# Seymore v. Department of Revenue CSE

> District Court, M.D. Florida · December 20, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104217

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** December 20, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

PHILLIP M. SEYMORE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:19-cv-481-FtM-99MRM

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CSE,
Title IV-D Agency, DOES,
ARIKA R. RICHARD, and HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Holy Cross
Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #19) and Defendant Florida
Department of Revenue’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #21). Plaintiff
pro se Phillip M. Seymore filed Responses in Opposition (Doc. ##23,
24). For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are granted to
the extent that the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
dismissed with prejudice and the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
I.
In this case plaintiff pro se Phillip M. Seymore asks this
Court to review the judicial proceedings and set aside a paternity
finding and child support orders that defendant Arika R. Richard
obtained in Florida state court in 2010. Plaintiff alleges that
he is not the father of the children and that the child support
orders were obtained without due process and through fraud.
Plaintiff purports to assert civil rights claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. The allegations against Holy

Cross Hospital relate to a birth certificate allegedly issued at
Holy Cross Hospital in 2006. The Florida Department of Revenue
CSE, Title IV-D Agency (“Department of Revenue”) is sued for
violations of due process of law, procedural due process, extrinsic
fraud, and identity theft for enforcing the orders and collecting
child support.
Plaintiff initially filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis and filed both a Complaint and an Amended Complaint during
that process. (Docs. ##1, 3, 5.) The Magistrate Judge reviewed
the file under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and found that plaintiff had failed
to show how his claims amount to cognizable claims in federal
court, in part because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred his

claims against the Department of Revenue. (Doc. #10.) Plaintiff
was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which he
filed on July 30, 2019 (Doc. #11). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a
Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #12) on November 6, 2019, which is
the operative complaint. Plaintiff then withdrew his request to
proceed in forma pauperis and paid the filing fee. (Doc. #14.)
Defendants were served, and the Department of Revenue and Holy
Cross Hospital move to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual
allegations must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. See
also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
This requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must

accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth.” Mamani
v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability fall short of being
facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the
Court engages in a two-step approach: “When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A pleading drafted by a party proceeding unrepresented (pro
se) is held to a less stringent standard than one drafted by an
attorney, and the Court will construe the documents filed as a
complaint and amended complaint liberally. Jones v. Fla. Parole
Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, “a
pro se pleading must suggest (even if inartfully) that there is at
least some factual support for a claim; it is not enough just to
invoke a legal theory devoid of any factual basis.” Id.
III.
A. The Due Process Claims Against the Department of Revenue

The Rooker–Feldman1 doctrine “places limits on the subject
matter jurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal
over certain matters related to previous state court litigation.”
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts cannot review

1 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state
appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme
Court.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Supreme Court has
found Rooker-Feldmen to apply in only two occasions – once in
Rooker, and again in Feldman. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
cautioned that the doctrine is limited to cases brought by state
court losers which invite federal district courts to review and
reject state court final judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S.
at 284; Skinner v. Switzer, 582 U.S. 521, 531 (2011); Lance v.

Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006).
As found by the Magistrate Judge, despite plaintiff’s
disclaimer and legal argument concerning the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in his complaints, the Eleventh Circuit has held in an
analogous case that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred a father’s
constitutional claims relating to orders to garnish his tax return
and suspend his driver’s license pursuant to a child support order
because those claims were “inextricably intertwined with the state
court judgment” concerning enforcement of child support
obligations. See Brown v. Coffin, 766 F. App’x 929, 932 (11th Cir.
2019). Here, it is apparent that plaintiff’s constitutional
claims against the Department of Revenue are inextricably

intertwined with a state court judgment. Although plaintiff
attempts to couch his claims as challenging the underlying birth
certificate, the Court finds that this issue is inextricably
intertwined with the state court judgment for child support that
resulted in the challenged garnishment because what plaintiff
seeks is relief from the child support order and the Department of
Revenue’s actions to enforce the child support order.
For these reasons, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this
Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
Section 1983 due process claims against the Department of Revenue.2
See Brown, 766 F. App’x at 932.
B. Remaining State Law Claims

With the dismissal of the Department of Revenue, no state
actors remain, as there are no alleged facts sufficient to show
that Arika Richard or Holy Cross Hospital acted under color of
state law. Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who,

2 To the extent the Third Amended Complaint might be construed
to allege that the state court proceedings relating to child
support are ongoing, the Court finds that the abstention doctrine
recognized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 (1971) and its
progeny would nevertheless still require dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims. See Davis v. Self, 547 F. App’x 927, 930-31 (11th Cir.
2013).
under color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege “(1) that the defendant deprived [the
plaintiff] of a right secured under the Constitution or federal
law and (2) that such deprivation occurred under color of state
law.” Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998).
Here, plaintiff merely alleges that Holy Cross was subject to
state regulation regarding paternity and birth certificate
matters, but the fact that defendant’s operations are subject to
state regulation “does not transform the company’s conduct into
‘state action’ for purposes of ‘color of law’ analysis.” Stoutt
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 598 F. Supp. 1000, 1001 (S.D.
Fla. 1984). And regarding Arika Richard, she appears from the
allegations to be the mother of the child and “the beneficiary” of

the challenged child support obligation. There are no allegations
that Richards’ alleged conduct is fairly attributable to the State,
and the law is clear that “the under-color-of-state-law element of
§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas
Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted).
Therefore, because the federal claims have been dismissed,
the Court need not address the issues raised in the Motions to
Dismiss as to the remaining counts. The remaining possible claims
in the Third Amended Complaint are all state law claims. Even
assuming these are properly pled, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(¢)(3),
the Court exercises its discretion and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Raney v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004)
(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims where all
claims which provided original jurisdiction have been dismissed. )
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. ##19, 21) are
GRANTED IN PART to the extent that the claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed with prejudice; otherwise, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims which are dismissed without prejudice.
2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly,
terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this _ 20th __ day of
December, 2019.

if aw (OL
: | hy >» ZAK Loeb
adi EF. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Plaintiff
Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10104217. Public record. Not legal advice.