# Pedraza v. Inch

> District Court, M.D. Florida · February 21, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104579

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** February 21, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104579

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating Monell “is meant to limit § 1983 liability to ‘acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered’”; adding that “[t]here are, however, several different ways of establishing municipal liability under § 1983”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JESUS ELOY PEDRAZA

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-141-J-34PDB

MARK INCH, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Jesus Pedraza, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action
on February 7, 2020, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1) under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pedraza names Mark Inch, Trinity Food Service, Centurion Medical,
Ms. Bartly, John Godwin, Mr. Hester, and Mr. White as Defendants. Pedraza asserts that
Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment because of injuries he sustained during a slip and fall accident and the
subsequent medical treatment he received. As relief, Pedraza requests injunctive relief
and compensatory and punitive damages.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at
any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Additionally, the Court must read a
plaintiff's pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
"A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact." Bilal v. Driver, 251
F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129
(11th Cir. 1990)). "Frivolous claims include claims 'describing fantastic or delusional

scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.'" Bilal, 251 F.3d at
1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)). Additionally, a claim may
be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success.
Id.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal
law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d
1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit "'requires proof of an
affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation' in § 1983 cases." Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d
611, 625 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.
1986)). More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). As such,
"'conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts, or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.'" Rehberger v. Henry Cty., Ga., 577 F.
App'x 937, 938 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Pedraza’s Allegations
In his Complaint, Pedraza alleges that:
On Oct. 16, 2019[,] at approximately 11:00 am while I
was working in the kitchen, for food service at Columbia C.I.,
and [sic] I slipped and fell. (The floor had a lot of spilled water
on it, but nobody put down a wet floor sign and the kitchen
doesn’t have any slip proof mats or paint to prevent falls.) I fell
so hard that it jarred my whole back and neck, and I couldn’t
move, so officer White had to call medical for a stretcher.
Nurse Bartly arrived with two orderlies and instructed them to
put me on the stretcher, but as soon as they tried to move me
I screamed because of the pain it caused and they stopped.
Then they called for the head nurse and when she got there
she said they needed a backboard and neck brace, but they
only brought a backboard. When they put me on the
backboard I told the nurse that my neck hurt really bad, but
they didn’t put me in a neck brace until I got to medical. The
nurses kept acting like I wasn’t hurt and I was faking it. So
they kept telling me if I got up and walked around they would
give me something for pain. From approximately 11:30 am to
5:30 pm I layed [sic] in medical in severe pain til [sic] finally a
lady showed up [and] did a x-ray of my back and said I had
two lower lumbar fractures. That was when the nurses finally
took my injuries serious and declared me a trauma patient. At
approximately 7:00 pm a[n] ambulance finally came and
transported me to a Lake City, Florida hospital and then due
to the severity of my injuries I was then transferred to a
hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. Where I was treated for the
pain and they performed a cat-scan and x-rays. When those
were done I was told I needed a M.R.I. to determine the full
extent of the damages, but I was told it was to[o] expensive to
get a M.R.I. there and that they would schedule me for a
M.R.I. at North Florida Regional Medical Center in Lake
Butler, Florida. Then I was transferred back to Columbia C.I.
m/u where I had to wait approximately 5 weeks to go get my
M.R.I. done. After the M.R.I. was done I was told I had 2
bulging disc[s] in my neck, but no M.R.I. was done at that time
on my back. I was told that I needed physical therapy and if
that didn’t work I would have to see a nuro-surgeon [sic] when
I got released from prison, because they don’t want to be
responsible, and now I live in severe pain every day of my life.

Complaint at 14-15. Pedraza contends that Defendants Inch, Trinity Food Service,
Centurion, Godwin, and Hester failed to ensure staff were properly trained in safety
procedures and how to respond to slip and fall emergencies. Id. at 13. According to
Pedraza, Defendant Bartly allowed two untrained inmates to move him after a severe slip
and fall and waited over seven hours to get him to a hospital for proper treatment. Id. As
to Defendant White, Pedraza states that he negligently failed to maintain a safe and
secure work place for inmates in the kitchen. Id.
Eighth Amendment Standard
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties
on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials
must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and
must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984)). “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an
objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct.” Oliver v. Fuhrman,

739 F. App'x 968, 969 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289
(11th Cir. 2004)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Under the objective component, a prisoner must allege
a condition that is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth
Amendment. Id. The challenged condition must be extreme
and must pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the
prisoner’s future health or safety. Id. The Eighth Amendment
guarantees that prisoners are provided with a minimal
civilized level of life’s basic necessities. Id.

Under the subjective component, a prisoner must
allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state
of mind that constituted deliberate indifference. Id. This
means the prisoner must show that the prison officials: (1) had
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)
disregarded that risk; and (3) displayed conduct that is more
than mere negligence. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245
(11th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 969-70. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's
interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). The Court notes that slip
and fall accidents generally do not constitute a claim for cruel and unusual punishment
because such incidents are considered negligence claims. See Winston v. Aducci-
Washington, Case No. 7:17-cv-01099-VEH-SGC, 2018 WL 2272940, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Apr.
19, 2018) report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:17-cv-01099-VEH-SGC, 2018 WL
2266955 (N.D. Ala. May 17, 2018) (collecting cases finding slip and fall accidents failed
as a matter of law to state a federal claim); Davis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 5:07-cv-279-
RS-EMT, 2008 WL 539057, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2008) (“Courts have regularly held
that slip and fall accidents do not give rise to federal causes of action.”).
As it relates to medical care, “[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’”
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). The Eleventh circuit has explained that
To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, [a plaintiff] must
show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants'
deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation
between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v.
Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir.2009). To
establish deliberate indifference, [a plaintiff] must prove “(1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard
of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]
negligence.” Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152,
1158 (11th Cir.2010) (alteration in original). The defendants
must have been “aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exist[ed]” and then actually draw that inference. Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir.2003) (quotation
omitted).

Easley v. Dep’t of Corr., 590 F. App’x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2014). “For medical treatment
to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the care must be ‘so grossly incompetent,
inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental
fairness.’” Nimmons v. Aviles, 409 F. App'x 295, 297 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d
1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Grossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute
deliberate indifference, as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less efficacious
course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem). However, the law is
well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of corrections
officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) ("As we held in Daniels, the protections
of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by
lack of due care by prison officials."). A complaint that a physician has been negligent "in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment." Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176
(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
has noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a constitutional deprivation from a
prison physician's failure to subordinate his own professional judgment to that of another
doctor; to the contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’
does not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App'x 892, 897
(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether
governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of

treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an
appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag,
61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Slip and Fall Accident
The Court finds Pedraza’s allegations concerning the slip and fall accident do not
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. “[S]lippery floors constitute a daily risk
faced by members of the public at large.” Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th
Cir.2004). As such, the slippery conditions in the kitchen cannot be considered extreme
nor does it pose an unreasonable risk of serious injury. Pedraza’s claim that prison

officials knew the floor was wet and failed to properly clean it does not establish conduct
that is more than mere negligence. See Aducci-Washington, 2018 WL 2272940, at *6;
Davis, 2008 WL 539057, at *3. Indeed, Pedraza has alleged nothing more than ordinary
lack of due care, which is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Whitley,
475 U.S. at 319. Nothing in the Complaint would indicate Pedraza’s claims regarding the
accident are anything more than a standard slip and fall negligence claim. Accordingly,
Pedraza’s claims against Defendants for the conditions of the kitchen and his accident do
not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, his Complaint is due to be
dismissed as to these claims.
Medical Care
As an initial matter, although Pedraza has generally pled facts concerning the
medical care he received, he has not given sufficient factual details regarding the roles
each Defendant played in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation, rendering his claims
against each Defendant conclusory. Therefore, he has not stated a claim upon which

relief can be granted. See Crow, 49 F.3d at 684. In any event, the Court again finds that
Pedraza has failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. According to Pedraza,
prison staff did not properly restrain him when they moved him, and unnamed nurses
acted like he was not hurt and thought he was faking his injury. At most, this shows
negligence in diagnosing and treating his medical condition, which is insufficient to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31. Ultimately, x-
rays conducted by prison staff established the existence of injuries and staff sent him to
various hospitals for diagnostic purposes and recommended physical therapy for
treatment. To the extent Pedraza challenges the diagnostic techniques or forms of

treatment, such decisions are “‘a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and
therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.”
Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Pedraza’s
allegation that prison officials did not want to be responsible for him seeing a neuro-
surgeon is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because it is
conclusory in nature and does not identify which Defendant(s) told him this. See Crow,
49 F.3d at 684. The Court also notes that Pedraza has not alleged that physical therapy,
the prison staff’s recommended treatment plan, has been ineffective such that referral to
a neuro-surgeon would have been needed.
Moreover, Pedraza has not alleged facts that would establish Defendants had a
subjective knowledge of the risks of his serious medical claim and disregarded that risk.
Indeed, Pedraza specifically alleges unnamed nurses did not believe he was initially
injured, which cuts against a claim that these nurses had a subjective understanding of
his injuries. Additionally, once an x-ray was done, prison medical staff had Pedraza

transported to better equipped hospitals for diagnostic purposes. Even if Pedraza had
demonstrated deliberate indifference, he has made no claims that the injuries were
caused by anything other than the actual fall, which the Court has already concluded does
not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. As such, Pedraza has not established a
connection between the alleged indifference and his injuries. Based on the above
analysis, the Court finds that Pedraza has not established a viable Eighth Amendment
claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Supervisory Claims
Pedraza also asserts supervisory claims against Defendants. The Eleventh Circuit

has explained:
"Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983
on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability."
Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir.
1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The
standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely
rigorous." Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).[1] "Supervisory liability occurs
either when the supervisor personally participates in the
alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal
connection between actions of the supervising official and the
alleged constitutional deprivation." Brown v. Crawford, 906
F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

1 Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
"The necessary causal connection can be established
'when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible
supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.'" Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360
(citation omitted).[2] "The deprivations that constitute
widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official
must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration,
rather than isolated occurrences." Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. A
plaintiff can also establish the necessary causal connection
by showing "facts which support an inference that the
supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew
that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop
them from doing so," Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235, or that a
supervisor's "custom or policy . . . resulted in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights," Rivas v. Freeman, 940
F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (overruled on other grounds as
recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
application of a heightened pleading standard for § 1983 cases involving qualified
immunity)); see also Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014).
In sum,
To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff
must allege (1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the
violation of his constitutional rights,[2] (2) the existence of a
custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff's constitutional rights,[3] (3) facts supporting an
inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or
knowingly failed to prevent it,[4] or (4) a history of widespread

2 Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003).
2 See Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Causation, of
course, can be shown by personal participation in the constitutional violation.").
3 See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1332 ("Our decisions establish that supervisory liability
for deliberate indifference based on the implementation of a facially constitutional policy
requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of a
flagrant, persistent pattern of violations.").
4 See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Douglas's
complaint alleges that his family informed [Assistant Warden] Yates of ongoing
misconduct by Yates's subordinates and Yates failed to stop the misconduct. These
abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged
deprivation that he then failed to correct. See id. at 1328–29
(listing factors in context of summary judgment).[5] A
supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for mere
negligence in the training or supervision of his employees.
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836–37 (11th Cir. 1990).

Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Here, any supervisory
claims fail because Pedraza has not alleged any facts suggesting that Defendants were
personally involved in, or otherwise causally connected to, any alleged violations of his
federal statutory or constitutional rights.
Claims Against Centurion
It appears that Pedraza is suing Centurion for alleged mismanagement of his
medical care. Pedraza has failed to allege any claims or facts as to Centurion specifically;
therefore, this claim is due to be dismissed as conclusory. See Crow, 49 F.3d at 684.
Moreover, Centurion contracted with the Florida Department of Correction to provide
medical services to inmates within the state of Florida. Although Centurion is not a
governmental entity, “[w]here a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state … is performed by a private entity, state action is present” for purposes of §
1983. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted). Indeed,
“when a private entity . . . contracts with a county to provide
medical services to inmates, it performs a function traditionally
within the exclusive prerogative of the state” and “becomes
the functional equivalent of the municipality” under section
1983. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997).
“[L]iability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of

allegations allow a reasonable inference that Yates knew that the subordinates would
continue to engage in unconstitutional misconduct but failed to stop them from doing so.").
5 West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2007).
respondeat superior.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d
1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Craig v. Floyd Cty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); see Denham v. Corizon
Health, Inc., Case No. 6:13-cv-1425-Orl-40KRS, 2015 WL 3509294, at *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla.
June 4, 2015) (“[W]hen a government function is performed by a private entity like
Corizon, the private entity is treated as the functional equivalent of the government for
which it works.”) (citation omitted), aff’d (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017).
Where a deliberate indifference medical claim is brought against an entity, such as
Centurion, based upon its functional equivalence to a government entity, the assertion of
a constitutional violation is merely the first hurdle in a plaintiff’s case. This is so because
liability for constitutional deprivations under § 1983 cannot be based on the theory of
respondeat superior. Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335
F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)); see Denno v. Sch. Bd. Of Volusia Cty., 218
F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). Instead, a government entity may be liable in a § 1983
action “only where the [government entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at
issue.” Cook ex. rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1116
(11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that an official policy
or custom of the government entity was the “moving force” behind the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94
(1978).

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments can be held liable for
constitutional torts caused by official policies. However, such liability is limited to “acts
which the [government entity] has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). Under the directives of Monell, a plaintiff also must
allege that the constitutional deprivation was the result of “an official government policy,
the actions of an official fairly deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or
practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Denno, 218 F.3d
at 1276 (citations omitted); see Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.
2016) (stating Monell “is meant to limit § 1983 liability to ‘acts which the municipality has

officially sanctioned or ordered’”; adding that “[t]here are, however, several different ways
of establishing municipal liability under § 1983”).
“A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the [government entity] or created
by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the
[government entity].” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to “’distinguish acts of the
[government entity] from acts of employees of the [government entity], and thereby make
clear that [governmental] liability is limited to action for which the [government entity] is
actually responsible.’” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329 n.5 (quotation and citation omitted).

Indeed, governmental liability arises under § 1983 only where “’a deliberate choice to
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’” by governmental
policymakers. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 483-84). A government entity rarely will have an officially-adopted policy that
permits a particular constitutional violation, therefore, in order to state a cause of action
for damages under § 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government entity
has a custom or practice of permitting the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330;
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A custom is an act “that has
not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,” but that is “so widespread
as to have the force of law.” Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. V. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404 (1997) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “custom” as “a
practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law” or a “persistent
and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d at 489. Last, “[t]o hold the [government
entity] liable, there must be ‘a direct causal link between [its] policy or custom and the

alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262,
1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Because Centurion’s liability under § 1983
would be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for
providing medical care and services to FDOC inmates, Pedraza must plead that an official
policy or a custom or practice of Centurion was the moving force behind the alleged
federal constitutional violation.
Upon review, Pedraza has neither identified an official Centurion policy of
deliberate indifference nor an unofficial Centurion custom or practice that was “the moving
force” behind any alleged constitutional violation. Centurion cannot be held liable based

on any alleged conduct of or decisions by its employees simply because they were
working under contract for Centurion to provide medical care to inmates. Pedraza’s
factual allegations relating solely to alleged individual failures in his medical care are
simply insufficient to sustain a claim that there is either a policy to deny medical care to
inmates or a practice or custom of denying adequate medical care, much less that the
practice was so widespread that Centurion had notice of violations and made a
“conscious choice” to disregard them. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th
Cir. 1998). Thus, Pedraza’s § 1983 claim against Centurion is due to be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminating any pending motions, and closing the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of February, 2020.

United States District Judge

Jax-8
c: Jesus Pedraza #M18534

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104579. Public record. Not legal advice.
