# Securities and Exchange Commission v. Choice Advisors, LLC

> District Court, S.D. California · April 15, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10089406

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** April 15, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10089406

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining the Court’s reasoning in Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–192 (footnote 13 omitted)
- holding that § 206(2) 2 establishes “federal fiduciary standards” that govern the conduct of investment advisors

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Case No.: 21-CV-1669-JO-MSB
COMMISSION,
12
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
Plaintiff,
13 AND DENYING IN PART
v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
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PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
CHOICE ADVISORS, LLC, and
15 AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MATTHIAS O’MEARA,
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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19 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission brought a civil law enforcement
20 action against municipal advisors, Choice Advisors, LLC and Matthias O’Meara, alleging
21 that they failed to represent their clients fairly and honestly. The SEC moved for partial
22 summary judgment on several of its claims based on Defendants’ (1) failure to properly
23 register with the appropriate agencies before providing municipal advisory services; (2)
24 entering into a prohibited fee-splitting agreement; (3) serving two masters—the bank and
25 school who sought financing from that bank—at the same time; and (4) failure to disclose
26 to their clients the conflicts of interests created by these actions. Dkt. 62. Defendants in
27 turn moved for partial summary judgment on a subset of these claims arguing that their
28 agreement with the bank did not constitute illegal fee-splitting and that the above actions
1 did not breach the fiduciary duties Defendants owed to their clients. Dkt. 65. For the
2 reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion for partial
3 summary judgment and denies Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment in its
4 entirety.
5 I. BACKGROUND
6 The SEC filed a civil law enforcement action against municipal advisor1 Matthias
7 O’Meara and his municipal advisory company, Choice Advisors, LLC, alleging that they
8 violated the law and breached their fiduciary duties in providing municipal advisory
9 services to their charter school clients, Bella Mente Montessori Academy and Liberty Tree
10 Academy. See Dkt. 1.
11 Bella Mente and Liberty Tree retained Defendants to assist them in the process of
12 issuing municipal bonds so that they could raise money to build new school facilities. See
13 id. ¶¶ 20–21. As first-time issuers of municipal bonds, these schools sought Defendants’
14 help in structuring a deal with a bank underwriter to raise the funds at the lowest cost
15 possible. See id. ¶¶ 3. To facilitate the municipal bond offering, the borrower selects a
16 bank underwriter to market and sell the bonds to investors. See id. ¶ 21. The borrower
17 negotiates the terms of the municipal bond offering with the underwriter, which typically
18 involves the school paying a “fee,” “spread,” or “discount”—usually a percentage of the
19 total value of the bond issued—to its bank underwriter in exchange for the bank purchasing
20 the school’s bond and “lending” the school money. See id. ¶¶ 20–21. After purchasing the
21 bonds from the school, bank underwriters then resell these bonds to third-party investors
22 for a profit. See id. This financing structure essentially enables the school to “borrow” the
23 money needed for building projects or operations by issuing bonds that the schools
24 ultimately repay with interest. See id. The municipal advisor’s role in these complex
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1 Municipal advisors are defined as “persons . . .who provide advice to, or on behalf of, a municipal
27 entity or obligated entity with respect to municipal financial products or the issuance of municipal
securities, including advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms, and other similar matters
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1 financial transactions is to act as the school’s “skilled representative in the bond offering
2 transaction” and help it negotiate favorable financing terms in the school’s best interest.
3 See id. ¶22; see also Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Roles and Responsibilities:
4 The Financing Team in an Initial Municipal Bond Offering, https://www.msrb.org/sites/d
5 efault/files/Financing-Team.pdf (last visited on February 28, 2024); see also Apfelbacher
6 Expert Report, Dkt. 64-3 at 4.2
7 Before becoming a municipal advisor for schools and school districts, O’Meara
8 worked as an underwriter at investment bank BB&T. Dkts. 65-1; 62-4, O’Meara Dep. Tr.
9 at 26:15–27:12. Because his job duties in this role included persuading schools to choose
10 BB&T as the underwriter for their municipal bond offerings, see Dkt. 62-4, O’Meara Dep.
11 Tr. at 26:15–27:12, O’Meara became acquainted with various schools including
12 Defendants’ future clients, Bella Mente and Liberty Tree, see Dkts. 62-19, Salzmann Decl.
13 Ex. Q; 62-20, Salzmann Decl. Ex. R. Around January or February 2018, O’Meara and
14 another BB&T employee, Paula Permenter,3 decided to leave their job at BB&T to start a
15 municipal advisory firm, Choice. Dkt. 62-4, O’Meara Dep. Tr. at 32:15–24, 35:10–25.
16 Instead of working for the banks to bring in school clients and negotiate the most favorable
17 terms for the bank, see id. at 29:1–20, O’Meara’s new role would focus on using his
18 expertise to advise schools issuing municipal bonds and to obtain the most favorable
19 financing terms and conditions for the schools, id. at 28:6–10, 29:1–30:18. On May 1,
20 2018, O’Meara tendered his resignation and gave BB&T two weeks’ notice of his
21 departure. Dkt. 62-4, Salzmann Decl. Ex. B at 68:1–9, 86:14–87:16.
22 Before O’Meara left BB&T, he negotiated a deal with the bank: for every school
23 that O’Meara brought to the bank for underwriting, BB&T would split its underwriter’s fee
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2 The Court only relies on Mr. Apfelbacher’s expert report to explain the role municipal advisors
26 play in a municipal bond offering. Defendants have not disputed or raised any objections to this portion
of Mr. Apfelbacher’s report. See Dkts. 64, Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Testimony of Expert; 77, Def.’s Reply
27 in Support of Mot. to Exclude Expert Testimony.
3 Paula Permenter is a co-founder of Choice. Dkt. 62-4, O’Meara Dep. Tr. at 35:10–25. She
28
1 with O’Meara and Choice. Dkt. 62-17, Salzmann Decl. Ex. O. Two days after O’Meara
2 gave notice of his resignation, Defendants and BB&T manager, Richard Harmon, reached
3 such an agreement, not only with respect to Bella Menta and Liberty Tree but also for three
4 other schools that O’Meara planned to represent. See id. As memorialized in an email sent
5 by Harmon, BB&T and O’Meara agreed that they would split the two percent underwriter
6 fee for Bella Mente’s bond offering as follows: the bank’s $20.00 fee per every $1,000.00
7 (i.e. two percent) of the total bond amount would be divided as “$7.50 Choice/$12.50
8 BBT.” Id. Likewise, for the Liberty Tree offering, BB&T and Defendants also agreed to
9 split the two percent underwriter fee. Id.; see also Dkt. 62-19, Salzmann Decl. Ex. Q.
10 Under the agreement, Choice would receive $5.00 and “BB&T [would] receive $15.00” of
11 the $20.00 underwriter fee per every $1,000.00 of the total bond amount. Dkt. 62-17,
12 Salzmann Decl. Ex. O. This arrangement also included three other schools that O’Meara
13 planned to represent: Temecula Valley, La Verne, and Monterey Bay. Id. The parties
14 called this arrangement an “agreement of fee splits” and anticipated that this would be the
15 “course of action for prospects and future deals[.]” Id.4
16 During his last two weeks at BB&T, O’Meara not only negotiated the above fee-
17 splitting arrangement, but also worked for the bank as an underwriter and for the schools
18 as their municipal advisor. Dkts. 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-23, Salzmann Decl. Ex.
19 U; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. On May 8, 2018, O’Meara sent an engagement letter to
20 Bella Mente memorializing the municipal advisory relationship between the school and
21 Choice. Dkt. 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S. While the engagement letter set forth the scope
22 of the municipal advisory relationship between Bella Mente and Choice, it made no
23 mention of O’Meara’s dual employment or that this situation could pose a conflict of
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26 4 Six days after O’Meara tendered his resignation, Harmon also sent an email to all BB&T
employees assuring them that O’Meara and Permenter “[were] not competitors.” Dkt. 62-16 at 3,
27 Salzmann Decl. Ex. N. Harmon further communicated that BB&T “ha[d] already seen transaction volume
flow both ways, even after only a few days” and anticipated “more deal flow coming [their] way from
28
1 interest for Bella Mente. See Dkt. 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S. In fact, it affirmed that
2 there were “no known actual or potential material conflicts of interest that might impair
3 [Choice’s] ability to render unbiased or competent advice or to fulfill its fiduciary duty” to
4 Bella Mente. Id. It also affirmatively represented that there were no “Other Engagements
5 or Relationships Impairing [Choice’s] Ability to Provide Advice.” Id. That same day,
6 O’Meara also sent Bella Mente an engagement letter on behalf of BB&T confirming that
7 BB&T would provide underwriting services for the school’s bond offering. Dkt. 62-23,
8 Salzmann Decl. Ex. U. On May 14, 2018, O’Meara’s second-to-last day as an underwriter
9 at BB&T, he sent an engagement letter to Liberty Tree memorializing its municipal
10 advisory relationship with Choice. Dkt. 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V.
11 When Defendants started working for the two schools, O’Meara and Choice were
12 not registered with the appropriate agencies as required by law. Although Defendants were
13 not registered with the SEC until August 27, 2018 and with the Municipal Securities
14 Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”)5 until October 16, 2018, O’Meara engaged Bella Mente and
15 Liberty Tree as municipal advisory clients on May 8, 2018 and May 15, 2018, respectively.
16 Dkts. 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. Defendants did not
17 inform either school that Defendants were not registered during this engagement process.
18 See Dkts. 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. Moreover, before
19 Defendants were officially registered, they completed the bond offering transactions on the
20 schools’ behalf and received payment for their services. See Dkts. 62-25, Salzmann Decl.
21 Ex. W; 62-26, Salzmann Decl. Ex. X; 65-16; 65-17. The bond offerings were finalized on
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5 Established by Congress in 1975, the MSRB is a regulatory organization that promulgates rules
25 for financial professionals involved in municipal securities; their goal is “to ensure a fair and efficient
market by preventing fraud and other unfair practices, establishing professional qualifications, supporting
26 market transparency and applying uniform practices to the industry.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4a(a); Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board, The Municipal Advisor’s Introduction to MSRB Rules,
27 https://www.msrb.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/Municipal-Advisor_Introduction-to-MSRB-Rules.pdf
(last visited January 30, 2024); Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (2021), The Role and Jurisdiction
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1 July 11, 2018 and September 21, 2018, Dkts. 62-14, Salzmann Decl. Ex. L; 62-15,
2 Salzmann Decl. Ex. M; 62-25, Salzmann Decl. Ex. W; 62-26, Salzmann Decl. Ex. X, and
3 at the closing of these transactions Choice was paid $157,000.00 by Bella Mente and
4 $53,437.50 by Liberty Tree. Dkts. 62-25, Salzmann Decl. Ex. W; 62-26, Salzmann Decl.
5 Ex. X; 65-16; 65-17.
6 Based on the above facts, the SEC filed its complaint against Defendants alleging
7 eight causes of action. See Dkt. 1. The SEC bases its various claims against Defendants
8 on some or all of the following predicate acts: (1) performing municipal advisory services
9 for the schools without being registered; (2) impermissibly agreeing to split fees with
10 BB&T; (3) “deceptively operat[ing] in a dual capacity” as both bank underwriter and
11 municipal advisor while O’Meara was still employed by BB&T; and (4) failing to disclose
12 the material conflicts of interest created by the above facts to their school clients. Id. ¶¶ 4–
13 8; 20–79. In its first claim, the SEC alleges that by participating in the conduct set forth
14 above, Defendants engaged in deceptive or manipulative practices by a municipal advisor
15 in violation of Section 15B(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)
16 (“Section 15B(a)(5)”). Id. ¶¶ 4–7; 80–82. In its second claim, the SEC alleges that, by
17 engaging in the above acts, Defendants also breached their fiduciary duties in violation of
18 Section 15B(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(1) (“Section
19 15B(c)(1)”). Id. ¶¶ 83–87. In its third and fourth claims, the SEC alleges that Choice failed
20 to register as municipal advisors in violation of the requirements set forth in Section
21 15B(a)(1)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1)(B) (“Section
22 15B(a)(1)(B)”) and MSRB Rule A-12. Id. ¶¶ 88–93. The SEC’s fifth claim alleges that
23 by performing the above predicate acts, Defendants unfairly dealt with their clients and
24 engaged in deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practices in violation of MSRB Rule G-17. Id.
25 ¶¶ 94–96. In its sixth claim, the SEC alleges that Defendants (1) entered into an illegal
26 fee-splitting agreement in violation of MSRB Rule-G42(e)(i)(D) and (2) also violated their
27 fiduciary duties as municipal advisors in violation of MSRB Rule G-42 by participating in
28 the predicate acts set forth above. Id. ¶¶ 97–99. In its seventh claim, the SEC alleges
1 Defendants also violated Section 15B(c)(1), which makes it illegal to engage in any act or
2 practice that is not consistent with the advisor’s fiduciary duty or in contravention of any
3 of the MSRB Rules, because Defendants (1) provided municipal services without being
4 registered as required by MSRB Rule A-12; (2) entered into an illegal fee-splitting in
5 violation of MSRB Rule G-42; and (3) breached their fiduciary duties set forth in MSRB
6 Rules G-17 and G-42. Id. ¶¶ 100–103. Finally, in its eighth claim, the SEC alleges
7 O’Meara aided and abetted Choice’s failure to register in violation of Section 15B(a)(1)(B)
8 and (c)(1), and MSRB Rule A-12. Id. ¶¶ 4–7; 104–107.
9 The SEC moved for partial summary judgment on its second, third, fourth, fifth,
10 sixth, seventh, and eighth claims. Dkt. 62. In turn, the Defendants moved for partial
11 summary judgment on the SEC’s first, second, and sixth claims. Dkt. 65.
12 I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
13 Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
14 Procedure if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
15 and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
16 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive
17 law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
18 248 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute as to a
19 material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a
20 verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–50.
21 A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing
22 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When the moving
23 party has the burden of proof at trial, they must affirmatively demonstrate that no
24 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless,
25 Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the
26 burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in
27 Rule 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
28 at 250; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot merely rest on his pleadings,
1 but must direct the court to specific, triable facts by “citing to particular parts of materials
2 in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also Anderson, 477 U.S.
3 at 250. When the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, the movant can
4 prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-
5 moving party’s case or by pointing to evidence that negates an essential element of the
6 non-moving party’s claim. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).
7 In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make
8 credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Id. Rather, the court must view
9 all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
10 party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
11 “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
12 inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is
13 ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
14 II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
15 Before turning to the substance of the parties’ summary judgment motions, the Court
16 first addresses the SEC’s evidentiary objections to O’Meara’s declaration submitted in
17 support of Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 67 at 19 (citing Dkt.
18 65-3, Def.’s Ex. A (“O’Meara Decl.”). The SEC objects to portions of his declaration on
19 the grounds that (1) statements about what O’Meara’s school clients “wanted” or “knew or
20 understood” are irrelevant and beyond the scope of O’Meara’s knowledge; (2) his claims
21 concerning the bond industry and what might have happened if O’Meara acted differently
22 are statements of opinions, not fact; and (3) representations that O’Meara’s complied with
23 the law are improper legal conclusions. Id. (citing Dkt. 65-3, O’Meara Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 18,
24 20–26).
25 The Court declines to address these objections individually as they are superfluous
26 and redundant of the summary judgment standard itself. In deciding a summary judgment
27 motion, the Court may only consider legally relevant facts contained in declarations, not
28 legal conclusions or argumentative statements. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.
1 Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). “[O]bjections on the grounds that the evidence is
2 irrelevant, speculative, argumentative, prejudicial, that it constitutes hearsay or
3 inadmissible lay opinion, or that there is a lack personal knowledge” are “all duplicative of
4 the summary judgment standard itself.” Holt v. Noble House Hotels & Resort, Ltd, 370 F.
5 Supp. 3d 1158, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1122 and
6 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Applying this standard, the Court did not consider any
7 irrelevant statements, improper opinions, or legal conclusions contained in the O’Meara
8 declaration in reaching its decisions. Where a paragraph containing an improper legal
9 conclusion otherwise contained admissible statements, the Court considered the admissible
10 evidence but disregarded the improper legal conclusions.
11 III. DISCUSSION
12 First, the Court will determine whether the undisputed facts establish that
13 Defendants illegally acted as municipal advisors before registering with the SEC and
14 MSRB. Second, the Court will assess whether Defendants entered into an impermissible
15 fee-splitting agreement with BB&T in violation of MSRB Rule G-42. Third, the Court
16 will consider whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties when they failed to
17 disclose (1) their lack of registration with the SEC and MSRB before providing municipal
18 advisory services; (2) the conflicts of interest posed by O’Meara operating in a dual
19 capacity as both bank underwriter and municipal advisor; and (3) their agreement to split
20 fees with BB&T. Finally, the Court will determine whether Defendants’ above actions
21 also constituted violations of MSRB Rule G-17’s requirement to deal fairly with all persons
22 and its prohibition against engaging in deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practices.
23 A. Registration with the SEC and MSRB
24 The Court first considers whether Defendants violated Section 15B(a)(1)(B) and
25 MSRB Rule A-12 by acting as municipal advisors to Bella Mente and Liberty Tree without
26 first being registered with the SEC and MSRB.
27 In passing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
28 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), Congress decided to regulate services provided by municipal
1 advisors, i.e., individuals who provide financial or securities advice to municipal entities
2 like schools. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1)(B); Registration of Municipal Advisors,
3 Exchange Act Release No. 34-70462 at 5 (Sept. 20, 2013) (describing new requirement).
4 This statutory framework requires all municipal advisors to register with the SEC before
5 they can begin providing financial or securities advice to clients. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
6 4(a)(1)(B) (stating that municipal advisors cannot “provide advice to or on behalf of a
7 municipal entity . . . with respect to municipal financial products or the issuance of
8 municipal securities . . . unless the municipal advisor is registered” with the SEC). The
9 MSRB, which promulgates rules for financial professionals involved in municipal
10 securities and regulates the activities of municipal advisors, likewise imposes a registration
11 obligation before advisors can provide such services. Municipal Securities Rulemaking
12 Board, The Municipal Advisor’s Introduction to MSRB Rules, https://www.msrb.org/sites
13 /default/files/2022-09/Municipal-Advisor_Introduction-to-MSRB-Rules.pdf (last visited
14 January 30, 2024). Specifically, the MSRB requires that all advisors must register with the
15 MSRB in addition to registering with the SEC. MSRB Rule A-12 (requiring municipal
16 advisors to register with the MSRB).
17 Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Defendants provided municipal advisory
18 services to Bella Mente and Liberty Tree prior to registering with the appropriate agencies.
19 See Dkts. 62-6, Salzmann Decl. Ex. D; 62-8, Salzmann Decl. Ex. F; 62-13 at 5:3–6:19,
20 Def. O’Meara’s Responses to RFAs Set 1, Nos. 3–8; 62-14, Salzmann Decl. Ex. L; 62-21,
21 Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-23, Salzmann Decl. Ex. U; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. Choice
22 was not registered with the SEC and MSRB until August 27, 2018, and October 16, 2018,
23 respectively. See Dkts. 62-6, Salzmann Decl. Ex. D; 62-8, Salzmann Decl. Ex. F. But
24 months prior to completing these registration requirements, Choice and O’Meara had
25 already started to provide municipal advisory services to the two schools. Dkts. 62-4,
26 Salzmann Decl. Ex. B, at 170:12–14; 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-24, Salzmann Decl.
27 Ex. V. In May of 2018, Defendants entered into formal contracts with Bella Mente and
28 Liberty Tree to advise the schools as they raised money by issuing bonds. Dkts. 62-21,
1 Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-22, Salzmann Decl. Ex. T; 62-23, Salzmann Decl. Ex. U; 62-24,
2 Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. Not only did O’Meara and Choice engage the schools as clients
3 prior to completing registration, but they assisted the schools in structuring their deals with
4 BB&T and helped to complete their bond offerings. Dkts. 62-14, Salzmann Decl. Ex. L;
5 62-15, Salzmann Decl. Ex. M; 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-22, Salzmann Decl. Ex.
6 T; 62-23, Salzmann Decl. Ex. U; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V; 62-25, Salzmann Decl. Ex.
7 W; 62-26, Salzmann Decl. Ex. X. When the bond offering transactions for Bella Mente
8 and Liberty Tree closed on July 11, 2018 and September 21, 2018, respectively, Defendants
9 received compensation for the completion of their municipal advisory services. Dkts. 62-
10 25, Salzmann Decl. Ex. W; 62-26, Salzmann Decl., Ex. X. Defendants point to no evidence
11 to the contrary. See Dkt. 72. In fact, they conceded in their briefing and during oral
12 argument on January 12, 2024 that Choice was not registered as a municipal advisor when
13 it provided municipal advisory services to the schools. Id. at 7:1–8; Dkt. 82, Hr’g Tr.
14 18:14–20:5.
15 Accordingly, because the undisputed facts establish that Choice and O’Meara
16 advised the schools prior to completing their registration requirements, the Court grants
17 summary judgment as to the SEC’s third claim for failure to register with the SEC in
18 violation of Section 15B(a)(1)(B) and fourth claim for failure to register with the MSRB
19 in violation of MSRB Rule A-12. The Court also grants partial summary judgment on the
20 SEC’s seventh claim that Defendants violated Section 15B(c)(1)’s prohibition against acts
21 contravening the MSRB Rules, based on Defendants’ violation of MSRB Rule A-12’s
22 registration requirement.6
23

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25 6 The SEC also moves for summary judgment on its eighth claim arguing O’Meara aided and
abetted Choice’s failure to register in violation of Section 15B(a)(1)(B) and (c)(1) and MSRB Rule A-
26 12. Dkts. 62 at 2:13–19; 62-1 at 16:14–25. However, given the SEC’s limited briefing addressing this
claim and dearth of authority provided regarding “aiding and abetting” violations of Section 15B of the
27 Securities Exchange Act—only offering one citation about the legal standards for “aiding and abetting”
violations of Section 10(b), 13(a),(b), and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act—the Court finds that the
28
1 B. Fee-Splitting Agreement
2 The Court next examines whether Defendants violated MSRB Rule G-42 by entering
3 into an illegal fee-splitting agreement with BB&T.
4 Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42 set forth the standards of conduct for
5 municipal advisors including the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed to their clients.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(1); MSRB Rule G-42(a).7 In specifying the contours of these
7 fiduciary duties, MSRB Rule G-42(e) imposes a specific prohibition against municipal
8 advisors “making, or participating in, any fee-splitting arrangement with underwriters on
9 any municipal securities transaction as to which it has provided or is providing advice.”
10 MSRB Rule G-42(e)(i)(D).
11 Here, the undisputed facts show that Defendants and BB&T agreed that, for every
12 school client that Defendants brought to BB&T to underwrite a bond offering, BB&T
13 would split a portion of its fee. Dkt. 62-17, Salzmann Decl. Ex. O. The parties also do not
14 dispute that underwriters commonly charge a maximum of two percent for their services
15 in issuing municipal bonds. Dkt. 62-4, O’Meara Dep. Tr. 107:5–22; see also Dkt. 62-18,
16 Salzmann Decl. Ex. P, Investigative Testimony of Paula Permenter, at 116:19–117:1.
17 Further, Defendants do not dispute that on May 3, 2018, O’Meara and Harmon exchanged
18 emails confirming their “agreement of fee splits, and course of action for prospects and
19 future deals[]” that would divide the underwriter’s two percent fee between them as
20 follows. Dkt. 62-17, Salzmann Decl. Ex. O. For Bella Mente, BB&T and Defendants
21 agreed that they would split BB&T’s two percent underwriter fee of $20.00 per $1,000.00
22 of the total bond amount as “$7.50 Choice/$12.50 BBT.” Id. For Liberty Tree, BB&T and
23 Defendants agreed that Choice would receive $5.00 and “BB&T will receive $15.00” of
24

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26 other than for the movant. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Thus, the Court denies summary judgment on
SEC’s eighth claim.
27 7 See Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Municipal Advisors: Understanding Standards of
Conduct (April 2016), https://www.msrb.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/MSRB-Rule-G-42-for-
28
1 the $20.00 underwriter fee charged for every $1,000.00 of the total bond amount. Id.; see
2 also Dkt. 62-19, Salzmann Decl. Ex. Q.8 After negotiating this arrangement, Harmon
3 communicated to other bank employees that BB&T expected Choice to refer future school
4 bond business to them: BB&T “ha[s] already seen transaction volume flow both ways,
5 even after only a few days” and anticipated “more deal flow coming [their] way from
6 referrals” from Defendants. Dkt. 62-16, Salzmann Decl. Ex. N. Thus, the SEC’s evidence
7 demonstrates that Defendant and BB&T entered into an agreement to divide a portion of
8 BB&T’s underwriter fee in exchange for Choice referring its school clients to use BB&T
9 as the underwriter.
10 Defendants do not dispute any of the above facts but instead contend that their
11 arrangement with BB&T does not constitute illegal fee-splitting. Dkt. 65-1 at 14–18. They
12 argue that a fee-splitting arrangement is only illegal when there is a secret kickback, i.e.
13 where the entirety of the fees first goes to one recipient and that recipient further divides
14 the fees pursuant to a secret agreement. Id. According to Defendants, because Bella Mente
15 and Liberty Tree knew what fees BB&T and Choice separately charged and their respective
16 fees were paid to BB&T and Choice directly, Defendants did not engage in an illegal fee-
17 splitting agreement. Id.
18 Based upon the plain language of the MSRB Rule G-42, the Court disagrees with
19 the Defendants’ interpretation of what constitutes illegal fee-splitting arrangements.
20 Looking to the plain language of MSRB Rule G-42(e), the rule clearly and unambiguously
21 prohibits any (1) fee-splitting arrangement; (2) between the underwriter of a bond and the
22
23
24
8 Defendants also entered into similar fee division agreements to split a two percent fee for three
25 other schools: Temecula Valley “$6 Choice/$14 bbt”; La Verne “$8/$12”; and Monterey Bay “$10/$15.”
Dkt. 62-17, Salzmann Decl. Ex. O. The fact that Choice’s fee came out of BB&T’s underwriting fees is
26 supported by O’Meara’s email to Erin Feeley, the executive director of Bella Mente, where O’Meara
stated, “BB&T has agreed to reduce its fee to accommodate Choice Advisors.” Dkt. 62-21, Salzmann
27 Decl. Ex. S. He similarly also communicated to her in person that “[he] thought [he] probably could get
BB&T to significantly reduce their fee” if Feeley hired Choice as a municipal advisor. Dkt. 62-4, O’Meara
28
1 municipal advisor; (3) concerning any municipal securities transactions, such as school
2 bond offerings; (4) which the underwriter and municipal advisors is providing advice.
3 MSRB Rule G-42(e)(i)(D); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)
4 (“The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.”
5 (internal citations and alteration omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 1140, 1144
6 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute.”
7 (internal citation omitted)).
8 While MSRB Rule G-42 provides no further definition of a fee-splitting
9 arrangement, the dictionary defines fee-splitting as “the practice of dividing a fee for
10 professional services between two professional persons,”9 or “payment by a specialist . . .
11 of a part of his or her fee to the person who made the referral.”10 As explained above, the
12 underwriter, BB&T, agreed that every school which Choice referred to BB&T for
13 underwriter services, BB&T would divide its industry-standard two percent underwriting
14 fee as follows: 1.25% to BB&T and 0.75% to Choice for Bella Mente, and 1.50% to BB&T
15 and 0.50% to Choice for Liberty Tree. See Dkt. 62-17, Salzmann Decl. Ex. O. Agreements
16 such as these both divide a fee between two professionals and reward one party to the
17 agreement for referring clients to the other. They also create a financial incentive for the
18 municipal advisor to guide its clients to a particular bank underwriter, here BB&T, creating
19 a conflict of interest for the municipal advisor. 11
20
21
9 Fee-splitting, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/fee-splitting (last visited
22 January 8, 2024).
10 Fee-splitting, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictoinary/fee%20spl
23 itting (last visited April 3, 2024); see also Fee-splitting, Collinsdictionary.com, https://www.collinsdictio
nary.com/us/dictionary/english/fee-splitting (last visited April 3, 2024).
24
11 Defendant argues it is common in the municipal bond industry for municipal advisors to
25 negotiate the fees of all other participants in the bond transaction including underwriters. Dkt. 65-1 at 11.
Defendants also argue that the fee division reflected the reality that “a large portion of the work that BB&T
26 might need to be doing . . . would now be falling onto [O’Meara’s] shoulders rather than onto BB&T’s.”
Dkt. 62-4, O’Meara Dep. Tr. 72:18–74:19. Neither of these arguments (and any supporting evidence)
27 create factual disputes regarding whether Defendants and the bank agreed to split the bank’s fee for
schools that Defendants referred to the bank. The Court is also not persuaded that the substance of this
28
1 The Court finds no justification for importing a secret kickback requirement into the
2 plain language of MSRB Rule G-42, which broadly prohibits all fee division agreements
3 between municipal advisors and bank underwriters. First, as seen below, the rule allows
4 for no fee-splitting arrangements between municipal advisors and bank underwriters,
5 whether disclosed or undisclosed. MSRB Rule G-42(e)(i)(D). The entirety of MSRB
6 Rule-G42(e)(i)(D) states municipal providers are prohibited from “making, or participating
7 in, any fee-splitting arrangement with underwriters on any municipal securities transaction
8 as to which it has provided or is providing advice, and any undisclosed fee-splitting
9 arrangements with providers of investments or services to a municipal entity or obligated
10 person client of the municipal advisor.” MSRB Rule G-42(e)(i)(D) (emphasis added). By
11 prohibiting all agreements between municipal advisors and underwriters and only
12 undisclosed agreements between municipal advisors and other providers of investment
13 services, the rule makes clear that the former is prohibited whether or not it is disclosed.
14 Second, when two parties agree to divide fees to incentivize referrals, the Court sees no
15 meaningful distinction between payments that are structured to go to both parties
16 simultaneously or payments that go to the underwriter first and then are further divided
17 with the municipal advisor. Regardless of how the payments are structured, all such
18 agreements to split fees create a conflict of interest on the part of the municipal advisor and
19 the corresponding risk that clients’ interests will be compromised because the municipal
20 advisor will not be working solely for their benefit.
21 Based on the undisputed facts regarding the nature of Defendant and BB&T’s
22 “agreement of fee splits,” Dkt. 62-17, Salzmann Decl. Ex. O, and the plain language of the
23 regulation, the Court finds that Defendants engaged in a prohibited fee-splitting agreement
24 with BB&T in violation of MSRB Rule G-42(e). It therefore grants partial summary
25 judgment on SEC’s sixth claim to the extent it is based on an illegal fee-splitting agreement
26

27
advisor and the bank because of the referral incentives and conflicts of interest created by such
28
1 in violation of MSRB Rule G-42(e). For the same reasons, the Court finds that Defendants
2 have not proved there is an absence of evidence to support their claim that they did not
3 enter into an illegal fee-splitting agreement. Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion
4 for partial summary judgment on the SEC’s sixth claim. The Court also grants partial
5 summary judgment as to the SEC’s seventh claim that Defendants violated Section
6 15B(c)(1)’s prohibition against acts contravening the MSRB Rules, based on Defendants’
7 violation of MSRB Rule G-42(e)’s restriction against fee-splitting agreements.
8 C. Breaches of Fiduciary Duties
9 The Court will next consider whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to
10 their clients in violation of Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42 when they failed to
11 disclose (1) Defendants’ failure to register with the SEC and MSRB; (2) O’Meara’s dual
12 employment with BB&T and Choice; and (3) Defendants’ impermissible fee-splitting
13 agreement with BB&T.
14 1. Scope of Fiduciary Duties Under Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42
15 To begin, the Court examines the scope of fiduciary duties that municipal advisors
16 are required to abided by under Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42. Section
17 15B(c)(1) was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act to prohibit violations of the MSRB Rules
18 and impose fiduciary duties on municipal advisors as follows:
19 A municipal advisor and any person associated with such municipal advisor
shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty to any municipal entity for whom
20
such municipal advisor acts as a municipal advisor, and no municipal advisor
21 may engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is not consistent
with a municipal advisor’s fiduciary duty or that is in contravention of any
22
rule of the Board.
23
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(1). Because federal courts have not interpreted this newer statute,
24
the Court looks to cases governing similar securities law for guidance on the scope of the
25
fiduciary duties required by this statute. The Supreme Court has recognized that § 206(2)
26
of the Investment Advisor’s Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2), (“§ 206(2)”) creates a
27
fiduciary duty for persons who advise clients about securities investments. Transamerica
28
1 Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17–18 (1979) (holding that § 206(2)
2 establishes “federal fiduciary standards” that govern the conduct of investment advisors).
3 In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
4 180, 194 (1963), the Supreme Court held that under § 206(2), investment advisors’
5 fiduciary duties included the duty of full disclosure requiring the “utmost good faith, and
6 full and fair disclosure of all material facts,” as well as an affirmative obligation “to employ
7 reasonable care to avoid misleading” their clients. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
8 Court relied on the fact that the passage of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 reflected
9 “a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which
10 might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice
11 which was not disinterested.” Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 692–93
12 (1980) (explaining the Court’s reasoning in Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–192 (footnote
13 omitted)).
14 Whether information is “material,” such that advisors must disclose it to their clients,
15 “depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or
16 misrepresented information.” United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788, 802 (9th Cir. 2011).
17 This objective standard is met if “a reasonable investor would have considered [the
18 information] useful or significant.” Id. (internal citations omitted). To meet the materiality
19 requirement, “there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
20 would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total
21 mix of information made available.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215
22 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). “[P]otential conflicts of interest are ‘material’
23 facts” to clients. Vernazza v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 327 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 2003), as
24 amended, 335 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2003). That is because individuals seeking advice must
25 “be permitted to evaluate such overlapping motivations, through appropriate disclosure, in
26 deciding whether an adviser is serving ‘two masters’ or only one, ‘especially if one of the
27 masters happens to be economic self-interest.’” Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 196 (quoting
28 United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961)).
1 The MSRB Rules which regulate financial professionals in the municipal securities
2 market echo and reinforce the same fiduciary duties and principles of full disclosure
3 explained by the Supreme Court in Capital Gains. See MSRB Rule G-42(a), (b), and (c).
4 MSRB Rule G-42(a), which sets forth the core standards of conduct for municipal advisors,
5 states that municipal advisors owe their clients a “fiduciary duty that includes a duty of
6 loyalty and a duty of care.” MSRB Rule G-42(a)(ii). The duty of loyalty includes, but is
7 not limited to, dealing honestly and with the utmost good faith with clients and requires
8 municipal advisors to “act in the client’s best interests without regard to the financial or
9 other interests of the municipal advisor.” MSRB Rule G-42, Duties of Non-Solicitors
10 Municipal Advisors Supplementary Materials .02, https://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-
11 Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-42 (last visited April 1, 2024). MSRB Rule
12 G-42(b) further specifies that a municipal advisor must “prior to or upon engaging in
13 municipal advisory activities, provide to the municipal entity or obligated person client full
14 and fair disclosure in writing of: all material conflicts of interest, including . . . any fee-
15 splitting arrangements involving the municipal advisor and any provider of investments or
16 services” to the client. MSRB Rule G-42(b)(i)(D). The municipal advisor must also
17 disclose “any other actual or potential conflicts of interest, which the municipal advisor is
18 aware after reasonable inquiry could reasonably be anticipated to impair the municipal
19 advisor’s ability to provide advice to or on behalf of the client in accordance with the
20 standards of conduct of section (a)” of MSRB Rule G-42. MSRB Rule G-42(b)(i)(F).
21 MSRB G-42(c) also specifies that the municipal advisor must disclose in writing the “form
22 and basis” of all compensation and all conflicts. MSRB Rule G-42(c)(i), (ii). Thus, based
23 on the above, under Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42 a municipal advisor’s
24 fiduciary duties are comprised of the duty of “full disclosure of all material facts,” Capital
25 Gains, 375 U.S. at 194, which includes disclosure of “any other actual or potential conflicts
26 of interest,” MSRB Rule G-42(b), that may impair the municipal advisor’s ability to
27 provide advice to or on behalf of the client’s bests interest.
28 ///
1 2. Failure to Disclose Lack of Registration
2 Having determined the scope of Defendants’ fiduciary duties, the Court now
3 considers whether the undisputed facts establish that Defendants breached their fiduciary
4 duties when they failed to disclose their lack of registration to their clients. As discussed
5 above, there is no dispute that Defendants illegally acted as municipal advisors before they
6 were registered with the SEC and MSRB. See Dkts. 62-6, Salzmann Decl. Ex. D; 62-8,
7 Salzmann Decl. Ex. F; 62-13 at 5:3–6:19, Def. O’Meara’s Responses to RFAs Set 1, Nos.
8 3–8; 62-14, Salzmann Decl. Ex. L; 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-23, Salzmann Decl.
9 Ex. U; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. And as admitted by Defendants, they did so without
10 ever informing the schools that they were not legally registered. See Dkts. 63, 65, 72; see
11 also Dkts. 62-13 at 5:15–6:19, Def. O’Meara’s Responses to RFAs, Set 1, Nos. 5–8
12 (admissions that prior to August 27, 2018, and October 16, 2018, O’Meara did not disclose
13 to Liberty Tree and Bella Menta that Choice was not registered with the SEC and MSRB,
14 respectively).
15 Defendants also offer no explanation or evidence as to why this information—that
16 they lacked legal permission to operate as municipal advisors—would not be material
17 information to the schools which Defendants sought to become potential clients. See Dkts.
18 63, 65, 72. School districts hire municipal advisors in order to benefit from their expertise
19 and knowledge of these complex transactions. See Municipal Securities Rulemaking
20 Board, Roles and Responsibilities: The Financing Team in an Initial Municipal Bond
21 Offering, https://www.msrb.org/sites/default/files/Financing-Team.pdf (last visited on
22 February 28, 2024). Any reasonable potential client would want to know whether their
23 advisor was properly licensed or registered and, therefore, whether they were legally
24 permitted to provide the services in question. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sztrom, 538 F.
25 Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (finding a reasonable investor would have considered
26 it important to know that the individual giving them investment advice and making trades
27 on their behalf was not associated with any registered investment adviser). Defendants’
28 failure to disclose this information impeded the schools’ ability to evaluate whether
1 Defendants were best suited to provide the advisory services for their needs given their
2 lack of registration. See id. For example, the school clients were not fully able to consider
3 the implications of a lack of registration, including considering whether Defendants were
4 qualified to render services and exploring any possible legal or practical consequences of
5 proceeding with unregistered advisors. See id. As this information bears on municipal
6 advisors’ fitness to perform the very work for which they were hired and reasonable clients
7 would have wanted to consider the implications of this information before engaging a
8 professional, Defendants’ failure to disclose this information constitutes a breach of their
9 fiduciary duties in violation of Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42. Capital Gains,
10 375 U.S. at 191–92, 194 (finding that the investment advisors’ fiduciary duty included the
11 duty of full disclosure requiring the “utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all
12 material facts”).
13 Thus, the Court grants partial summary judgment on the SEC’s second claim for
14 breach of fiduciary duties in violation of Section 15B(c)(1) and sixth claim for breach of
15 fiduciary duties in violation of MSRB Rule G-42 for failure to disclose Defendants’ lack
16 of registration.
17 3. Failure to Disclose the Conflict of Interest Created by O’Meara’s Overlapping
18 Employment
19 The Court next turns to whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing
20 to disclose the conflict posed by the fact that they performed municipal advisory services
21 for the schools while O’Meara was still employed as an underwriter.
22 Here, the undisputed evidence shows that O’Meara engaged with and performed
23 advisory services for Bella Mente while he was still employed as an underwriter at BB&T.
24 Dkt. 62-4, Salzmann Decl. Ex. B, at 68:1–9. Although he had given his resignation notice
25 on May 1, 2018, O’Meara was still employed with BB&T until May 15, 2018. See Dkts.
26 62-4 at 68:1–9; 62-16, Salmann Decl. Ex. N; 62-23, Salzmann Decl. Ex. U. Defendants
27 do not dispute that on May 8, 2018, O’Meara sent an engagement letter to Bella Mente
28 finalizing the selection of Choice as its municipal advisor. Dkt. 62-1, Salzmann Decl. Ex.
1 S. It is also undisputed that on the same day, O’Meara sent Bella Mente an engagement
2 letter, this time on behalf of BB&T, confirming the bank as Bella Mente’s underwriter.
3 Dkt. 62-23, Salzmann Decl. Ex. U.12
4 The SEC argues that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to Bella Mente by
5 failing to inform it that O’Meara’s overlapping employment presented a conflict of interest
6 that could compromise its interests in the bond issuance process. Dkt. 62-1 at 16–17. The
7 SEC points to the engagement letter Defendants sent to Bella Mente which affirmatively
8 misrepresents that (1) “Choice Advisors has no known actual or potential material conflicts
9 of interest that might impair its ability either to render unbiased or competent advice or to
10 fulfill its fiduciary duty to Client” and (2) “Choice Advisors is not aware of any other
11 engagement or relationship Choice Advisors has that might impair [its] ability to either to
12 render unbiased or competent advice or to fulfill its fiduciary duty to [its client].” Dkt. 62-
13 21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S.
14 While Defendants do not dispute the simultaneous employment, see Dkt. 65-1 at 11–
15 14, they argue there was no breach of fiduciary duty because Bella Mente and Liberty Tree
16 both knew of O’Meara’s overlapping employment, id. at 12:16–24, 13:22–14:2; see also
17 Dkt. 72. Defendants argue that the following evidence supports their position that they
18 communicated this information to both of their clients: (1) O’Meara’s declaration; (2) the
19 declaration of Burt Hands, board member of Liberty Tree; and (3) the fact that Erin Feeley,
20 executive director of Bella Mente, sought a recommendation letter from O’Meara. Dkts.
21 65-3, O’Meara Decl. ¶ 9; 65-5, Hands Decl. ¶ 5; 65-12, Feeley Dep. Tr. 157:24–158:4.
22 After reviewing the evidence, the Court disagrees. O’Meara’s declaration merely
23 contains a vague statement that “prior to leaving BB&T, [he] informed all the schools [he]
24 was working with … that [he] would be leaving BB&T to form Choice.” Dkt. 65-3,
25 O’Meara Decl ¶ 9. The declaration of Burt Hands is similarly vague and ambiguous about
26

27
12 The evidence is less clear with regard to Liberty Tree as Defendants sent this school an
28
1 the timing and content of any disclosure; it states only that he “understood that Matt
2 switched roles between BB&T and Choice Advisors during the course of our professional
3 relationship.” Dkt. 65-5, Hands Decl. ¶ 5. Finally, the fact that Erin Feeley sought a letter
4 of recommendation from O’Meara in the event she left her job, Dkt. 65-12, Feeley Dep.
5 Tr. 157:24–158:4, is even further afield from the pertinent inquiry; it has no bearing on
6 whether she knew about the conflict of interest posed by the fact that O’Meara was still
7 working at BB&T at the time that he advised her to retain BB&T. Defendants point to no
8 other evidence in the record to support their contention that Feeley knew about the
9 implications of O’Meara’s overlapping employment and conflict of interest. See Dkts. 65,
10 72.
11 The conflict of interest arising from O’Meara’s simultaneous work for the bank and
12 Bella Mente was material information Bella Mente should have had during its selection of
13 municipal advisors. This information was critical to Bella Mente’s ability to evaluate
14 whether O’Meara and Choice could adequately serve its best interests while O’Meara was
15 still acting as an underwriter for BB&T. Schools contemplating bond offerings and banks
16 offering underwriting services have competing interests: the school wants the bank that
17 will offer it the best terms, while the bank wants the school’s business on the most
18 profitable terms for itself, regardless of whether the school can do better elsewhere.
19 Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, What to Expect From Your Underwriter,
20 https://www.msrb.org/sites/default/files/MSRB-Rule-G-17-For-Issuers.pdf (last visited on
21 March 18, 2024). Defendants’ failure to disclose the conflict of interest posed by
22 O’Meara’s dual employment deprived Bella Mente of the chance to gauge whether its
23 advisor was prioritizing its interests or whether O’Meara was “serving two masters” when
24 he referred Bella Mente to BB&T for underwriting services. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at
25 197 (reasoning that investors should be allowed to evaluate whether the advisor had
26 overlapping motivations and was “serving two masters or only one”). Because Defendants
27 failed to disclose material information that would aid Bella Mente’s assessment of whether
28 its interests would be adequately served by hiring O’Meara and Choice, the Court finds
1 that this failure to disclose O’Meara’s dual employment is a breach of fiduciary duty in
2 violation of Section 15B(c)(1) and MSRB Rule G-42(b)(i)(D), (F) and G-42(c)(i), (ii).
3 Vernazza, 327 F.3d at 859, as amended, 335 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
4 defendant’s misrepresentations about potential conflicts of interest to be material facts
5 owed to clients). Thus, the Court grants partial summary judgment on the SEC’s second
6 claim for breach of fiduciary duties in violation of Section 15B(c)(1) and denies
7 Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the SEC’s second claim for breach
8 of fiduciary duties in violation of Section 15B(c)(1). For the same reasons, the Court grants
9 partial summary judgment on SEC’s sixth claim for violations of MSRB Rule G-
10 42(b)(i)(D), (F) and G-42(c)(i), (ii) to the extent this claim is based on Defendants’ failure
11 to disclose the conflict of interest caused by O’Meara’s simultaneous employment.
12 Because the same failure to disclose in violation of the MSRB Rules also violates Section
13 15B(c)(1), the Court also grants partial summary judgment on SEC’s seventh claim that
14 Defendants violated Section 15B(c)(1) based on their violations of MSRB Rules G-
15 42(b)(i)(D), (F) and G-42(c)(i), (ii).
16 4. Disclosure of Conflict of Interests Created by Fee-Split Agreement
17 Next, the Court examines whether the SEC has met its burden to prove that
18 Defendants violated MSRB Rule G-42 by failing to disclose the conflict of interest created
19 by their fee-splitting agreement with BB&T.
20 The SEC and Defendants respectively point to evidence in the record that could
21 support either conclusion on this issue. The SEC argues that Defendants misled the school
22 clients because Defendants’ engagement letters failed to disclose that Choice had any
23 affirmative or potential conflicts of interest. Dkt. 62-1 at 17–19, 21–22. The SEC points
24 to the engagement letters sent to Bella Mente and Liberty Tree which affirmed that “Choice
25 Advisors has no known actual or potential material conflicts of interest that might impair
26 its ability to either render unbiased or competent advice or to fulfill its fiduciary duty to
27 Client.” Dkts. 62-21, Salzmann Dec. Ex. S; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V. The letters also
28 affirmatively represented that Choice neither had other engagements or relationships
1 impairing their ability to provide advice to the schools and that “Choice Advisors does not
2 share fees with any other parties and any provider of investments or services to the Client.”
3 Dkts. 62-21, Salzmann Decl. Ex. S; 62-24, Salzmann Decl. Ex. V.
4 Defendants on the other hand argue that the schools knew of the fee-splitting
5 agreement between Choice and BB&T based on the schools’ communications with
6 O’Meara. See Dkt. 65-1 at 12, 17–18. Defendants point to an email O’Meara sent to Erin
7 Feeley, executive director of Bella Mente, on May 8, 2018, stating, “As a reminder, BB&T
8 has agreed to reduce its fee to accommodate Choice Advisor.” Dkt. 65-14, Def.’s Ex. L.
9 The Court agrees this exchange could support the inference that O’Meara and Feeley had
10 discussed the fee-split arrangement at least once prior to May 8, 2018. See id. Reviewing
11 the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to Defendants, the Court finds that
12 Defendants have created a triable issue that O’Meara informed Erin Feeley about the fee-
13 splitting arrangement on one or two occasions. See id.
14 Given the existence of a triable issue regarding Defendants’ disclosure of their fee-
15 splitting agreement, the Court denies the SEC’s partial summary judgment motion on its
16 second claim for breach of fiduciary duty in violation of Section 15B(c)(1); its sixth claim
17 for breach of fiduciary duties in violation of MSRB Rule G-42; and its seventh claim for
18 violations of Section 15B(c)(1)’s prohibition against any violations of the MSRB Rules, to
19 the extent that these claims are based on Defendants’ failure to disclose their fee-splitting
20 agreement with BB&T.
21 D. Deceptive, Dishonest, or Unfair Practices
22 Finally, the Court considers whether Defendants’ (1) performance of advisory
23 services without being registered; (2) impermissible fee-splitting agreement with BB&T;
24 (3) operation in a dual capacity as both bank underwriter and municipal advisor while
25 O’Meara was still employed by BB&T; and (4) failure to disclose the material conflicts of
26 interest created by these acts constitute unfair dealings and deceptive, dishonest, or unfair
27 practices in violation of MSRB Rule G-17. MSRB Rule G-17 provides that “[i]n the
28 conduct of its municipal securities business, each broker, dealer, and municipal securities
1 dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest,
2 or unfair practice.” (emphasis added). Defendants stipulated on the record during the
3 February 14, 2024 hearing that the above acts, if committed by them, would constitute
4 failures to “deal fairly” with the school clients in violation of this rule. See Dkt. 88.13
5 Based on this stipulation, the Court grants partial summary judgment on the SEC’s fifth
6 claim for violation of MSRB Rule G-17 to the extent this claim is based on Defendants’
7 (1) engagement in municipal advisory services without being registered and failure to
8 disclose the lack of registration; (2) impermissible agreement to split fees with BB&T; and
9 (3) failure to disclose their performance as both bank underwriter and municipal advisor
10 while O’Meara was still employed by BB&T. Given this violation of MSRB Rule G-17,
11 the Court also grants partial summary judgment as to the SEC’s seventh claim of violation
12 of Section 15B(c)(1), which prohibits any acts in contravention of any MSRB Rule.
13 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
14 For the reasons set out above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
15 the SEC’s motion for partial summary judgment [Dkt. 62].14 The Court also DENIES
16 Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety [Dkt. 65].
17
18

19
13 Defendants dispute that the same acts constitute a violation under MSRB Rule G-17’s
20
prohibition that a municipal advisor “shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice.”
21 Dkt. 84, Def.’s Suppl. Br.; see also Dkt. 88. The Court finds that based on the plain language of MSRB
Rule G-17 and the limited guidance cited by both parties’ moving papers that these same actions may also
22 constitute deceptive and dishonest acts. However, given the dearth of guidance and authority on the issue
and Defendants’ stipulation that these acts constitute failures to “deal fairly” with clients in violation of
23 the same rule, the Court declines to reach this issue.
14 Defendants also moved for summary judgment on the SEC’s first claim for violations of Section
24
15B(a)(5). Dkts. 65, 65-1. They argued that scienter is required for Defendants’ actions to constitute
25 “deceptive or manipulative acts” in violation of this statute and that the SEC had not created a triable issue
on this mens rea element. Dkt. 65-1 at 5, 9–11. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court finds that
26 the SEC did create a triable issue on scienter because the action they allege against Defendants (i.e.,
entering into a fee-splitting agreement, providing services without being registered, and engaging in
27 overlapping employment) are, by their very nature, intentional acts. Dkt. 82, Hr’g Tr. 23:6–25:1.
However, because the SEC has stipulated to dismiss this claim pending the Court’s issuance of the instant
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1 The Court also sets forth the following deadlines regarding the SEC’s motion for
2 || civil penalties and to enter judgment against Defendants O’Meara and Choice:
3 1. The SEC shall file its motion by May 15, 2024.
4 2. Defendants’ opposition brief shall be filed by June 14, 2024.
5 3. The hearing to address the SEC’s motion for civil penalties and to enter judgment
6 against Defendants O’Meara and Choice is set for June 26, 2024 at 9:30 a.m.
7 Unless otherwise directed by the Court, no reply briefs shall be filed.
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9 IT IS SO ORDERED. °
10 || Dated: April 15, 2024 —
11 Hot orabfe Tinso ok Ohta
United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10089406. Public record. Not legal advice.