# Mohit v. City of Haines City

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 4, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104672

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 4, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104672

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that district courts need not allow amendment when it would be futile
- explaining that executive actions “characteristically apply to a limited number of people, often to only one. This includes . . . individual acts of zoning enforcement”
- holding that, absent an allegation of at least one similarly situated comparator, plaintiffs failed to state a “class of one” equal protection claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

BENEDICT MOHIT,

Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:18-cv-1775-T-33JSS
CITY OF HAINES CITY,

Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on consideration of
Defendant City of Haines City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 44), filed on October 1,
2019. Plaintiff Benedict Mohit, proceeding pro se, responded
on October 9, 2019. (Doc. # 45). For the reasons given below,
the Motion is granted and Counts II and III of Mohit’s Second
Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
I. Background
The factual background of this case is amply and well
presented in United States Magistrate Judge Julie S. Sneed’s
July 9, 2019 Report and Recommendation, pertaining to Haines
City’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. (Doc.
# 40). The Court presumes the parties are familiar with the
findings and conclusions contained in the Report and
Recommendation, which the Court later adopted without
objection from either party. (Doc. # 42). Accordingly, the
Court will only present here an essential summary of the
facts.
In July 2012, Haines City adopted its current land
development regulations in the form of Ordinance No. 12-1424
(“LDR”) which, in pertinent part, prohibits any person from

keeping farm animals within the City limits and requires a
conditional use permit to use residentially zoned property
for agricultural purposes. (Doc. # 43 at 7; Doc. # 40 at 1).
Mohit’s 20-acre property, which he purchased in May 2012, was
within the residential zone impacted by the LDR. (Doc. # 43
at 1, 2).
In May 2015, pursuant to a court order, Mohit submitted
an application for a conditional use permit to pursue certain
agricultural activities on his property. (Doc. # 43 at 11;
Doc. # 40 at 2). On August 6, 2015, the City Commission passed
Resolution No. 15-1153 (the “Conditional Use Permit”)

granting Mohit permission to conduct agricultural activities
on his property subject to certain conditions. (Doc. # 43 at
11; Doc. # 43-1 at 11-14). Specifically, he was limited to
twenty cattle, twenty goats, and five horses, and he was not
allowed to operate feed lot operations or swine production.
(Doc. # 43-1 at 11). The Conditional Use Permit also required
Mohit to reapply for a new permit in ten years. (Id. at 13).
Mohit filed suit against Haines City in state court
alleging, among other things, that the LDR and the Conditional
Use Permit violated certain Florida statutes that prohibit
duplicative regulation of agricultural activities. (Doc. #
26-2 at ¶¶ 42-104; Doc. # 40 at 2). The state trial court

eventually granted summary judgment to the City on those
counts. (Doc. # 26-4; Doc. # 26-6; Doc. # 40 at 3). Once
Mohit’s state case was concluded, he filed a complaint in
federal court. (Doc. # 1; Doc. # 40 at 4).
After this Court dismissed Counts II and III of Mohit’s
first amended complaint without prejudice, Mohit filed, pro
se, a second amended complaint on August 27, 2019. (Doc. #
43). As before, Mohit raises three causes of action against
Haines City: (1) taking of property without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment (Count I);
(2) violation of due process and equal protection under the

United States Constitution (Count II); and (3) violation of
the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) (Count III). (Id. at 15-
32). Haines City has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 44),
to which Mohit has responded (Doc. # 45), and the Motion is
ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss brought under Rule
12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all the allegations in
the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d
1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the
plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations

in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the Supreme
Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, the plaintiff
must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The Court must limit its consideration to well-pled
factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in
the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.1 La Grasta v.
First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
Although pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings prepared by attorneys, Tannenbaum v.
United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), pro se
parties are still required to comply with minimum pleading

standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and this district’s Local Rules. Grew v. Hopper, No. 2:07-
cv-550-FtM-34SPC, 2008 WL 114915, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9,
2008); see also Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146
F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[a]lthough
we construe them liberally, pro se pleadings also must comply
with the procedural rules that govern pleadings”).
III. Analysis
A. Count I: Takings Clause Claim
As an initial matter, Haines City does not appear to
seek dismissal of Count I in its current Motion because its

arguments are confined to the claims in Counts II and III.

1 As discussed in Judge Sneed’s Report and Recommendation,
the Court takes judicial notice of the records of the state
court action and of Haines City’s Land Development
Regulations and may do so without converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 40 at 6-
7).
See (Doc. # 44 at 7-22). To the extent Haines City attempts
to argue that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on the taking
of property without just compensation does not apply to state
action, (Id. at 7), such an argument is contravened by clear
precedent. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 175 n.1 (1985),
overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Penn.,

139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (“The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition,
of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). Thus, to the extent Haines City seeks dismissal
of Count I, its Motion is denied.
B. Count II: Due Process Claim
Count II of Mohit’s second amended complaint is for
“violation of due process and equal protection.” (Doc. # 43
at 18).
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, and as Judge
Sneed’s Report and Recommendation previously laid out, the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause only protects

rights that are “fundamental,” such as those rights created
by the Constitution. Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d
1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014). Because property rights are not
created by the Constitution but, rather, are creatures of
state law, “there is generally no substantive due process
protection for state-created property rights.” Id. “There is,
however, at least one exception to this Circuit’s general
rule that there are no substantive due process claims for
non-fundamental rights. Where a person’s state-created rights
are infringed by a ‘legislative act,’ the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause generally protects that
person from arbitrary and irrational governmental action.”

Id. at 1279-80 (citing Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1273
(11th Cir. 2005)).
The linchpin of this analysis is whether the
governmental acts complained of are executive or legislative
in nature. Id. at 1280. As the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Executive acts typically arise from the ministerial
or administrative activities of the executive
branch and characteristically apply to a limited
number of people, often to only one. This includes
employment terminations or individual acts of
zoning enforcement.

Legislative acts, on the other hand, generally
apply to a larger segment of — if not all of —
society. Laws and broad-ranging executive
regulations are the most common examples. A
legislative act also involves policy-making rather
than mere administrative application of existing
policies. Prospective “zoning-type decisions made
by an elected body” are often legislative or quasi-
legislative.

Id. (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
Here, the property rights asserted by Mohit are state-
created rights, as Mohit concedes. See (Doc. # 43 at 2, 10,
16, 20). Thus, they are not fundamental rights and the Due
Process Clause will only be implicated if those property
rights were infringed by a legislative act of the City.
The City actions that Mohit complains of are: (1)
adopting regulations that improperly regulate his farming

activities (Doc. # 43 at 18, 20); (2) the City “meanly
applied” its regulations to him via the Conditional Use Permit
(Id. at 22); (3) a citation he received from the City in
August 2018 about his hay crop being more than 12 inches high
in violation of a City nuisance ordinance (Id.); (4) City
officials’ alleged actions in July 2014 “threaten[ing] to
shut [Mohit’s] Farm down, impose penalty fines and place a
lien” on his farm unless he filed an application for a
conditional use permit (Id. at 22-23); (5) the Conditional
Use Permit’s ten-year limitation (Id. at 23); (6) the City’s
alleged arbitrary decision prohibiting him from changing the

use of his farmland from growing hay to grazing livestock
(Id.); and (7) the City prohibited him from erecting a barbed
wire fence on his farm. (Id. at 24).
As this Court has previously determined, the City’s
action of granting Mohit’s Conditional Use Permit was an
executive action because it affected Mohit alone. (Doc. # 40
at 16). In addition, the other alleged City actions that Mohit
points to in his second amended complaint were similarly
directed solely at Mohit and, thus, are executive actions
that are not actionable under the substantive component of
the Due Process Clause. See Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1280
(explaining that executive actions “characteristically apply

to a limited number of people, often to only one. This
includes . . . individual acts of zoning enforcement”). For
example, the City’s citation for having hay growing more than
12 inches tall or prohibiting Mohit from having a barbed wire
fence – both of which are in line with the City ordinances
cited by Mohit in his second amended complaint – are
individual acts of zoning enforcement. See (Doc. # 43 at 15).
Thus, no matter how arbitrary these decisions were on
the part of the City, they do not give rise to a substantive
due process cause of action. “[A]n as-applied challenge to
a land-use statute never gives rise to a substantive-due-

process claim when the sole basis for the challenge is
allegedly arbitrary behavior that does not infringe on a
fundamental right.” Hillcrest Prop., LLP v. Pasco Cty., 915
F.3d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We cannot be clearer on
this point: regardless of how arbitrarily or irrationally the
[City] has acted with respect to [plaintiff], [plaintiff] has
no substantive-due-process claim.”).
However, as before, the Court can discern that Mohit
also appears to challenge the LDR which, as it previously
concluded, is a challenge to a legislative act. (Doc. # 40 at
17). In such circumstances, the Court must proceed beyond the
“fundamental rights” inquiry.

“Substantive due process challenges that do not
implicate fundamental rights are reviewed under the ‘rational
basis’ standard.” Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1280. Under rational
basis scrutiny, “the challenged provision need only be
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”
Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390–91 (11th Cir. 1998).
Put another way, if there is “any conceivably valid
justification” for the challenged legislative act, and if
there is “any plausible link between the purpose of the
[legislative act] and the methods selected to further this
purpose, then no violation of substantive due process

exists.” Id. at 1391. This standard is “highly deferential”
and courts will hold legislative acts unconstitutional under
a rational basis standard “in only the most exceptional of
circumstances.” Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1280.
Mohit claims in his second amended complaint that the
LDR is unconstitutional because it violates Florida law, is
“unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious,” has no rational
basis, did not result in a general benefit to the health,
safety, and welfare of the public, and made farm production
inefficient and unprofitable. (Doc. # 43 at 18).
Even accepting Mohit’s factual allegations as true,

Mohit fails to plausibly allege that the LDR lacks any
rational basis. First, Mohit argues that the City regulations
are arbitrary and are without rational basis because they
violate two Florida statutes that prohibit “duplication of
state regulation” with respect to agricultural lands – Fla.
Stat. § 163.3162(a) and § 823.14(6). (Doc. # 43 at 18-20).
However, the state trial court has already determined that
the LDR and Conditional Use Permit are not in violation of
Florida law, including these provisions. Mohit also argues
that the challenged regulations are not rationally related to
any legitimate government purpose because, in a state trial

court hearing, the City Attorney admitted that the
regulations may not be in complete conformance with Florida
law. (Id. at 22). But, again, this issue has already been
determined by the Florida state court.
The remainder of Mohit’s allegations, as before, fail to
plausibly allege that the LDR lacks any rational basis. He
claims that City regulations were “meanly applied” to him,
and he labels the LDR as “unreasonable, arbitrary, and
capricious” and lacking a rational basis, but these are bald
legal conclusions, without offering any factual explanation
to support these contentions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(explaining that a complaint cannot tender “naked assertions”
devoid of further factual enhancement). Despite being advised
in the Report and Recommendation to include allegations
regarding how the actual substance of the LDR is arbitrary or
capricious with regard to its impact on the property owners
of Haines City generally, Mohit’s second amended complaint
fails to provide such allegations. Accordingly, this portion
of Count II must be dismissed.
C. Count II: Equal Protection Claim
Mohit also brings an equal protection claim. The Equal
Protection Clause requires that the government treat

similarly situated persons in a similar manner. Gary v. City
of Warner Robins, 311 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). If an ordinance does not
infringe upon a fundamental right or target a protected class,
equal protection claims are judged under the rational basis
test. Id. That means that the ordinance must be rationally
related to the achievement of a legitimate government
purpose. Id. “The general rule is that legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” Id. at 1339 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).

To establish a “class of one” equal protection claim,
the plaintiff must show that he has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is
no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Foley v.
Orange Cty., 638 F. App’x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2016). “To be
similarly situated, the comparators must be prima facie
identical in all relevant respects.” Id. (citing Grider v.
City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010)).
In his second amended complaint, Mohit alleges that his
farm is “similarly situated in pertinent ways to some of his
neighbors’ farms because all Greenbelt farm lands are used

for the ‘purpose of growing plants, crops, trees, and other
agricultural or forestry products; raising livestock; and for
other agricultural purposes.” (Doc. # 43 at 21). He claims
that farms to the north are subject to different LDRs that
allow more liberal agricultural uses of the land. (Id. at
20). He also points, as before, to a neighbor who was granted
a permit allowing him to keep an unlimited number of animals
of any species on his farm. (Id. at 24).
As previously held, this falls far short of stating a
viable equal protection claim. The Court previously
determined that the one comparator farm that Mohit has
identified is twice the size of Mohit’s 20-acre farm and,

thus, Mohit failed to identify any similarly situated
properties. (Doc. # 40 at 19). And, as previously held,
Mohit’s vague allusion to “some of his neighbors’ farms” is
too vague and conclusory to satisfy the pleading standard set
forth in Twombly and Iqbal. (Doc. # 40 at 19-20); see
Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1342
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (holding that, absent an allegation of at
least one similarly situated comparator, plaintiffs failed to
state a “class of one” equal protection claim); see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (to be actionable, a plaintiff’s
allegations must “nudge” his claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible).
Finally, as before, Mohit has not sufficiently alleged
that the City’s regulatory actions were not rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. While he
complains that the regulations were “meanly applied” to him,
and that the City “arbitrarily” prohibited him from changing
his hay crop to livestock, these allegations are far too
conclusory to support a claim that the City’s actions were
arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, this portion of Count
II is dismissed.
D. Count III: FHA claim

Lastly, Mohit continues to bring a claim under the FHA,
despite this Court’s previous decision that his claim was
both inadequately pled and untimely. (Doc. # 40 at 23, 26).
The Court warned Mohit that “to avoid a second dismissal, he
must plead a facially sufficient and timely FHA claim by
alleging actions taken against him by the City on or after
August 6, 2017, that would represent a violation of the FHA.”
(Id. at 26).
To avoid this time-bar, Mohit alleges that the City
violated the FHA by (1) finding him to be in violation of a
City ordinance requiring certain plants or crops to be under
12 inches in height, on August 30, 2018; (2) charging him a

$53 stormwater assessment on November 1, 2018; and (3)
enforcing the LDR zoning resolution and/or granting him the
Conditional Use Permit on terms he dislikes. (Doc. # 43 at
25, 26). Mohit claims that the City took these actions due to
discrimination against him based on his race, color, and
national origin. (Id. at 26).
This Court has previously held that Mohit did not present
a facially plausible claim that the City’s actions in adopting
the LDR and approving Mohit’s application for a Conditional
Use Permit constitute intentional discrimination, resulted in
a discriminatory impact, or represent a refusal to make a

reasonable accommodation in violation of the FHA. (Doc. # 40
at 22). The Court determined that the LDR is facially race-
neutral, nor had Mohit alleged that the City harbored a
discriminatory intent in adopting the LDR. (Id. at 22-23).
What’s more, as this Court previously held, to the extent
Mohit challenges the passage of the LDR or the granting of
the Conditional Use Permit, the City approved the Conditional
Use Permit on August 6, 2015, and thus the two-year statute
of limitations under the FHA ran in August 2017. (Doc. # 40
at 24). To avoid this ruling, Mohit also alleges two actions
taken against him in 2018. First, the Court notes that both

of these actions took place after Mohit filed his original
complaint in July 2018, so it is difficult to see how they
could form the basis for his FHA claim. In any event, Mohit
has not alleged that the City’s action in serving the hay
citation and stormwater charge were not authorized by the
City’s LDRs, codes, or ordinances. He also does not allege
that his crops were less than 12 inches high (and thus, he
was not in violation of the City nuisance ordinance) or that
other people were not levied similar stormwater fees. Most
importantly, these allegations fail to plausibly allege or
suggest intentional discrimination, a discriminatory impact,
or a refusal to make a reasonable accommodation. See Bonasera

v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x 581, 583 (11th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that plaintiffs can establish a violation of the
FHA by alleging (1) intentional discrimination; (2)
discriminatory impact; or (3) a refusal to make a reasonable
accommodation).
Mohit alleges that “[t]he City’s regulations are
colorblind but Officials Bennett, Elaison, Greenwood, and
Reilly may not be” and that those same officials “harbored a
discriminatory intent” against him. Such allegations, without
more, are too vague and conclusory to support a plausible
claim for a violation of the FHA. See Franklin v. Curry, 738

F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Mere labels and conclusions
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do, and a plaintiff cannot rely on naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement.”). For these reasons,
Mohit’s FHA claim must be dismissed for failure to plausibly
allege a claim and because it is untimely.
IV. Conclusion
This is Mohit’s third attempt to plead a cause of action
that meets the minimal pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite the clear directives
contained in Judge Sneed’s Report and Recommendation, Mohit’s

second amended complaint failed to rectify the deficiencies
identified in the Report and Recommendation. Under these
circumstances, any further amendments would be futile, and
the Court will not allow Mohit further opportunities to amend
these claims. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310
(11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that district courts need not
allow amendment when it would be futile). Accordingly, Counts
II and III of Mohit’s second amended complaint are dismissed
with prejudice. Count I will proceed.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendant City of Haines City’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 44) is
GRANTED. Counts II and III of the second amended
complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
(2) Defendant is directed to file an answer to Count I within
14 days from the date of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 4th
day of March, 2020.
fase Or. Hunaby (noch
VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104672. Public record. Not legal advice.