# Nguon v. Glynn

> District Court, S.D. California · June 9, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10085897

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** June 9, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 HUNG DUONG NGUON, Case No.: 21cv2113-CAB (JLB)
CDCR #K-49649,
12

Plaintiff,
13 ORDER DISMISSING SECOND
vs. AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
14
PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO

15 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
MARY ANNE GLYNN, et al.,
16 Defendants.
17
18 Plaintiff Hung Duong Nguon, a state prisoner confined at the Richard J. Donovan
19 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se, has paid the
20 civil filing fee and filed a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF
21 No. 16.) Plaintiff claims he received inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth
22 Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at 1-24.)
23 I. Background
24 Plaintiff’s initial Complaint, which named 98 Defendants and was nearly 700 pages
25 long, was rejected for failure to comply with this Court’s General Order 653a. (ECF Nos.
26 1-2.) He thereafter filed a First Amended Complaint which named the same 98 Defendants
27 and claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on deliberate indifference
28 to serious medical needs, equal protection, the ADA, and state law medical malpractice.
1 (ECF No. 11.) The Court screened the First Amended Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.
2 § 1915A, which provides that a court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s complaint, or
3 any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages
4 from defendants who are immune. (ECF No. 12.) The Court found the First Amended
5 Complaint failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because it alleged a disagreement
6 with the diagnosis and treatment of his medical conditions rather than deliberate
7 indifference to a serious medical need, failed to state an ADA claim for lack of a proper
8 Defendant and because it did not allege any actions were taken because of a disability,
9 failed to state an equal protection claim because there were no allegations of unequal or
10 arbitrary treatment, and the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
11 state law medical malpractice claim. (Id. at 9-19.) The First Amended Complaint was
12 dismissed with leave to amend and Plaintiff was notified of those pleading deficiencies and
13 instructed that any defendants not re-named and any claims not re-alleged would be
14 considered waived. (Id. at 20.)
15 Plaintiff has filed a Second Amended Complaint in which he brings his Eighth
16 Amendment claim against 36 of the original 98 Defendants and adds the California
17 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) as a Defendant for his ADA
18 claim. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff was granted leave to exceed the page limitations and has
19 submitted Exhibits in support of the Second Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 17-18.)
20 II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
21 A. Standard of Review
22 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner his Second Amended Complaint requires a pre-
23 Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under that statute, the Court must sua
24 sponte dismiss a prisoner’s complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,
25 fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Rhodes v.
26 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
27 The standard for determining whether a prisoner has failed to state a claim upon
28 which relief can be granted under § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in
1 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”
2 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a
3 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
4 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell
5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not
6 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
7 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
8 B. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
9 Plaintiff alleges he went to the “MD-line” on December 27, 2019, where Defendant
10 RJD Dr. Corleone examined him and “lied and fabricated on CDCR documents” that
11 Plaintiff did not have a compression fracture of his spine and lumbar spine scoliosis, even
12 though “a handful of medical doctors” had previously diagnosed those conditions. (ECF
13 No. 16 ¶ 3.) He alleges his severe chronic back pain was left untreated by Dr. Corleone
14 causing his condition to worsen to the point where his back goes out causing him to “fall
15 hard to the ground,” and that he has debilitating pain when he walks, stands, sits or bends,
16 as well as numbness, tingling and weakness in his back and legs, and loss of control of his
17 bladder and bowels. (Id.)
18 On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff went to the MD-line again and was seen by Defendant
19 RJD Dr. Chau “who ‘upheld’ the ‘fabrication of CDCR documents in conjunction with’
20 Dr. Corleone.” (Id. ¶ 4.) “Plaintiff states that although he has ‘pain that’s radiculopathy,’
21 Dr. Chau ‘lied and fabricated on CDCR documents’ that he has ‘chronic back pain without
22 radiculopathy,’ and based on that diagnosis denied his requests for morphine, a CT-Scan
23 and an MRI.” (Id.) Dr. Chau also allegedly deleted spinal scoliosis from the “problem
24 list” of Plaintiff’s ongoing medical conditions and falsely claimed he did not show acute
25 distress or grimacing. (Id.) He contends that doctors specializing in spinal problems at the
26 University of California, Davis (“UC Davis”) have diagnosed him with “chronic-appearing
27 vertebral body height loss,” “multilevel disk degeneration within the thoracic spine,”
28 “hypodense faci within multiple vertebral bodies (with) coarsened trabeculae, possibly
1 representing osseous hemangiomas,” “facet arthropathy,” “disc bulge with intervertebral
2 disc height loss,” “bilateral facet arthropathy with small left facet joint effusion,” and “focal
3 protrusion with small annular fissure into the right lateral recess.” (Id.) Attached to the
4 Second Amended Complaint are medical records from UC Davis. (ECF No. 18, Exs. 4,
5 7.) He states that several other doctors have diagnosed him with lumbar spinal scoliosis
6 with gross thoracic kyphosis. (Id.) After Plaintiff saw Dr. Chau again on January 14, 2020,
7 Dr. Chau allegedly falsified medical records to reflect that Plaintiff did not complain of a
8 “decubitus ulcer in the buttocks or sacrum area” with pressure sores, and then “denied
9 every request that Plaintiff asked for.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed inmate grievances against Drs.
10 Corleone and Chau. (Id.) Attached as Exhibits to the Second Amended Complaint are
11 copies of Plaintiff’s RJD medical records. (ECF No. 18, Exs. 1-3, 5-6, 8-14.)
12 On March 2, 2020, Plaintiff went to the MD-line and was seen by Defendant RJD
13 Dr. Casian who, “following in the footsteps of defendants Corleone and Chau in lying and
14 fabricating on CDCR documents,” found “the gross alignment of the spine is within normal
15 limits,” and refused “to believe plaintiff has serious back problems that caused him to fall
16 multiple times.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant RJD RN Sazon interviewed Plaintiff numerous times
17 regarding inmate grievances against Drs. Corleone, Chau, Casian, Silva, Luu, Mohamed,
18 Santos, Guldseth, Sedighi, Clayton, Roberts, Hodges and Barenchi, and Nurse Pasha, but
19 aided and abetted those doctors and nurses by failing to intervene. (Id. ¶ 6.) He filed an
20 inmate grievance against Nurse Sazon for rejecting those grievances. (Id.)
21 On December 31, 2019, Plaintiff made a “Reasonable Accommodation Request” in
22 which he identified what “he is unable to do because of the serious back problem,” and in
23 which he requested steroid injections, an egg-crate mattress, a “no full duty chrono,” a high
24 medical risk classification, a morphine prescription, and referral to an orthopedist. (Id.
25 ¶ 7.) He claims Defendant CDCR violated the ADA when it denied him those reasonable
26 accommodations. (Id.)
27 On January 28, 2020, Defendant Dr. Schultz, an RJD Radiologist, “engaged in
28 fraud” by redacting the report of Plaintiff’s x-ray, falsely stating that Plaintiff’s spine is
1 “within normal limits,” and diagnosing his condition as “mild degenerative spondylosis,”
2 which Plaintiff states is similar to arthritis, thereby aiding and abetting the deliberate
3 indifference of the medical doctors. (Id. ¶ 8.) He alleges that because the diagnoses of his
4 “sixteen different back problems are changed to a simple matter of spondylosis or arthritis,”
5 his requests for a back brace, morphine, referral to an orthopedic specialist or surgeon, an
6 MRI, a CT-scan, and physical therapy were all denied. (Id.) He states that a “handful of
7 defendant” medical doctors and nurses told him: “All you have is arthritis. We do not
8 provide ‘back brace’ or morphine for people with arthritis.” (Id.) He claims to have tried
9 numerous pain medications and creams, none of which are effective to alleviate his pain
10 other than morphine or fentanyl, and although doctors at the UC Davis recommended
11 Gabapentin, he was refused that medication in violation of California Prison Health Care
12 Services Pain Management Guidelines. (Id.) Plaintiff acknowledges Drs. Corleone,
13 Casian, Santos, Luu and Sedighi each granted his request to review the medical reports
14 from the UC Davis doctors, “thoroughly” reviewed his medical records, and explained to
15 him the reasons for their diagnosis and treatment plans during their “numerous”
16 consultations, which typically lasted “for about 15 to 30 minutes, and on a few occasions
17 it lasted for over an hour,” and on at least one occasion “perhaps even two hours.” (Id.
18 ¶¶ 12-17, 19-20.) He alleges his requests to his treating physicians Drs. Corleone, Chau,
19 Casian, Luu, Guldseth, Santos, Mohamed, Sedighi and Silva for opioid pain medication,
20 an egg crate mattress, a wheelchair, cortisone treatments, a back brace and ice packs were
21 repeatedly denied on the basis they did not think they were “medically necessary” because
22 they have diagnosed Plaintiff with arthritis, thus effectively denying any treatment other
23 than Tramadol. (Id. ¶¶ 12-21.) Plaintiff submitted multiple health care service request
24 forms to Defendants RJD Drs. Hodges, Barenchi, Roberts, Messler, Clayton, Guldseth,
25 Mohamed, Santos and Luu complaining of severe chronic back pain. (Id. ¶ 9.) He alleges
26 they allowed him to suffer severe pain with no treatment and consciously allowed his back
27 to weaken and give out again and again resulting in serious injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff
28 submitted a medical request on April 3, 2020, complaining he fell to the ground when his
1 back went out and injured his wrist. (Id. ¶ 10.) He went to the MD-line on April 15, 2020,
2 where Dr. Luu misdiagnosed his wrist injury as “muscle pain/strain.” (Id.) On April 17,
3 2020, Defendant RJD Radiologist Dr. Laufik, “in order to aid and abet defendant Dr. Luu’s
4 extreme departure from standard of practice so that he can harm plaintiff by denying
5 treatment altogether,” “illegally engaged in fraud” when he “heavily redacted” a report of
6 an x-ray of Plaintiff’s wrist. (Id. ¶ 11.) His requests for an ice pack for his wrist were
7 denied for six months. (Id.) Plaintiff states that for years he had been prescribed Lisinopril
8 for hypercholesterolemia, a calcium carbonate vitamin D supplement for osteopenia, and
9 testosterone for hypogonadism, but they were discontinued by Dr. Luu when his blood
10 levels “showed dangerous levels of abnormality.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
11 Plaintiff alleges he has informed or written letters to Defendants RJD Wardens
12 Pollard and Madden, RJD Chief Medical Officer Glynn, CDCR Secretaries Diaz and
13 Allison, RJD Chief Deputy Warden Buckel, Director of Corrections Services Foss,
14 Director of the Division of Adult Institutions Gipson and RJD Chief Physician and
15 Executives Hodges and Barenchi, complaining of the medical treatment he has received at
16 RJD. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.) He presents copies of that correspondence (see ECF No. 18, Ex. 15)
17 and claims these Defendants were aware his medical needs were unmet and were the
18 ultimate authority acting within the scope of their employment when they failed to
19 intervene and allowed the denial of medical care to continue. (Id.) He claims Defendants
20 Corleone, Chau, Casian, Luu, Guldseth, Santos, Mohamed, Sedighi, Silva, Saidro, Zhang,
21 Messler, Clayton, Glynn, Roberts, Hodges, Barenchi, Hofmeister, Brown, Waters, Laufik,
22 Pasha, Pollard, Gates, Diaz, Allison, Palmer, Howard, Tung, Martinez, Buckel, Madden,
23 Foss, Gibson, and Schultz failed to provide or ensure he was provided adequate medical
24 care. (Id. ¶¶ 27-40.) He seeks injunctive relief in the form of (1) a morphine prescription,
25 (2) twice weekly physical therapy, (3) CT-scans and MRIs of his spine, (4) steroid
26 injections into his spine, (5) consultations with an orthopedist, an endocrinologist and a
27 pain management specialist, (6) an egg crate mattress, (7) a full no duty chrono and (8) a
28 high medical classification. (Id. ¶ 41.)
1 C. Analysis
2 1. Eighth Amendment Claim
3 The prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment embodied in the
4 Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
5 “establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is
6 punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1976). “[A] prison
7 official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the
8 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
9 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Second, “a
10 prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” that is, “one of ‘deliberate
11 indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id., quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. The
12 prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
13 the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
14 substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
15 The Court found in its prior dismissal Order, as it does now, that Plaintiff’s
16 allegations of pain and injuries regarding his back and wrist conditions satisfy the serious
17 medical need prong of an Eighth Amendment claim sufficient to survive screening under
18 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Doty v. County of
19 Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]ndicia of a ‘serious’ medical need include
20 (1) the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and worthy of
21 comment or treatment, (2) the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
22 individual’s daily activities, and (3) the existence of chronic or substantial pain.”)
23 However, the Court found in its prior dismissal Order, as it does now, that Plaintiff
24 has failed to plausibly allege any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
25 medical needs. The deliberate indifference prong of an Eighth Amendment violation
26 regarding medical care “is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond
27 to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett
28 v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). To plausibly allege deliberate indifference,
1 “the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be
2 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the
3 inference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Farmer, 511
4 U.S. at 837. Allegations of differences of opinion over proper medical care, inadequate
5 medical treatment, medical malpractice, or even gross negligence by themselves are not
6 sufficient to allege an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835
7 (“[N]egligen(ce) in diagnosing or treating a medical condition” does not amount to
8 deliberate indifference), quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that “an inadvertent
9 failure to provide medical care,” allegations that “a physician has been negligent in
10 diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” or “medical malpractice” do not state an
11 Eighth Amendment claim); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (disagreement over the necessity or
12 extent of medical treatment does not show deliberate indifference); Sanchez v. Vild, 891
13 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate
14 indifference to [plaintiff]’s serious medical needs.”); Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873,
15 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[A] difference of opinion between a prisoner patient and prison
16 medical authorities as to what treatment is proper and necessary does not give rise to a
17 claim under [§ 1983].”)
18 Plaintiff’s allegations against his treating physicians, Drs. Corleone, Chau, Casian,
19 Luu, Guldseth, Santos, Mohamed, Sedighi and Silva, against the doctors who read his x-
20 rays and MRI, Drs. Schultz and Laufik, and Nurse Pasha, allege no more than a
21 disagreement with the diagnoses of and appropriate course of treatment for his medical
22 conditions. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Corleone examined him and diagnosed his back condition
23 differently than other doctors who had previously examined him. (ECF No. 16 at ¶ 3.) He
24 alleges he was examined by Dr. Chau who agreed with Dr. Corleone’s diagnosis and
25 independently diagnosed Plaintiff as having chronic back pain without radiculopathy, even
26 though Plaintiff claims his back pain is radiculopathy, and on the basis of that diagnosis
27 denied Plaintiff’s requests for morphine, a CT scan and an MRI. (Id. ¶ 4.) He alleges Dr.
28 Casian agreed with the diagnoses of Drs. Corleone and Chau, and independently found
1 “the gross alignment of the spine is within normal limits.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges
2 that Dr. Luu, based on an examination and an x-ray, misdiagnosed his wrist injury and
3 discontinued two prescriptions after his blood levels “showed dangerous levels of
4 abnormality.” (Id. ¶¶ 10, 22.) Plaintiff alleges Dr. Guldseth discontinued his calcium
5 supplement after examining him, and that Drs. Santos, Mohammed, Sedighi and Silva
6 agreed with the diagnoses of the other doctors but only after they examined him and
7 independently diagnosed him with “arthritis of the back,” and on that basis refused him
8 morphine and an ice pack. (Id. ¶¶ 19-22.) Plaintiff alleges Radiologists Drs. Schultz and
9 Laufik misread his x-rays and MRI and failed to properly diagnose his condition resulting
10 in the denial of an ice pack, and that Nurse Pasha relied on the medical opinions from those
11 doctors to deny an ice pack. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 18.) However, Plaintiff acknowledges Drs.
12 Corleone, Casian, Santos, Luu and Sedighi granted his requests to read the medical reports
13 of the UC Davis doctors who had previously diagnosed him, “thoroughly” reviewed his
14 medical records, and explained to him the reasons for their diagnosis and treatment plans
15 during their “numerous” consultations which typically lasted “for about 15 to 30 minutes,
16 and on a few occasions it lasted for over an hour,” and on at least one occasion “perhaps
17 even two hours.” (Id. ¶¶ 12-17, 19-20.)
18 Plaintiff has once again failed to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim
19 arising from his disagreement with the diagnoses of his treating medical providers or that
20 their opinions differed from those of other doctors. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058
21 (disagreement over the necessity or extent of medical treatment does not show deliberate
22 indifference); Mayfield, 433 F.2d at 874 (“[A] difference of opinion between a prisoner
23 patient and prison medical authorities as to what treatment is proper and necessary” does
24 not state a claim). Rather, Plaintiff alleges he consulted with and was examined by his
25 treating medical providers on numerous occasions who, after reviewing his medical records
26 including those of outside doctors, diagnosed him differently than the outside doctors, and
27 Plaintiff personally disagrees with the diagnoses and treatments. Those allegations do not
28 plausibly allege any Defendant knew of and deliberately disregarded his serious medical
1 needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (a prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an
2 excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
3 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
4 must also draw the inference.”); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that “an inadvertent
5 failure to provide medical care,” allegations that “a physician has been negligent in
6 diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” or “medical malpractice” do not state an
7 Eighth Amendment claim); Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242 (“A difference of opinion [even
8 between prison doctors and outside physicians] does not amount to a deliberate
9 indifference to [plaintiff]’s serious medical needs.”)
10 Although Plaintiff cannot establish an Eighth Amendment violation based solely on
11 disagreements with his doctors or between doctors, deliberate indifference can be shown
12 where the chosen course of medical treatment was “medically unacceptable under the
13 circumstances” and chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s
14 health.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Id.
15 at 1060. Plaintiff has failed to allege deliberate indifference under this standard because
16 there are no facts in the Second Amended Complaint from which the Court could plausibly
17 infer that any treating Defendant deliberately and knowingly chose a course of medical
18 treatment in conscious disregard to an excessive risk to his health. Rather, Plaintiff alleges
19 he was examined numerous times in response to his complaints of back pain, wrist pain
20 and falling down, sometimes for hours at a time, and received x-rays, an MRI and other
21 treatments. The allegations Defendants redacted reports of his x-rays and MRI, failed to
22 include in their medical reports every symptom he reported, or produced fraudulent
23 medical records, all simply by recording diagnoses with which Plaintiff disagreed, do not
24 plausibly allege they chose an unacceptable course of medical treatment in conscious
25 disregard to an excessive risk to his health, but are all based on what Plaintiff claims is a
26 failure to properly diagnose his condition. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical
27 malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
28 prisoner.”) Accordingly, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint fail to state an
1 Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Drs. Corleone, Chau, Casian, Luu, Guldseth,
2 Sedighi, Silva, Schultz and Laufik or Nurse Pasha.
3 Plaintiff also once again seeks to hold a number of Defendants liable for failing to
4 supervise his treating medical providers or intervene to reverse their treatment or diagnosis.
5 He alleges he sent multiple medical health request forms to Defendants Roberts, Hodges,
6 Barenchi, Messler, Clayton, Guldseth, Mohamed, Santos and Luu complaining of severe
7 chronic back pain. (ECF No. 16 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges he has informed or written letters
8 to Defendants Pollard, Madden, Glynn, Diaz, Allison, Buckel, Foss, Gipson, Hodges and
9 Barenchi complaining of the medical treatment he received at RJD, and alleges they were
10 the ultimate authority acting within the scope of their employment when they failed to
11 intervene and allowed the alleged denial of medical care to continue. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.) He
12 alleges Defendant Nurse Sazon interviewed him numerous times regarding his inmate
13 grievances against Drs. Corleone, Chau, Casian, Silva, Luu, Mohamed, Santos, Guldseth,
14 Sedighi, Clayton, Roberts, Hodges and Barenchi, and Nurse Pasha, but aided and abetted
15 those Defendants by failing to intervene. (Id. ¶ 6.)
16 The Court notified Plaintiff in the prior dismissal Order that supervisory liability is
17 not an independent cause of action under § 1983, and that in order to state a § 1983 claim
18 against supervisory personnel he must allege both an underlying constitutional violation
19 and a connection between the supervisor’s actions and the violation. (See ECF No. 12 at
20 13, citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held
21 liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement
22 in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
23 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’”), quoting Hansen v.
24 Black, 855 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989).) “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation
25 of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
26 participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally
27 required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,
28 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The
1 inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities
2 of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a
3 constitutional deprivation.”), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77 (1976).
4 There are no factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint which, if proven
5 true, would establish that the non-treating supervisory Defendants, in conscious disregard
6 to an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health, were aware he was not receiving constitutionally
7 adequate medical care. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges these Defendants were aware, at
8 most, that he disagreed with the diagnoses and treatment of the treating medical Defendants
9 and they should have intervened. Because he has failed to plausibly allege he received
10 constitutionally inadequate medical care, he has not stated a claim against the supervisory
11 Defendants. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (allegations of an underlying constitutional
12 violation and a connection between the supervisor’s actions and the violation are required
13 to state a claim); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (the prison official must “be aware of the facts
14 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [and]
15 must also draw the inference.”)
16 Plaintiff alleges the remaining Defendants, other than the CDCR, which include
17 Zhang, Hofmeister, Brown, Waters, Gates, Palmer, Howard, Tung, Saidro and Martinez,
18 along with the previously discussed Defendants Corleone, Chau, Casian, Luu, Guldseth,
19 Santos, Mohamed, Sedighi, Silva, Sazon, Messler, Clayton, Glynn, Roberts, Hodges,
20 Barenchi, Laufik, Pasha, Pollard, Diaz, Allison, Buckel, Madden, Foss, Gibson and
21 Schultz, failed to provide or ensure he was provided adequate medical care. (Id. ¶¶ 27-40.)
22 As with the supervisory Defendants, the allegations that these Defendants participated in
23 the alleged deliberate indifference of the treating medical providers by failing to intervene
24 when faced with Plaintiff’s complaints that in his opinion he had been misdiagnosed, fail
25 to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment violation because Plaintiff has not plausibly
26 alleged the treatment he received violated the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S.
27 at 106 (inadvertent failure to provide medical care, mere negligence or medical malpractice
28 and differences of opinion over what medical treatment is proper, do not state an Eighth
1 Amendment claim). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged these Defendants were aware of
2 facts from which an inference could be drawn that he faced a serious risk to his health and
3 actually drew such an inference because he has not plausibly alleged he received
4 unconstitutional medical care. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743
5 (“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the
6 meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative
7 acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation
8 of which complaint is made.”)
9 Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses the Eighth Amendment claims in the
10 Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
11 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
12 2. ADA Claim
13 Plaintiff alleges he made a “Reasonable Accommodation Request” in which he
14 identified what “he is unable to do because of the serious back problem,” and in which he
15 requested steroid injections, an egg-crate mattress, a no full duty chrono, a high medical
16 risk classification, a morphine prescription, and referral to an orthopedist. (ECF No. 16
17 ¶ 7.) He claims he is entitled to those reasonable accommodations under the ADA and that
18 Defendant CDCR is liable for failing to provide them. (Id.)
19 In the Court’s prior dismissal Order Plaintiff was informed that he was unable to
20 state an ADA claim against an individual, the only Defendants named in the First Amended
21 Complaint, and that the CDCR, who was not named as a Defendant, can only be liable
22 under the ADA “if it intentionally or with deliberate indifference fails to provide
23 meaningful access or reasonable accommodation to disabled persons.” (ECF No. 12 at 17,
24 quoting Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) and citing Vinson v.
25 Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in [his or] her individual capacity to vindicate
27 rights created by Title II of the ADA.”).) Plaintiff has now added the CDCR as a Defendant
28 in the Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 16 ¶ 7.)
1 To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege:
2 (1) he ‘is an individual with a disability;’ (2) he ‘is otherwise qualified to
participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs,
3
or activities;’ (3) he ‘was either excluded from participation in or denied the
4 benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was
otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;’ and (4) ‘such exclusion,
5
denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.’
6
7 O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).
8 The Court informed Plaintiff in its prior dismissal Order that his allegations of
9 disagreement with his medical treatment and discontinuation of his medication do not state
10 an ADA claim. See e.g. Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 174 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that
11 the ADA does not set forth a standard of care for medical treatment), citing Olmstead v.
12 Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999) (“We do not hold in this opinion that the ADA
13 imposes on the States a ‘standard of care’ for whatever medical services they render . . .”)
14 Even if Plaintiff could overcome that defect, he has once again failed to cure another defect
15 of pleading identified in the Court’s prior dismissal Order, that the refusal to accommodate
16 were taken because of his disability. (See ECF No. 12 at 19.) The Second Amended
17 Complaint once again fails to allege facts from which a plausible inference could be drawn
18 that Defendant CDCR’s actions were taken “by reason of his disability” as opposed to a
19 legitimate disagreement regarding his diagnosis and the proper course of treatment.
20 O’Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1060.
21 The Court dismisses the ADA claim from the Second Amended Complaint sua
22 sponte for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121;
23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
24 D. Plaintiff is Denied Further Leave to Amend
25 Because Plaintiff has previously been notified of the same pleading defects he has
26 failed to cure in his Second Amended Complaint, and because it is now absolutely clear he
27 cannot state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, the dismissal of
28 the Second Amended Complaint is with prejudice and without further leave to amend. See
1 || Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not
2 ||dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the
3 || deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”), quoting Akhtar v.
4 || Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012).
5 Conclusion and Order
6 Good cause appearing, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs
7 Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failing to
8 ||state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk of Court will enter judgment
9 || accordingly.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
11 Dated: June 9, 2022 €
12
Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
13 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10085897. Public record. Not legal advice.