# Morris v. Board of Trustees of the California State University

> District Court, N.D. California · April 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10078667

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** April 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 MATTHEW MORRIS, Case No. 23-cv-04562-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND AND
9 v. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART THE CSU DEFENDANTS’
10 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, et
11 al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 34

12 Defendants.

13
14 Pending before the Court is the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 21, and
15 Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. No. 34. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition
16 without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons
17 discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand and GRANTS IN PART and
18 DENIES IN PART the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
19 I. BACKGROUND
20 In its January 2, 2024 order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute, the Court laid out
21 this case’s procedural background from its removal in March 2023 through the beginning of this
22 year. Dkt. No. 31. While it will not retread that procedural ground, the Court briefly summarizes
23 the subsequent developments as follows.
24 After the Court dismissed the case and the Clerk entered judgment in favor of the CSU
25 Defendants, Plaintiff Matthew Morris filed a motion for permission to e-file documents, a motion
26 to remand, and a response to the Court’s December 13, 2023 order to show cause.1 See Dkt. Nos.
27
1 33 (motion to e-file), 34 (motion to remand), 35 (response to OSC). On January 8, Plaintiff filed a
2 motion for relief from judgment, explaining that serious medical issues had prevented him from
3 prosecuting his case, and requesting that the case be reopened. Dkt. No. 36. Based on Plaintiff’s
4 explanation, which was supported by documentation, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion, ordered
5 the case re-opened, and set aside the previously entered judgment. Dkt. No. 37. In that same
6 order, the Court also established a briefing schedule for the then-revived CSU Defendants’ motion
7 to dismiss, Dkt. No. 21 (“MTD”), and Plaintiff’s then-pending motion to remand, Dkt. No. 34
8 (“Remand Mot.”). In compliance with the briefing schedule, the CSU Defendants filed an
9 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand on January 24, 2024. Dkt. No. 38 (“Remand Opp.”).
10 Plaintiff timely filed an opposition to the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 7, Dkt.
11 No. 39 (“MTD Opp.”), and the CSU Defendants timely filed a Reply on February 14, Dkt. No. 30
12 (“MTD Reply”). On February 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed another (but not identical) opposition to the
13 CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 42 (“MTD Opp. II”). The Court took the motions
14 under submission on March 6, 2024. Dkt. No. 44.
15 II. LEGAL STANDARD
16 A. Motion to Remand
17 A suit may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would
18 have had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar Inc. v.
19 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed
20 in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). “If at any time before final
21 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
22 remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing
23 federal jurisdiction. See Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083,
24 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683–685
25 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as
26 before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.”).
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1 B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
3 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
4 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
5 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
6 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
7 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule
8 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
9 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
10 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
11 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
12 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the
13 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
14 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless,
15 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
16 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.
17 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).
18 Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
19 “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
20 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation
21 omitted). In addition, “[i]n civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must
22 construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi
23 v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, even a “liberal interpretation of
24 a . . . complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See
25 Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are
26 bound by the rules of procedure,” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require
27 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R.
1 Even if the court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the “court should
2 grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that
3 the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203
4 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
5 III. DISCUSSION
6 A. Motion to Remand
7 The Court first addresses the jurisdictional challenge raised in Plaintiff’s motion to
8 remand. Plaintiff argues that because the Federal Defendants were dismissed from the case after
9 its removal, “remanding this case back to Dept. 17 of the Alameda County Superior Court would
10 be least burdensome to the plaintiff as well as the defendant.” Remand Mot. at 4. In their
11 opposition, the CSU Defendants argue that the Court has jurisdiction over the matter despite the
12 dismissal of the Federal Defendants, and that the “values of economy, convenience, fairness, and
13 comity” would be best served by the Court retaining that jurisdiction and ruling on the CSU
14 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Remand Opp. at 4.
15 The Court, after considering the question, concludes that it has jurisdiction over this case.2
16 As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that at time the Federal Defendants filed a notice of
17 removal, removal was proper on the grounds they cited – the federal officer removal statute. 3 See
18 Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 8–11 (removal notice discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The Ninth Circuit has
19 explained that “[i]t is well settled that ‘post-filing developments do not defeat jurisdiction if
20 jurisdiction was properly invoked as of the time of filing.’” See Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733
21 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2013). Applying this to the removal context, as Visendi did, means that the
22

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2 To be clear, Plaintiff has not suggested that the Court currently lacks jurisdiction. He has instead
argued that “with all federal employees and agencies dismissed from the case,” remand would be
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“harmless.” Remand Mot. at 4. Nevertheless, given that cases “shall” be remanded “[i]f at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” the
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Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as a challenge to its jurisdiction and accordingly assesses the
propriety of continued litigation in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
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3 The “Federal Defendants” consist of: Kiran Ahuja, in her official capacity as the director of the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management; the U.S. Office of Personnel Management; Shalanda
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Young, in her official capacity as the director the U.S. Office of Management and Budget; U.S.
1 Federal Defendants’ post-removal dismissal does not destroy the Court’s jurisdiction since
2 jurisdiction was proper at the time of removal. It just means that “the court has discretion whether
3 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims” now that the Federal
4 Defendants are out of the case.4 Chapman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 14-03412 LB, 2014 WL
5 4954208, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014). Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff brings two causes of
6 actions against the CSU Defendants under federal law means that the Court has original federal
7 question jurisdiction over those two claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether the Court will
8 elect in its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s related state law claims
9 depends on the viability of Plaintiff’s two federal causes of action, as analyzed below.
10 At this point, since it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction over this case, the Court DENIES
11 Plaintiff’s motion to remand.
12 B. Motion to Dismiss
13 The Court begins by assessing whether the claims over which is has original jurisdiction
14 are viable, and concludes neither one is.
15 Two of Plaintiff’s twenty-nine causes of action invoke a federal claim. His sixteenth cause
16 of action is labeled “Civil Conspiracy to Violate 18 U.S. Code § 241” (as well as California Penal
17 Code § 141), and his twentieth cause of action is titled “improper disclosure of health/medical
18 information” under HIPAA (as well as Civ. Code § 56.20). The headings are the only hints
19 suggesting the possible federal nature of the claims: the allegations that supposedly describe the
20 Sixteenth and Twentieth causes of action are identical to one another (and to the allegations
21 describing causes of action Seventeenth through Twenty-Eight), and discuss only in general terms
22 Defendants’ allegedly “discretionary, harassing and retaliatory actions” and the emotional distress
23
4 The CSU Defendants’ opposition discusses disagreement in other circuits as to the nature of the
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jurisdiction that district courts retain over state law claims following the post-removal dismissal of
federal officers. See Remand Opp. at 3. They discuss the Fifth Circuit’s holding that in such a
25
circumstance, the entire suit remains within the court’s (mandatory) original jurisdiction, and the
Third Circuit’s different conclusion that that the court retains (discretionary) supplemental
26
jurisdiction. However, the CSU Defendants do not actually argue that this Court has original
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s entire case. Since they do not raise that argument, and since the Ninth
27
Circuit has not spoken on the question, the Court will assume without deciding that following the
1 those actions caused. See Compl. ¶ 222-27 (alleging civil conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 241),
2 ¶¶ 246-51 (alleging improper disclosure of health information under HIPAA). They do not, in
3 other words, discuss unlawful conspiracy or medical document disclosure.
4 And consulting the remainder of the complaint clarify any of these causes of action. As
5 relates to civil conspiracy claim, the most germane allegation is found in Paragraph 17, which
6 states that “Sule also stated that she was forced into conspiracy to harm the Plaintiff by defendants
7 Animashaun, Fultz, Moore, and others.” But this allegation does not squarely address “who was
8 involved in a conspiracy, how they conspired together, and what acts they took in furtherance of
9 the conspiracy, especially as it relates to the cited statutes.” MTD at 21. And as for the improper
10 disclosure claim, the Court does not identify anything in the complaint alleging “what specific
11 medical information was disclosed, when, and how.” Mot. at 23. Even if had, however, the CSU
12 Defendants are correct that there is no private right of action for a violation of HIPAA. Webb v.
13 Smart Document Sols., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 82601,
14 which states that “Under HIPAA, individuals do not have a right to court action.”). As a result,
15 both federal claims fall far short of the pleading standards necessary to state a claim for relief.
16 Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixteenth
17 and twentieth causes of action. Since amendment of the HIPAA claim would be futile because no
18 such claim exists as a matter of law, however, the dismissal of that claim is without leave. See
19 Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009).
20 Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court turns to consider his state ones. As
21 is well established, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has
22 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). “[I]n the usual
23 case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
24 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine – judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
25 comity – will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”
26 Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010). This is that usual case, and the
27 Court will therefore decline supplemental jurisdiction and hold off on ruling on the viability of
1 Court DENIES the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs state law claims without
2 || considering them at this time.
3 || IV. CONCLUSION
4 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Dkt. No. 34, and GRANTS IN PART
5 and DENIES IN PART the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 21.
6 The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint one final time, but will not
7 permit him to add new parties or new causes of action (though he is certainly permitted to remove
8 Defendants and causes of action). Any amended complaint is due within 30 days of this order. If,
9 in any amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead any federal claims or decides not to
10 assert any federal claims, the Court advises the parties that it would be strongly disinclined to
11 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, and would very likely remand the
12 || case to Alameda County Superior Court.
5 13 Finally, the Court again advises Plaintiff, who is representing himself, that he can seek
14 assistance at the Legal Help Center in drafting an amended complaint. The Legal Help Center
3 15 provides free information and limited-scope legal assistance to pro se litigants. More information
16 about the Legal Help Center is provided at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/legal-help. Telephone
3 17 appointments may be scheduled either over the phone at (415) 782-8982 or by email at
18 federalprobonoproject @ sfbar.org.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20 || Dated: April 2, 2024
2 Abepured 5 □□□ □□
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
22 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10078667. Public record. Not legal advice.