# Taylor v. Gipson

> District Court, N.D. California · August 11, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10068603

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** August 11, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10068603

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding district court impermissibly focused on whether consuming halal meat 6 is required of Muslims as a central tenet of Islam, rather than on whether plaintiff sincerely 7 believed eating kosher meat is consistent with his faith

## Opinion text

1
2
3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
5
6 TRACY TAYLOR, Case No. 21-cv-00055-JD

7 Plaintiff,
ORDER RE DISMISSAL
v.
8
Re: Dkt. Nos. 23, 24
9 CONNIE GIPSON, et al.,
Defendants.
10

11
12 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
13 The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed a second
14 amended complaint.
15 DISCUSSION
16 STANDARD OF REVIEW
17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek
18 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
19 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims
20 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek
21 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se
22 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
23 Cir. 1990).
24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the
25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed
26 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
27 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
1 the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
2 omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
3 face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face”
4 standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
5 must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
6 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
7 to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by
9 the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was
10 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
11 LEGAL CLAIMS
12 Plaintiff alleges that prison officials have interfered with his ability to practice his religion.
13 Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) provides: “No
14 government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or
15 confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which includes state prisons, state
16 psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden results from a rule of general
17 applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1)
18 is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
19 furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The statute applies
20 “in any case” in which “the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives
21 Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). RLUIPA also includes an express
22 private cause of action that is taken from RFRA: “A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as
23 a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42
24 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a); cf. § 2000bb-1(c). For purposes of this provision, “government” includes,
25 inter alia, states, counties, municipalities, their instrumentalities and officers, and “any other
26 person acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).
27 To establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant burdened the
1 interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner is not required
2 to objectively show that a central tenet of his faith is burdened by a prison regulation to raise a
3 viable claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 884-85. Rather, the test of whether the
4 prisoner’s belief is “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief” determines the Free Exercise
5 Clause inquiry. Id. (finding district court impermissibly focused on whether consuming halal meat
6 is required of Muslims as a central tenet of Islam, rather than on whether plaintiff sincerely
7 believed eating kosher meat is consistent with his faith). The prisoner must show that the religious
8 practice at issue satisfies two criteria: (1) the proffered belief must be sincerely held and (2) the
9 claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns. Malik v.
10 Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (cited with approval in Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884).
11 Plaintiff professes to be an adherent of “Thelema” and expresses his beliefs through
12 consumption of tobacco products. Plaintiff originally alleged that the California Department of
13 Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) officials had
14 prevented him from purchasing or receiving tobacco products which had interfered with his ability
15 to practice his beliefs. He sought injunctive relief and money damages.
16 The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information
17 about defendants’ conduct. The defendants named were Gipson, CDCR Director of Prisons and
18 Atchley, Warden of SVSP. Plaintiff stated that Gipson implemented a policy that prevented
19 plaintiff from obtaining proper tobacco. He alleged that Atchley denied his request to obtain
20 tobacco in an appeal response. But plaintiff also said that a higher level of appeal was granted and
21 stated that tobacco could be approved by the Religious Review Committee. Plaintiff said that he
22 never heard from the Religious Review Committee, but it is not clear what actions he took to
23 obtain an approval by the committee.
24 A review of plaintiff’s exhibits indicated that he had also sought relief in state court. Dkt.
25 No. 17 at 21. On October 12, 2017, the Del Norte County Superior Court ordered that SVSP
26 make tobacco available to plaintiff for his religious needs. Dkt. No. 17 at 21. The court noted that
27 there was no support for plaintiff’s request to have ten pounds of tobacco available in his cell. Id.
1 plaintiff was to be provided an herb mix containing 1% tobacco for outdoor use. Id.
2 For the second amended complaint, plaintiff was directed to provide more information
3 about how his rights had been violated by defendants and why the order providing the herb mix
4 containing tobacco was not sufficient, or not followed by prison officials. It was noted that it did
5 not appear that the named defendants were personally involved. Gipson implemented a tobacco
6 policy, which had exceptions for religious purposes. Atchley appeared to have denied an inmate
7 appeal. Plaintiff was advised that there is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal
8 or grievance system. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). To the extent
9 that these defendants or other defendants such as members of the Religious Review Committee
10 had failed to comply with the Del Norte Superior Court order, plaintiff had failed to identify such
11 defendants and describe what occurred. Plaintiff was also directed to state why he had not sought
12 relief in Del Norte Superior Court, if that court’s order had not been followed.
13 The second amended complaint again fails to state a claim for relief. The defendants are
14 Gipson, CDCR Director of Prisons and Atchley, Warden of SVSP. Plaintiff reports that his
15 concerns about the use of tobacco products were resolved in the Del Norte Superior Court. Dkt.
16 No. 22 at 3. What, if any, claims remain is not clear. He states that CDCR violated state law by
17 failing to provide exceptions to the CDCR tobacco ban for religious reasons. Id. at 5. Yet,
18 plaintiff notes that due to his state court litigation, CDCR adopted emergency regulations to
19 provide for a religious exemption through approved vendors. Id. Plaintiff says that none of the
20 approved vendors sell tobacco products, but he already stated that this action does not concern the
21 use of tobacco products because that has been resolved.
22 To the extent that plaintiff seeks an order allowing him to obtain tobacco products from
23 unapproved vendors, he should seek relief in his state court cases. He already has a case against
24 the same defendants involving the same subject matter, and so cannot seek relief in this Court.
25 The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral
26 estoppel. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Under res judicata, a final judgment on
27 the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. See
1 actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is
2 || conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior
3 || litigation. See id.!
4 To the extent the state court denied this claim and plaintiff seeks relief in this Court, he
5 |} may not go forward. Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter
6 || jurisdiction to review state court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain
7 || federal review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
8 States. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983);
9 Rooker y. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). For all these reasons, plaintiff fails to
10 state a claim for relief. Because plaintiff has already been provided multiple opportunities to
11 amend and further amendment would be futile, this action is dismissed without leave to amend.
a 12 CONCLUSION

13 1. Plaintiff's motions for the Court to review his second amended complaint (Dkt. Nos.

v 14 || 23,24) are GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

15 2. The Clerk is requested to close this case.
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 || Dated: August 11, 2021

Z 18
19
JAMES ATO
20 United St@ltes District Judge
21
22
23
24
25
26
7 ' Although res judicata has traditionally been referred to as “claim preclusion,” and collateral
estoppel as “issue preclusion,” see Allen, 449 U.S. at 94 & n.5, the Supreme Court clarified in
28 Taylor vy. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008), that claim preclusion and issue preclusion are now
collectively referred to as “res judicata.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10068603. Public record. Not legal advice.