# Caudle v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation

> District Court, S.D. California · March 10, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10080731

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** March 10, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10080731

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that where state cannot foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing 23 prior to the deprivation, a statutory provision for post-deprivation hearing or a state 24 common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 RONALD EDWARD CAUDLE, Case No.: 3:20-CV-0098-JLS-LL
CDCR #AB-6670,
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ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION
Plaintiff,
13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA
vs. PAUPERIS; (2) DISMISSING
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DEFENDANTS CDCR, RJD, AND

15 FRIJAS PURSUANT TO
CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND
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CORRECTIONS AND § 1915A(b)(1); AND (3) DIRECTING
17 REHABILITATION; RICHARD J. U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT
DONOVAN CORRECTIONAL SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT
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FACILITY; E. FRIJAS; ROMERO PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
19 CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ROMERO, § 1915(d) AND FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3)
20 Defendants.
(ECF No. 2)
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23 Plaintiff Ronald Edward Caudle, proceeding pro se and currently housed at
24 Atascadero State Hospital located in Atascadero, California, has filed a Complaint pursuant
25 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1), together with a Motion to Proceed In Forma
26 Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff claims prison officials at Richard J. Donovan
27 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, violated his rights under the Eighth
28 and Fourteenth Amendment.
1 I. Motion to Proceed IFP
2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
4 $400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to
5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
6 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.
7 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed
8 IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v.
9 Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.
10 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.
11 § 1915(b)(1)–(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a
13 “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the
14 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C.
15 § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified
16 trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average
17 monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance
18 in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no
19 assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (4). The institution having custody of the prisoner
20 then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income in
21 any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court
22 until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.
23 In support of his Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate
24 Statement Report as well as a prison certificate of funds authorized by a CDCR accounting
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1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
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1 official. See ECF No. 2 at 4–7; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews,
2 398 F.3d at 1119. These records show Plaintiff had only $3.07 to his credit at the time his
3 Complaint was submitted for filing with the Clerk of Court.
4 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and
5 assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C.
6 § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a
7 civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner
8 has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee”); Bruce, 136 S.
9 Ct. at 630; see also Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a
10 “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to
11 pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered”). Instead, the
12 Court will direct the $350 total filing fee owed in this case be collected by the agency
13 having custody of Plaintiff and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the
14 installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
15 II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A
16 A. Standard of Review
17 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-
18 answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes,
19 the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which
20 is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are
21 immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing
22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)
23 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the
24 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”
25 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted.)
26 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
27 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
28 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
2 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard
3 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
5 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
6 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
7 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
8 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
10 [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
11 experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned,
12 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
13 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
14 Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the Court
15 may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a
16 written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all
17 purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555
18 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426
19 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be
20 considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss)).
21 B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
22 On July 18, 2019, Plaintiff was returning to his cell at RJD when he was “assaulted
23 by three inmates.” (Compl. at 3.) One of the inmates “punched” Plaintiff in the face while
24 the other two inmates “threatened [him] with homemade prison knives.” (Id.) Plaintiff
25 alleges these events all “transpired in front of Correctional Officer Romero who stood by
26 watching and laughing while the incident occurred.” (Id.) Romero then “instructed the
27 correctional officer in the control tower to open [Plaintiff’s] cell door.” (Id.) When his
28 cell door opened, Plaintiff claims that “one of the inmates ran into [his] cell” and took
1 Plaintiff’s property. (Id.) These inmates also purportedly told Plaintiff “right in front of
2 Correctional Officer Romero that if [Plaintiff] tried to tell anyone about what happened,
3 they would stab [Plaintiff].” (Id.)
4 A week prior to this incident, Plaintiff claims Romero “tried to question [him] in
5 regard to [Plaintiff] being a witness in a criminal case against correctional officers at
6 Pelican Bay State Prison in the 90’s and early 2000’s.” (Id.) Romero allegedly told
7 Plaintiff that “inmates who told on officers ended up getting hurt.” (Id.) Plaintiff further
8 claims that one of the inmates who assaulted him “worked for Officer Romero as a porter.”
9 (Id.)
10 Plaintiff attempted to “tell several staff members[,] including the Warden, only to
11 have [his] request for an interview and inquiry into the matter go unanswered.” (Id.)
12 On July 25, 2019, Plaintiff approached Romero and told him that he “needed to be
13 placed in administrative segregation to which he replied, ‘take your bitch ass back to your
14 cell.’” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff “swallowed four razor blades and was taken to the outside
15 hospital under suicide watch.” (Id.)
16 Plaintiff claims that while he was at an outside hospital, his “personal property
17 should have been secured by staff.” (Id.) However, “Romero neglected his duties and in
18 fact left [his] property unattended for two days during which time the majority of [his]
19 personal property was stolen by other inmates.” (Id.)
20 Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance on August 29, 2019 regarding
21 “correctional officers’ actions and the theft of [his] personal property.” (Id. at 5.)
22 However, to date, there has been “no response/decision given on this appeal” which
23 purportedly violates “CDCR guidelines.” (Id.)
24 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.
25 at 7.)
26 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
27 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
28 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
1 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
2 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030,
3 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2015).
4 D. Claims against CDCR and RJD
5 First, to the extent Plaintiff includes the CDCR and RJD as parties, his Complaint
6 fails to state any claim against these Defendants upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1).
8 Neither the CDCR nor RJD are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Hale v.
9 State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department
10 of corrections is an arm of the state and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983);
11 see also Anderson v. California, No. 3:16-CV-01172-LAB-JLB, 2016 WL 4127785, at *2
12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016) (sua sponte dismissing both CDCR and RJD pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
13 § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A because neither are “persons” subject to § 1983 liability).
14 Thus, Defendants CDCR and RJD are DISMISSED from this action for failure to
15 state a claim.
16 E. Grievance claims
17 Plaintiff appears to seek to hold Defendant Frijas liable for his role in responding to
18 Plaintiff’s administrative grievances. (See Compl. at 5.) However, a prison official’s
19 allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot
20 serve as a basis for section 1983 liability. See generally Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,
21 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a
22 specific prison grievance procedure”) (citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639,
23 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not violated simply because defendant fails properly to
24 process grievances submitted for consideration); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 F. App’x.
25 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court properly dismissed section 1983 claims against
26 defendants who “were only involved in the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at
27 860).
28 ///
1 Therefore, the claims against Defendant Frijas are DISMISSED from this action for
2 failing to state a claim.
3 F. Property claim
4 Plaintiff alleges that when he was transferred to a “crisis bed,” his “personal property
5 should have been secured by staff and placed in storage” for him. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff
6 alleges that Romero “neglected his duties” and left his property “unattended for two days
7 during which time the majority of [Plaintiff’s] personal property was stolen by other
8 inmates. (Id.) “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against
9 deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural
10 protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545
11 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
12 Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of
13 hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. Sinaloa Lake Owners
14 Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989). Neither the negligent
15 nor intentional deprivation of property constitutes a due process claim under section 1983
16 if the deprivation was random and unauthorized, however. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
17 535–44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on
18 other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
19 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). The availability of an
20 adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief because it
21 provides sufficient procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128
22 (1990) (holding that where state cannot foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing
23 prior to the deprivation, a statutory provision for post-deprivation hearing or a state
24 common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process); King v.
25 Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). The Ninth Circuit has long
26 recognized that California law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy.
27 Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code
28 §§ 810–895).
1 Deprivations of property resulting from negligence, or “mere lack of due care,” do
2 not deny due process at all and must be redressed through a state court damages action.
3 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a
4 negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
5 property.”); id. at 330 (“‘To hold that this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within
6 the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to
7 distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution.’” (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545
8 (Stewart, J., concurring))). In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly warned against turning
9 the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 into a “font of tort law to be superimposed upon
10 whatever systems may already be administered by the States.” See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
11 693, 701 (1976).
12 Thus, because Plaintiff claims Defendants deprived him of personal property, any
13 remedy he may have lies in state court and his federal claims must be dismissed for failing
14 to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez,
15 203 F.3d at 1126–27.
16 G. Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Romero
17 As currently pleaded, the Court finds the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint
18 contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to state Eighth Amendment claims as
19 to Defendant Romero that are “plausible on its face,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and therefore,
20 sufficient to survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
21 §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
22 United States v. Williams, 842 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) (the Eighth Amendment
23 “requires that prison officials ‘must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
24 inmates.’”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (“[P]rison officials have
25 a duty [under the Eighth Amendment] . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands
26 of other prisoners.”)).
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1 Therefore, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to effect service of
2 summons of Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendant Romero on Plaintiff’s behalf.2 See 28
3 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform
4 all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be
5 made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to
6 proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).
7 III. Conclusion and Orders
8 For all the reasons discussed, the Court:
9 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2).
10 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from
11 Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 filing fee owed in monthly payments in an amount
12 equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court
13 each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME
15 AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.
16 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph Diaz,
17 Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.
18 4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants CDCR, RJD, and Frijas
19 sua sponte based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against them pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
20 § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate CDCR,
21 RJD, and Frijas as Defendants in this matter.
22 5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No.
23 1) upon Defendant Romero and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal
24 Form 285 for this Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified
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27 2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a
substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v.
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1 copy of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1), and the summons so that
2 he may serve them upon Defendant Romero. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff
3 must complete the Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible, include an address
4 where Defendant Romero may be served, see S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1.c, and return it to the
5 United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter
6 accompanying his IFP package.
7 6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint and
8 summons upon Defendant Romero as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285 provided
9 to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C.
10 § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
11 7. ORDERS Defendant Romero, once served, to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint
12 within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to
14 “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
15 other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte
16 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a
17 preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a
18 “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is required to respond).
19 8. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to
20 serve upon Defendant Romero, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon
21 Defendant’s counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document
22 submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must
23 include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a
24 certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been
25 was served on Defendant or her counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal.
26 CivLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with
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1 || the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, may be
2 || disregarded.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 Dated: March 10, 2020 tt
5 jen Janis L. Sammartino
6 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10080731. Public record. Not legal advice.