# Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club, Inc

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 27, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104846

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 27, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104846

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a plaintiff may assert a claim for retaliation under the ADA outside of the employment context

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

SAMANTHA RING,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:19-cv-772-T-33JSS

BOCA CIEGA YACHT CLUB, INC.,

Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendant Boca Ciega Yacht Club’s (BCYC’s) Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. # 122), filed on January 17, 2020, and
Plaintiff Samantha Ring’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
# 128), filed on January 24, 2020. Both parties have filed
responses in opposition. (Doc. ## 135, 137). For the reasons
that follow, BCYC’s Motion is granted and Ring’s Motion is
denied.
I. Background
A. BCYC
BCYC is a tax-exempt, not-for-profit corporation. (Doc.
# 129-22). According to the Mission Statement within its
Bylaws, BCYC’s mission is to promote safe boating activities,
promote instruction and education in safe boating and all
nautical activities, promote fellowship and camaraderie among
the members, and be an integral part of the community of
Gulfport. (Doc. # 129-30 at 1).
BCYC has a Board of Directors consisting of seven elected
“Flag Officers” (including the Commodore and Vice Commodore),
the immediate past Commodore, and eight other Directors who

are each elected to a two-year term. (Doc. # 129-30 at 6, 7;
Doc. # 129-24 at 11-13). The Board is responsible for managing
and controlling BCYC’s affairs, approving budgets, and making
and enforcing the club’s Bylaws, rules, and policies. (Doc.
# 129-30 at 6).
1. The Lease with the City
BCYC leases the clubhouse and adjacent grounds from the
City of Gulfport. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 3; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 3A;
Doc. # 128-6). On December 21, 2007, BCYC and the City
executed a Lease running for 13 years and expiring on December
31, 2020. (Id.).

BCYC pays the City an annual rent of $1 per year for the
lease of the clubhouse and parking area. (Doc. # 128-6 at 1).
The Lease also includes 56 wet slips and 50 dry storage slips
on the premises for exclusive use by BCYC members, with
members leasing the slips directly from the City. (Id. at 1-
3). BCYC is responsible for the payment of all utility
charges, taxes, and fees. (Id. at 4). The Lease provides that
BCYC must maintain its status as a not-for-profit Florida
corporation and a tax-exempt organization for the life of the
Lease. (Id.). If it fails to do so, the City can terminate
the Lease. (Id. at 6).
Under the Lease, BCYC is permitted to use the premises

“only for a meeting place, recreational purposes, vessel
docking and storage, watercraft events and business office,
for [BCYC’s] members, only. [BCYC] may make no other use of
the premises without written consent of [the City].” (Id. at
4). However, BCYC may host regattas and other nautical events
“so long as the same are coordinated with [the City’s]
harbormaster.” (Id.).
The boat ramp leased to BCYC is for the exclusive use of
members and their guests, and BCYC cannot allow use of the
boat ramp by the general public. (Id.). However, the Lease
provides that BCYC must allow members of certain named

organizations to have access to the beach. (Id.). In addition,
only one person is allowed to live aboard their boat on the
leased premises at a time. (Id.).
According to the Lease, BCYC is not allowed to sell or
distribute alcoholic beverages on the premises to anyone
other than members of BCYC and their guests. (Id. at 6). BCYC
“shall not sell or distribute any goods or merchandise to the
general public in competition with items sold by Lessor at
the City Marina.” (Id.). “In the event [BCYC] obtains the
proper licenses to dispense alcoholic beverages as a private
club, the sale or consumption of such beverages shall not be
available to the general public and the same shall be limited

to Lessee’s members and their guests.” (Id.).
2. Membership application process
The membership application process is as follows.
First, prospective members must fill out an application.
(Doc. # 129-30 at 3). According to the Bylaws, membership in
BCYC is open to any person who is “of good character” and at
least 21 years old. (Id. at 2). Applicants must also undergo
a background check. (Id. at 3). Gerri Angel, the longtime
chair of the BCYC Membership Committee, submitted an
affidavit averring that she sends applications to an
investigator to perform these background checks. (Doc. # 137-

20 at 1, 2). The investigator will verify the applicant’s
address, and conduct a criminal background check and an
employment check. (Id. at 2). The purpose of this background
check is to ensure that applicants have a valid, land-based
address and are thus less likely to live aboard their boat,
ensure the applicant does not have any prior felonies or
sexual offenses on their record, and ensure that the applicant
can pay the membership dues. (Id. at 2-3).
Once an applicant passes the background check, Angel
will call the prospective member to ask them general questions
regarding their interest in the club. (Doc. # 129-1 at 60;
Doc. # 137-20 at 3). Angel has discretion about what to ask

during that initial phone call. (Doc. # 129-1 at 61). Next,
the prospective member will meet with at least three
Membership Committee members at the BCYC clubhouse during
“interview night.” (Doc. # 137-20 at 1, 3; Doc. # 129-1 at
63). According to Angel, on interview night, she provides
prospective members with a history of the club, explains that
the club is run by volunteers, including scheduled Saturday
“workdays,” and explains the parameters of BCYC’s Lease with
the City. (Id. at 3-4). The Membership Committee will ask
applicants why they wish to join BCYC and what they will bring
to the club. (Id. at 4-5). Angel represents that the committee

meets with applicants in person to make sure they have an
interest in nautical or maritime activities and will be “a
good fit” for the club. (Id. at 4, 5).
If the applicant is approved by the Membership
Committee, their application is presented to the board and
board members have a chance to object to any applicants. (Doc.
# 129-30 at 3; Doc. # 137-20 at 5). Then, the applicants will
come to the next general meeting and will be voted in upon a
majority vote of the general membership. (Id.). Once every
month, except in December, applicants’ names are brought up
to BCYC’s board and then applicants are voted in at a general
meeting. (Doc. # 128 at ¶ 34; Doc. # 137 at ¶ 34).

In 2019, annual membership dues were $145 per quarter
per household. (Doc. # 128 at ¶ 40; Doc. # 137 at ¶ 40).
Members pay no renewal fees or additional fees of any kind.
(Id.). Members are, however, expected to attend general
membership meetings and participate in “workdays,” a Saturday
time commitment where members attend to the maintenance and
upkeep of the club facilities. (Doc. # 129-30 at 1; Doc. #
129-1 at 16-17); see also (Doc. # 129-30 at 15) (as part of
the clubhouse policies, stating that BCYC “is a self-help
sailing association of members willing to perform work around
the Clubhouse, grounds and docks to maintain and improve the

property and to keep expenses at a minimum”).
3. BCYC’s guest and pet policies
According to the Bylaws, guest and visitor privileges
are determined by the Board. (Doc. # 129-30 at 13). Per the
stated clubhouse policies, all guests must be accompanied by
club members. (Id. at 15, 17). Under “Use of Premises,” the
policies allow “special personal use by members” subject to
certain approvals and conditions, but the club is “[n]ot for
use by [the] general public.” (Id. at 15). In addition, per
BCYC policy, no pets or animals are allowed inside the
clubhouse, although they are allowed on the grounds and on
the screened porch. (Id. at 17). All pets must be on a leash

and under the owner’s control at all times. (Id.).
B. Samantha Ring
During the majority of her membership in BCYC, Ring
worked as a full-time schoolteacher for the Pinellas County
School District, where she taught Spanish at Bay Point Middle
School. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 33; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 33). Ring teaches
Spanish to 18-25 middle school students each school day,
during six 47-50 minute periods. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 35; Doc. #
135 at ¶ 35). Dena Collins, the principal of Bay Point Middle
School, testified that Ring is an effective teacher; she
manages her classroom well and keeps sometimes disruptive

middle school students engaged. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 36; Doc. #
135 at ¶ 36).
According to Collins, Ring’s attendance record during
the 2019-2020 school year had been normal and predictable.
(Doc. # 122 at ¶ 34; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 34). Collins testified
that Ring had never requested any reasonable accommodations
from Bay Point Middle School and had never approached the
school with a request to bring a service animal. (Doc. # 122
at ¶ 37; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 37). Based on her review of Ring’s
personnel file from the Pinellas County School District,
Collins testified that Ring had worked for at least several
years as a full-time teacher, posting full hours annually for

many years, and she had not disclosed any health impairments
on an employee information form in August 2016. (Doc. # 122
at ¶ 38; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 38). Ring does not bring her dog,
Piper, to work because of concerns regarding students with
dog allergies, dog phobias, and that a dog’s presence would
be distracting to middle school students. (Doc. # 128 at ¶
15; Doc. # 137 at ¶ 15).
Ring avers that she has “severe allergies” to bee venom
or bee stings and sunflower seeds. (Doc. # 128-2 at 1). She
claims that these allergens trigger an anaphylactic reaction,
making it hard for her to breathe. (Id. at 1-2). She also
suffers from anxiety with panic attacks.1 (Id. at 4). Ring

1 The Court agrees with BCYC that Ring’s allegations raised
in her January 23, 2020 affidavit, regarding her poor eyesight
and being legally blind in one eye, are unsupported by any
other record evidence. (Doc. # 137 at 16-18; Doc. # 128-2 at
3-4). Since the beginning of this litigation, Ring’s
uses an EpiPen when she has an allergic reaction, and she had
to use her EpiPen twice in November and December 2019. (Id.
at 2).
Ring obtained Piper in August 2015 but did not obtain
her to be a service animal. (Id. at 2). However, according to
Ring, one day while Ring and Piper were out on Ring’s boat,
Piper, untrained, killed a bee buzzing nearby. (Id. at 2-3).

At that point, Ring decided to start training Piper to be her
service animal. (Id. at 3). According to Ring, Piper passed
the Canine Good Citizen test in January 2019. (Id.). She avers
that Piper is trained to retrieve her medi-pack or apply “deep
pressure therapy” when she is having a panic attack. (Id. at
3-4). Additionally, Piper has been working with a dog trainer,
Dawn Scheu, to “fine tune Piper’s ability to detect sunflower
seeds.” (Id. at 4).
C. Ring’s interactions with BCYC concerning Piper
Ring is a sailor and joined BCYC in 2007. (Doc. # 128 at
¶ 7; Doc. # 137 at ¶ 7). Piper made a bad first impression on

Larry Brown, the BCYC Commodore in 2018. When Brown first
observed Piper, the dog was “out of control” and would bark
and lunge at people. (Doc. # 129-24 at 48). At that time, in

disability allegations have hinged on her allergies and
anxiety.
Brown’s opinion, Ring “clearly did not have control over the
dog.” (Id.). Brown admits that as time went on, and Piper
received training, her behavior improved. (Id.).
In approximately August 2018, Ring texted Brown a
photograph of a note prepared by Dr. Andres Santayana. (Doc.
# 129-24 at 17). This note read:
Samantha Ring is a patient under the care of our
clinic. I am familiar with this patient’s history
and functional limitations, as well as her
anaphylactic allergies. In order to help alleviate
these functional limitations due to her anxiety and
to assist with her allergies, I support Samantha’s
decision to have her service animal accompany her
at all times. A specially trained service animal
will help to mitigate her anxiety and prevent any
risks with her anaphylactic allergies, improving
her quality of life.

(Doc. # 100-2).
Ring testified that, along with this note, she made a
request for accommodation under the ADA to Brown requesting
that Piper be allowed into the clubhouse as a service animal.
(Doc. # 129-31 at 117-18, 120-21). Brown testified that he
understood this note to be a request for an exemption to the
club’s general prohibition against having dogs inside the
clubhouse and that Ring believed Piper to be a service dog.
(Doc. # 129-24 at 17, 19, 23-24). According to Brown, he did
not think this note was sufficient, so he asked Ring to
demonstrate Piper’s training, and “maybe she could change
minds of people that are on the board.” (Id. at 19, 21-22).
When Ring argued that she was allowed to bring Piper
into the clubhouse under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), Brown testified that he researched the ADA and
determined that BCYC was a private club and therefore exempt
from the ADA’s requirements. (Id. at 24-25).

On December 23, 2018, Brown issued Ring a written
reprimand for violating the Club’s pet policy for bringing
Piper into the clubhouse and warned her that any subsequent
violations would trigger the imposition of a fine. (Doc. #
122 at ¶ 22; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 22). According to Brown, Ring
wanted to bring Piper into the clubhouse because she was
living on her boat at the time, it was “freezing” out, and
the clubhouse would be more comfortable than her boat. (Doc.
# 129-24 at 48-49). It was around this time that Ring
threatened to file a complaint with the Pinellas County Office
of Human Rights (the “PCOHR”), and Brown “told her to go ahead

and do that and that we would talk to them.” (Id. at 28, 95-
96). On January 2, 2019,2 Ring filed a signed and verified

2 The Charge of Discrimination is date stamped January 2,
2018, but Ring signed the document on December 28, 2018, and
so it appears that the agency’s staff inadvertently forgot to
switch the stamp to reflect the new year.
Charge of Discrimination with the PCOHR, alleging that BCYC
had discriminated against her on the basis of her disability
by failing to allow her service animal on BCYC’s premises.
(Doc. # 28-1).
In January 2019, Nick Southard, the Commodore who took
over after Brown, decided to hire an investigator to verify
Ring’s current address because BCYC officers were concerned

about Ring living aboard her boat. (Doc. # 129-1 at 39-41,
159). On January 21, 2019, Ring again brought Piper to the
clubhouse and Southard confirmed that a fine would be imposed.
(Doc. # 122 at ¶ 24; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 24; Doc. # 100-4). On or
about January 22, 2019, BCYC became suspicious that Ring was
using electricity from an electrical unit installed at the
BCYC dock that was unmetered and paid for by the City. (Doc.
# 129-1 at 184-86; Doc. # 129-12). Southard testified that
this electricity was meant to be used only intermittently for
minor repairs but that BCYC felt Ring was “stealing” this
electricity by having a line running from the outlet to her

boat while she was not there. (Id. at 186).
D. BCYC suspends, and ultimately expels, Ring
On January 31, 2019, the Board moved to suspend Ring’s
membership. (Doc. # 100-5). The motion states that Ring had
lived for three years as a non-sanctioned liveaboard on her
boat in contravention of the Lease. (Id. at 2). “During that
time, she has provided the Club and the City with four false
addresses as her land-based residence.” (Id.). In addition,
according to the motion, Ring had been “stealing City
electricity by keeping an extension cord plugged into the
City’s 110v electrical outlet on the pedestal near her boat
in the Club basin.” (Id. at 3). Ring denies that she stole

electricity from the City or lied about her address. (Doc. #
135 at 8; Doc. # 129-31 at 142-43, 179-80). She spoke in her
own defense at the January 31 Board meeting. (Doc. # 129-31
at 141).
In April 2019, the general membership of the club voted
to expel Ring.3 (Doc. # 100-6). The stated reasons for
expulsion were: (1) providing false addresses; (2) a pattern
of violations of club rules; (3) a pattern of dishonesty; (4)
undermining the club’s mission to be part of the Gulfport
Community by damaging the club’s relationship with the City;
(5) sowing discord among members; (6) two previous attempts

to expel; and (7) a pattern of offensive and boorish conduct
– toward members and guests – that is not aligned with the

3 BCYC claims that the expulsion took place on April 19, 2019,
while Ring alleges in the operative complaint that it took
place on April 1, 2019. (Doc. # 100 at 7; Doc. # 122 at 8).
standards of the BCYC community.” (Id. at 2). Ring amended
her administrative complaint in April 2019 to add charges of
retaliation. (Doc. # 100-7 at 1).
According to an investigative report dated May 29, 2019,
the PCOHR investigated Ring’s claims of discrimination
against BCYC (the “Investigative Report”). (Doc. # 47-7). At
the end of the Investigative Report, under “Conclusions,” the

report’s author wrote that, “based upon the available
evidence, there is reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act of discrimination based on disability . . . and
retaliation has occurred.” (Id. at 15).
II. Procedural Background
Ring initiated the instant action in federal court on
March 29, 2019, asserting claims against BCYC for failure to
make reasonable modifications and retaliation under Title III
of the ADA. (Doc. # 1). Following several rounds of motions
to dismiss, the operative complaint is Ring’s third amended
complaint. In that complaint, Ring brings three causes of

action against BCYC: failure to make reasonable modifications
under the ADA (Count I); retaliation in violation of the ADA
(Count II); and discrimination in violation of the Florida
Civil Rights Act (FCRA) (Count III). (Doc. # 100).
Both parties now seek summary judgment in their favor on
all claims. (Doc. # 122 at 1; Doc. # 128 at 25). The Motions
are ripe for review.
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996)(citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,

593-94 (11th Cir. 1995)(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s

response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his
conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
Finally, the filing of cross-motions for summary
judgment does not give rise to any presumption that no genuine
issues of material fact exist. Rather, “[c]ross-motions must
be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shaw
Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538–

39 (5th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Oakley, 744
F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984)(“Cross-motions for summary
judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in
granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not
genuinely disputed.”(quotation omitted)).
IV. Analysis
To prevail under Title III of the ADA, Ring must
demonstrate that (1) she is an individual with a disability,
(2) BCYC is a place of public accommodation, and (3) she was
denied full and equal treatment because of her disability.

Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161,
1165 (M.D. Fla. 2005). Disability-discrimination claims under
the FCRA are analyzed using the same framework as ADA claims.
Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir.
2007). The parties dispute each of these prongs.
For the reasons discussed below, this Court need not
determine whether Ring suffers from a disability that
substantially limits a major life activity. The Court will
assume for the purposes of summary judgment, without
deciding, that Ring does have a disability.
A. Whether BCYC is a private club
According to BCYC, it is a “genuinely private club,”

making it exempt from the public accommodation requirements
of Title III of the ADA and the FCRA. (Doc. # 122 at 1, 11-
18). Ring argues in her own motion that BCYC is a place of
public accommodation. (Doc. # 128 at 18-25).4 The parties
agree that whether BCYC qualifies for the private club
exemption as a “public accommodation” under the ADA is a
question of law for the Court to decide. (Doc. # 145); see
United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1968)
(explaining that whether an institution is a “private club”

4 Ring also argues that BCYC bears the burden of proving that
it is entitled to the private-club exemption. The cases cited
by Ring in support of that proposition are not binding on
this Court. The Court is also aware of contrary decisions
within this Circuit. See Jenkins v. Wholesale Alley, Inc.,
No. 1:05-cv-03266-JEC, 2007 WL 9701996, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
11, 2007) (“Before the plaintiff may succeed on a public
accommodations claim under the ADA, he must first establish
that the defendant operated a public accommodation.”). Under
either standard, summary judgment in BCYC’s favor is
appropriate.
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a question of law); see
also Jankey v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 14 F. Supp.
2d 1174, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Whether a particular facility
is a ‘public accommodation’ under the ADA is a question of
law.”).
Title III of the ADA provides that:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases
(or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). For purposes of Section 12182(a),
discrimination includes a failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures. Id. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Private clubs or establishments are exempt from Title
III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (“The provisions of this
subchapter shall not apply to private clubs or establishments
exempted from coverage under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000–a(e))[.]”). Title II of the Civil
Rights Act, in turn, exempts “private club[s] or other
establishment[s] not in fact open to the public, except to
the extent that the facilities of such establishment[s] are
made available to the customers or patrons of [certain
businesses like hotels and restaurants] “affecting interstate
commerce or supported in their activities by State action.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (b),(e).5
To determine whether an establishment is truly a private
club or establishment for purposes of the ADA, both parties
point to the eight-factor test set forth in United States v.
Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989). The
eight Lansdowne factors are: (1) the genuine selectivity of

the group in the admission of members; (2) the membership’s
control over the operations of the establishment; (3) the
history of the organization; (4) the use of the facilities by
non-members; (5) the purpose of the club’s existence; (6)

5 The ADA provides that certain listed private entities will
be considered public accommodations, including, in pertinent
part: (1) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving
food or drink; (2) a motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment;(3) an auditorium, convention center, lecture
hall, or other place of public gathering; (4) a park, zoo,
amusement park, or other place of recreation; (5) a nursery,
elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education; and (6) a gymnasium,
health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B),(C),(D),(I),
(J), (L). Despite Ring’s arguments to the contrary, BCYC falls
outside the umbrella of the listed statutory places of public
accommodation. While members may go there for recreation and
potluck dinners, BCYC is not similar to or like a restaurant,
bar, or gymnasium. Thus, the Court will look to the Lansdowne
factors in determining whether BCYC is a place of public
accommodation.
whether the club advertises for members; (7) whether the club
is for profit or not for profit; and (8) the formalities
observed by the club, e.g., bylaws, meetings, and membership
cards. Id. at 795-805; see also Lobel v. Woodland Golf Club
of Auburndale, 260 F. Supp. 3d 127, 140-47 (D. Mass. 2017)
(looking to Lansdowne factors to determine if golf club was
a place of public accommodation under the ADA); Jankey, 14 F.

Supp. 2d at 1180-84 (looking to same with respect to studio
lot facilities).
1. Genuine selectivity in admission of members
Because “genuine selectivity is an integral
characteristic of a private club,” courts have found this
factor to be the “most important” in ascertaining private-
club status. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 797; see also EEOC v.
Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 1436 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[S]elective
membership practices are the essence of private clubs.”). A
variety of characteristics can reflect whether a club is truly
selective, including the formality of the club’s admissions

procedures, the standards or criteria for admission, the
membership’s control over the selection of new members, the
numerical limit on club membership, the substantiality of the
membership fees, and the extent to which applicants are denied
admission. See Lobel, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (citing
Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 797-98).
a. Formality of admission procedures
According to the BCYC Bylaws, prospective members must
fill out an application, pass a background check, be “vetted
by the Membership Committee,” have their application read at
a board meeting, and be admitted upon a majority vote of the

general membership. (Doc. # 129-30 at 3). The record evidence
reflects that BCYC follows this process. See (Doc. # 129-1 at
58-69). Thus, BCYC utilizes a multi-step and formalized
process in admitting members, and this factor supports a
finding of private-club status. See Lobel, 260 F. Supp. 3d at
140 (“Woodland’s procedures for evaluating and selecting new
members exhibit several characteristics that are relatively
formal,” including a set procedure that applicants must
follow, “and thus support a finding of genuine
selectivity.”).
b. The standards or criteria for admission

Applicants may be anyone over 21 years of age. (Doc. #
129-1 at 58). Applicants need not own a boat or have any prior
sailing experience, but should have an interest in sailing
and nautical activities. (Id. at 56-60). Applicants need not
be sponsored by a current BCYC member or receive
recommendations. (Id. at 70). They must pass a background
check to ensure that they have a land-based address, a clean
criminal record, and are employed. (Doc. # 137-20).
It is undisputed that Gerri Angel will make the initial
telephone calls to applicants and that what questions she
asks are generally up to her. (Doc. # 129-1 at 61). Applicants
must then meet with additional Membership Committee members

at the clubhouse and answer questions as to why they wish to
join. According to Angel, since 2016, there have been three
to six other members who have served with her on the BCYC
Membership Committee. (Doc. # 137-20 at 1). At this interview
night, applicants are asked about why they wish to join BCYC
and Membership Committee members evaluate whether the
applicants would be a “good fit.” (Id. at 3-5). If they pass
the Membership Committee, the applicants’ names are read to
the Board, and applicants must then attend the general
membership meeting, at which a vote will take place. (Id. at
5).

Southard testified that he could not recall any instance
at which an applicant who appeared before the general meeting
was denied admission. (Doc. # 129-1 at 72). Southard described
it as “fait accompli” – that once Angel passes an applicant
to the general meeting, his or her admission is assured. (Id.
at 67). However, Angel represented in her declaration that,
in 2017 and 2018, she has chosen not to invite certain
applicants to interview night or the general meeting because,
based on either their answers in the initial telephone call
or at interview night, it was determined that they were not
a good fit for BCYC. (Doc. # 137-20 at 6). Certain applicants
have also had objections lodged against them by the board.

(Id.). Angel did not state which proportion of applicants
failed to progress to interview night or the general vote.
See generally (Id.).
Ring’s point is well-taken that BCYC’s admissions
procedures and criteria are less stringent than those found
to confer private-club status by other courts. For example,
the social club at issue in Chicago Club utilized two paths
to admission:
The board of directors extends invitations to
membership under one of two provisions in the
Club’s bylaws. Under one provision, one member
proposes a candidate and two members second the
proposal. Two directors must be acquainted with
candidates for resident membership, and one
director must be acquainted with nonresident
candidates. The names of the candidates are
published to the Club, and members may comment upon
the candidates. The Club’s secret membership
commission reviews the proposed candidates and the
membership’s comments and makes recommendations to
the board. The board may then extend invitations to
membership. Another provision of the bylaws allows
the board of governors, upon its own motion and
without any formal procedure, to elect a person to
any class of membership in which there is a vacancy.
In no case under either procedure may an invitation
to membership issue if two or more directors
present for the vote are opposed.

This procedural gauntlet incorporates a screening
process that emphasizes personal interaction
between members and candidates for membership.

. . .

The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Club is
extremely selective in admitting new members.

86 F.3d at 1426, 1437; see also Bommarito v. Grosse Pointe
Yacht Club, No. 05-cv-73359, 2007 WL 925791, at *11 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2007) (holding that defendant yacht club
qualified for the exemption where it required a written
application, the sponsorship of three current members, the
posting of the candidacy at the clubhouse, consideration by
the board of directors, and a secret ballot).
However, membership selection need not always meet such
a lofty standard to confer private-club status. The Court is
cognizant of the Seventh Circuit’s admonition in Chicago Club
that “by no stretch of the imagination should the practices
of the Club outlined above be considered as the minimum
necessary to qualify as a bona fide membership club under
[Section] 2000e(b). To the contrary, it is clear that less
stringent membership policies and guest arrangements than
those employed by the Club would easily meet [Section]
2000e(b)’s bona fide private membership club requirements.”
86 F.3d at 1437.
For example, a district court within this Circuit has
held that a golf course clubhouse was exempt from Title III
of the ADA where the club “de facto offer[ed] membership” to
any homeowner within a residential subdivision. Huene v.

Landings Club, Inc., No. CV411-282, 2012 WL 515674, at *3
(S.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2012), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 4:11-CV-282, 2012 WL 777183 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2012). As
the Huene court reasoned, “broadly allowing Landings-
subdivision homeowners to join is not the same as allowing
anybody to walk in off the street and obtain a membership.”
Id.
Here, by ensuring that applicants pass a background
check, have an interest in sailing or other nautical
activities, are willing to help volunteer and attend club
events, requiring applicants to personally meet with several

members of the Membership Committee, and be voted in by a
majority vote of the general membership, BCYC has meaningful
standards or criteria for admission of new members. The record
evidence demonstrates that BCYC members are knit together by
a common love of sailing, or a desire to learn more about
nautical activities, and a willingness to expend their time
maintaining the club’s premises and supporting club
activities. As former Commodore Brown explained when asked
what makes BCYC a private club, “I think that the idea of
having a club with people that are like-minded, that want to
do the same things, should be able to come together as a group
and do that thing that they like to do together. And so if

having it being a public club means that just anybody can be
a member, then what’s the point of having it as a club?” (Doc.
# 129-24 at 56-57).
“A private club is a group of individuals who imagine
the membership as a personification of whatever priorities or
interests the club professes to embrace. Whether these
priorities or interests are laudatory or mundane is beside
the point, which is that they are shared by a group who have
chosen their social intimates on the basis of these values.”
Chicago Club, 86 F.3d at 1437. Thus, this factor weighs in
favor of the private-club exemption.
c. The membership’s control over the selection of
new members

“[M]embership participation in the selection of new
members is a critical attribute of a private club.” Chicago
Club, 86 F.3d at 1436. For the reasons described above, the
Membership Committee screens potential members at interview
night, and the BCYC membership gets to vote at a general
meeting as to whether applicants should be admitted. Members
of the Board also get a chance to object to new members prior
to the general meeting. This factor weighs in favor of the
private-club exemption.
d. The numerical limit on club membership

While the Bylaws do not contain a formal numerical limit
on membership, Southard testified that the number of members
has stayed stable, at around 200. (Doc. # 129-1 at 12). This
factor is neutral.
e. The substantiality of the membership fees
In 2019, annual membership fees were $145 per quarter
per household. (Doc. # 128 at ¶ 40; Doc. # 137 at ¶ 40).
Members pay no renewal fees or additional fees of any kind.
(Id.).
This amount is negligible in comparison to the
substantial sums charged by other private clubs. See, e.g.,

Lobel, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 142 (determining that club charged
new members a non-refundable $55,000 initiation fee and
required dues of approximately $14,000 per year). However,
BCYC does impose volunteer requirements on its members,
requiring them to participate in Saturday “workdays” to
maintain the clubhouse and premises. As stated in the
clubhouse policies, this volunteer time is expected in order
“to keep expenses at a minimum.” (Doc. # 129-30 at 15).
The Court has not located, nor have the parties pointed
to, any case law determining whether an organization was
exempt where financial fees were low but members were
nonetheless required to put in “sweat equity.” The Court finds

the opinion in Rasmussen v. Cent. Fla. Council Boy Scouts of
Am., Inc., to be instructive on this point. In Rasmussen, a
local council of the Boy Scouts of America owned a
“reservation” encompassing five camps, which included
lodging, activity areas, dining areas, and other facilities
for use by Boy Scout troops. No. 6:07-cv-1091-Orl-19UAM, 2008
WL 681055, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2008). The court found
that although the reservation was staffed by seven permanent
staff members, adult volunteers “play an important role in
the Scouts.” Id. While council members had to pay a fee to
use the camp, the council overall lost money on the camping

program due to its “affordable camping fees.” Id.
When faced with a claim brought under Title III of the
ADA, the council asserted the private-organization exemption.
Id. at *6. The court ultimately determined that, except for
a gift shop that was open to the public, the remainder of the
council’s facilities were not open to the public and, thus,
the council qualified for the exemption. Id. at *9. Thus, the
low fees did not deprive the camp of private-club status.
This factor is, at most, neutral.
f. The extent to which applicants are denied admission
While Southard testified that he could not recall any
potential applicant being denied membership once they

progressed to the general meeting vote, Angel stated in her
affidavit that candidates had been denied admission at
earlier stages of the process in 2017 and 2018, although she
did not state what percentage of applicants were denied
admission. The Court also notes the Rasmussen court’s
determination of the exemption’s applicability despite the
fact that the council sponsored scouting programs involving
24,406 child members and 8,630 adult volunteers because the
council had a “plan or purpose of exclusiveness” by requiring
scouts to adhere to the Scout Oath and Law, as well as profess
their belief in God. Id. at *1, *8. This factor is also

neutral.
In short, the “genuine selectivity in admission of
members” factor weighs in BCYC’s favor.
2. The membership’s control over the operations
of the establishment

Control of an organization’s operations by its members
is another factor weighing in favor of private-club status.
Lobel, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 143. Here, the evidence establishes
that the BCYC Board, which is composed of BCYC members,
controls the affairs of the club and has the power to
promulgate and enforce its by-laws, policies, and rules.
While BCYC members do not invest funds as property owners
would, they nonetheless maintain the premises and organize
events. While Ring points to BCYC’s Lease with the City, there
is no record evidence that the City, in fact, exercises
control over BCYC’s day-to-day operations. Ring has failed to
direct this Court to any case in which the mere fact that a
municipality leased land to an otherwise private organization
was sufficient to destroy the organization’s status as a
private club. This factor weighs in favor of private-club
status.
3. The history of the organization
BCYC was incorporated in 1966. (Doc. # 128 at ¶ 23; Doc.
# 137 at ¶ 23). BCYC’s purpose, as stated in the articles of
incorporation, was to (1) promote safe boating activities in
Pinellas County and adjacent areas; and (2) promote
instruction and education in safe boating and nautical
activities.” (Doc. # 128 at ¶ 24; Doc. # 137 at ¶ 24).
According to its Lease with the City, BCYC’s premises are to
be used solely by its members and their guests. This factor
weighs in favor of private-club status.
4. The use of the facilities by non-members
BCYC hosts an annual “Fun Day” when the BCYC clubhouse

is open to members of the public. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 6; Doc. #
135 at ¶ 6). During Fun Day, BCYC provides free food to
visitors. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 9; Doc. # 135 at ¶ 9).
According to Brown, other than Fun Day, the clubhouse is
not indiscriminately open to members of the public at large
and access to the clubhouse for any purpose, including any
entertainment and educational events, is limited to members
and their guests. (Doc. # 129-24 at 78, 81). Other than Fun
Day, when the club provides free food, the club does not sell
food or drinks on the premises, nor is it used for lodging.
(Id. at 78). Once an individual becomes a member, they are

issued a key to the clubhouse, giving them unlimited access
to the clubhouse. (Id.). Non-members are not issued keys.
(Id.). Southard testified that, unless a member is at the
clubhouse, the clubhouse is kept locked. (Doc. # 129-1 at
256). In addition, the gate that provides access to the BCYC
dock is also normally kept locked, as Ring herself admitted
in her deposition. (Doc. # 129-31 at 159-60).
BCYC offers adult sailing school to members of the public
in the spring and fall on a limited, space-available basis,
and enrollment in the adult sailing school includes a 90-day
limited membership to BCYC, which entitles sail school
participants to access the clubhouse. (Doc. # 122 at ¶ 10;

Doc. # 135 at ¶ 10). In addition, the Sea Scouts are a youth
sailing club that is run by members of BCYC for kids. (Doc.
# 122-1 at 109-10; Doc. # 129-24 at 74). While neither the
children nor their parents need be members of BCYC, a BCYC
member or members act as a sponsor for the Sea Scout troop
and work with the children. (Doc. # 129-1 at 110; Doc. # 129-
24 at 74).
According to Brown, for any event held at the club other
than Fun Day, “there has to be a club member who is
responsible for any of the activity that happens.” (Doc. #
129-24 at 81). For example, if a member were to host a paint

your own wine glass event or a regatta at BCYC, an event which
non-members would attend, the member is there to make sure
“everything gets taken care of” and ensures “people aren’t
just running around doing whatever they want.” (Id. at 81,
82).
Ring points out that BCYC hosts 10 or more potlucks a
year. (Doc. # 129-1 at 98). According to Southard, nonmembers
are allowed to attend potluck dinners only as guests of
members. (Id. at 99-100). Ring states that, per the Lease
with the City, BCYC has to allow members of the Gulfport Lions
Club, Gulfport Yacht Club, Gulfport Youth Sailing, the Sea
Scouts, and the City’s authorized invitees and their guests

access to the beach area located behind the Lions Club
clubhouse. (Doc. # 129-30 at 4). Ring also points to BCYC’s
meeting minutes and calendar reflecting that events held by
or benefitting certain community organizations will be held
on BCYC’s premises. (Doc. # 128-16). By way of example: (1)
BCYC sponsored the “Cat’s Point Regatta,” an event hosted by
the BCYC Sea Scouts and nearby Eckerd College; (2) BCYC
participated in a tour of homes sponsored by the Gulfport
Area Chamber of Commerce by being the place tour participants
registered and got their maps; and (3) a local high school
drama club hosted a “covered dish” at BCYC as a fundraiser.

(Id. at 3, 5, 6).
Ring submitted her own affidavit attesting that the
clubhouse was rarely locked and she often saw “strangers”
freely walking about. (Doc. # 128-2 at 5). She attested that
the key pad at the entrance to the parking lot has a 4-digit
code has been the same for 12 years. (Doc. # 135-2 at 1).
She claims that, even when the gate is locked, the gate code
is “common knowledge.” (Id.). Similarly, the door to the
clubhouse has both a key-lock and a key pad, which code has
not been changed in many years. (Id. at 2).
Ring also submits three affidavits from individuals who
are not members of BCYC and aver that they have used the BCYC

facilities on multiple occasions and have never been asked
for identification, or to sign in. (Doc. ## 128-17, 128-18,
128- 19). They claim that they have been able to use BCYC’s
facilities “freely,” including the restroom, kitchen, and
parking area. (Id.).
According to the affidavit of BCYC member Lee Nell, the
gate to BCYC’s parking lot “used to be left open” but in
approximately 2018, BCYC decided to keep this gate closed at
all times — except during events — to discourage trespassers.
(Doc. # 137-4 at 4). Nell attested that before BCYC adopted
the closed-gate policy, there were occasions when non-members

would access the grounds. (Id.). However, according to Nell,
BCYC’s policy has “always” been that members question any
non-members about why they are on the premises, and guests
must always be accompanied by members. (Id. at 4-5). According
to Nell, Ring is the “only person who ever violated this rule
while she was a member of BCYC. Club members have reported
intercepting non-members on Club grounds, only to learn that
these visitors had been instructed by Ms. Ring to just ‘come
on in.’” (Id. at 5).
“Regular” or “indiscriminate” use of an establishment’s
facilities by nonmembers “contradicts private status.”
Jankey, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. However, a private club with

a limited guest policy in which guests are not permitted
“unfettered use of facilities” will not defeat the private-
club exemption. See Kelsey v. Univ. Club of Orlando, Inc.,
845 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
While BCYC does sponsor community events at which non-
members will be present, Southard testified that non-members
are always there as guests of the attending members. (Doc. #
129-1 at 100, 102, 110). Ring has not directly refuted this
evidence regarding community events; she merely points to the
community events themselves as obviating private-club status.
Not only are these events consistent with BCYC’s stated guest

policy, but courts considering this issue have consistently
held that “occasional use of the Club facilities by non-
members . . . does not convert [an establishment] into a place
of public accommodation under the ADA.” Reimer v. Kuki’O Golf
& Beach Club. Inc., No. 12-00408 LEK-BMK, 2013 WL 1501522, at
*3 (D. Haw. Apr. 11, 2013); see also Jankey, 14 F. Supp. 2d
at 1178 (“A private club . . . is not converted into a public
accommodation under the ADA because it is occasionally used
by the general public.”). As one district court explained,
“[o]cassionally allowing local charities or civic
organizations to use an establishment’s facilities to host
public events is not the sort of public use that is

inconsistent with private-club status. Indeed, a contrary
rule would actively discourage clubs from hosting charitable
functions, for fear of losing their private-club status.”
Lobel, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (citation omitted).
Finally, the self-serving affidavit submitted by Ring
herself is insufficient, by itself, to show that BCYC allows
unfettered use of the facilities. See Reimer, 2013 WL 1501522,
at *3 (holding that unsupported claims made in plaintiff’s
declaration were insufficient to show that nonmember use of
the club was so pervasive as to make it a place of public
accommodation). As for the three affidavits submitted by

members of the public in support of the proposition that BCYC
allows unfettered use of its facilities to non-members, it is
unclear when these incidents occurred, over what span of time,
or if Ring herself encouraged these individuals to enter
BCYC’s premises without a member. These isolated incidents
are insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
on this issue in light of the testimony that only members are
given key cards, that once BCYC realized trespassers were on
the property, it kept the gates locked, and the Club’s stated
policy that club premises are for the use only of members and
that nonmembers are only allowed when accompanied by a member.
“[I]solated accounts of incidents when members failed to

abide by defendant’s rules” are insufficient to defeat
private-club status. See Kelsey, 845 F. Supp. at 1530; see
also Jankey, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-81 (finding private-club
status despite plaintiff’s contention that he had been “waved
through” to the property on approximately a dozen occasions).
On this record, it is plain that BCYC does not intend or allow
unfettered or regular use of its facilities by non-members.
BCYC’s limited guest policy and isolated incidents of non-
compliance do not demand a different result. See Jankey, 14
F. Supp. 2d at 1178; Kelsey, 845 F. Supp. at 1530. This factor
weighs in favor of private-club status.

5. The purpose of the club’s existence
As stated in the Bylaws, BCYC’s purpose is to promote
safe boating activities, boating education, and fellowship
among its members. (Doc. # 129-30 at 1). No board member or
flag officer is allowed to use the club to aid any political
party or use the clubhouse to further a private business.
(Id. at 7). While Ring points to the social aspect of BCYC
and it’s “rhumb-loving roots,” the fact that part of BCYC’s
purpose is that of a social club is not dispositive. For
example, the Chicago Club clearly had a purpose of both
forwarding business connections among the city’s business
titans, but also functioned as a social club and gathering

place for members and their guests. See Chicago Club, 86 F.3d
at 1426-27. This factor weighs in favor of private-club
status.
6. Whether the club advertises for members
BCYC maintains an active website and Facebook page, runs
an adult sailing school, advertises events and the sailing
school in “The Gabber,” a Gulfport publication, and recruits
new members at its boat show. (Doc. # 129-1 at 88-90, 95, 98,
231; Doc. # 128-7). Other courts that have examined this
question have found similar efforts insufficient to confer
public-accommodation status. See Lobel, 260 F. Supp. 2d at

144 (“There is no evidence that [defendant] actively uses its
website or Facebook page to solicit or recruit new members.
It does not, for example, use either platform to send ‘form
letters to certain individuals soliciting applications for
membership.’”); Jankey, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82 (finding
commissary located on movie studio lot to be exempt from ADA
despite being advertised for four years in a subscription
publication); Bommarito, 2007 WL 925791, at *9-10 (finding
yacht club to be exempt from ADA despite newspaper articles
and advertisements promoting a fishing event, sailing
classes, and a “Yachtsmen’s Weekend” to nonmembers). As the
Seventh Circuit has noted, “[p]rudently increasing membership

to increase revenue while not abandoning selective membership
practices exhibits nothing more than fiscal responsibility.”
Chicago Club, 86 F.3d at 1435. This factor weighs in favor of
private-club status.
7. Whether the club is for profit or not for profit
and the formalities observed by the club

BCYC is a tax-exempt, not-for-profit organization and
observes formalities such as the election of officers and
board members. This factor weighs in favor of private-club
status. See Pappion v. R-Ranch Prop. Owners Ass’n, 110 F.
Supp. 3d 1017, 1025 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
Based on its review of these factors, the Court
determines that BCYC is a private club or organization as a
matter of law. Although this case presents a closer call
than most, when viewing the Lansdowne factors as a whole,
BCYC meets the requirements of being a private club.
Accordingly, BCYC is exempt from the requirements of Title
III of the ADA.
The Court thus turns to the private-organization
exemption under the FCRA. The FCRA provides that: “[a]ny
violation of any Florida statute making unlawful
discrimination because of . . . handicap . . . in the area[]
of . . . public accommodations gives rise to a cause of

action[.]” Fla. Stat. § 760.07. The statute defines “public
accommodations” as:
places of public accommodation, lodgings,
facilities principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, gasoline stations,
places of exhibition or entertainment, and other
covered establishments. Each of the following
establishments which serves the public is a place
of public accommodation within the meaning of this
section:

(a) Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment
which provides lodging to transient guests,
other than an establishment located within a
building which contains not more than four
rooms for rent or hire and which is actually
occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his or her residence.

(b) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter, soda fountain, or other facility
principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including, but
not limited to, any such facility located on
the premises of any retail establishment, or
any gasoline station.
(c) Any motion picture theater, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment.

(d) Any establishment which is physically located
within the premises of any establishment
otherwise covered by this subsection, or
within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment, and
which holds itself out as serving patrons of
such covered establishment.

Fla. Stat. § 760.02 (11).
The statute further provides that:
The term “public accommodations” does not include
lodge halls or other similar facilities of private
organizations which are made available for public
use occasionally or periodically.

Fla. Stat. § 760.07.
As BCYC is not principally engaged in selling food,
drinks, or lodging to the general public and does not provide
recreation to the general public in the same way a theater or
concert hall does, the definitions in Section 760.02 are
inapplicable. That leaves the “private organizations”
exemption in Section 760.07. Another court in this district
has noted that “[n]o reported Florida cases have discussed
the ‘private organizations’ exemption to the FCRA,” and so
the court turned to federal law for guidance. Rasmussen, 2008
WL 681055, at *11. As described above, the Rasmussen court
determined that a chartered organization of the Boy Scouts
was a private club under Title III of the ADA, with the
exception of its “Trading Post,” which was available to the
general public. Id. at *8. Turning to the FCRA claim, the
court reasoned:
The Council is . . . a “private club” within the
meaning of Title III of the ADA. . . . In plain
English, a “private club” qualifies as a type of
“private organization,” because a club is
necessarily an organization. Thus, the term
“private organization” appears to be as broad in
application, if not broader, than the term “private
club.” As a result, the Council’s status as a
“private club” under federal law qualifies it as a
“private organization” within the meaning of the
FCRA.
Id. at *11. This Court agrees. Because it has determined that
BCYC is a private club within the meaning of Title III, it
follows that it is also a “private organization” under the
FCRA. Thus, BCYC is also exempt under the FCRA.
The Court notes at this juncture that the Eleventh
Circuit has not issued a ruling as to whether a facility that
is not a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA might
nevertheless be subject to a retaliation claim under Title V
of the Act. The likely answer is that these claims rise and
fall together. The ADA’s retaliation provision states that
the “remedies and procedures available under sections 12117,
12133, and 12188 of this title shall be available to aggrieved
persons for violations of subsections (a) and (b), with
respect to subchapter I, subchapter II and subchapter III,
respectively.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203(c). In other words, the
remedy for a violation of the ADA’s retaliation provision is
tied to the respective remedies available in Titles I, II,
and III of the ADA.
The Court has located only one other district court that
has analyzed this question, and it held, persuasively, that

“Defendants who are not otherwise subject to ADA remedies
cannot be sued for retaliation under the ADA.”
Saniefar v. Moore, No. 117-CV-00823-LJOBAM, 2018 WL 3020458,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2018). The Saniefar court reasoned
that, because the retaliation provision does not provide its
own remedial provision, the most reasonable inference is that
“Congress did not intend to create a remedy for retaliation
allegedly perpetrated by [defendants] not covered by
Subchapter III.” Id. at *7.
Thus, because BCYC is not a place of public
accommodation, all of Ring’s claims fail as a matter of law.

However, even if BCYC were a place of public accommodation,
Ring’s claims would still fail for the reasons detailed below.
B. Retaliation and causation
BCYC argues that it neither took Ring’s alleged
disability into account nor retaliated against her. (Doc. #
122 at 1). Instead, according to BCYC, Ring was expelled for
“continually violating the Club’s By-Laws and rules since
2014.” (Id.). Ring responds that BCYC’s actions were taken
because of her disability and in retaliation for exercising
her rights. (Doc. # 135 at 20).
As an initial matter, while Ring now argues in her
summary judgment motion that BCYC expelled her “for seeking

assistance in addressing BCYC’s discriminatory conduct from
the city of Gulfport” (Doc. # 128 at 4), this is not the basis
for the retaliation claim in her complaint. According to the
allegations in the third amended complaint, BCYC took the
adverse actions of fining, suspending, and ultimately
expelling Ring because she filed a charge with the PCOHR, and
“[t]he adverse actions against Ring were taken in retaliation
for Ring having filed an administrative complaint.” (Doc. #
100 at 10).
As such, BCYC only had fair notice that Ring’s
retaliation claim was based on her action of filing a charge

with the PCOHR, not on her communications with City officials.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(stating that the purpose of Rule 8’s liberal pleading
guidelines is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (ellipsis
omitted)). Summary judgment briefing is not the appropriate
time to raise a new claim, and Ring’s claim that BCYC
retaliated against her in violation of the ADA for raising
BCYC’s alleged discriminatory conduct with the City is thus
not properly before this Court. See Corey Airport Servs.,
Inc. v. Decosta, 587 F.3d 1280, 1282 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“Because Corey cannot amend its Complaint by adding a new

claim in its summary judgment papers, we will not discuss
conduct beyond the scope of the Second Amended Complaint.”);
accord Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315
(11th Cir. 2004) (“At the summary judgment stage, the proper
procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend
the complaint in accordance with [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 15(a).”).
Moving onto the merits of the retaliation claim, the
record reflects that Ring and BCYC have had a tumultuous
relationship. In February 2016, a motion was presented to
expel Ring from membership. (Doc. # 129-40). The motion stated

that a similar motion had been made in 2015 because of, among
other things, “her boorish behavior, both publicly and in
private, against some other BCYC members and officers.” (Id.
at 3). However, after a discussion with certain BCYC officers,
the 2015 motion was never brought forward. (Id.).
The February 2016 motion stated that Ring had
“repeatedly, willfully, and continually violat[ed] one or
more of the BCYC rules and policies.” (Id.). An attached bill
of particulars set forth the specific bases for the motion.
(Id.). The bill of particulars included: (1) after hosting a
potluck dinner, Ring did not clean up the food, instead
leaving the mess for others to clean up; (2) publicly

criticizing other members; (3) Ring shirked certain
responsibilities regarding the BCYC Christmas boat parade;
(4) Ring brought her “very large, very furry” dog to a large
gathering honoring a longtime BCYC member who was ill, refused
to remove the dog when asked, and “harangued” another member
about this; (5) Ring was living aboard her boat without the
necessary authorization; (6) Ring took club supplies without
asking; (7) Ring exceeded her allotted time on the T-docks;
(8) allowing Piper to run, unrestrained and off leash, on the
premises; and (9) generally acting in a rude and aggressive
manner to other club members, including sending threatening

and mocking emails to one of the officers. (Id. at 4-9).
According to the bill of particulars, these infractions began
in August 2014 and continued until January 2016. (Id.); see
also (Doc. # 137-4 at 3) (BCYC member describing Ring bringing
another dog, Harry, to a crowded event where Harry “kept
bumping into members, including the terminally ill lifetime
member” being honored at the event, and stating that Ring
“verbally attacked the Chair of the event for asking her to
remove her dog from the banquet area”). Despite this motion,
Ring was ultimately allowed to keep her BCYC membership. See
(Doc. # 122 at 5). In addition, Ring’s deposition is replete
with accusations of other BCYC members making derogatory

comments to or about her or engaging in disagreements with
her during her time as a BCYC member. See, e.g., (Doc. # 129-
31 at 57-61, 64-66, 76-78, 83-84, 93-94, 127-28).
In approximately August 2018, Ring forwarded her note
regarding her purported need for a service animal to Commodore
Brown. (Doc. # 129-24 at 17). Brown testified that he
researched the ADA and discussed the matter with Ring. (Id.
at 95). When it became apparent to Brown that they were not
going to reach a resolution, he encouraged Ring to file a
complaint with the PCOHR. (Id. at 95-96).
On December 23, 2018, Brown issued Ring a written

reprimand for bringing Piper into the clubhouse against BCYC
rules. (Doc. # 129-26). Ring filed her complaint with the
PCOHR on January 2, 2019. (Doc. # 28-1).
It was in this early to mid-January time frame that Ring
both contacted City officials to complain of BCYC’s treatment
of her and also when Southard reached out to an investigator
to verify Ring’s address. (Doc. # 129-1 at 39-41, 159; Doc.
# 129-4 through 129-8).
On January 21, 2019, Ring again brought Piper into the
clubhouse, and then-Commodore Southard issued Ring a fine.
(Doc. # 100-4). On January 31, 2019, the BCYC Board suspended
Ring’s membership privileges. (Doc. # 100-5). According to

the suspension motion, board member Anthony Angel moved to
suspend Ring “due to her fraud on the City, which conduct is
likely to endanger the welfare of BCYC by negatively impacting
[BCYC’s] efforts to negotiate a favorable lease with the City
of Gulfport, thereby jeopardizing BCYC’s future existence.”
(Id. at 1). The explanatory notes in support of the motion
explain that, since the City installed a new mooring field,
preventing boaters from living aboard their vessels has
become “of heightened interest to the City.” (Id. at 2).
According to the motion, Ring had lived for three years
“as a non-sanctioned ‘liveaboard’ despite the provision in

BCYC’s lease with the City prohibiting such liveaboards.
During that time, she has provided the Club and the City with
four false addresses as her land-based residence. . . . Ms.
Ring has been stealing City electricity by keeping an
extension cord plugged into the City’s 110v electrical outlet
on the pedestal near her boat in the Club basin. . . . As Ms.
Ring is well aware, the City strongly objects to boat owners
using that electrical power on a constant or ongoing basis.”
(Id. at 2-3).6
In conclusion, the motion stated that the Board believed
that “the City has stalled the start of the Club’s lease
negotiations awaiting the Club’s actions to comply with its

obligations under the current Lease. Regardless, it is clear
that Ms. Ring has in the past violated a number of lease
provisions and rules, and she continues to do so. Her actions
have jeopardized the likelihood that the Club will be able to
secure favorable terms in a new lease, without which the
Club’s future survival is extremely uncertain. For this
reason, [the Board] believe[s] Ms. Ring’s conduct is likely
to endanger the welfare of BCYC, and therefore, it is
necessary to suspend Ms. Ring from the Club immediately.”
(Id. at 3).

6 During her deposition, Ring never explicitly denied ever
living on board her boat. She admitted that she applied at
one point to be the authorized liveaboard. (Doc. # 129-31 at
124-25). It is unclear when this request occurred, although
it likely took place in 2018 because Ring made her request to
Brown, the Commodore at the time. (Id.). It’s also unclear
whether this request was ever granted or denied, although
Brown expressed his “concern” about Ring having Piper with
her on board the boat. (Id.).
Ring appeared in person at the January 31, 2019, Board
meeting to defend herself against the charges and implied
that the accusations of stealing electricity and providing
false land-based addresses were untrue. (Doc. # 129-31 at
139, 141-43). During her deposition, she referred to another
BCYC member, Ray Rodriguez, as her “roommate.” (Id. at 140).
But, while Ring provided the address of the Rodriguez family

home to BCYC, Rodriguez’s ex-wife had informed the BCYC Board
that Ring did not live at that residence and never had. (Doc.
# 129-1 at 158-65; Doc. # 129-7). The record also reflects
that, on January 25 and 28, 2019, BCYC sent letters to Ring
at two different addresses, both of which were marked “return
to sender; not deliverable as addressed.” (Doc. # 129-40 at
19).
Although Ring disputed the charges, the general
membership of BCYC voted to expel Ring from membership in
April 2019. (Doc. # 100-6). Ring has cited to evidence
suggesting that certain members of the club worked together

on a “script” of what they wanted to say in support of her
expulsion. (Doc. # 135-4; Doc. # 135-5).
Here, Ring has brought a retaliation claim under the
ADA. The ADA provides that “no person shall discriminate
against any individual because such individual has opposed
any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because
such individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA].” Stewart
v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th
Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)). Section 12203
provides remedies to individuals who have been retaliated
under Title I, Title II, or Title III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(c). See Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th

Cir. 2004) (noting that a plaintiff may assert a claim for
retaliation under the ADA outside of the employment context).
The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. §
12203(a), is similar to Title VII’s prohibition on
retaliation, Shannon v. Postmaster General of U.S. Postal
Service, 335 F. App’x 21, 26 (11th Cir. 2009), so Title VII
retaliation standards are permissibly imported into ADA
cases. Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287. Under that standard, a
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation to
avoid summary judgment. This showing contains three elements:
first, the plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected

conduct; second, the plaintiff suffered an adverse action;
and finally, the adverse action was causally related to the
protected expression. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197
F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Stewart, 117 F.3d at
1287). Once a prima facie case has been established, the
defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged decision. Farley,
197 F.3d at 1336. The plaintiff then must “demonstrate that
[she] will be able to establish at trial that the
[defendant’s] proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a
pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation.” Id.
Even assuming that Ring’s complaint to the PCOHR

qualifies as statutorily protected conduct and that she
suffered an adverse action by being suspended and expelled
from BCYC membership, that leaves the question of whether the
actions were causally related.
The Supreme Court has stated that “mere temporal
proximity between . . . knowledge of protected activity and
an adverse . . . action . . . must be ‘very close.’” Clark
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)
(citations omitted). The Court cited with approval decisions
in which a three- to four-month disparity was found to be
insufficient to show causal connection. See Id.

However, the rule of temporal proximity is “not
absolute.” Singleton v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cty.,
725 F. App’x 736, 739 (11th Cir. 2018). Where, for example,
there was no evidence that a plaintiff’s employer’s adverse
action was motivated by the accommodations request, but the
evidence instead “overwhelmingly indicate[d] the [adverse
action] resulted from [plaintiff’s] inability to keep up with
the daily demands of his job,” the Eleventh Circuit determined
that an exception to the general rule of temporal proximity
was warranted. Id.
Here, there is no evidence of BCYC officers, board
members, or club members stating that they wished to suspend

or expel Ring from membership because she was seeking to
exercise her rights under the ADA by bringing a purported
service animal into the clubhouse or because she filed a
charge of discrimination with the PCOHR. True, it is apparent
from the record that BCYC felt Ring was jeopardizing its
ongoing lease negotiations with the City. But there is no
indication from the record that her filing the complaint with
PCOHR was causally related to later adverse events. Instead,
the only evidence linking these events is their temporal
proximity.
As an initial matter, there was a lag of more than three

months between when Ring filed her complaint with PCOHR in
January 2019 and when she was expelled in April 2019, and an
even longer gap between her expulsion and when she sought to
present Piper as a service animal in July 2018. A time gap of
this length is insufficient to show the requisite causal
connection. See Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (citing with
approval cases holding that a three or four month gap is
insufficient to show causal connection).
However, the Court is cognizant that there was less than
a month between the time Ring filed her complaint with PCOHR
in early January 2019 and when the board moved to suspend her
membership privileges on January 31, 2019. But even with this

close temporal proximity, in light of the other evidence in
the record regarding the reasons BCYC had to suspend Ring,
the Court believes that this case calls for an exception to
the general rule of temporal proximity. See Singleton, 725 F.
App’x at 739; see also Whatley v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid
Transit, 632 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1980)(“The evidence
reveals . . . the dismissal was a culmination of problems
growing out of appellant’s manner of handling his job.”).
For a similar reason, even if Ring had met her burden of
proving a prima facie case of retaliation, BCYC has more than
met its burden of showing that it had legitimate and non-

discriminatory reasons for expelling Ring from membership.
The record reflects that, as far back as 2015, the club had
sought to expel Ring for various rule infractions and boorish
behavior. In addition, the motion for suspension demonstrates
that BCYC sought to expel Ring because she was living aboard
her boat without authorization, in violation of its Lease
with the City, was accused of using City electricity without
permission, and, in BCYC’s opinion, had provided false land-
based addresses.
Thus, BCYC had legitimate and non-discriminatory
reasons for expelling Ring. Ring has provided this Court with
no evidence demonstrating that these stated reasons were

pretextual — either directly by persuading the Court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated BCYC or
indirectly by showing that BCYC’s proffered explanations are
unworthy of credence. See Wofsy v. Palmshores Retirement
Cmty., 285 F. App’x 631, 634 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed,
regarding Ring’s alleged false addresses, the record evidence
establishes that a club member disputed that she ever lived
at one provided address and mail sent to two other addresses
was returned as undeliverable. Ring has not met her burden of
demonstrating that BCYC’s reasons for expelling her were
pretextual.

Accordingly, BCYC is entitled to summary judgment on
Ring’s retaliation claim.
The Court also notes that causation is a necessary
element in both Title III and the FCRA, because FCRA
discrimination claims track the analysis used for ADA claims.
Title III of the ADA prohibits a public accommodation from
discriminating “on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a). The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this language
to establish a “but-for” causation standard for ADA claims.
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6
(11th Cir. 2008); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d
1068, 1073-77 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing Titles I, II, and

IV of the ADA, and holding that “the ADA imposes liability
whenever the prohibited motivation makes the difference in
the employer’s decision”). That is, to succeed on an ADA
claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s
discriminatory actions would not have occurred but for the
plaintiff's disability.
For the reasons previously described, Ring has not
demonstrated a reasonable dispute of material fact on the
issue of whether BCYC’s suspension and expulsion would not
have occurred but for her disability. The record demonstrates
that BCYC had many reasons for wanting to expel Ring,

including that she had a pattern of violating club rules, was
endangering their Lease with the City or, perhaps, was plainly
disliked by many members. None of this establishes, however,
that BCYC acted against Ring because of her disabilities.
Thus, her Title III and FCRA claims for disability
discrimination fail for this reason as well. See Estate of
Smith v. Forest Manor, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-01774-RDP, 2018 WL
2770203, at *9 (N.D. Ala. June 8, 2018) (granting summary
judgment to defendant on Title III claim where the “undisputed
Rule 56 evidence demonstrates that Forest Manor personnel had
a reason other than Smith’s disability for not installing
foot rests on her wheelchair and not using a lap restraint”).

Accordingly, BCYC is entitled to summary judgment on all
of Ring’s claims.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant Boca Ciega Yacht Club’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. # 122) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Samantha
Ring’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 128) is
DENIED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Boca
Ciega Yacht Club and against Plaintiff Samantha Ring on
all counts of the complaint.

(3) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to CLOSE THE CASE.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
27th day of March, 2020.
fan 9D. Mewmby ney,
VIR TA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

59

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104846. Public record. Not legal advice.