# R. T. B. v. United States

> District Court, S.D. California · December 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10085002

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** December 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Case No.: 19-cv-2305-W(KSC)
11 R.T.B., a minor, by and through his parents

and Next Friends, RICHARD D. BREAULT and
12 MAYA M. BREAULT; RICHARD D. BREAULT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO
APPROVE MINOR’S COMPROMISE
individually; and MAYA M. BREAULT,
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individually,

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Plaintiffs, [ECF No. 56]
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v.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Defendant.
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20 On October 28, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an petition for approval of Minor’s
21 Compromise for their minor child, R.T.B. ECF No. 56 (“Petition”). This Report and
22 Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Thomas J. Whelan pursuant to 28
23 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 17.1 of the United States District Court for the Southern
24 District of California. After reviewing the Petition and all supporting documents, and for the
25 reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Judge GRANT the Petition.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 BACKGROUND
2 On April 12, 2019, Plaintiffs R.T.B., a minor, by and through his parents and Next Friends,
3 Richard D. Breault and Maya M Breault; Richard D. Breault, individually; and Maya M. Breault,
4 individually, initiated a complaint against Defendant for medical malpractice and negligence
5 under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”); see also ECF No. 56 at 2-3.
6 Minor Plaintiff R.T.B. is a five-year old male born April 16, 2016, who suffers from cerebral palsy
7 and global developmental delays. ECF No. 56 at 3. The claims arise from injuries sustained by
8 R.T.B. during and shortly after his birth at Camp Pendleton Naval Hospital, including severe,
9 permanent brain damage known as hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. Complaint at 4; see also
10 ECF No. 56 at 2. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of Defendant’s conduct R.T.B. “will never live
11 independently, will never work, and will require 24/7 attendant care, as well as specialized
12 medical care for the rest of his life.” ECF No. 56 at 3.
13 With the help of Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford, the parties reached a tentative
14 settlement on September 23, 2021. See ECF No. 54. On October 28, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an
15 Petition for Approval of Minor’s Compromise and for Approval of Minor’s Trusts. ECF
16 No. 56. The Petition was supported by a declaration executed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. ECF No.
17 56-11, Declaration of Anne E. Brown (“Brown Decl.”); see also ECF No. 56-12, Declaration of
18 Brian K. Findley (“Findley Decl.”). On October 29, 2021, the undersigned was assigned to handle
19 the Minor’s Compromise. ECF No. 57.
20 CONSENT TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
21 Rule 17.1(a) of the Local Rules for the Southern District of California provides that “[t]he
22 parties may, with district judge approval, consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28
23 U.S.C. §636(c) for entry of an order approving the entire settlement or compromise.” CivLR
24 17.1(a). Rule 17.1(b)(3) states that “[s]hould money or property be held in a trust for a minor
25 or incompetent, the proposed trust instrument must be submitted to a magistrate judge on an
26 ex parte petition for review and approval before the settlement is approved or the judgment is
27 entered.” CivLR 17.1(b)(3). Rule 17.1(b)(3) provides that the parties may consent to magistrate
28 judge jurisdiction without district judge approval. Id. In the Petition, Plaintiffs state that the
1 “parties have consented to magistrate jurisdiction to approve the entire settlement under 28
2 U.S.C. §636(c) and as provided in Civil Local Rule 17.1(b)(3).” See ECF No. 56 at 15. As a
3 result, this Court has the authority to evaluate the proposed trust instruments pursuant to Rule
4 17.1(b)(3) but, because the parties did not obtain approval from District Judge Whelan for
5 Magistrate Judge Major to approve the entire settlement or compromise in accordance with Rule
6 17.1(a), this Court does not have the final authority to approve the entire compromise and must
7 submit that decision to Judge Whelan via this Report and Recommendation.
8 IMPROPER APPROVAL PROCEDURE REQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES
9 In the Petition, Plaintiffs state that the settlement has not yet been approved by “the
10 Department of Justice Torts Branch, and the Assistant Attorney General of the United States.”
11 ECF No. 56 at 5; see also ECF No. 56-4 at 10 (stating that the settlement is not final as it is
12 subject to a number of conditions including that “[t]he Attorney General or the Attorney
13 General’s designee must approve the terms and conditions of the settlement and authorize the
14 attorney representing the United States to consummate a settlement for the amount and upon
15 the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties, as set forth in this [Settlement Agreement]
16 and the Reversionary Trust”). Because the settlement was not final, the Court declined to
17 provide an advisory opinion as to the reasonableness of the tentative settlement. ECF No. 58.
18 At a hearing on the issue, the AUSA repeatedly stated that this is the procedure the United
19 States always uses to conduct its settlements and indicated that the burden of potentially
20 reviewing two settlements is more appropriately placed on the court than on the Department of
21 Justice. ECF No. 62; see also ECF No. 60. The Court disagrees. As set forth in the Court’s
22 original order, the Court finds that the Department of Justice is inappropriately seeking an
23 advisory decision and that the Department of Justice, including the final decision maker, should
24 agree to the settlement before seeking court approval. See ECF No. 58. The AUSA repeatedly
25 refused to present this settlement to the Assistant Attorney General without a judicial order
26 approving the settlement. In fact, the United States stated that if the Court is unwilling to
27 address the reasonableness of the settlement before it is presented to the Assistant Attorney
28 General, then the settlement “will be null and void.” ECF No. 60-1 at 20. This standoff between
1 the Court and the Department of Justice only harms the Plaintiffs. While the Department of
2 Justice is unwilling to compromise its rigid position in this case to ensure that justice is provided
3 to the Plaintiffs, the Court places the Plaintiffs’ needs above the unreasonable and improper
4 demands of the Department of Justice. As a result, the Court takes the opposite position and
5 will issue the advisory opinion that the Department of Justice demands. In reaching this
6 decision, the Court relies on the AUSA’s representations that the DOJ Torts Branch has been
7 monitoring this case and that if the Court approves the tentative settlement, the Director of the
8 Torts Branch will recommend that the Assistant Attorney General approve the settlement and
9 that the Assistant Attorney General will give “great deference” to the Court’s decision and the
10 Director’s recommendation.
11 LEGAL STANDARD
12 It is well settled that courts have a special duty to safeguard the interests of litigants who
13 are minors in civil litigation. Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011); see
14 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (district courts “must appoint a guardian —or issue another
15 appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an
16 action.”). “In the context of proposed settlements in suits involving minor plaintiffs, this special
17 duty requires a district court to ‘conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the settlement
18 serves the best interests of the minor.’” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Dacanay v.
19 Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d
20 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that “a court must independently investigate and evaluate
21 any compromise or settlement of a minor’s claims to assure itself that the minor’s interests are
22 protected, even if the settlement has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent
23 or guardian .”). To facilitate the Court in satisfying the duty to safeguard, Civil Local
24 Rule 17.1(a) provides that “[n]o action by or on behalf of a minor or incompetent will be settled,
25 compromised, voluntarily discontinued, dismissed or terminated without court order or
26 judgment.” CivLR. 17.1(a). This requires the Court to determine if the settlement is in the best
27 interests of the minor and to consider not only the fairness of the amount of the settlement, but
28 the structure and manner of distribution of the assets for the benefit of the minor.
1 The Ninth Circuit established that courts reviewing the settlement of a minor’s federal
2 claim should “limit the scope of their review to the question whether the net amount distributed
3 to each minor plaintiff in the settlement is fair and reasonable, in light of the facts of the case,
4 the minor’s specific claim, and recovery in similar cases.” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181–82. They
5 should “evaluate the fairness of each minor plaintiff’s net recovery without regard to the
6 proportion of the total settlement value designated for adult co-plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ counsel—
7 whose interests the district court has no special duty to safeguard.” Id. at 1182 (citing Dacanay,
8 573 F.2d at 1078). “So long as the net recovery to each minor plaintiff is fair and reasonable in
9 light of their claims and average recovery in similar cases, the district court should approve the
10 settlement as proposed by the parties.” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1182.
11 The Ninth Circuit limited its decision in Robidoux to “cases involving the settlement of a
12 minor’s federal claims.” Id. at 1181–82 (emphasis added). Where a settlement involves state
13 law claims, federal courts are generally guided by state law rather than Robidoux. J.T. by &
14 Through Wolfe v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., No. 116CV01492DADJLT, 2019 WL 954783, at
15 *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2019). See also A.M.L. v. Cernaianu, No. LA CV12-06082 JAK (RZx), 2014
16 WL 12588992, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (collecting cases). The court in A.M.L. noted that,
17 although federal courts generally require claims by minors to “be settled in accordance with
18 applicable state law,” the Ninth Circuit in Robidoux held such an approach “places undue
19 emphasis on the amount of attorney’s fees provided for in a settlement, instead of focusing on
20 the net recovery of the minor plaintiffs.” Id. at *2 (quoting Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181) (other
21 citation omitted). But see Mitchell v. Riverstone Residential Grp., No. CIV. S-11-2202 LKK, 2013
22 WL 1680641, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) (“[A] number of district courts have applied the
23 rule provided in Robidoux to evaluate the propriety of a settlement of a minor’s state law claims
24 as well”) (collecting cases).
25 The California Probate Code provides the applicable statutory scheme for approval of a
26 minor’s compromise under state law. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 3601 . Under California law,
27 the Court is tasked with evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement and determining
28 whether the compromise is in the best interest of the minor. A.M.L., 2014 WL 12588992, at *3
1 (citations omitted). The Court is afforded “broad power . . . to authorize payment from the
2 settlement—to say who and what will be paid from the minor’s money—as well as direct certain
3 individuals to pay it.” Goldberg v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1378, 1382 (Cal. Ct. App.
4 1994); see also Pearson v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
5 (explaining that the purpose of requiring court approval of a minor’s settlement is to “allow[]
6 the guardians of a minor to effectively negotiate a settlement while at the same time protect[ing]
7 the minor’s interest by requiring court approval before the settlement can have a binding effect
8 on the minor”).
9 DISCUSSION
10 A. Proposed Settlement
11 The complete and precise terms of the proposed settlement are set forth in the Stipulation
12 for Compromise Settlement and Release of Federal Tort Claims Act Claims (“Settlement
13 Agreement”), the Irrevocable Reversionary Inter Vivos Grantor Medical Care Trust
14 (“Reversionary Trust”), and the Legacy Enhancement Master Pooled Trust and Joinder
15 Agreement (“Special Needs Trust”). See ECF Nos. 56-4, 56-6, and 56-8. The Court has reviewed
16 and considered all of the submitted documents. The proposed settlement provides that
17 Defendant will pay $3,500,000 to R.T.B., his parents, and his attorneys. ECF No. 56 at 5; see
18 also ECF No. 56-4. Defendant will make an upfront cash payment of $1.4 million. Id. at 2. This
19 money will be used as follows: $100,000 to R.T.B.’s parents, $875,000 in attorneys’ fees to the
20 two law firms representing Plaintiffs (25% of the $3.5 million settlement), $125,858.29 in
21 advanced litigation fees, $62,016.13 to satisfy a medical lien, and $237,125.58 to fund a Special
22 Needs Trust for R.T.B. ECF No. 56 at 6. The Special Needs Trust utilizes a “pooled trust fund
23 to benefit individual with disabilities.” ECF No. 56-8 at 1. R.T.B. will benefit significantly from
24 participating in the pooled Special Needs Trust. As R.T.B.’s relatively small contribution will be
25 combined with money from other individuals with disabilities to obtain a better return on his
26 investment and more reasonable fees. ECF No. 56 at 8; see also 56-8 at 1. The pooled trust
27 will create a sub-account for R.T.B. to protect his assets and the professional trustee will make
28 distribution decisions based on R.T.B.’s specific situation. The Special Needs Trust will “provide
1 [R.T.B.] with items, benefits and services” so that [he] has the ability “to lead a comfortable and
2 fulfilling life.” ECF No. 56-8 at 1.
3 As part of the settlement, the United States also will provide and additional $1.2 million
4 to fund the Reversionary Trust for the benefit of R.T.B. ECF No. 56 at 6; see also ECF No. 56-
5 6. Initially, the Reversionary Trust will be funded with $900,000. See ECF No. 56; see also ECF
6 No. 56-6. The United States will provide $1.2 million to purchase an annuity contract that will
7 fund the Reversionary Trust. ECF No. 56-6. “The United States will purchase annuity
8 contract(s), from an annuity company(ies) rated at least A by A.M. Best rating service, to pay
9 the Reversionary Trust.” ECF No. 56-4 at 5. The parties anticipate that the Reversionary Trust
10 will provide $4,700 per month for R.T.B.’s care beginning ten years from the date of purchase
11 of the annuity contract. ECF No. 56; see also ECF No. 56-4 at 5. The Reversionary Trust
12 payments will be used to provide care for R.T.B. for the rest of his life, including medical care
13 and devices, in-home attendant care, residential care, and other necessary expenses. ECF No.
14 56 at 5-6; see also ECF No. 56-6. The parties state that the “expected payout of the settlement
15 over R.T.B.’s lifetime is projected to be $5,721,600.00.” ECF No. 56 at 5.
16 Plaintiffs state that this case was particularly challenging because it “was two cases in
17 one – the obstetrical case and the resuscitation case.” ECF No. 56 at 11. Plaintiffs’ attorney,
18 Anne Brown, who was “a registered nurse practicing in the area of high-risk obstetrics” prior to
19 becoming a lawyer, states that “this case involved complex questions of law and medicine as
20 well as potential causation issues concerning the timing and etiology of the events leading to
21 R.T.B.’s brain damage.” Brown Decl. at 4. Ms. Brown explained that she reviewed extensive
22 records, consulted with well-qualified experts in numerous medical specialties, and worked with
23 the experts “as they prepared detailed reports that ultimately very likely significantly contributed
24 to reaching a settlement of this case.” Id. at 5-6. Ms. Brown noted that while she and co-
25 counsel worked hard to develop and present a persuasive case for liability, there were significant
26 medical and legal challenges that could have resulted in an unfavorable or less favorable result
27 for Plaintiffs. Id. at 6.
28 Plaintiffs’ counsel also provided the Court with case law supporting the proposed
1 settlement. Findley Decl. at 3-4; see also Brown Decl. at n1. In a case arising out of very similar
2 circumstances, the court approved a settlement providing a net recovery of $4,800,000. I.A. ex
3 rel. Acuna v. United States, No. 1:11-CV-00406-LJO, 2012 WL 6097066, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
4 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV-0406-LJO, 2012 WL 6194194 (E.D.
5 Cal. Dec. 12, 2012); see also Waters V. United States, No. CV 9:06-2438-PMD, 2008 WL
6 11349818, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2008) (settlement of $4,500,000 approved for minor plaintiff
7 who was permanently and totally disabled and required substantial medical care for the
8 remainder of his life due to the injuries alleged); Garcia v. United States, No. 2:16-cv-168, 2018
9 WL 889433, at *1, *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018) (settlement of $4,250,000 approved for minor
10 plaintiff that suffered from “numerous disabilities and medical problems, including, but not
11 limited to, ‘permanent injuries due [to] hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy’”), report and
12 recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 838975 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2018). The Court has performed
13 its own review of cases involving facts similar to those at issue here and finds the case law bears
14 out Plaintiffs’ counsel’s assertion.
15 Based upon the information provided in the Petition, Settlement Agreement, Reversionary
16 Trust, Special Needs Trust, and the supporting documents, and considering the totality of the
17 facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the Reversionary Trust and Special
18 Needs Trust are fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of R.T.B. and will provide the continuity
19 of care he requires. The Court further finds that the Trusts are consistent with the California
20 Probate Code. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 3602(c)(1) and 3600 et. seq. Finally, upon consideration
21 of the facts of this case, Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant’s defenses, the challenging medical and
22 legal issues, and recoveries in similar cases, the Court finds that the proposed settlement of
23 $3,500,000 is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of R.T.B. and, therefore, RECOMMENDS
24 the proposed settlement be APPROVED.
25 ///
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27 ///
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1 B. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
2 In addition to assessing whether the settlement is fair and reasonable, the Court must
3 approve the attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid for representation of a minor. See Cal. Prob.
4 Code § 3601; Cal. Rule of Ct. 7.955.1 In contingency fee cases, attorneys’ fees for representing
5 a minor historically have been limited to 25% of the gross recovery. See, e.g., DeRuyver v.
6 Omni La Costa Resort & Spa, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-0516-H-AGS, 2020 WL 563551, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
7 Feb. 4, 2020); Mitchell v. Riverstone Residential Grp., No. 2:11-cv-02202-LKK-CKD, 2013 WL
8 1680641, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013); McCue v. South Fork Union Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-cv-
9 0233-LJO-MJS, 2012 WL 2995666, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2012); Welch v. Cty. Of Sacramento,
10 No. 2:07-cv-0794-GEB-EFB, 2008 WL 3285412, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2008); Red v. Merced
11 Cty., No. 1:06-cv-1003-GSA, 2008 WL 1849796, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008). “[M]ost courts
12 require[] a showing of good cause to award more than 25% of any recovery” and such an award
13 is “rare and justified only when counsel proves that he or she provided extraordinary services.”
14 Schwall v. Meadow Wood Apts., No. CIV. S-08-0014 LKK, 2008 WL 552432, at *1-*2 (E.D. Cal.
15 Feb. 27, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a request for
16 attorney’s fee is reasonable, a court may consider factors such as the time and labor required,
17 whether the minor’s representative consented to the fee, the amount of money involved, the
18 result obtained, and whether the fee is fixed, hourly, or contingent. See California Rule of Court
19 7.955(b).
20 Here, Plaintiffs’ attorneys are seeking $875,000, which is 25% of the gross recovery and
21 within the presumptively reasonable range. Ms. Brown justifies the request for attorneys’ fees
22 by explaining that “[t]his case involved collecting, reviewing and analyzing over 17,000 pages
23 of medical records, relevant policies and procedures, as well as depositions of the plaintiffs and
24 12 key defense witnesses located around the world, all done during the COVID pandemic.”
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1 Similarly, San Diego Superior Court Civil Rule 2.4.6.2 states that, regarding a minor’s
27 compromise, “the court will determine the amount of costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees to be
allowed from the proceeds of the settlement. Absent extraordinary circumstances, attorney’s
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1 Brown Decl. at 6. Mr. Findley states that his “firm devoted hundreds of hours of time to ensuring
2 the success of this case. Recovery was not certain, and should the case not have been
3 successful, this time and effort spent would have been unrecoverable by [his] law firm.” Findley
4 Decl. at 4. The attorneys provided significant and specialized expertise as Ms. Brown previously
5 was a registered nurse practicing in the area of high-risk obstetrics and her legal practice focuses
6 on military families whose children suffer catastrophic injuries during birth [Brown Decl. at 3]
7 and Mr. Findley and his firm have extensive experience in litigating cases involving minors injured
8 during birth [Findley Decl. at 2-3]. The Court finds that given the facts of this litigation, including
9 the experience of counsel and the time expended, the requested attorneys’ fees are fair and
10 reasonable.
11 Plaintiffs’ counsel also seek $125,858.29 in advanced litigation costs. The attorneys state
12 that “[e]xpert fees represent 90% of the costs advanced.” ECF No. 56 at 11. The attorneys
13 explain that they incurred the costs because “it was necessary to contact and consult with well-
14 qualified experts in: pediatric anesthesiology, anesthesiology, neuroradiology, obstetrics,
15 neonatology, pediatric radiology, pediatric ENT, pathology[,] as well as an economist and life
16 care planner.” Brown Decl. at 5-6; see also ECF No. 56-13 (“Litigation Costs Invoice”). Counsel
17 also had to pay more than $25,000 to cover fees associated with defense witness depositions.
18 ECF No. 56-13. After reviewing the Litigation Cost Invoice, and understanding the facts and
19 issues in this case, the Court finds that the requested costs are reasonable and fair.
20 CONCLUSION
21 After conducting an independent inquiry and evaluation of the proposed settlement, the
22 Court finds that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the
23 R.T.B., given his injuries, the legal and factual issues involved in this case, and recoveries in
24 similar cases. See Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181-82. The Court also finds that the proposed
25 attorneys’ fees ($875,000.00) and litigation costs ($125,858.29) are fair and reasonable.
26 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Judge Whelan issue an Order: (1) adopting this
27 Report and Recommendation; and (2) GRANTING Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Petition for Approval of
28 Minor’s Compromise and for Approval of Minor’s Trusts. ECF No. 56. This Court further
1 || RECOMMENDS that Judge Whelan:
2 1. Approve the settlement and all terms of the settlement contained in the
3 || Settlement Agreement.
4 2. Approve the terms of the Reversionary Trust and Supplemental Needs Trust.
5 3. Require Plaintiffs to satisfy all liens prior to the establishment of the trust.
6 4. Find that no bond is required as both the Reversionary Trust and Special Needs
7 || Trust are managed by professional Trustees.
8 5. Find that no annual accountings to the Court are required as both the Reversionary
9 || Trust and Special Needs Trust are managed by professional Trustees.
10 6. Find that Maya Breault and Richard Dylan Breault, as parents and next friends of
11 ||R.T.B., a minor, are authorized to sign the Stipulation, the Reversionary Trust, the Special Needs
12 || Trust, and any other documents that are necessary to consummate the Settlement, and to
13 || provide any information and documentation necessary to complete the purchase of annuity
14 || contracts and the establishment of the Reversionary Trust and the Special Needs Trust.
15 Any party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all
16 || parties no later than January 5, 2022. The document should be captioned “Objections to
17 || Report and Recommendation.” If objections are filed, any reply is due by January 12, 2022.
18 Although the federal statutory scheme provides for a 14-day objections period to a
19 || Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the undersigned notes that the Petition in this
20 is unopposed. See ECF No. 56-4. Therefore, if all parties wish to waive the objections
21 || period, they should file a joint stipulation to that effect immediately, to allow the Court to adopt
22 || this Report and Recommendation without further delay. There will be no adverse consequences
23 any party who files objections or otherwise chooses not to waive the objection period.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 ||Dated: 12/22/2021 lxirbee Mager
26 Hon. Barbara L. Major
United States Maqistrate Judde
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10085002. Public record. Not legal advice.