# Higgins v. Healthsouth Corporation

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 28, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10103545

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 28, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10103545

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that federal courts “use the applicable state’s contract law to construe and enforce settlement agreements”
- applying similar factors to an individual FCA retaliation claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ex rel. MELISSA HIGGINS,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No.: 8:14-cv-2769-T-33AEP

HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION,

Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
HealthSouth Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 104),
filed on July 30, 2019. Plaintiff Melissa Higgins filed a
response in opposition (Doc. # 113) on August 13, 2019.
HealthSouth filed a reply in support of its Motion (Doc. #
122) on August 23, 2019. For the reasons discussed below,
the Motion is granted.
I. Background
In her Amended Complaint, Higgins alleges that her
former employer, HealthSouth, defrauded the United States by
generating improper fees and fraudulent billings to Medicare,
Medicaid, and other public and private health insurers. (Doc.
# 88 at ¶¶ 2, 30, 87-164, 194). She alleges that HealthSouth
defrauded the government by knowingly admitting and
readmitting patients to its inpatient rehabilitation
facilities that did not meet certain federal criteria and
then billing the government for unnecessary services provided
to those patients. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 13-24, 100-64).
According to the Amended Complaint, Higgins formerly
worked for HealthSouth as the local and regional Director of
Therapy Operations in Arlington, Texas. (Id. at ¶¶ 165-68).

When she raised concerns regarding the alleged fraudulent
billing practices within the corporation, she was stripped of
her responsibilities and then forced to resign in 2011. (Id.
at ¶¶ 31-34, 172-86).
In July 2012, Higgins filed the instant qui tam action
against HealthSouth, raising several claims on behalf of the
United States under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729,
et seq., and a retaliation claim under the FCA pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 3730(h). (Doc. # 2 at ¶¶ 161-75).
On April 1, 2019, the United States notified the Court
that it would not be intervening in the case at that time.

(Doc. # 73). Accordingly, the Court lifted the seal from the
Complaint and directed that it be served upon HealthSouth.
(Doc. # 74).
On June 24, 2019, the United States notified the Court
that it would intervene in this action for the purposes of
settlement. (Doc. # 81). Following the parties’ filing of a
Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, this Court dismissed
Higgins’s federal qui tam claims with prejudice, but it
retained jurisdiction to resolve Higgins’s claim for
retaliation under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), as well as any claims
for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
(Doc. # 87).

Higgins thereafter filed her Amended Complaint, in which
she raises two claims — a retaliation claim under the FCA, 31
U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Count I), and a claim for attorneys’ fees,
expenses, and costs under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) and (h) (Count
II). (Doc. # 88 at ¶¶ 198-207). In addition, Higgins filed
a motion for attorneys’ fees, seeking attorneys’ fees, costs,
and expenses pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). (Doc. # 89).
That motion is currently pending.
HealthSouth now moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Count I and those portions of
Count II that relate to the retaliation claim in Count I.

(Doc. # 104 at 1). According to HealthSouth, Higgins’s claims
are barred by the waiver and release contained in the
Severance Agreement she signed in connection with the
termination of her employment. HealthSouth appended a copy
of the Severance Agreement to its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.
# 104-1). Higgins responded, and HealthSouth replied. (Doc.
## 113, 122). The Motion is now ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss brought under Rule
12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all the allegations in
the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d

1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the
plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations
in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the Supreme
Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). In addition, courts are not “bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Generally, if matters outside the pleadings are
presented as part of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). There is, however, an
exception to this rule. “In ruling upon a motion to dismiss,

the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it
is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) its
authenticity is not challenged.” SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc
of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n.2 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[A] document central to the complaint that the defense
appends to its motion to dismiss is also properly considered,
provided that its contents are not in dispute.”).
Similarly, although the existence of an affirmative
defense usually will not support a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a
district court may dismiss a complaint when the complaint’s

“own allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative
defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face
of the complaint.” Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1028
(11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit,
Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984)); see also Banco
Popular N. Am. v. M/V Triple Play, No. 12-20188-CIV-GRAHAM,
2012 WL 12885237, at 82 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2012) (explaining
that waiver is typically an affirmative defense that may be
raised in a motion to dismiss only if it is apparent on the
face of the complaint).
III. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute that

the Severance Agreement is central to the plaintiff’s claim
and is authentic. See SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337.
Accordingly, the Court will consider the Severance Agreement
in ruling upon HealthSouth’s Motion.
A. The Terms of the Severance Agreement
The Severance Agreement entered into between Higgins and
her former employer provides that the company would pay
Higgins the following: (1) two months’ salary, (2) a lump sum
payment equal to all unused paid time off that Higgins had
accrued, and (3) a two-month continuation of Higgins’s
vision, health care, medical, and dental insurance benefits

with the company. (Doc. # 104-1 at 1-2). In exchange, Higgins
agreed to:
irrevocably and unconditionally release[] the
Company and its parents (including, but not limited
to, . . . HealthSouth Corporation) . . . from any
and all complaints, claims, liabilities,
obligations, promises, agreements, causes of
action, rights, costs, losses, debts and expenses
of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, which
Ms. Higgins . . . ever had, now have, or hereafter
can, will or may have . . . by reason of any matter,
fact or cause whatsoever against the Company or any
of the other Company Releasees from the beginning
of time to the date upon which Ms. Higgins signs
this Agreement.

(Id. at 2-3). The release explicitly includes “all claims
arising out of, or relating to, Ms. Higgins’ employment with
the Company and the termination of Ms. Higgins’ employment
with the Company, including . . . all claims arising under
any foreign, federal, state and local laws including, without
limitation . . . the False Claims Act.” (Id. at 3). The
Severance Agreement provided Higgins with at least 21 days to
consider the terms of the Agreement and seven days to revoke
her consent after signing, and further advised Higgins of her
right to consult with an attorney prior to signing the
Agreement. (Id. at 1, 7). The Agreement also contained, in
bold, all-capital letters just above the signature lines, the
following:
THE UNDERSIGNED HAVE CAREFULLY READ THIS SEVERANCE
AGREEMENT AND HAVE NOT BEEN COERCED INTO SIGNING
IT; THEY UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS AND THEY FREELY
AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO ABIDE BY ITS TERMS.

(Id. at 7). Higgins signed the Severance Agreement on July
15, 2011 — 22 days after her resignation. (Id.; Doc. # 88 at
¶ 183).
B. Whether the Severance Agreement is Void as Against
Public Policy

Higgins first attacks the Severance Agreement as against
public policy and, therefore, legally unenforceable. (Doc.
# 113 at 8). Higgins claims that the language of the waiver
and release contained in the Severance Agreement seeks to
extinguish her right to bring a case under the FCA, and “it
is in the public interest that fraud against the Government
be exposed and prosecuted by the Department of Justice.”
(Id.).
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not had cause to
consider this question, the Tenth Circuit has rejected the
argument that “the policy of the FCA to protect an employee
from retaliation for bringing forward information about fraud
against the government outweighs a private release.”
VanLandingham v. Grand Junction Reg’l Airport Auth., 603 F.
App’x 657, 661 (10th Cir. 2015). The Tenth Circuit drew a
distinction between qui tam actions brought by a private
person on behalf of the government, which under 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(1) “may be dismissed only if the court and the
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and
their reasons for consenting,” and the retaliation provision
of the FCA, which “does not have a similar requirement.” Id.
Based on this difference, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court’s ruling that the FCA “does not preclude [the
plaintiff’s] waiver of her private retaliation claim.” Id.;
see also Brown v. City of S. Burlington, 393 F.3d 337, 346
(2d Cir. 2004) (drawing a distinction between the public-
benefit provisions of the FCA and the retaliation provision).
Another Florida district court reached a similar

conclusion where a release discharged “any and all” claims
the plaintiff might have arising out of his employment with
the defendant. United States ex rel. Keeler v. Eisai, Inc.,
Case No. 09-22302-CIV-UNGARO, 2011 WL 13099033, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. June 21, 2011). In that case, the court held that the
plaintiff was barred from bringing his FCA retaliation claim,
but the release did not bar the plaintiff’s FCA qui tam
claims. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Davis v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., No. 4:09-CV-645-Y, 2010 WL 3239228, at *3-4
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2010) (holding that a written release
could not be enforced to dismiss plaintiff’s qui tam claims

under the FCA without the consent of the Attorney General and
the court but that the release did bar plaintiff’s retaliation
claims).
The cases Higgins relies on to support her argument are
inapposite. In United States v. Northrop Corp., the Ninth
Circuit only considered the public policy implications of the
release of qui tam claims and expressly refused to consider
the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision. See 59 F.3d 953, 963-
65, 968 n.12 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, in United States
ex rel. Dillion v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 2:15-
cv-13 (WOB-JGW), 2017 WL 3000662, at *4 (E.D. Ky. July 13,
2017), that court specifically found that the separation

agreement entered into by the plaintiff barred her
retaliation claim under the FCA and granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss with respect to that claim.
The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive.
Here, Higgins has already settled her qui tam claims, and
only her retaliation claim remains. Accordingly, the waiver
and release contained in Higgins’s Severance Agreement, if
valid and enforceable, will serve to bar her retaliation claim
under the FCA.1

1 Higgins also argues that other provisions of the Severance
Agreement, including the “Non-disparagement” and “Testimony”
provisions, serve to render the Severance Agreement void and
unenforceable. (Doc. # 113 at 8-9). But Higgins cannot
credibly claim that these provisions stopped her from filing
a qui tam action under the FCA because Higgins filed such an
action, leading to a settlement between HealthSouth and the
United States Department of Justice. (Id. at 6). Moreover,
these provisions do not bear on Higgins’s release of her
private retaliation claim against HealthSouth.
C. Whether the Release is Valid and Enforceable
Higgins alleges in her Amended Complaint that she raised
concerns about HealthSouth’s fraudulent billing practices
within the company, and she was forced to resign because of
those complaints. (Doc. # 88 at ¶¶ 165-87). Higgins
therefore clearly knew of the existence of a potential
retaliation claim at the time she signed the waiver. However,

in both her Amended Complaint and her response in opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss, Higgins argues that she was coerced
or forced into signing the Severance Agreement. (Id. at ¶¶
183-86; Doc. # 113 at 1, 5).
A waiver of remedial statutory rights must be
scrutinized under the “totality of the circumstances” to
ensure that the release was knowing and voluntary. Myricks
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th
Cir. 2007) (involving employment discrimination suit under
Title VII). This Court’s review of the totality of the
circumstances involves several objective factors, including:

the plaintiff’s education and business experience;
the amount of time the plaintiff considered the
agreement before signing it; the clarity of the
agreement; the plaintiff’s opportunity to consult
with an attorney; the employer’s encouragement or
discouragement of consultation with an attorney;
and the consideration given in exchange for the
waiver when compared with the benefits to which the
employee was already entitled.
Id. (quoting Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 86 F.3d
196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also VanLandingham, 603 F.
App’x at 660 (applying similar factors to an individual FCA
retaliation claim).
Applying these factors to the instant case, the Court
finds that: (1) Higgins was educated, as she alleges that she
has a Bachelor of Science degree and was a Director of Therapy
Operations during her employment with HealthSouth (Doc. # 88
at ¶ 42); (2) the Severance Agreement gave Higgins 21 days to
consider the Agreement before signing it and an additional
seven days to revoke her consent (Doc. 104-1 at 1); (3) as
will be more fully discussed below, the Severance Agreement

plainly and clearly included all claims arising from
Higgins’s employment and her subsequent termination,
including claims under the FCA (Id. at 3); (4) the Agreement
advised Higgins of her right to consult with an attorney
before executing the Agreement, which Higgins had time to do
because she did not sign the Agreement until July 15, 2011,
22 days after her termination date of June 23, 2011 (Id. at
7; Doc. # 88 at ¶ 183); and (5) Higgins was given an additional
two months of salary and insurance benefits and a lump sum
payment for paid time off to which she would not otherwise
have been entitled (Doc. # 104-1 at 1-2). Here, the totality
of the circumstances indicates that Higgins accepted valuable
consideration in exchange for her knowing and voluntary
relinquishment of the claims described in the Severance
Agreement.
D. Whether the Terms of the Severance Agreement are
Ambiguous

Higgins argues that the Severance Agreement’s language
is ambiguous and must be construed against HealthSouth as the
Agreement’s drafter. (Doc. # 113 at 9-11). Specifically,
she claims that the Agreement is ambiguous because it does
not articulate whether the release of claims under the “False
Claims Act” pertains to the federal FCA, the Texas False
Claims Act, or both. (Id. at 10). Higgins argues that, given
this ambiguity, the Court should find the invocation of the
“False Claims Act” invalid or read the terms of the release
to include only the Texas False Claims Act, thus putting her
federal retaliation claim outside of the Agreement’s terms.
(Id. at 11).
The Severance Agreement indicates that Texas law governs
the Agreement (Doc. # 104-1 at 6), and, accordingly, the Court
will look to Texas law to construe the contract. See Vinnett
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 271 F. App’x 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that federal courts “use the applicable state’s
contract law to construe and enforce settlement agreements”).
Under Texas law, an unambiguous contract will be enforced as
written, and ordinarily the writing alone will be deemed to
express the parties’ intentions. Sun Oil Co. (Del.) v.
Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1981). Whether a contract
is ambiguous is a question of law that must be decided by

examining the contract as a whole in light of the
circumstances present when the contract was entered into.
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940
S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996).
A contract is not ambiguous if it can be given a certain
or definite legal meaning or interpretation. Id. Ambiguity
does not arise simply because the parties advance conflicting
interpretations of the contract; rather, for an ambiguity to
exist, both interpretations must be reasonable. Id.
While Texas law requires that a release must mention the
claim to be effective, it does not require “that the parties

anticipate and identify each potential cause of action
relating to the release’s subject matter.” Chaplin v.
NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Keck v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692,
698 (Tex. 2000)).
Here, examining the Severance Agreement as a whole in
light of the circumstances present when the contract was
entered into, the Agreement plainly includes: “all claims
arising out of, or relating to, Ms. Higgins’ employment with
the Company and the termination of Ms. Higgins’ employment
with the Company, including . . . all claims arising under

any foreign, federal, state and local laws including, without
limitation . . . the False Claims Act.” (Doc. # 104-1 at 3
(emphasis added)). Thus, the Severance Agreement can be given
a definite legal meaning and interpretation: by its plain
terms, the Severance Agreement encompasses all claims arising
under both state and federal law that are related to Higgins’s
employment with HealthSouth and her termination. Such broad
language would encompass both the federal False Claims Act
and the Texas False Claims Act. Accordingly, Higgins’s
retaliation claim under the FCA falls within the Agreement’s
unambiguous terms.
E. Whether this Court Should Grant Higgins Leave to
Further Amend Her Complaint

Finally, Higgins requests leave to file a second amended
complaint in order to add a claim under the Texas False Claims
Act. (Doc. # 113 at 11-12). Yet the Court fails to see how
Higgins can amend her complaint to overcome the hurdle imposed
by the broad terms of the Severance Agreement. Any amendment
would necessarily be futile and, thus, Higgins’s claim for
retaliation must be dismissed with prejudice and without
leave to amend. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927
F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Leave to amend a complaint
is futile when the complaint as amended would still be
properly dismissed.”) (quotation marks omitted); see also

Zuluaga v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 8:17-cv-2543-T-33TGW, 2018
WL 2215606, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 2018) (denying plaintiff
the opportunity to file a second amended complaint because
“leave to amend at this juncture would be futile”).
F. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)

As part of its Motion, HealthSouth also seeks to dismiss
“those portions of Count II requesting attorneys’ fees
related to the [retaliation] claims made in Count I.” (Doc.
# 104 at 1). Count II of Higgins’s Amended Complaint consists
only of a demand for attorneys’ fees and costs under 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3730(d) and (h). (Doc. # 88 at ¶¶ 202-07).
In cases where the government does not proceed with an
action, the FCA provides for awards to qui tam plaintiffs
that include “an amount for reasonable expenses which the
court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” 31 U.S.C. §
3730(d)(2). The retaliation provision of the FCA also
provides for relief in the form of “litigation costs and
reasonable attorneys’ fees.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2).
The Court is not convinced that a stand-alone request
for attorneys’ fees is a separate cause of action under the
FCA. The statute itself does not provide for a separate cause
of action for such fees. Rather, the language of Sections

3730(d) and (h) provide a remedy for plaintiffs in connection
with substantive FCA claims. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1),
(d)(2) (entitling “qui tam plaintiffs” to an “[a]ward” and
providing guidelines for distributing relators’ share of the
proceeds or settlement of an action and additionally
providing for costs necessarily incurred and reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs); Id. § 3730(h)(2) (setting forth
the relief available to plaintiffs in connection with a
retaliation claim). This remedy is available to Higgins
through a motion seeking such attorneys’ fees and costs, which
Higgins has filed and the Court will rule upon in due course.

Accordingly, Count II of Higgins’s Amended Complaint is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. This Court’s Order
will not serve to nullify or terminate Higgins’s pending
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. # 89), and the Court
expressly reserves jurisdiction to rule on that motion.
Because it must dismiss Higgins’s retaliation claim with
prejudice, this Court further determines that she is not
entitled to relief under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2), including
her costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating the
retaliation claim. While the statute does not specifically
state that its remedies are available only to prevailing
parties, the parties here have cited no case law to the

contrary. See Miniex v. Houston Hous. Auth., No. 4:17-00624,
2019 WL 1675857, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2019) (stating in
dicta that statutory remedies under Section 3730(h)(2) are
available to successful FCA retaliation claimants); Thompson
v. Quorum Health Res., LLC, No. 1:06-CV-168, 2010 WL 2044542,
at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 21, 2010) (same).
This does not, however, impact Higgins’s entitlement to
costs and fees under Section 3730(d). See United States ex
rel. Bisk v. Westchester Med. Ctr., No. 06cv15296-LAK-FM,
2016 WL 8254797, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016) (explaining
that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under Section

3730(d) does not include attorneys’ fees recoverable under
Section 3730(h) because the statutory language suggests that
the two provisions constitute “separate and distinct bases
for a fee award”).
As previously explained, Higgins has filed a motion in
this Court seeking her attorneys’ fees and costs under 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d), which is currently pending before the
Honorable Anthony E. Porcelli, United States Magistrate
Judge. (Doc. # 89). Therefore, Higgins is directed to
supplement her Motion for Attorneys’ Fees within 10 days of
the date of this Order, explaining what portion of the

requested fees, if any, were incurred in the litigation of
her retaliation claim and therefore are not recoverable.
IV. Conclusion
HealthSouth’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. Higgins’s
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its
entirety. The Court will retain jurisdiction in order to
resolve Higgins’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. # 89).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant HealthSouth Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. # 104) is GRANTED. The Amended Complaint is

dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.
(2) The Clerk is therefore directed to close this case.
(3) The Court will retain jurisdiction to rule on Higgins’s
pending Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. # 89). Higgins
is directed to supplement her Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
within 10 days of the date of this Order, explaining
what portion of the requested fees, if any, were incurred
in the litigation of her retaliation claim.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
28th day of August, 2019.

tama In. Hecverby Cray
VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10103545. Public record. Not legal advice.