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By
a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1). He raises one
ground. Id. at 5. Respondents filed an Answer in Response to
Order to Show Cause (Response) (Doc. 10).1 Petitioner filed a
notice that he does not intend to file a reply (Doc. 12). See
Order (Doc. 4).

1 The Court will reference the page number assigned by the
electronic filing system with respect to all documents and
exhibits.
II. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Petitioner carries the burden to establish a need for an
evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011) (opining a petitioner bears
the burden of establishing the need for an evidentiary hearing
with more than speculative and inconcrete claims of need), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 1120 (2012). Upon review, Petitioner has not met
this burden; the Court finds it can "adequately assess
[Petitioner's] claims without further factual development," Turner
v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1034 (2004). The Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
474 (2007).

III. THE PETITION AND RESPONSE
Although not a model of clarity, in ground one of the
Petition, Petitioner apparently challenges the filing of the
information, stating it was filed in bad faith, and the sufficiency
of the evidence presented at trial, complaining there were
“unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct” and no foundation for
the jury to find a factual act of force, assault, violence or
putting in fear in the taking of the motor vehicle. Petition at
5. Additionally, Petitioner claims he was improperly sentenced
to life because he was not charged with the greater offense of
2
carjacking with a weapon. Id. at 6-7. Finally, Petitioner
asserts he was acquitted by the state circuit court judge in the
order denying post-conviction relief. Id. at 10-11. Under relief
requested, Petitioner references the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and relies on the Due Process Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the “equity of the paramount organic laws.”
Id. at 21.
Respondents, noting the Petition is not entirely clear,
restate Petitioner’s ground one: “whether Petitioner fairly
presented his claim that his due process rights were violated
because the information in his case was filed in bad faith[.]”
Response at 14 (capitalization omitted). Respondents contend

ground one is unexhausted and procedurally barred. Id. at 14-17.
Alternatively, Respondents assert the information adequately
placed Petitioner on notice of the offense, satisfying due process
requirements. Id. at 18-20. Finally, they submit, to the extent
Petitioner argues insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence at
trial was sufficient to support every element of the offense of
carjacking. Id. at 20-22.
IV. HABEAS REVIEW
In this case, Petitioner claims he is detained “in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
3
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court recognizes its authority to award
habeas corpus relief to state prisoners “is limited-by both statute
and Supreme Court precedent.” Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 936
F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Apr. 20, 2019) (No. 19-8341). The AEDPA governs a state prisoner's
federal petition for habeas corpus and “prescribes a deferential
framework for evaluating issues previously decided in state
court[,]” Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338,
1354 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), limiting a federal
court’s authority to award habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254;
Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per curiam) (recognizing
AEDPA imposes “important limitations on the power of federal courts
to overturn the judgments of state courts in criminal cases"). As

such, federal courts may not grant habeas relief unless one of the
claims: "(1)'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States,' or (2) 'was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)."
Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1300-1301
(11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-6918, 2020 WL 1325907 (U.S.
Mar. 23, 2020).
In Knight, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
4
A decision is “contrary to” clearly
established federal law “if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.”
Williams [v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)] at
413, 120 S. Ct. 1495. A state court decision
involves an unreasonable application of
federal law “if the state court identifies the
correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Id. To justify issuance of
the writ under the “unreasonable application”
clause, the state court’s application of
Supreme Court precedent must be more than just
wrong in the eyes of the federal court; it
“must be ‘objectively unreasonable.’”
Virginia v. LeBlanc, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct.
1726, 1728, 198 L.Ed.2d 186 (2017)(quoting
Woods v. Donald, ––– U.S. –––, 135 S. Ct. 1372,
1376, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015)); see also Bell
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843,
152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (explaining that “an
unreasonable application is different from an
incorrect one.”).

Knight, 936 F.3d at 1330–31.
To obtain habeas relief, the state court decision must
unquestionably conflict with Supreme Court precedent, not dicta.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). If some fair-
minded jurists could agree with the lower court's decision, habeas
relief must be denied. Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison,
911 F.3d 1335, 1351 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 394
(2019). Therefore, unless the petitioner shows the state-court's
5
ruling was so lacking in justification that there was error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fair-minded disagreement, there is no entitlement to habeas
relief. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19-20 (2013).
This Court must accept that a state court's finding of fact,
whether a state trial court or appellate court, is entitled to a
presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “The
state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, absent
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Sealey, 954 F.3d
at 1354 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This presumption of
correctness, however, applies only to findings of fact, not mixed
determinations of law and fact. Brannan v. GDCP Warden, 541 F.
App'x 901, 903-904 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (recognizing the

distinction between a pure question of fact from a mixed question
of law and fact), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 906 (2014). Where there
has been one reasoned state court judgment rejecting a federal
claim followed by an unexplained order upholding that judgement,
federal habeas courts employ a "look through" presumption: "the
federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to
the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant
rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188,
1192 (2018) (Wilson).
6
Thus, the reviewing federal court’s habeas corpus
consideration of a petition under AEDPA is a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a mechanism
for ordinary error correction. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-103
(citation and quotation marks omitted). As noted in Sealey, 954
F.3d at 1354 (citations omitted), when reviewing whether there has
been an unreasonable application of federal law, “[t]he key word
is ‘unreasonable,’ which is more than simply incorrect.”
Consequently, state-court judgments will not easily be set aside
due to the applicability of the highly deferential AEDPA standard
that is intentionally difficult to meet. See Richter, 562 U.S.

at 102. Although a high hurdle, this high standard does not impose
a complete bar to issuing a writ, but it severely limits those
occasions to those "where there is no possibility fairminded
jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts"
with Supreme Court precedent. Id.
V. GROUND ONE
Respondents assert ground one is unexhausted and procedurally
defaulted. Response at 14-17. The doctrine of procedural default
requires the following:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the
constitutionality of a state prisoner's
conviction and sentence are guided by rules

7
designed to ensure that state court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect
necessary to preserve the integrity of legal
proceedings within our system of federalism.
These rules include the doctrine of procedural
default, under which a federal court will not
review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court
declined to hear because the prisoner failed
to abide by a state procedural rule. See,
e.g., Coleman,[2] supra, at 747-748, 111 S.
Ct. 2546; Sykes,[3] supra, at 84-85, 97 S. Ct.
2497. A state court's invocation of a
procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims
precludes federal review of the claims if,
among other requisites, the state procedural
rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to
support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See,
e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ----, ----,
131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62
(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S.----, ----,
130 S. Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417
(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally
defaulted claims from being heard is not
without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain
federal review of a defaulted claim by showing
cause for the default and prejudice from a
violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501
U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012).
A petition for writ of habeas corpus should not be entertained
unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state court remedies.
Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455

2 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

3 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

8
U.S. 509 (1982). A procedural default arises "when 'the
petitioner fails to raise the [federal] claim in state court and
it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion
would be futile.'" Owen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894,
908 n.9 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300,
1304 (11th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1151 (2010).
There are, however, allowable exceptions to the procedural
default doctrine; "[a] prisoner may obtain federal review of a
defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice
from a violation of federal law." Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10
(citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). To demonstrate cause, a

petitioner must show some objective factor external to the defense
impeded his effort to properly raise the claim in state court.
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 934 (1999). If cause is established, a petitioner must
demonstrate prejudice. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner
must show "there is at least a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different had the
constitutional violation not occurred." Owen, 568 F.3d at 908.
Alternatively, a petitioner may obtain review of a
procedurally barred claim if he satisfies the actual innocence
“gateway” established in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The

9
gateway exception is meant to prevent a constitutional error at
trial from causing a miscarriage of justice and conviction of the
actually innocent. Kuenzel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 690
F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1004 (2013).
Respondents assert the construed claim of a deprivation of
due process of law due to the information being filed in bad faith
was not properly raised in the trial court. Response at 14. Thus,
Respondents argue the trial court never considered the merits of
the claim and, consequently, it was never exhausted. Id. In
addressing the question of exhaustion, a district court must ask

whether the claim was raised in the state court proceedings and
whether the state court was alerted to the federal nature of the
claim:
Before seeking § 2254 habeas relief in federal
court, a petitioner must exhaust all state
court remedies available for challenging his
conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). For
a federal claim to be exhausted, the
petitioner must have "fairly presented [it] to
the state courts." McNair v. Campbell, 416
F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). The Supreme
Court has suggested that a litigant could do
so by including in his claim before the state
appellate court "the federal source of law on
which he relies or a case deciding such a claim
on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the
claim 'federal.'" Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.
27, 32, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004).

10
The Court's guidance in Baldwin "must be
applied with common sense and in light of the
purpose underlying the exhaustion
requirement"-namely, giving the state courts
"a meaningful opportunity" to address the
federal claim. McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302. Thus,
a petitioner could not satisfy the exhaustion
requirement merely by presenting the state
court with "all the facts necessary to support
the claim," or by making a "somewhat similar
state law claim." Kelley,[4] 377 F.3d at 134-
44. Rather, he must make his claims in a manner
that provides the state courts with "the
opportunity to apply controlling legal
principles to the facts bearing upon (his)
[federal] constitutional claim." Id. at 1344
(quotation omitted).

Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1351-52 (11th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1104 (2013).
The record demonstrates Petitioner did not assert this
alleged due process deprivation in the trial court, nor did he
raise such a claim on direct appeal or in his Rule 3.850 motion.
On direct appeal, his appellate counsel filed an Anders5 brief.
(Doc. 10-2 at 238-49). The 1st DCA, on October 10, 2012, gave
Petitioner thirty days to serve a pro se brief, warning Petitioner
that failure to do so would result in the case being presented to
the court without benefit of a pro se brief. Id. at 251.

4 Kelley v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1149 (2005).

5 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

11
Petitioner did not file a brief,6 and the 1st DCA affirmed per
curiam. Id. at 253.
In his Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner, through counsel, raised
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 260-
76. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 294-301. The 1st
DCA affirmed with a written opinion. Id. at 330-34. Notably,
Petitioner does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in this Court.
After a thorough review of the record before the Court, the
Court concludes Petitioner failed to exhaust a Fourteenth
Amendment claim in the state courts. It is clear from state law

that any future attempts at exhaustion of this ground would be
futile. As such, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this
ground for relief. Petitioner has failed to show cause and

6 Notably, on direct appeal, Petitioner failed to file a brief
and reference a federal source of law or any case deciding a claim
on federal grounds, and he did not label any claims as federal.
Thus, Petitioner never gave the state court a meaningful
opportunity to address a Fourteenth Amendment federal
constitutional claim or any other constitutional claim. As such,
Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims of constitutional
error. He has not shown cause and prejudice or that a fundamental
miscarriage of justice will result if the Court does not reach the
merits of his claims of constitutional error.

12
prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result
if the Court does not reach the merits of ground one.
The Court finds Petitioner’s claim of a deprivation of due
process of law based on his assertion that the information was
filed in bad faith is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner has neither shown cause and prejudice nor that a
fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the claim is not
addressed on its merits. Consequently, ground one is due to be
denied.
Alternatively, Respondents assert the information adequately
placed Petitioner on notice of the offense, satisfying due process

requirements. Response at 18-20. “Cases in [the United States
Supreme Court] have long proceeded on the premise that the Due
Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in
a criminal trial.” Spencer v. State of Tex., 385 U.S. 554, 563-
64 (1967). Under due process protections, Petitioner is entitled
to notice of the charges against him to be able to adequately
prepare to defend himself. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201
(1948).
The information charged Petitioner with carjacking (count
one) and leaving the scene of an accident involving unattended

13
property (count two). In pertinent part, 7 the information
charged:
JAMES ROY CARTER on September 6, 2011, in
the County of Duval and the State of Florida,
did unlawfully by force, violence, assault, or
putting in fear, take a motor vehicle, from
the person or custody of Chao Chen, with the
intent to permanently or temporarily deprive
the lawful owner or custodian of the motor
vehicle, contrary to the provisions of Section
812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

(Doc. 10-1 at 22).
To implicate due process rights, an information must fail to
provide adequate notice of the charges:
“[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first,
contains the elements of the offense charged
and fairly informs a defendant of the charge
against which he must defend, and, second,
enables him to plead an acquittal or
conviction in bar of future prosecutions for
the same offense.” Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d
590 (1974); see also United States v. Steele,
178 F.3d 1230, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 1999)
(similar). “For an indictment to be valid, it
must contain the elements of the offense
intended to be charged, and sufficiently
apprise the defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet.” United States v. Sharpe,
438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted).

7 Petitioner went to trial on count one of the information. (Doc.
10-1 at 147, 154). The state nolle prossed count two. (Doc. 10-
1 at 141) (Doc. 10-2 at 331 n.1).

14
United States v. Middleton, No. 13-0161-WS, 2013 WL 5498268, at *1
(S.D. Ala. Oct. 1, 2013). Of import, “due process prohibits a
defendant from being convicted of a crime not charged in the
information or indictment.” Rogers v. State, 963 So. 2d 328, 332
(Fla. 2nd DCA 2007) (quoting Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 69
(Fla. 2004)).
The record shows the trial court instructed the jury, to prove
the crime of carjacking, the state had to prove three elements
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the accused took the motor vehicle
from the person or custody of the victim; (2) force, violence,
assault, or putting in fear was used in the course of the taking;

and (3) the taking was with the intent to temporarily or
permanently deprive the victim of his right to the motor vehicle
or any benefit from it. (Doc. 10-1 at 34). Comparing the
information to the trial court’s instructions, the information
contains all three elements of the offense of carjacking. Indeed,
there is nothing missing from the information which restricted
Petitioner’s “ability to put on an effective defense.” Middleton,
2013 WL 5498268, at *2. Through the information, Petitioner
received adequate notice of the charge of carjacking to prepare
for trial and to enable him to plead, in the future, he already
faced the charge against further prosecution.

15
It is important to recognize,
“[n]o principle of procedural due process is
more clearly established than that notice of
the specific charge, and a chance to be heard
in a trial of the issues raised by that charge,
if desired, are among the constitutional
rights of every accused in a criminal
proceeding in all courts, state or federal.”
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S. Ct.
514, 92 L. Ed. 644 (1948). This right of a
defendant “to reasonable notice of a charge
against him,” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273,
68 S. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948),
“contemplates that the accused be ... informed
[of the nature and cause of the accusation]
sufficiently in advance of trial or sentence
to enable him to determine the nature of the
plea to be entered and to prepare his defense
if one is to be made,” id. at 279 n. 1, 68 S.
Ct. 499 (Rutledge, J., concurring). “In order
for an accusation of a crime (whether by
indictment or some other form) to be proper
under the common law, and thus proper under
the codification of the common-law rights in
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must allege
all elements of that crime....” Apprendi,[8]
530 U.S. at 500, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).

Rogers, 963 So. 2d at 332.
In this case, Petitioner was informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation of carjacking in advance of trial so that he
could determine the nature of his plea and prepare his defense.
Moreover, the information properly alleged all elements of the

8 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

16
offense of carjacking. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown a
deprivation of due process of law or any other constitutional
violation and he is not entitled to habeas relief.
Finally, Respondents submit, to the extent Petitioner argues
insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence at trial was sufficient
to support every element of the offense of carjacking. Response
at 20-22. The court reviewing a claim under the standard set
forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), may only set
aside a jury’s verdict, “only if no rational trier of fact could
have agreed with the jury.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651
(2012) (per curiam) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011)

(per curiam)). Indeed,
Jackson says that evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction so long as “after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S., at
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. It also unambiguously
instructs that a reviewing court “faced with
a record of historical facts that supports
conflicting inferences must presume—even if it
does not affirmatively appear in the record—
that the trier of fact resolved any such
conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and
must defer to that resolution.” Id., at 326,
99 S. Ct. 2781.

Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. at 7.

17
Testimony from the state’s witnesses supported the jury’s
verdict that Petitioner took the motor vehicle from Mr. Chen;
Petitioner used force, violence, and an assault to take the vehicle
(Petitioner and the victim fought and struggled over the keys to
the vehicle according to the testimony of the victim); and
Petitioner took the vehicle to temporarily (or permanently)
deprive Mr. Chen of his right to the motor vehicle or any benefit
from it (Petitioner drove off in the vehicle). (Doc. 10-2 at 242-
44, summary of state’s case). Considering all of evidence in the
light most favorable to the state, there was certainly sufficient
evidence to support the conviction for carjacking. Petitioner is

not entitled to relief on ground one.
Liberally construing the Petition, Petitioner raises an
additional claim. In the supporting facts of ground one, he
contends he had to be charged with the greater offense, carjacking
with a weapon, to be legally sentenced to life in prison. Petition
at 6-7. Twice, the trial court soundly rejected Petitioner’s
contention that he was improperly sentenced to life in prison.
Petitioner raised a comparable issue in a motion to correct illegal
sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(a), Fla. Stat. (Doc. 10-2 at 356-
58). The trial court denied the motion, finding Petitioner was
correctly adjudicated and sentenced as a habitual felony offender

18
and concluding the sentence imposed was lawful, correct and
appropriate. Id. at 361-73.
Petitioner raised a comparable claim in a second Rule 3.800(a)
motion. Id. at 375-401; (Doc. 10-3 at 1-15). In its Order Denying
Defendant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, the trial court
denied relief. (Doc. 10-3 at 17-28). The court noted Petitioner
had been convicted of carjacking and sentenced as a habitual felony
offender to a term of life in prison, id. at 17, and the 1st DCA
affirmed. Carter v. State, 108 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
(per curiam) (unpublished). Although recognizing that unarmed
carjacking is a first degree felony subject to a sentence of up to

thirty years pursuant to § 812.133(2)(b), Fla. Stat., the court
opined that because Petitioner was designated a habitual felony
offender, the court legally enhanced his sentence up to life
pursuant to § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (Doc. 10-3 at 17). The
court found, based on this legal and authorized enhancement, the
life sentence did not exceed any statutory maximum. Id. The
court further found Petitioner qualified as a habitual felony
offender, having at least three prior felonies, with at least one
of which was not related to the purchase or possession of a
controlled substance. Id. at 17-18. As such, the court denied
the motion to correct illegal sentence. Id. at 18.

19
Petitioner’s claim is refuted by the record. The state filed
a Notice of Intent to Classify Defendant as an Habitual Felony
Offender. (Doc. 10-1 at 24). Petitioner and his counsel were
provided copies of the notice. Id. At sentencing, the court
relied on two qualifying felonies, one for the sale or delivery of
cocaine, and one for the sale of cannabis. Id. at 119-20. The
court determined they were qualifying felonies, they occurred on
separate dates, and that one or both of the convictions or release
therefrom was within five years of the current offense. Id. at
120. The court found Petitioner met the criteria to be classified
as a habitual felony offender. Id. at 121

The documents concerning the prior offenses supporting the
habitual offender sentence are in the record. Id. at 61-71. The
record shows these qualifying prior felony convictions existed.
Petitioner did not contest the convictions, admitting they were
his. Id. at 119-20. Neither side had any information that
Petitioner had received a pardon for either prior offense or that
either offense had been set aside in any post-conviction
proceeding. Id. at 120. Based on the above, the trial court
properly classified Petitioner as a habitual felony offender and
he is not entitled to habeas relief as the claim has no merit.

20
Alternatively, the Court finds this additional claim presents
an issue purely of state law that is not cognizable on federal
habeas review. It involves a statutory interpretation of state
law by state courts, not a claim of constitutional dimension that
Petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law
or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Of import,
the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “was not enacted
to enforce State-created rights.” Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d
1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507,
1508 (11th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1170 (2001).
The law in the Eleventh Circuit allows that only in cases of

federal constitutional error will a federal writ of habeas corpus
be available. See Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 471 (11th Cir.
1993); Krasnow v. Navarro, 909 F.2d 451, 452 (11th Cir. 1990).
Consequently, federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of
state law. It is certainly not the province of this Court to
reexamine state-court determinations on issues of state law. See
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). "This limitation
on federal habeas review is of equal force when a petition, which
actually involves state law issues, is 'couched in terms of equal
protection and due process.'" Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507,

21
1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (quoting Willeford v. Estelle,
538 F.2d 1194, 1198 (5th Cir. 1976)).
The federal habeas corpus court will be bound by the Florida
court's interpretation of its own laws unless that interpretation
breaches a federal constitutional mandate. McCoy v. Newsome, 953
F.2d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 944 (1992). Since this additional claim presents an issue
that is not cognizable in this habeas proceeding, it cannot provide
a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Furthermore, there is
no breach of a federal constitution mandate and Petitioner is not
entitled to federal habeas relief.

Petitioner also contends he was acquitted on the merits of
carjacking. Petition at 10. He bases his argument on the fact
that in its order denying the motion for post-conviction relief
dated September 7, 2016, the circuit court said the state filed a
nolle prosequi as to count one. Id. The record does show, in the
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, a
scrivener’s error or mere misstatement by the court. (Doc. 10-2
at 294). After stating Petitioner proceeded to trial on count one
only, was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life as a habitual
felony offender, the court then noted the state “filed a nolle
prosequi as to Count 1.” Id. (emphasis added). The court

22
referenced its Exhibit C, the Judgment and Sentence reflecting the
conviction for count one, carjacking, and the life sentence as a
habitual felony offender. Id. at 305-10.
As previously noted, the record clearly demonstrates
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of count one, the carjacking
offense, and the state, at sentencing, nolle prossed count two,
not count one. (Doc. 10-1 at 141). Therefore, the court’s
statement that the state filed a nolle prosequi as to count one
was a mere misstatement concerning the facts in the record or a
scrivener’s error. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his
contention that he was acquitted of the offense of carjacking as

he clearly was not acquitted of carjacking. Therefore, Petitioner
is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is
DENIED.
2. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close
this case.
4. If Petitioner appeals the denial of his Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), the Court denies a certificate of

23
appealability. ° Because this Court has determined that a
certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall
terminate from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on
appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such
termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of
June, 2020.

4 De
af J. DAVIS
United States District Judge

sa 6/11
Cc:
James Roy Carter
Counsel of Record

° This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a
petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2). To make this
substantial showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)), or that "the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration, this Court will
deny a certificate of appealability.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10105280. Public record. Not legal advice.