# Sunlift International, Inc. v. Wolf

> District Court, N.D. California · July 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10068385

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** July 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10068385

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming denial of L1-A classification where “record contain[ed] evidence that [the 8 beneficiary] performed managerial tasks [but did] not compel the conclusion that such tasks 9 comprised his primary responsibilities”

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
SUNLIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
7 Case No. 20-cv-08869-JCS
Plaintiff,
8 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY
9 JUDGMENT, GRANTING
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, et al., DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
Defendants. AFFIRMING DENIAL OF PETITION
11
Re: Dkt. Nos. 17, 18
12

13 I. INTRODUCTION
14 On August 10, 2020, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied a Form
15 I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (“Petition”) filed by Plaintiff Sunlift International, Inc.
16 (“Sunlift”) on behalf of Mr. Ping Zhou (“Beneficiary”). Sunlift contends the denial was arbitrary
17 and capricious and contrary to law and brings this action seeking to overturn the denial, while
18 USCIS asks the Court to uphold the denial. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for
19 Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment
20 (“Defendants’ Motion”). The Court finds that the motions are suitable for determination without
21 oral argument. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED and Defendants’
22 Motion is GRANTED.1
23 II. BACKGROUND
24 A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
25 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a limited number of employment-
26 based, first preference visas are made available to “certain multinational executives and
27
1 managers.” INA § 203(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C). Such visas are referred to as EB-1C
2 visas. In order to be eligible for an EB-1C visa, an individual must in the three years preceding
3 the application have “been employed for at least 1 year by a firm or corporation or other legal
4 entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and . . . seek[ ] to enter the United States in order to
5 continue to render services to the same employer or to a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity
6 that is managerial or executive.” Id. The main issue in this case is whether the Beneficiary meets
7 the requirements of this provision based on his employment by Sunlift in a “managerial capacity.”
8 The term “managerial capacity” is statutorily defined as follows:

9 (44)(A) The term “managerial capacity” means an assignment within
an organization in which the employee primarily—
10
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision,
11 function, or component of the organization;

12 (ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory,
professional, or managerial employees, or manages an
13 essential function within the organization, or a department or
subdivision of the organization;
14

15 (iii) if another employee or other employees are directly
supervised, has the authority to hire and fire or recommend
16 those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion
and leave authorization) or, if no other employee is directly
17 supervised, functions at a senior level within the
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function
18 managed; and

19 (iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the
activity or function for which the employee has authority.
20
21 INA § 101(a)(44)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2). A beneficiary
22 who is found to be employed in a managerial capacity under subsection (i) based on management
23 of a “function . . . of the organization[,]” is referred to as a “function manager.” In this case,
24 Sunlift contends Mr. Zhou is eligible for an EB-1C visa on the basis that he is a function manager.
25 In a decision by the Office of Administrative Appeals (“AAO”) adopted as USCIS policy
26 guidance, the AAO set forth the following required elements for demonstrating that a beneficiary
27 is a function manager:
defined activity; (2) the function is “essential,” i.e., core to the
1 organization; (3) the beneficiary will primarily manage, as opposed
to perform, the function; (4) the beneficiary will act at a senior level
2 within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function
managed; and (5) the beneficiary will exercise discretion over the
3 function’s day-to-day operations.
4 Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). The policy guidance explains
5 further, “Whether the function is sufficiently related to an organization’s core activity or activities
6 is inherently one of degree, and therefore, all relevant facts should be considered in making this
7 determination.” Id.
8 A U.S. employer seeking permanent employment for a foreign national under an EB-1C
9 visa must file an I-140 petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(1). The petitioner has the burden to
10 demonstrate eligibility for EB-1C classification by a preponderance of the evidence. INA § 291,
11 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I. & N. Dec. 369, 375-376 (2010) (“Except where a
12 different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration
13 proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit
14 sought.”). If the visa petition is approved and the statutory number of such visas for the year have
15 not been used, beneficiaries of the petition can apply to adjust status if they are in the United
16 States or seek an immigrant visa from a U.S. consulate if they are outside the country. See INA §§
17 221, 245(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1255(a).
18 B. Factual Background and Administrative Proceedings
19 Sunlift is a California corporation, organized under the laws of the State of California on
20 November 18, 2013. Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”), pp. 435-36. Sunlift is “engaged
21 in construction and development work in Northern California.” CAR, p. 426. It is a wholly-
22 owned subsidiary of a Chinese company, Shenzhen Shenglin Electrical Engineering Co., Ltd.
23 (“Shenzhen Shenglin”). CAR, pp. 389-91, 447-48. Shenzhen Shenglin is “a business entity
24 primarily engaged in the manufacturing and sales of electrical and mechanical equipment,
25 installation and maintenance of hydroelectric and electrical equipment, and construction of
26 electrical transformation and distribution systems.” CAR, p. 421.
27 Beneficiary Ping Zhou is a citizen of China who began working for Shenzhen Shenglin as
1 decided to transfer Mr. Zhou to the United States to serve as president of Sunlift. CAR, p. 604.
2 Mr. Zhou came to the United States on an L-1A multinational executive or manager nonimmigrant
3 visa with an initial term of one year (February 5, 2014 – February 24, 2015). CAR, p. 432.
4 USCIS subsequently granted extensions through April 2018 and then an additional two-year
5 extension through April 2020. CAR, p. 430; Plaintiff’s Motion at 2.
6 According to Mr. Zhou, Sunlift “began its business operation in stone retail and countertop
7 fabrication.” CAR, p. 26. Mr. Zhou, as president of Sunlift, decided in the Fall of 2014 to acquire
8 a company called B&B Marble, Inc. Id.; see also CAR, pp. 649-683 (documents reflecting
9 acquisition of B&B Marble, executed by Mr. Zhou for Sunlift). According to Mr. Zhou, “as the
10 industry became highly competitive, and Sunlift began to incur a financial loss, he . . . made the
11 strategic decision to re-direct Sunlift’s business towards home remodeling projects.” CAR, p. 26.
12 In 2016, “Sunlift’s remodeling projects continued to increase, and replaced stone fabrication as its
13 main source of business income.” Id. According to Mr. Zhou, in response to this growth he
14 “created new business units and hired employees with relevant experience to manage those
15 business operations.” Id. Sunlift continued to move towards “higher valued rebuilding and
16 construction projects” and in 2017 it completed “the first house construction project.” Id. Mr.
17 Zhou states that he decided to close the showroom and warehouse for the stone fabrication side of
18 the business that year and Sunlift began to turn a profit by the end of the year. Id. In 2018, Mr.
19 Zhou “secured several residential home building projects for Sunlift, and the company generated
20 over one million dollars in gross revenue for the first time.” Id.
21 On March 30, 2018, USCIS received a Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker,
22 from Sunlift on behalf of Mr. Zhou. CAR, pp. 415-16. In support of the Petition, Sunlift
23 submitted a letter from counsel describing Mr. Zhou’s responsibilities and duties as follows:
24 • Planned, formulated and established company's primary goals,
general operating plans and policies (Mr. ZHOU spent 30% of his
25 time on this function);

26 o Developed long-term and short-term goals for marketing,
engineering, business development, customer service and all
27 other business matters affecting the company;
programs, procedures and methods in concert with general
1 policies;
2
o Directed and coordinated operational activities with the help of
3 subordinate managers, exercising the wide latitude of
discretionary decision making (Mr. ZHOU spent 30% of his
4 time on this function);
5
o Presided over executive meetings and general and special
6 meetings;
7
o Implemented general policies established by the company,
8 directing their administration and execution;
9
o Monitored the quality of the company's products and services
10 and ensuring maximum user satisfaction;
11
o Approved on negotiation and signing major trade and
12 purchasing contracts;
13
o Decided on the research findings of the national and
14 international market and identifying business opportunities;
15
o Recruited, terminated, evaluated and promoted the managerial
16 personnel based on their job performance, qualification and
contribution;
17

18 o Oversaw the company’s financing, developing, marketing,
producing and other administrative executing issues (Mr.
19 ZHOU spent 20% of his time on this function);
20
o Reviewed comprehensive annual business objectives and
21 agendas and overseeing the implementation process;
22
o Developed and implemented financial/investment strategy;
23

24 o Managed financial performance and budgets;
25
o Ensured all operations and activities are conducted in
26 accordance with the mission and values, sound business
practices and policies and practices;
27
ZHOU spent 20% of his time on this function);
1

2 o Maintained and developed the relationship between the
company and its members, guests, employees, community,
3 government and industry;
4
o Participated in outside activities to enhance the prestige of the
5 company;
6
o Broadened the scope of the company’s operation by fulfilling
7 the public obligations of the company as a member of the
community;
8

9 o Built senior commercial relationships with key commercial
contacts and potential partners/sponsors; and
10

11 o Attended major industrial conferences and meetings.
12 CAR, pp. 424-425. In addition, supporting documentation was attached to the Petition, including:
13 1) a commercial lease executed by Mr. Zhou, CAR, pp. 617-39; 2) the paperwork regarding the
14 acquisition of B&B Marble, executed by Mr. Zhou, CAR, pp. 649-83; and 3) bids/estimates for
15 four jobs prepared by Mr. Zhou, CAR, pp. 695-720.
16 On January 1, 2019, USCIS issued a Request For Evidence (“RFE”) seeking further
17 supporting documentation regarding a number of the requirements of the visa classification,
18 including evidence that Mr. Zhou would be employed in a “primarily managerial or executive
19 capacity.” CAR, pp. 403, 405. The RFE stated that the Petition did “not establish that the
20 beneficiary’s position with [Sunlift] [was] in a qualifying executive or managerial role” because
21 the “position description was provided by counsel and not by the petitioner.” CAR, p. 405. It
22 stated further:
the job description provided by counsel of the offered position
23 includes job duties which are given in broad categories and do not
provide much insight into the actual job duties performed. More
24 clarity in detail is necessary. It is not clear what the day-to-day tasks
will be. For example, counsel states that the beneficiary is tasked with
25 “Setting the subsidiary company’s short and long term goals,
objectives, policies and business strategies in business development,
26 marketing and fiscal matters” but did not describe how the beneficiary
performs this duty. The description of the beneficiary’s duties must
27 be more detailed to establish the actual role of the beneficiary with
chart or a brief description of the duties of the beneficiary’s direct
1 reports, if any. The evidence does not clearly show how the
petitioner’s staff functions to relieve the beneficiary from performing
2 non qualifying tasks and is not sufficient to establish that the
beneficiary’s position is in a qualifying role. Please submit
3 documentary evidence to establish that the beneficiary’s position with
the petitioner is in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
4
5 CAR, p. 405. Evidence listed in the RFE that might establish that Mr. Zhou’s position was
6 “managerial” included “[a]n explanation of the specific daily tasks that are involved with the
7 completion of each of the beneficiary’s proposed duties and the percentage of time to be spent on
8 each.” CAR, p. 406. The RFE also sought a statement from an authorized Sunlift official “clearly
9 describing [Mr. Zhou’s] proposed job duties[,]” and, if applicable, more detailed information
10 showing that Mr. Zhou was a “functional manager.” CAR, p. 406.
11 On March 29, 2019, Sunlift submitted a letter from Mr. Zhou, as Sunlift’s president,
12 responding to the RFE (“RFE response letter”). CAR, pp. 101-123. In the section of the letter
13 addressing Mr. Zhou’s “managerial position,” he provided a list of employees under his
14 supervision and their job duties, both at Sunlift and at Shenzhen Shenglin, to show that his job did
15 not involve “non-qualifying duties,” but rather, that those duties were performed by subordinates.
16 CAR, pp. 106-14, 116-21. The letter explained that Sunlift had “an average of 10-12 employees”
17 and that the variation was due to the high turnover in the construction industry. CAR, p. 104.
18 In the RFE response letter, Mr. Zhou also described his own job duties at both Shenzhen
19 Shenglin and Sunlift. CAR, pp. 114-15, 121-22. He described his job responsibilities at Sunlift as
20 follows:
• Formulate corporate polices and business strategies (Mr.
21 ZHOU spends 20% of his time on this function);

22 o Plan, formulate and establish company’s primary goals,
general operating plans and policies of the overall direction of
23 company;

24 o Coordinating with parent company in execution of the
subsidiary company’s policies and business strategies;
25
• Manage and direct company’s operation (Mr. ZHOU spends
26 40% his time on this function)

27 o Direct and coordinate operational activities at the highest
contracts with major customers, directing market research and
1 analysis, and reviewing and approving major expenses, etc.;

2 o Plan and control the company’s financial activities,
including but not limited to reviewing and analyzing
3 financial reports, overseeing financial policies and
procedures, and adjusting financial goals, etc.;
4
• Take overall responsibility for the human resource functions
5 (Mr. ZHOU spends 30% of his time on this function);

6 o Formulate and develop policies and programs in the areas
of recruitment, compensation and benefits, training, labor
7 relations and performance management;

8 o Manage and coordinate the new hire process for managers
and executives;
9
o Set up performance review standards, conduct performance
10 assessments on subordinate employees;

11 o Direct overall personnel administration on managers of all
departments and other staff, regarding their appointments,
12 promotions, transfers, demotions, suspensions, layoffs, and
dismissals;
13
• Promote strategic alliance and public relationship, including
14 maintaining and developing relationships between the
company and clients, government agencies, financial
15 agencies, and industry, participating in outside activities on
behalf of the company to enhance the prestige of the
16 company, building senior commercial relationship with key
commercial contacts and potential partners/sponsors, etc. (Mr.
17 ZHOU spends 10% of his time on this function).
18 CAR, pp. 114-115. A number of exhibits were attached to the March 29, 2019 RFE response,
19 including Mr. Zhou’s resume, CAR pp. 176-78; a “current” organizational chart for Sunlift, CAR,
20 p. 180; a “previous” organizational chart for Sunlift, CAR, pp. 101, 225; additional bids/estimates
21 for two jobs prepared by an employee, CAR, pp. 187-204; and an updated lease, CAR, pp. 233-90.
22 On May 14, 2019, the Director of the USCIS’s Nebraska Service Center (“Director”)
23 denied Plaintiff’s Petition. CAR, pp. 85-89. The Director stated that while “[t]he record indicates
24 that it is more likely than not that the beneficiary’s previous position abroad was in a qualifying
25 role . . . [it] does not establish that the beneficiary’s position with the petitioner is in a qualifying
26 executive or managerial role.” CAR, p. 87. The Director pointed to differences between the job
27 description in the original Petition and the one in the later letter from Mr. Zhou in response to the
1 in response to the RFE, which the Director found cast doubt on the “reliability and sufficiency of
2 the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition.” CAR, p. 88. The letter further
3 stated:
The vague and generalized description of the beneficiary’s position is
4 of limited evidentiary value and are not persuasive on the issue of
whether the beneficiary is employed in a qualifying role. The list of
5 job duties which are primarily based on broad tasks, which suggest a
general sense of the beneficiary’s heightened degree of discretionary
6 authority but fail to convey an understanding of what the beneficiary
would actually be doing on a daily basis. Other evidence submitted
7 by the petitioner casts further doubt on the nature of the beneficiary’s
duties. . . . The contradictory structures presented for this organization
8 as well as the overall size of the organization indicates that the
beneficiary may be performing non qualifying tasks.
9
10 CAR, pp. 88-89.
11 On June 14, 2019, Sunlift appealed the denial of the Petition by the Director. CAR, pp. 64-
12 74. On July 25, 2019, Sunlift submitted an appellate brief, a letter by Mr. Zhou in response to the
13 denial (“denial response letter”) and additional evidence. CAR, pp. 8-61. In the appellate brief,
14 Sunlift’s counsel highlights Mr. Zhou’s description in his denial response letter of how he led
15 Sunlift from being “a company that lost money to a profitable one,” starting with only one
16 employee in 2014 and growing to a company with “a staff of over a dozen.” CAR, pp. 8-9.
17 According to Sunlift, “[i]n the course of these business changes, [Mr. Zhou’s] job description also
18 had to be adjusted, which explains why there were modifications to his job description at the time
19 of the RFE response.” CAR, p. 9.
20 According to Sunlift, Mr. Zhou’s denial response letter also “explains that the
21 Beneficiary’s position is that of a senior manager, and specifically, a manager of Sunlift’s
22 Business Development function.” CAR, p. 9. It states:
23 [Mr. Zhou’s denial response letter] also explains that the Business
Development activities of Sunlift extend across different business
24 units, including sales, marketing, project management, product
management, and vendor management. Networking, negotiations,
25 partnerships, and cost-savings efforts are also involved. All of these
different departments and activities are driven by and aligned to the
26 business development goals. The Beneficiary has served as the most
senior manager of this function.
27 . . .
response letter], it is ‘unquestionable that the Business Development
1 function managed by [Mr. Zhou] is a clearly defined activity, as it
involves the development and implementation of growth
2 opportunities within Sunlift, and between Sunlift and external
organizations such as its customers. Business Development is often a
3 stand-alone department in many companies, and is the most essential
part of any company. It is the function that helps a company to make
4 profit. In Sunlift’s case, Business Development is absolutely a core
function because its activities brought Sunlift from a business that lost
5 money to a profitable one. Sunlift survived hard times, but now
thrives because it went through multiple changes in its business
6 directions, including an acquisition and adaptation of new strategies,
all of which resulted from [Mr. Zhou’s] decision making in managing
7 this function. As the President of Sunlift, [Mr. Zhou] is also the most
senior member of the Business Development function, who exercises
8 discretion over the function’s day-to-day operations. He manages the
function and relies on his subordinates, i.e. his direct reports and
9 indirect reports to perform the function.
10 CAR, p. 9. The appellate brief goes on to argue that Mr. Zhou satisfies the legal criteria for
11 function managers set forth in an Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) decision, Matter of G-
12 Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO Nov. 8, 2017). CAR, pp. 9-10. It also explains that there
13 is no “discrepancy” between the two organizational charts provided in response to the RFE
14 because one was described as a “previous” organizational chart and the other was described as a
15 “current” organizational chart. CAR, p. 10.
16 On August 10, 2020, the AAO denied Plaintiff’s appeal based on a de novo review of the
17 Director’s decision. CAR, pp. 2-7. Because Sunlift did not contend Mr. Zhou qualified for an EB-
18 1C visa based on employment in an executive capacity, the AAO addressed only whether Mr.
19 Zhou would be working in a managerial capacity. CAR, p. 3. It considered evidence regarding
20 Mr. Zhou’s job duties along with evidence of the nature of Sunlift’s business, its staffing levels,
21 and its organizational structure. Id. According to the AAO, Sunlift was required to demonstrate
22 that Mr. Zhou would perform the high-level responsibilities set forth in the statutory definition at
23 INA § 101(a)(44)(A)(i)-(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A)(i)-(iv), of the INA and that his duties
24 would be primarily managerial. Id. The AAO found that Mr. Zhou did not meet this requirement,
25 explaining its conclusion as follows:
26 In sum, the duty descriptions submitted for the Beneficiary that do not
credibly articulate his daily managerial tasks or establish that he
27 would likely devote a majority of his time to qualifying managerial-
qualifying managerial tasks, including him delegating duties to his
1 claimed subordinates. The Petitioner provides few specific examples
and little documentation to substantiate the development activities the
2 Beneficiary monitored, budgets he set, major contracts he negotiated,
or “market development decisions” he made. Likewise, the Petitioner
3 did not detail or document the financial policies or procedures the
Beneficiary set, strategic planning he oversaw, pay policies he
4 established, strategic alliances or public relationships he promoted, or
media issues he managed. In addition, the Petitioner did not
5 specifically articulate or substantiate with supporting documentation
the corporate or general operating policies or business strategies the
6 Beneficiary implemented, recruitment policies and programs he
ordered, efficiencies in internal business operations he established, or
7 new business lines, sales channels. or products he developed.

8 The Beneficiary’s generic duty descriptions could apply to any
manager acting in any business or industry and they provided few
9 credible details specific to the Petitioner’s operations. This lack of
detail and documentation is particularly noteworthy since the
10 Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary has been acting in his
managerial role in the United States pursuant to an L-1 A
11 nonimmigrant visa for approximately two years and four months
since November 2015.
12
13 CAR, p. 4.
14 The AAO also rejected Sunlift’s assertion that Mr. Zhou is a “function manager,” finding
15 that Sunlift had not: 1) “clearly defined [Mr. Zhou’s] asserted function”; 2) demonstrated that the
16 business development function was “essential”; or 3) provided evidence that Mr. Zhou managed
17 the function by delegating non-qualifying tasks to subordinates as opposed to performing the
18 function himself. CAR, p. 6. The AAO stated:
19 [T]he Beneficiary’s claimed “business development” function is
explained as being an extensive grouping of generic and seemingly
20 unrelated responsibilities that could apply to any business, including
“sales, promotion, marketing, advertising, project management,
21 business planning, and expansion, distribution strategies, product
management and product strategies, and public relations.” In addition,
22 the Petitioner indicates this function also includes “development of
distribution channels, vendor management, strategic initiatives,
23 business strategic partnerships, marketing development, business
expansion, brand building, exploring new opportunities in external
24 markets,” amongst various other responsibilities. ln other words, the
Beneficiary’s asserted function is not clearly defined, but is explained
25 as any number of potential responsibilities and functions within the
business. Further, as we discussed, the Petitioner provides few
26 examples of the Beneficiary management of his claimed function,
such as the marketing, advertising, distribution, product strategies,
27 vendors, or partnerships he oversaw or managed. In addition, the
business.
1
2 CAR, p. 6.
3 With respect to Sunlift’s evidence regarding staffing and the “current” organizational chart
4 supplied by Sunlift in response to the RFA, the AAO found that there were discrepancies between
5 the organizational chart – which listed 14 employees, and state tax records for the first quarter of
6 2018, which listed only six employees. CAR, p. 5. The AAO further found that Sunlift
7 “provide[d] no evidence to substantiate the Beneficiary exercising personnel authority over his
8 subordinates or the other members of its organizational chart, nor documentation to establish his
9 delegation of duties to them.” CAR, p. 5.
10 The AAO also rejected Sunlift’s reliance on Mr. Zhou’s decisions in 2016 to “replace[ ]
11 stone fabrication as [Sunlift’s] main source of business income;” “create[ ] new business units and
12 hire[ ] employees with relevant experience;” and “continue[ ] to move the company’s focus
13 towards higher value rebuilding and construction projects;” and his decision in 2017 to
14 “streamline financial efficiency by closing the showroom and warehouse for the stone fabrication
15 side of the busines,” finding that “these generic examples provided by [Mr. Zhou] appear to
16 describe him making one time decisions as the owner of a business, but not as a function manager
17 who is daily in charge of a business development function as claimed.” CAR, p. 6.
18 C. Contentions of the Parties
19 In Sunlift’s motion, it contends it has met the requirements for demonstrating that Mr.
20 Zhou is a function manager and that both the Director’s May 14, 2019 decision and the AAO’s
21 August 10, 2020 decision should be reversed on the grounds that they are “arbitrary, capricious, an
22 abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” under the Administrative Procedures
23 Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Plaintiff’s Motion at 4. Sunlift “disputes that the evidence
24 submitted in support of its petition seeking to qualify [Mr. Zhou] as a multinational transfer acting
25 in a managerial capacity is deficient[and] maintains that evidence submitted in support of its
26 original petition in February 2018, in its response to USCIS’s Request for Evidence submitted in
27 March 2018, and in support of its appeal submitted in July 2019 collectively meet its burden of
1 6-7. Sunlift notes in passing that while non-binding, the decisions approving his L-1A non
2 immigrant visa petitions, which rely on the same definition of “managerial capacity,” support its
3 argument that the denial of the Petition at issue in this case was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 5.
4 USCIS opposes Sunlift’s motion and seeks summary judgment in its favor affirming the
5 denial of the Petition, arguing that substantial and probative evidence supports its conclusion that
6 Sunlift did not meet its burden. Defendants’ Motion at 2. USCIS contends the scope of judicial
7 review under the APA is narrow and that a reviewing court is not empowered to substitute its
8 judgment for that of the agency. Id. at 5 (Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
9 402, 416 (1971)). Moreover, it asserts, courts are especially deferential in the context of
10 immigration policy. Id. (citing Jang v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997)). So long as the
11 agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, USCIS contends, it must be upheld. Id. at
12 6. That requirement is met here as to the AAO denial of the Petition, USCIS argues. Id. at 7. It
13 rejects Sunlift’s argument that the Director’s denial is also subject to review, arguing that the APA
14 provides for review only of final agency action. Id. (citing Herrera v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
15 Servs., 571 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2009)).
16 USCIS also argues that the Court should not consider the agency’s prior approvals of
17 Sunlift’s L-1A nonimmigrant visa petitions filed on behalf of Mr. Zhou because “Congress did not
18 intend for USCIS ‘to be bound by its initial determination that an employee is a manager for
19 purposes of granting a temporary visa when an application for a permanent visa is filed.’” Id. at
20 12 (quoting Nat’l Hand Tool Corp. v. Pasquarell, 889 F.2d 1472, 1476 (5th Cir. 1989)). Further, it
21 asserts, there is no dispute that the USCIS’s previous approvals of Plaintiff’s L-1A non immigrant
22 petitions are not “service precedent decisions.” Id. at 12-13 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c); Seven
23 Star, Inc. v. United States, 873 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1989); Mott Thoroughbred Stables, Inc. v.
24 Rodriguez, 87 F. Supp. 3d 237, 244 (D.D.C. 2015)). According to USCIS, “[a]s ‘many cases
25 where I–140 petitions [seeking EB-1C classification] were denied involved aliens who already
26 enjoyed classification in L nonimmigrant status,’ many courts have heard the same argument that
27 Plaintiff references here – and rejected it.” Id. at 13 (quoting Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293
1 Talent, LLC v. Wolf, 448 F. Supp. 3d 644, 653 (W.D. Tex. 2020); Mahalaxmi Amba Jewelers v.
2 Johnson, 652 F. App’x 612, 618 (10th Cir. 2016); Noble House, Inc. v. Wiles, No. CV 12-7816-
3 PA-RZx, 2013 WL 1164093, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013); Nat’l Hand Tool Corp., 889 F.2d at
4 1476)).
5 In its reply brief, dkt. 19, Sunlift does not challenge USCIS’s assertion that the Court’s
6 review is limited to the final agency action, that is, the AAO’s denial of the Petition and not the
7 denial by the Director. Nor does it dispute that the prior approval of an L-1A non immigrant visa
8 for Mr. Zhou has no binding effect or cite any case where a court has pointed to such a decision to
9 show that a subsequent denial of an EB-1C visa was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
10 discretion or otherwise contrary to the law under the APA. It reiterates its argument that it has met
11 its burden by showing that the evidence and information supplied in support of the Petition
12 establishes that Mr. Zhou is a function manager under the INA.
13 III. ANALYSIS
14 A. Legal Standards Under the APA
15 The APA provides for judicial review of final agency actions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and
16 704. Under the APA, a reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
17 findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
18 not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The scope of review under this standard is
19 “narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
20 Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). “Nevertheless, the
21 agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
22 including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Id. (quoting
23 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, (1962)). Typically, this requires
24 courts to “‘consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
25 whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-
26 Best Freight System, 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); and citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
27 Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
1 capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
2 entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
3 decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
4 be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
5 of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43. “In recognition of the agency’s
6 technical expertise the court usually defers to the agency’s analysis, particularly within its area of
7 competence.” Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010); see
8 also Jang v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997) (A court’s review is “especially deferential
9 in the context of immigration policy.”). Agency action is not entitled to such deference, however,
10 “when the agency’s decision is without substantial basis in fact” or there is no “rational connection
11 between the facts found and the determinations made.” Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar,
12 606 F.3d at 1163 (citing Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757, 766 (9th Cir. 2007)).
13 An agency’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Family Inc. v. U.S.
14 Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 2006). “Substantial
15 evidence” is defined as “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
16 to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
17 Even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence contained in the
18 record, this does not render the agency’s findings unsupported by substantial evidence. Consolo v.
19 Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Under this standard, the Court may not reweigh the
20 evidence. State of Cal., Dep't of Educ. v. Bennett, 843 F.2d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, a court
21 must affirm the agency’s decision unless the evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable fact
22 finder could fail to find the facts were as [the plaintiff] alleged.” Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512,
23 1514 (9th Cir. 1997).
24 “In reviewing an administrative agency decision, ‘summary judgment is an appropriate
25 mechanism for deciding the legal question of whether the agency could reasonably have found the
26 facts as it did.’ ” City & County of San Francisco v. United States, 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.
27 1997) (quoting Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985)). Because a
1 was based, the usual standard for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
2 Procedure does not apply. Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d at 769-770. Instead, in APA
3 cases, “the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the
4 evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Id. at 769.
5 B. Application of Legal Standards
6 As discussed above, to establish eligibility for an EB-1C visa as a “function manager” a
7 petitioner must establish that “(1) the function is a clearly defined activity; (2) the function is
8 ‘essential,’ i.e., core to the organization; (3) the beneficiary will primarily manage, as opposed to
9 perform, the function; (4) the beneficiary will act at a senior level within the organizational
10 hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and (5) the beneficiary will exercise discretion
11 over the function’s day-to-day operations.” Matter of G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-05 (AAO
12 Nov. 8, 2017), ECF No. 17-1 at 5. The AAO found that Sunlift had not met its burden, focusing
13 on the first three of these requirements. In particular, it found that Sunlift had not “clearly
14 defined” Mr. Zhou’s asserted function, demonstrated that it was an essential function or shown
15 that he primarily managed this function rather than performing it himself. CAR, p. 7. Applying
16 the deferential standards set forth above, the Court finds that the AAO’s decision2 is supported by
17 substantial evidence and is rationally related to its conclusion.
18 The descriptions of Mr. Zhou’s job in the initial Petition, the RFE response and the denial
19 response letter set forth broad categories of duties but provide little detail as to his day-to-day
20 activities to show that he devotes the majority of his time to qualifying managerial activities or
21 delegates non-managerial tasks to subordinates. See CAR, pp. 9, 101-123, 424-425. Nor do the
22 documents supplied provide a picture of his day-to-day duties. Sunlift provided a small number
23 of bids/estimates, a lease, and acquisition papers for B&B Marble, but did not provide emails or
24 other documentary evidence reflecting many of the tasks described by Sunlift, including
25 formulating policies, conducting financial analyses and coordinating with Sunlift’s parent
26
2 Because the APA provides for judicial review only of final decisions and Sunlift does not
27
dispute that the decision of the Director is not a final decision, the Court reviews only the AAO
1 company. “Specifics are required to establish managerial or executive capacity.” Brar Bros. Farm
2 v. Napolitano, No. C11-358-RSM, 2012 WL 3887073, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2012). Instead,
3 the job duties and function Sunlift claims Mr. Zhou performs are described in largely generic
4 terms and while Sunlift offered a handful of examples showing that Mr. Zhou sometimes engages
5 in managerial activities, this evidence does not compel the conclusion that his duties are primarily
6 managerial, as is required. See Brazil Quality Stones, Inc. v. Chertoff, 531 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th
7 Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of L1-A classification where “record contain[ed] evidence that [the
8 beneficiary] performed managerial tasks [but did] not compel the conclusion that such tasks
9 comprised his primary responsibilities”).
10 The Court rejects Sunlift’s argument that past approval of L1-A visas for Mr. Zhou show
11 that the denial of the EB-1C visa Sunlift now seeks was arbitrary and capricious. Sunlift does not
12 dispute that the prior approvals have no binding effect on USCIS. Further, numerous courts have
13 rejected this argument. See, e.g., Decor Team LLC v. McAleenan, No. CV-19-05346-PHX-MTL,
14 2021 WL 661974, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2021); Noble House, Inc. v. Wiles, No. CV 12-7816
15 PA RZX, 2013 WL 1164093, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. I.N.S.,
16 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30 (D.D.C. 2003). In Décor Team LLC, the court reasoned as follows:
17 [A]s a general matter, USCIS is not bound by its previous decisions.
See Seven Star, Inc. v. United States, 873 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir.
18 1989) (“[A] decision by an administrative agency in one case does not
mandate the same result in every similar case in succeeding years.”).
19 There is an exception for administrative decisions specifically
designated as precedential. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c). Here, no party asserts
20 that the prior L-1A visa approvals were precedential; as such, these
decisions are not binding with respect to the I-140 petition. Cf. R.L.
21 Inv. Ltd. Partners v. I.N.S., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1024–25 (D. Haw.
2000), aff'd, 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It would be ridiculous to
22 require the INS to grant a petition because it had previously granted a
similar petition by mistake. That is precisely why unpublished
23 decisions do not create precedent. The agency recognizes that they
may be unimportant for wider purposes or, for that matter, may be
24 questionable.”). To “conclude otherwise would impermissibly shift
the burden from the petitioner, who bears the burden to establish
25 entitlement to the visa, to USCIS to show that an earlier decision was
mistaken.” Healthy & Nat. Trading LLC v. United States Dep't of
26 Homeland Sec., No. CV 14-2332 PA, 2014 WL 12564125, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 12, 2014), aff'd sub nom. 691 F. App'x 437 (9th Cir. 2017).
27
work, temporarily, for the same company in the United States in a
1 managerial, executive, or specialized position.” ... In contrast, “an
approved J-140 petition is part of a three-step process for obtaining an
2 EB-1C visa, which affords lawful permanent residency.” . . . Courts
have noted this distinction in confirming that USCIS is not bound by
3 its L-1A visa determinations in assessing a subsequent I-140 petition.
See, e.g., Noble House, Inc. v. Wiles, No. CV 12-7816 PA RZX, 2013
4 WL 1164093, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013) (“The benefits
associated with the granting of an I-140 petition—permanent
5 residence—are sufficiently distinct from the status provided by a L-
1A visa—temporary non-immigrant status—that the results of
6 USCIS's analysis of an I-140 petition need not automatically mimic
the conclusion USCIS reached when it approved an L-1A visa
7 application[.]”). For these reasons, the Court agrees with Defendants
that USCIS’s prior approvals of [the beneficiary’s] L-1A visas do not,
8 in themselves, render the subsequent denial of the I-140 petition
9 arbitrary or capricious.
10 || 2021 WL 661974, at *3-4. The undersigned agrees with the reasoning in Décor Team LLC and
11 therefore concludes that past approval of Mr. Zhou’s L-1A visas are insufficient to establish that
«12 || the denial of the Petition was arbitrary and capricious.

13 In sum, the Court finds that USCIS’s denial of the Petition was not arbitrary and

v 14 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

15 || IV. CONCLUSION
16 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion is

= 17 GRANTED. The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19
20 || Dated: July 22, 2021
21
22 €
J PH C. SPERO
23 ief Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10068385. Public record. Not legal advice.