# Morales v. Kijakazi

> District Court, S.D. California · December 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10088812

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** December 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10088812

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- emphasizing the importance of specific, 25 clear, and convincing reasons to support an ALJ’s decision and noting that even “a lack of 26 objective medical evidence to support the intensity of symptoms is insufficient, standing 27 alone, to discount a claimant's testimony.”
- explaining the 15 claimant need not show that her impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause the 16 severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 17 caused some degree of the symptom.”

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ESMERALDA JENNIFER MORALES, Case No.: 22-CV-1205-SBC

12 Plaintiff,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
13 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner of
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Social Security,
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Defendant.
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19 I. INTRODUCTION
20 This Action arises from the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner” or
21 “Defendant”) denial of Esmeralda Jennifer Morales’ (“Plaintiff”) application for disability
22 insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Title II”). On December 5,
23 2022, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s Motion”). (Doc. No.
24 15.) On January 30, 2023, Defendant filed its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
25 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (“Defendant’s Cross-Motion”). (Doc. No. 18.) Plaintiff
26 declined to reply to Defendant’s Cross-Motion. On July 7, 2023, the Action transferred to
27 this Court from then-presiding Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes. (ECF No. 21.) The
28 Parties’ motion practice is now ripe for this Court’s resolution. Having considered the
1 Parties’ submissions and the entirety of the administrative record, the Court GRANTS
2 Plaintiff’s Motion, DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion, and explains below.
3 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
4 On February 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance
5 benefits (“application”), alleging she could no longer work due to a disability that began
6 on November 17, 2012. (AR 196-202.) On April 13, 2021, the Commissioner denied
7 Plaintiff’s application. (AR 63-78). On August 10, 2021, the Commissioner denied
8 Plaintiff’s application again, following Plaintiff’s June 10, 2021, request for
9 reconsideration. (AR 76-97; 110.) Consequently, on August 22, 2021, Plaintiff requested
10 a hearing on her application before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 117-118.)
11 On January 11, 2022, ALJ Randolph E. Schum (“ALJ Schum”) convened a telephonic
12 administrative hearing on Plaintiff’s application. (AR 42-62.) Plaintiff appeared along with
13 her attorney at the time, David S. Klain. (AR 27.) Impartial vocational expert, Gayle M.
14 Tichauer, (“VE Tichauer”) and Plaintiff’s therapist, Kathryn Webb, (“Webb”) were also
15 present. (Id.) Plaintiff, VE Tichauer, and Webb each testified at the hearing. (Id.) On
16 February 15, 2022, ALJ Schum issued a Notice of Decision (“Decision”) that found
17 Plaintiff was not disabled and that denied Plaintiff an award of disability insurance benefits.
18 (AR 24-41.) On April 18, 2022, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council’s review of ALJ
19 Schum’s Decision. (AR 193.) On June 23, 2022, the Appeal’s Council denied Plaintiff’s
20 request and thus finalized ALJ Schum’s Decision. (AR 4-9.) On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff
21 filed the operative Complaint in this Action. (Doc. No. 1.)
22 III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
23 a. Plaintiff’s Medical History
24 Plaintiff is 36 years old and alleges that she suffers from medical conditions that
25 have rendered her disabled and not able to work since November 17, 2012. (AR 46; 196-
26 202.) Plaintiff obtained approximately three years of college-level education. (AR 46.)
27 Prior to November 17, 2012, Plaintiff served in the United States Navy, where she worked
28 as an armed security guard and performed clerical services for the Navy’s aviation
1 administration. (AR 46-47.) Aside from her employment with the Navy, Plaintiff
2 previously worked as an unarmed security guard in the private sector and as a hostess at a
3 restaurant. (AR 47-48.)
4 During the January 11, 2022, administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that her
5 psychiatric impairments consist of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and seizures.
6 (AR 48-49.) Plaintiff elaborated that her psychiatric impairments cause her to experience
7 symptoms that contribute to her inability to work reliably. (AR 47.) Specifically, Plaintiff
8 stated that she experiences debilitating panic attacks, severe migraines, sleep deprivation,
9 and seizures that prevent her from working consistently. (AR 47-49; 51.) Plaintiff added
10 that her panic attacks began in 2010 and worsened over time. (AR 52.) Plaintiff elaborated
11 that her symptoms became exacerbated to the point that she was checked into inpatient
12 treatment at a hospital in 2018 and 2019. (Id.)
13 During the administrative hearing, ALJ Schum asked Plaintiff about her use of
14 medication to manage her symptoms. (AR 48-49.) Plaintiff stated she took medication for
15 her seizures in the past but stopped taking the medication in 2019 once she became
16 pregnant. (AR 49.) Plaintiff added that she took and continues to take prescribed
17 medication for her migraines and difficulty sleeping. (AR 49-50.) Plaintiff further testified
18 that she takes Zoloft and Trazodone for her psychiatric impairments and that, despite taking
19 the medication as prescribed, she still experiences panic attacks and sleep deprivation that
20 contribute to her inability to work reliably. (AR 51.)
21 b. ALJ Schum’s Decision
22 To assess Plaintiff’s stated disability, ALJ Schum conducted the five-step sequential
23 analysis applicable to claims for disability insurance benefits under Title II. See 20 C.F.R.
24 §§ 404.1520, 416.920. As noted below, ALJ Schum concluded that Plaintiff did not meet
25 the definition of a disabled individual from November 17, 2012, through September 30,
26 2018. (See generally AR 24-41.) In his Decision, ALJ Schum made the following findings
27 of fact and conclusions of law:
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1 (1) Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on
2 September 30, 2018. (AR 29.);
3 (2) Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from her
4 alleged onset date of November 17, 2012, through September 30, 2018, the date she
5 was last insured. (AR 30 [citing 20 CFR 404.1571, et seq.].);
6 (3) Through September 30, 2018, Plaintiff had four severe impairments, namely anxiety,
7 depressive, PTSD, and seizure disorders. (AR 30 [citing 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c).].);
8 (4) Through September 30, 2018, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or a combination
9 of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
10 impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 30 [citing 20 CFR
11 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.].);
12 (5) Through September 30, 2018, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
13 to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with certain non-exertional
14 limitations, namely (1) never climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; (2) avoiding
15 concentrated exposure to unprotected heights; (3) and not working in a setting which
16 included constant or regular contact with the general public or more than occasional
17 handling of customer complaints. (AR 32.) In so finding, ALJ Schum noted Plaintiff
18 (1) was able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks;
19 and (2) could respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers in a task-oriented
20 setting where contact with others was casual and not more than occasional. (Id.);
21 (6) Through September 30, 2018, Plaintiff was not able to perform any of her past
22 relevant work. (AR 35 [citing 20 CFR 404.1565.].);
23 (7) As of the date she was last insured, Plaintiff was 31 years old, which constitutes a
24 younger individual between the ages of 18 and 49. (AR 36 [citing 20 CFR
25 404.1563.].);
26 (8) Plaintiff had at least a high school education. (AR 36 [citing 20 CFR 404.1564.].);
27 (9) Transferability of job skills was not material to ALJ Schum’s non-disability finding
28 because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supported a finding that
1 Plaintiff was “not disabled,” regardless of whether Plaintiff had transferable job
2 skills. (AR 36 [citing SSR 82 – 41; 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2.].);
3 (10) Through September 30, 2018, and in considering Plaintiff’s age, education,
4 work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
5 national economy that Plaintiff could have performed. (AR 36 [citing 20 CFR
6 404.1569; 404.1569(a).].) ALJ Schum adopted VE Tichauer’s testimony that
7 Plaintiff could perform work as (1) a kitchen helper; (2) a routing clerk; or (3) a
8 housekeeping cleaner, after finding VE Tichauer’s testimony “consistent with the
9 information contained in the Dictionary of Titles.” (Id.)
10 IV. LEGAL STANDARD
11 Title II of the Social Security Act authorizes a claimant to seek judicial review if she
12 is dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s final decision on her disability benefits application.
13 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court will not disturb the Commissioner’s decision unless it
14 is based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d
15 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial
16 evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id.; see also
17 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (defining substantial evidence
18 as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
19 conclusion.”). Courts review the entire administrative record, weighing both the evidence
20 that supports and detracts from the ALJ’s decision. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039
21 (9th Cir. 1995). When reviewing the record, courts are deferential to the ALJ because the
22 ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony,
23 and resolving ambiguities. Id.; Barbee v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2345921, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June
24 28, 2022) (citing same). If the evidence is subject to more than one rational interpretation,
25 the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
26 2005) (emphasis added).
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1 V. DISCUSSION
2 a. ALJ Schum’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony
3 The sole issue before the Court is whether ALJ Schum properly evaluated Plaintiff’s
4 subjective testimony when he discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. When assessing a
5 claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must “consider all of the evidence presented, including
6 information about prior work record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). To that end, “the court
7 defers to the ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper
8 reasons.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995); Coffmann v. Berryhill, 2018
9 WL 6419676 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2018) (citing same). A two-step inquiry controls the
10 ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s testimony regarding her subjective pain or the intensity
11 of her symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must
12 determine “whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
13 underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other
14 symptoms.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the
15 claimant need not show that her impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause the
16 severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have
17 caused some degree of the symptom.”). Second, if the claimant meets the first prong, the
18 ALJ must then state “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant's
19 testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Id.
20 At the January 11, 2022, administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she
21 experienced symptoms arising from her PTSD and seizures that prevented her from
22 working reliably. (AR 47.) Plaintiff explained that she could not maintain consistent
23 employment due to severe migraines, sleep deprivation, seizures, and panic attacks that
24 worsened over time. (AR 47; 49; 51-52.) Plaintiff added that her psychiatric impairments
25 led her to two inpatient hospitalizations in 2018 and 2019 after she reported experiencing
26 suicidal ideations. (AR 33.) ALJ Schum found Plaintiff’s testimony to be only partially
27 credible, and he discounted Plaintiff’s testimony accordingly. (AR 33.) ALJ Schum noted
28 that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
1 cause some of the alleged symptoms” but her testimony regarding “the intensity,
2 persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms was not entirely consistent with the
3 medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.) In doing so, ALJ Schum cited to
4 Plaintiff’s medical records dating back to 2014 and extending through 2018. ALJ Schum
5 acknowledged that the records corroborated Plaintiff’s diagnoses with depression, PTSD,
6 and suicidal ideation and showed Plaintiff’s treatment “through counseling, psychotherapy,
7 and the use of medication.” (See id.) ALJ Schum then observed that “Despite this increase
8 in symptoms, [Plaintiff] did not experience an actual inpatient hold due to increased
9 psychiatric symptoms until October 2018 and again in July 2019.” (Id.)
10 ALJ Schum did not explain why he found a tension between Plaintiff’s “increase in
11 symptoms” for depression, PTSD, and suicidal ideation and the fact that Plaintiff “did not
12 experience an actual inpatient hold due to increased psychiatric symptoms until October
13 2018 and again in July 2019.” (AR 33.) Instead, ALJ Schum stated that “the records in the
14 file showed [Plaintiff] received a level of treatment commensurate with the allegations
15 [Plaintiff] presented with at the time [she] had acute symptoms.” (AR 33.) Taken alone,
16 the statement appears to support Plaintiff’s credibility due to the alignment between the
17 objective medical record and Plaintiff’s contentions regarding her symptoms, as ALJ
18 Schum noted. However, ALJ Schum added that Plaintiff’s “[treatment] records showed
19 that, prior to the date last insured, [Plaintiff] received treatment within a short period of
20 time with gaps between her treatment visits lasting at times a few months.” (AR 34.) From
21 there, ALJ Schum concluded that Plaintiff’s credibility merited discounting due to
22 “multiple gaps in care,” where Plaintiff “appeared to only seek treatment when her
23 symptoms worsened because of other factors and stressors.” (AR 35.)
24 Coupled with the citations to the record stated above, ALJ Schum’s factual
25 observation as to Plaintiff’s “multiple gaps in care” was the most insight ALJ Schum
26 provided regarding his decision to discount Plaintiff’s credibility. The statement conveyed
27 ALJ Schum’s belief that Plaintiff underwent treatment for her mental health symptoms at
28 a rate that was too infrequent to support Plaintiff’s credibility. Without more, however, the
1 Court finds ALJ Schum’s Decision is not supported by substantial evidence. While
2 “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s
3 subjective testimony,” an ALJ must still “identify what testimony is not credible and what
4 evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Sec.
5 Admin, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th
6 Cir. 2014); see also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). As
7 discussed in greater detail below, the law imposes a requirement of specificity, which the
8 Court finds to be lacking in ALJ Schum’s Decision.
9 As a threshold matter, the Commissioner does not address ALJ Schum’s silence as
10 to what specific testimony Plaintiff proffered that ultimately undermined her credibility
11 regarding the extent of her symptoms. Instead, the Commissioner argues that ALJ Schum
12 properly discredited Plaintiff’s credibility as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting
13 effects of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms based on ALJ Schum’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
14 testimony was “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
15 record.” (AR 33.) To support its argument, the Commissioner points to ALJ Schum’s
16 summary of Plaintiff’s ability to engage in various daily life activities despite her suicide
17 attempts, such as caring for her two children, driving, paying bills, preparing meals, doing
18 laundry, buying groceries online, interacting with medical providers, and maintaining a
19 relationship with her live-in boyfriend. (Doc. No. 6, 6:5-19.)
20 Plaintiff’s various daily life activities are insufficient to sustain ALJ Schum’s
21 credibility assessment. Contreras v. Saul, 477 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1123–24 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
22 3, 2020) (concluding same after the ALJ did not offer “specific, clear, and convincing
23 reasons” for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony even though the ALJ “refer[red] to various
24 specific activities of daily living” such as plaintiff caring for her son, gardening, watching
25 television, cooking, and grocery shopping, after she attempted suicide.); Erika M. v.
26 Kijakazi, 2023 WL 5042875, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2023) (“Even if the ALJ had
27 articulated Plaintiff's daily activities as a reason to reject part of her testimony, the Ninth
28 Circuit has “repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain
1 daily activities ... does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall
2 disability. One does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.”) (citing
3 Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F. 3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)); Haas v. Saul, 2021 WL 615053,
4 at *19 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2021) (finding harmful error where the ALJ’s “reason for
5 discounting plaintiff’s statements [about his anxiety, panic attacks, and inability to focus]
6 was not clear and convincing” because the decision lacked citations to specific testimony,
7 emphasized plaintiff’s ability to email his doctors and engage in other daily living
8 activities, and overlooked plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms.).
9 Specific to the “multiple gaps in care” that ALJ Schum cited in his Decision, the
10 Commissioner reiterates ALJ Schum’s statements on the matter without offering
11 substantive analysis. The Commissioner instead restates ALJ Schum’s factual observation
12 that Plaintiff’s treatment records revealed “months-long gaps between treatment” and that
13 “Plaintiff largely sought treatment when experiencing situational stressors.” (AR 35; Doc.
14 No. 18, 6:28-7:6.) From there, the Commissioner concludes that ALJ Schum “properly
15 found that Plaintiff’s treatment history did not support her allegations of disabling mental
16 limitations.” (Doc. No. 18, 7:5-6.) The Court declines to adopt the Commissioner’s
17 position. The Decision’s “lack of specificity prevents the Court from properly analyzing
18 the ALJ’s reasoning for discrediting Plaintiff's testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
19 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings
20 sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit
21 claimant's testimony.”); Nicholas S. B. v. Saul, 2021 WL 4932551, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
22 29, 2021) (stating same); Michael Louis W. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2701988, at *10 (S.D.
23 Cal. July 12, 2022) (finding harmful error where the ALJ failed to specify which of
24 Plaintiff's statements regarding pain and physical dysfunction he discredited); Erika M.,
25 2023 WL 5042875, at *10 (same and concluding that “the ALJ failed to give specific, clear
26 and convincing reasons’ for finding that Plaintiff's symptoms are under control”).
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1 ALJ Schum was required to identify which specific portions of Plaintiff’s symptom
2 testimony purportedly conflicted with the objective evidence when ALJ Schum found
3 Plaintiff’s “multiple gaps in care” undermined her credibility regarding the extent of her
4 symptoms. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). ALJ Schum did
5 not do so in his Decision. Further, ALJ Schum failed to explain why Plaintiff’s “multiple
6 gaps in care” undermined Plaintiff’s credibility to any extent. Such circumstances
7 constitute harmful error. Erika M., 2023 WL 5042875, at *10 (finding harmful error and
8 explaining that “although not explicitly stated, the ALJ seems to discredit Plaintiff's
9 testimony based on Plaintiff's symptoms being purportedly managed with proper
10 medication compliance. However, the ALJ failed to demonstrate why this undermines
11 Plaintiff's overall complaints.”); Heather W. v. Saul, 2020 WL 7642597, at *16 (S.D. Cal.
12 Dec. 23, 2020) (finding harmful error where the ALJ’s decision “did not identify the
13 testimony the ALJ sought to discredit by his finding [that] she never sought inpatient
14 mental health treatment for her suicidal ideations” and where “the decision fails to explain
15 why such a failure to seek inpatient treatment in her case undermines her testimony. What
16 the decision asks the reviewing Court to do is accept this single statement in a vacuum,
17 without any context and explanation.”); Nicholas S. B., 2021 WL 4932551, at *7 (“Under
18 Ninth Circuit authority, [the ALJ’s] analysis is insufficient. Nowhere did the ALJ identify
19 which portions of Plaintiff's testimony were credible and which were not, nor did the ALJ
20 provide ‘specific, clear and convincing’ reasons for finding those portions of Plaintiff's
21 testimony not credible.”) (citing Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036); Greger v. Barnhart, 464
22 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the ALJ “must specifically identify what
23 testimony is credible and what testimony undermines the claimant's complaints.”); Bunnell
24 v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the importance of specific,
25 clear, and convincing reasons to support an ALJ’s decision and noting that even “a lack of
26 objective medical evidence to support the intensity of symptoms is insufficient, standing
27 alone, to discount a claimant's testimony.”).
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1 ALJ Schum further erred by failing to cite to objective records showing that
2 “Plaintiff should have pursued more aggressive treatment options” when ALJ Schum
3 anchored his credibility determination on Plaintiff’s “multiple gaps in care.” See A.H. v.
4 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 5443243, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020) (ALJ erred in
5 discounting testimony due to conservative treatment because “the ALJ [did] not cite to
6 records showing that the plaintiff should have pursued more aggressive treatment
7 options.”); see also Agans v. Saul, 2021 WL 1388610, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2021)
8 (explaining “the ALJ does not discuss, nor is it clear from the Administrative Record, what
9 non-conservative treatment options exist for [postural orthostatic tachycardia] syndrome”
10 and concluding “the record d[id] not support a finding that the treatment plaintiff received
11 for her combination of impairments discredits her pain allegations.”). ALJ Schum cited to
12 Drs. Paxton and Rivera-Maya’s opinions to support his Decision, where both psychiatrists
13 concluded that Plaintiff had “severe mental medically determinably impairments with
14 moderate limitations.” (AR 34.) In doing so, ALJ Schum concluded that “the full medical
15 evidence of record showed [Plaintiff] with treatment as needed for acute symptoms but that
16 [Plaintiff’s] treatment was also inconsistent with large gaps between visits during the
17 period under consideration.” (Id.) However, ALJ Schum again failed to specify which
18 portions of Plaintiff’s testimony conflicted with specific portions of Drs. Paxton and
19 Rivera-Maya’s opinions regarding ALJ Schum’s concern over Plaintiff’s “multiple gaps”
20 between her mental health treatments. (Id.)
21 For this related reason, ALJ Schum erred in issuing his Decision. Nicholas S. B.,
22 2021 WL 4932551, at *7 (finding error in ALJ’s decision and remanding for further
23 administrative proceedings after noting, in relevant part, that “the ALJ once again
24 described [three medical] opinions, but did not specify which portions of plaintiff’s
25 testimony these opinions contradicted and why.”); see id. (stating “If the ALJ had wanted
26 to rely on a lack of treatment to discount Plaintiff's testimony, she would have needed to
27 analyze the reason Plaintiff gave for his lack of treatment, instead of simply noting it.”)
28 (citing SSR 16-3p at *9 (“We will not find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent with the
1 evidence in the record [based on lack of treatment] without considering possible reasons
2 he or she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the degree of
3 his or her complaints.”); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792–93 (9th Cir.
4 1997), as amended on reh'g (Sept. 17, 1997) (“In this case, the ALJ disbelieved [plaintiff]
5 because no objective medical evidence supported [plaintiff’s] testimony regarding the
6 severity of subjective symptoms from which he suffers, particularly pain. An ALJ may not
7 discredit a claimant's subjective testimony on that basis.”).
8 “To find the claimant not credible the ALJ must rely either on reasons unrelated to
9 the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between his
10 testimony and his own conduct, or on internal contradictions in that testimony.” Light, 119
11 F.3d at 792–93; Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). As
12 discussed above, ALJ Schum did not do so when he issued his Decision. ALJ Schum
13 neglected to explain why Plaintiff lost credibility merely for “multiple gaps in care”
14 without further analysis, in the absence of specific evidentiary citations, and in light of ALJ
15 Schum’s observation that the objective record corroborated Plaintiff’s “increase in
16 symptoms” in depression, PTSD, and suicidal ideation. Absent any stated connection
17 between Plaintiff’s specific testimony and the relevant medical evidence, the Court is
18 precluded from concluding ALJ Schum appropriately evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility.
19 VI. CONCLUSION
20 Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
21 and DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 15, 18.) The
22 Action shall be REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with the
23 findings of this Order. Finally, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of this Court to enter
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1 || judgment in favor of Plaintiff and close this case accordingly.
2 IT IS SO ORDERED.
3 || Dated: December 22, 2023
MF 4.

6 United States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10088812. Public record. Not legal advice.