# Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 16, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10103449

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 16, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

RACHEL WOODWARD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:18-cv-1983-T-CPT

ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of
Social Security,1

Defendant.
_______________________/

O R D E R

The Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of her claims
for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
payments, and Widow’s Insurance Benefits (WIB). For the reasons discussed below,
the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I.
The Plaintiff was born in 1965, obtained an associate’s degree, and has past
relevant work experience as a preschool teacher. (R. 26, 40). In June 2015, the

1 Andrew M. Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019. Pursuant
to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Saul is substituted for Acting
Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill as the Defendant in this suit.
Plaintiff applied for DIB, SSI, and WIB, alleging disability as of July 1, 2013, due to
anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, bulging discs, and chronic colitis. (R. 212-20,
232). The Social Security Administration denied her applications both initially and
on reconsideration.
At the Plaintiff’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a
hearing on the matter on July 24, 2017. (R. 33-68). The Plaintiff was represented by
counsel at that hearing and testified on her own behalf. A vocational expert (VE) also

testified.
In a decision dated November 6, 2017, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff: (1) was
insured for DIB through June 30, 2016; had a prescribed period for WIB through April
30, 2022; and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset
date of July 1, 2013; (2) had the severe impairments of obesity, hearing loss, chronic
gastritis, hiatal hernia, bipolar disorder, substance dependence, ankylosing spondylitis,
cervical spine disc protrusion, and lumbar spine degenerative disc disease; (3) did not,
however, have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of any of the listed impairments; (4) had the residual functional

capacity (RFC) to perform light work with some postural, environmental, and mental
limitations; and (5) based in part on the VE’s testimony, could not perform her past
relevant work but was capable of performing other jobs in significant numbers in the
national economy. (R. 17-27). In light of these findings, the ALJ concluded that the
Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 27).
The Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. 1-6).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
II.
The Social Security Act (the Act) defines disability as the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).2 A physical or mental impairment under the Act
“results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Regulations
(Regulations) prescribe “a five-step, sequential evaluation process.” Carter v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 726 F. App’x 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4));
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).3 Under this process, an ALJ must determine whether the
claimant: (1) is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment;

(3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals an impairment specifically listed in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) has the RFC to perform past relevant
work; and (5) can perform other work in the national economy given her RFC, age,

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Code of Federal Regulations are to the version
in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision.
3 Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive
authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
education, and work experience. Carter, 726 F. App’x at 739 (citing Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)).
While the claimant has the burden of proof through step four, the burden temporarily
shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Sampson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F. App’x
727, 734 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)).
If the Commissioner carries that burden, the claimant must then prove that she cannot
perform the work identified by the Commissioner. Id. In the end, “the overall burden

of demonstrating the existence of a disability . . . rests with the claimant.” Washington
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001)).
A claimant who does not prevail at the administrative level may seek judicial
review in federal court provided that the Commissioner has issued a final decision on
the matter after a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review is limited to
determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and whether he applied the correct legal standards. Id.; Hargress v. Soc. Sec.
Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1305 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hargress, 883
F.3d at 1305 n.2 (quoting Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2004)). In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court “may not decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations,
or re-weigh the evidence.” Carter, 726 F. App’x at 739 (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405
F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). While the court accords deference to
the Commissioner’s factual findings, “no such deference is given to [his] legal
conclusions.” Keel-Desensi v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1417326, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 29,
2019) (citations omitted).
III.
The Plaintiff contends on appeal that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately
address her “new and/or worsening symptoms” stemming from cellulitis and swelling

in her lower extremities. (Doc. 22 at 5-7). The Commissioner counters that the ALJ
thoroughly considered the entire record, including the more recent documentation
upon which the Plaintiff relies, and properly assessed the relevant medical opinions in
reaching his conclusion. Id. at 7-12.
Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ submissions, the Court
agrees with the Commissioner and finds no basis for reversal or remand.
A.
The Plaintiff’s claim of error as it pertains to her DIB application requires little
discussion. To be eligible for DIB under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate

disability on or before the last date for which she was insured. Moore, 405 F.3d at
1211; 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(3), 423(a) & (c); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.101, 404.130, 404.131. “If
a claimant becomes disabled after losing insured status, h[er] DIB claim will be denied
despite a disability.” McClain v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 676 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th
Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
As noted above, the Plaintiff lost her insured status for purposes of DIB on June
30, 2016, and she was therefore required to prove she was disabled prior to that date.
The Plaintiff, however, fails to point to any evidence of new or worsening symptoms
before June 30, 2016. Indeed, her chronology related to these alleged symptoms does
not even begin until more than four months later, in November 2016. (Doc. 22 at 5).
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s contention that her DIB claim must be remanded for
additional consideration fails.

B.
The Plaintiff’s claim of error as it relates to her SSI and WIB claims also fails,
albeit for different reasons. Unlike DIB, eligibility for SSI does not have a date of last
insurability requirement. Rather, “[f]or SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the
first month where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file.” Stone v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 596 F. App’x 878, 879 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see also
Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.330, 416.335. As a result, the Plaintiff was
required to show for purposes of her SSI claim that she was disabled beginning June
26, 2015, or after.

WIB benefits, on the other hand, are available to the widow of a deceased
worker where the widow is over the age of fifty, unmarried (unless certain exceptions
apply), and has a disability that began before the end of the prescribed period. 42
U.S.C. § 402(e). The prescribed period ends on the month before the claimant attains
the age of sixty or, if earlier, either seven years after the worker’s death or seven years
after the widow was last entitled to survivor’s benefits, whichever is later. Id.; 20
C.F.R. § 404.335. Here, the prescribed period for the Plaintiff’s WIB eligibility does
not end until April 30, 2022. (R. 20).
The crux of the Plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ unduly relied upon the
October 13, 2015, opinion of a state agency consultant, Dr. P.S. Krishnamurthy, while
discrediting the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints that her physical symptoms worsened
after that date. A review of the ALJ’s decision and the record does not support either
of these contentions.

The ALJ stated in his decision that, in determining the Plaintiff’s RFC, he gave
“great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Krishnamurthy, who found the Plaintiff capable
of light work activity with some postural and environmental limitations. (R. 25, 107-
09, 120-22). In support of this determination, the ALJ observed that Dr.
Krishnamurthy’s assessment of the Plaintiff was “consistent with the treatment notes
of her primary care provider[s], Dr. [Carissa] Stone, and Dr. [Thomas A.]
DiGeronimo.” (R. 25). The ALJ pointed out in this regard that, while Drs. Stone and
DiGeronimo “noted some abnormalities [with the Plaintiff], including an abnormal
gait at times, tenderness, and muscle spasms,” they also stated that the Plaintiff “often

showed normal physical examination findings.” (R. 25); see also (R. 415, 418-19, 422-
23, 426-27, 431, 435, 439, 532, 536, 539-40, 553, 559-60, 565, 569, 575, 580, 586-86,
590, 594, 597-98, 601-02, 605-06, 610, 614, 618, 621-22, 633, 649, 654, 659, 665-66,
675-76, 687, 692, 697-98, 704, 708, 712). The ALJ additionally pointed out that “the
most recent notes of Dr. DiGeronimo” dated March 13, 2017, “included examination
findings of a normal gait and station.” (R. 25); see also (R. 704).
As this recitation demonstrates, despite the Plaintiff’s suggestion, the ALJ did
not rely blindly on Dr. Krishnamurthy’s assessment. Rather, he conducted a
comprehensive review of the treatment records and found Dr. Krishnamurthy’s
opinion consistent with that evidence.
Nor did the ALJ ignore portions of the record favorable to the Plaintiff’s
disability claims, as the Plaintiff maintains. To the contrary, he specifically noted in
his decision many of the record entries the Plaintiff now claims he overlooked. (R. 24)

(ALJ noting that the Plaintiff’s treatment records remained largely the same in 2016
as they had been earlier; adding that, in early 2017, the Plaintiff presented to Surgical
Associates of Tampa Bay for complaints of swelling in her feet and lower legs, trouble
walking, discoloration, and cramping; and that the Plaintiff briefly saw a podiatrist in
July 2017 for treatment of cellulitis on her left foot).
Although the ALJ may not have explicitly discussed every piece of evidence
related to the Plaintiff’s cellulitis or leg swelling, there was no requirement that he do
so. The Eleventh Circuit has held in this regard that “there is no rigid requirement
that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,” as long as

the ALJ’s decision evidences that he considered the claimant’s medical condition as a
whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). In the Court’s view, the ALJ’s decision
demonstrates that he considered the entire record, including the medical evidence post-
dating Dr. Krishnamurthy’s opinion, in assessing the Plaintiff’s physical impairments.
The Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of her subjective
allegations relating to her leg swelling is likewise unavailing. At step four of the
sequential evaluation process, the ALJ is required to assess the claimant’s RFC and
her ability to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545.
To determine a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must make a determination based on all the
relevant evidence of record what a claimant can do in a work setting despite any
physical or mental limitations caused by her impairments and related symptoms. Id.

at § 404.1545(a)(1). As a result, in rendering the RFC, the ALJ must consider the
medical opinions and other evidence of record, all of the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments (both severe and non-severe), the total limiting effects of
each impairment, and the claimant’s subjective symptoms. Id. at §§ 404.1520(e),
404.1545(a); see Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (“ALJ must
consider the applicant’s medical condition taken as a whole.”).
The evaluation of a claimant’s subjective symptoms is governed by the “pain
standard.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. Under this standard, the claimant must show
“(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical

evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition or (3)
that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity that it can be
reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Id. (quoting Holt v. Sullivan, 921
F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Where a claimant satisfies this “pain standard,” the Regulations dictate that the
ALJ then assess the intensity and persistence of the symptoms to determine how they
limit the claimant’s capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); see also Social Security
Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (S.S.A., Oct. 25, 2017) (applicable as of Mar. 28,
2016). Factors relevant to this evaluation include the objective medical evidence;
evidence of factors that precipitate or aggravate the claimant’s symptoms; medications
and treatments available to alleviate the symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medication used to relieve pain or other symptoms; how the
symptoms affect the claimant’s daily activities; and the claimant’s past work history.

Id. A claimant’s subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that meets the
pain standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability. Brown v. Sullivan, 921
F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
“After considering a claimant’s complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject them
as not creditable, and that determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.”
Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Wilson v. Heckler, 734
F.2d 513. 517 (11th Cir. 1984)). If the ALJ elects not to credit the claimant’s subjective
testimony, however, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.
Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quotation and citation omitted). An ALJ “need not cite

particular phrases or formulations” in this evaluation, so long as the reviewing court
can be satisfied that he “considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.” Id.
at 1210 (quoting Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated
credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562
(citation omitted).
In this case, in arriving at his RFC assessment, the ALJ acknowledged the
Eleventh Circuit’s pain standard and noted his duty to consider “all [of the Plaintiff’s]
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as
consistent with” the evidence. (R. 22). After stating he had carefully considered all of
the evidence, including the Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ then determined that, while
the Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms,” her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record.” (R. 24). In support of this determination,
the ALJ found the Plaintiff’s allegations inconsistent with the normal physical
examination findings in the medical records, as well as notations in the treatment
records that she cared for others, including her grandchildren in 2017. Id. In addition,
the ALJ noted that, although he found the Plaintiff “significantly limited in the ability
to perform both physical and mental work-related activities,” the RFC he assessed for
her was supported “only in part” by her subjective allegations. (R. 25).
The Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this finding is unsupported by substantial

evidence or otherwise in error, and thus it will not be disturbed on appeal. See Werner
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The question is not . . .
whether [the] ALJ could have reasonably credited [the claimant’s] testimony, but
whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.”); Davis v. Astrue, 346 F. App’x 439,
441 (11th Cir. 2009).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. The Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
2. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of the Defendant and
to close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 16th day of August 2019.

UNitebodio Act.
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE
United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:
Counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10103449. Public record. Not legal advice.