# Giles v. Davis

> District Court, N.D. California · March 1, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10066881

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** March 1, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
OSSIE GILES,
4 Case No. 18-cv-07466-YGR (PR)
Plaintiff,
5 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY
6 JUDGMENT
G. FORNCROOK, et al.,
7
Defendants.
8

9 I. INTRODUCTION
10 Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”),
11 filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1. He seeks monetary
12 damages. Id. at 3.1
13 In its July 15, 2019 Order of Partial Dismissal and Service, the Court found Plaintiff’s
14 complaint stated cognizable Eighth and First Amendment violations against the following
15 Defendants at SQSP: Associate Wardens G. Forncrook and R. Broomfield2; Captain J. Arnold;
16 Lieutenants B. VanMastrigt and R. Shelton; Sergeants J. Sangmaster; Correctional Counselor II A.
17 Maxfield; Chief Disciplinary Officer Y. Samara; Correctional Officers F. Jaugan, and J.
18 Cartwright; Office of Appeals Chief M. Voong; and Psychologist R. Pearl (hereinafter
19 “Defendants”).3 Dkt. 6 at 2-4.
20 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
21

22
1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management
filing system and not those assigned by the parties.
23

2 In his complaint, Plaintiff misspelled Defendant Broomfield’s last name as “Bloomfield.”
24
Dkt. 1 at 2. The Court has since been informed that the correct spelling is “Broomfield.” Dkt. 10
at 2.
25

3 In its July 15, 2019 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim
26
against Defendant Sergeant Madding and the supervisory liability claim against Defendant
Warden Ron Davis. Dkt. 6 at 4-5. The Court had also found a cognizable First Amendment claim
27
for denial of access to established grievance procedures against Defendant Lieutenant M. Nelson.
1 In their motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
2 under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as to Plaintiff’s
3 First Amendment claims against Defendants Voong and Broomfield, and that they are entitled to
4 judgment as a matter of law as to the remaining claims. In the alternative, Defendants argue they
5 are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, and
6 Defendants have filed a reply. Dkts. 26, 28. Having read and considered the papers submitted and
7 being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
8 II. BACKGROUND
9 A. Factual Background
10 The following background of Plaintiff’s claims is taken from the Court’s July 15, 2019
11 Order:
Plaintiff claims that on November 13, 2017, he filed a 602 inmate
12 appeal, log no. SQ-A-17-3257, against Defendant Cartwright for
“disrespect and defamation [by] calling Plaintiff a pedophil[e]”
13 during a confrontation on November 8, 2017. Dkt. 1 at 8. Plaintiff
claims that he exhausted this appeal to the third level of review, and
14 that his appeals were “denied.” Id. at 8-14.

15 Plaintiff claims that eight days after the confrontation, on November
16, 2017, he was placed in administrative segregation (“ad seg”) by
16 Defendants VanMastrigt as well as Classification Committee
members Defendants Forncrook and Maxfield “pending a [Rules
17 Violation Report (“RVR”)] 115 outcome written by [Defendant]
Cartwright whos[e] description of the incident was [en]titled [‘]force
18 or violence threatening a peace officer[’] [and] also [alleged] a pattern
of blatant disrespect towards him on multiple occasions [including]
19 6-23-2017, 7-12-2017, 7-27-2017 and 9-16-2017.” Id. at 6, 15-18.
Plaintiff claims that there was “no documentation of these
20 accusations . . . .” Id. at 15-18. Plaintiff claims that the charges on
the RVR were “false.” Id. at 17. Plaintiff adds that Defendant Jaugan
21 filed a “false supplemental report” to the RVR. Id. at 6, 17. Plaintiff
indicates that Defendant Sangmaster approved both the RVR and
22 supplemental reports, and that Defendant Arnold requested a mental
health assessment. Id. at 30.
23
Plaintiff claims that he had never been placed in ad seg during the
24 thirty-one years he has been incarcerated. Id. at 23. On November
29, 2017, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Pearl, an SQSP
25 psychologist, conducted an “RVR mental health assessment of
Plaintiff,” and indicated that he “is adjusting with no significant
26 psychiatric distress and if Plaintiff is found guilty [of the RVR] there
are no apparent mental health factors or functioning deficits that
27 should be consider[ed] when assessing a [Secure Housing Unit]
deprivations from being housed in ad seg. Id. at 26.
1
At Plaintiff’s December 4, 2017 disciplinary hearing, Defendant
2 Shelton, the hearing official, found Plaintiff “guilty as charged based
on a preponderance of evidence using [Defendant] Cartwright’s
3 report RVR 115.” Id. at 29. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Shelton
did not take into account Plaintiff’s “RVR supplemental witness
4 report” or his “other witness statements [by] [Correctional Officers]
M. Martinez [and] N. Faghirzaden [and] inmate’s statements.” Id. at
5 40. On December 5, 2017, Defendant Samara, as Chief Disciplinary
Officer, affirmed the December 4, 2017 hearing results. Id. at 37-39.
6 Plaintiff appealed the guilty finding at the Defendant 4, 2017 hearing,
and pursued this appeal to the final level of appeal where it was
7 denied. Id. at 43.

8 Plaintiff claims that based on the aforementioned actions, Defendants
participated in “violation [his] First and Eight[h] Amendment [rights],
9 which protects [him] against retaliation for filing a grievance and
cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff adds that “[e]ach
10 named supervisor[] had all relevant evidentiary documents available
to them, which clearly shows retaliation, but they chose to ignore
11 these documents and move forward with this illegal [ad seg]
admittance of Plaintiff.” Id.
12
Dkt. 6 at 2-3.
13
B. The Court’s Initial Review of Complaint
14
In its July 15, 2019 Order, the Court found “[w]hen liberally construed, Plaintiff’s
15
complaint state[d] a cognizable First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against
16
Defendants Cartwright and Jaugan for authoring false RVR and supplemental reports,
17
respectively, and for causing Plaintiff’s removal from his housing and placement into ad seg” for
18
forty-four days from November 15, 2017 through December 28, 2017. Id. at 3. The Court further
19
determined that the complaint stated “a cognizable claim against Defendants VanMastrigt,
20
Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster, Arnold, Shelton, and Samara for the violation of
21
Plaintiff’s right to due process insofar as he was removed from his housing and placed into ad seg
22
without evidentiary support, and for a violation of his First Amendment rights insofar as they were
23
involved in failing to rectify or correct the false RVR.” Id. Lastly, the Court found that the
24
allegations against Defendants Broomfield and Voong stated a cognizable First Amendment claim
25
for denial of access to established grievance procedures. Id. at 4.
26
C. Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony
27
During his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he never filed an administrative grievance in
1 connection with his claim that Defendants Broomfield and Voong denied him access to
2 established grievance procedures in violation of the First Amendment. Quinn Decl., Ex. A at
3 32:7-18.
4 In discussing his retaliation claim, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that Defendants
5 Arnold, Sangmaster, Samara, Shelton, Pearl, Maxfield, Forncrook, and VanMastrigt retaliated
6 against him because they could have released him from ad seg but failed to do so. Id. at 22:12-
7 23:3; 28:23-29:4. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Cartwright retaliated against him by
8 “falsifying a document [i.e., the RVR] that led to [his] removal from GP [general population] and
9 place[ment] in [ad seg].” Id. at 33:2-4. Plaintiff added that Defendant Jaugan retaliated against
10 him by preparing a supplemental rules violation report that contained lies and “bolster[ed]”
11 Defendant Cartwright’s RVR. Id. at 29:8-25, 31:11-32:1. Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants
12 named above “could have stopped” his placement in ad seg, but “they stuck together on . . .
13 something that’s not the truth [Cartwright’s RVR].” Id. at 22:12-23:3. Plaintiff claimed that
14 many of the aforementioned Defendants did not communicate with him about the November 13,
15 2017 grievance against Defendant Cartwright. Id. at 18:10-11 (Defendant Pearl); 23:4-7
16 (Defendant Samara); 31:9-17, 32:2-6 (Defendant Jaugun); 33:5-15 (Defendant Cartwright).
17 Plaintiff further claimed that some of the remaining Defendants did not communicate with him
18 outside of their decisions relating to his placement in ad seg. Id. at 23:18-24 (Defendant
19 Sangmaster); 28:1-10 (Defendant Arnold).
20 Finally, Plaintiff confirmed that he never mentioned that he suffered from anxiety, sleep
21 deprivation, or any other “psychological or mental health issue that [he was] having in the ad seg”
22 to Defendant Pearl, an SQSP psychologist, on November 29, 2017, after he was moved to ad seg.
23 Id. at 15:21-18:11. In fact, after being transferred to ad seg, he met with another psychologist, Dr.
24 Bachnick (a non-party), and reported that he had “some adaptation to the ad seg unit,” “denied any
25 changes in appetite or sleep,” and complained only of weight-loss due to lack of food in his cell.
26 Id. at 18:25-19:17. Plaintiff also made the following statement to Dr. Bachnick: “[N]ow that I got
27 my legal paperwork, I can work on it without distraction, so it’s probably a good thing.” Id. at
D. Defendant Cartwright’s Declaration
1
Defendant Cartwright, who worked as an SQSP correctional officer in 2017, claims that on
2
November 8, 2017, Plaintiff “made a number of threatening remarks to [Defendant Cartwright],
3
such as, ‘You’re nothing by a coward, you fucking bitch,’ and ‘I’ll beat your ass when I get out of
4
here.’” Cartwright Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant Cartwright claims that he was “sick from work on both
5
November 9, 2017 and November 10, 2017, and was then off work between November 11, 2017
6
and November 14, 2017.” Id. ¶ 3. He returned to work on November 15, 2017, and “prepared
7
a[n] [RVR] concerning the November 8, 2017 incident.” Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Defendant Cartwright states
8
that “[l]ater that morning, after the report had been submitted, [Plaintiff] was moved from the
9
institution’s general population to ad seg because of the threatening remarks that he made to
10
[Defendant Cartwright] during the incident.” Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Cartwright states that
11
“[f]ollowing the December 4, 2017 hearing, [Plaintiff] was found guilty of threatening staff during
12
the November 8, 2017 incident.” Id. ¶ 7.
13
Defendant Cartwright states that he “did not learn [Plaintiff] had filed an administrative
14
grievances against [him] until weeks after the incident.” Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Cartwright also
15
claims that he “had no knowledge of the grievance when [he] prepared the [RVR].” Id.
16
III. DISCUSSION
17
A. Legal Standard
18
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment
19
on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The
20
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
21
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v.
22
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of
23
establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
24
317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in
25
the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-
26
moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex,
27
477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
1 (1986).
2 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised
3 in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
4 banc). The defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative
5 remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172; Williams v.
6 Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). If the defendants carry that burden, “the burden
7 shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his
8 particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively
9 unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The ultimate burden of proof remains with
10 defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied,
11 and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. at 1166.
12 A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary
13 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).
14 Submitted by Defendant in support of the motion for summary judgment are declarations from
15 Defendant Cartwright (dkt. 28-1, Cartwright Decl.) and Defendants’ attorney, Deputy Attorney
16 General Michael Quinn (dkt. 21-1, Quinn Decl.), as well as Plaintiff’s deposition (id., Ex. A).
17 Meanwhile, Plaintiff has filed his verified complaint and attached exhibits. Dkt. 1. The Court will
18 construe this filing as an affidavit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as it is based
19 on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v.
20 McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). However, Plaintiff has not verified his
21 opposition and declaration because he failed to sign them under penalty of perjury.4 Dkt. 26 at 25.
22
4 The Court notes that even if it considered Plaintiff’s allegations in his opposition to the
23
extent such allegations are based on his personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible
in evidence, see Schroeder, 55 F.3d at 460 & nn.10-11, the result would not change. Plaintiff’s
24
opposition fails to address key arguments made by Defendants, including that: (1) authoring
alleged false RVR reports does not violate the First and Eighth Amendments; (2) housing an
25
inmate in ad seg for forty-four days does not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
(3) his First Amendment claim against Defendants Broomfield and Voong are unexhausted. See
26
Dkt. 26. Further, even if Plaintiff’s unverified opposition seems to ignore his deposition testimony
and alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for filing a grievance, id. at 9, the Court
27
explains below that he still fails to show evidence that any of the Defendants expressed any
B. Exhaustion Under the PLRA
1
1. Overview
2
The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with
3
respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
4
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
5
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is
6
mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and
7
effective.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40
8
(2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably
9
money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. A prisoner “seeking
10
only money damages must complete a prison administrative process that could provide some sort
11
of relief on the complaint stated, but no money.” Id. at 734.
12
The PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548
13
U.S. 81, 83 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and
14
other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
15
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. Thus,
16
compliance with prison grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. Id.
17
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise
18
procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 83.
19
The regulations that set out the features of the administrative remedies process for
20
California prisoners underwent a substantial restructuring in 2020.5 On March 25, 2020, and
21
effective June 1, 2020, California Code of Regulations Title 15, sections 3084 through 3084.9
22
were repealed and replaced with renumbered and amended provisions at sections 3480 through
23
3487. The regulations in effect for several years before June 1, 2020, provided CDCR inmates
24
and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any policy, decision, action, condition, or
25
omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a
26

27
5 As explained below, the relevant time-frame for Plaintiff’s claims is from November
1 material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,
2 § 3084.1(a) (repealed eff. June 1, 2020). Inmates also had the right to file administrative appeals
3 alleging misconduct by correctional officers. See id.
4 From January 28, 2011,6 until June 1, 2020, the regulations provided a three-level system
5 for an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies: first level appeal, second level appeal, and third
6 level appeal. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7 (repealed eff. June 1, 2020). In order to exhaust
7 available administrative remedies within this system during November to December 2017, the
8 relevant time frame of Plaintiff’s claims, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal:
9 (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDCR 602 inmate appeal form (“602
10 appeal”), (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to
11 the Director of the CDCR (i.e., Director’s Level). See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp.
12 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the administrative remedies exhaustion requirement
13 under § 1997e(a). See id. at 1237-38.
14 Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his available
15 administrative remedies as to his First Amendment claim against Defendants Voong and
16 Broomfield. Dkt. 21 at 14. Specifically, in support of this argument, Defendant notes that during
17 Plaintiff’s deposition, “[Plaintiff] stated that he never filed an administrative grievance in
18 connection with his claim that Defendants Broomfield and Voong denied him access to
19 established grievance procedures in violation of the First Amendment.” Id. at 11 (Quinn Decl.,
20 Ex. A, 32:7-18).
21 2. Analysis Relating to First Amendment Claim Against Defendants
Broomfield and Voong
22
Although non-exhaustion under Section 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense, a prisoner’s
23
concession to non-exhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d
24
1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoner’s concession to non-exhaustion is valid ground for
25
26
6 The regulations pertaining to the inmate appeal process were initially amended effective
27
January 28, 2011. Again, Plaintiff’s claims took place in 2017, which is after January 28, 2011.
1 dismissal, as long as no exception to exhaustion applies), overruled on other grounds in Albino v.
2 Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, a claim may be dismissed without
3 prejudice if it is clear from the record that the prisoner concedes that he did not exhaust
4 administrative remedies. See id. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Section 1997e(a) to mean that
5 an action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies
6 before he or she filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See
7 McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 Here, the record shows that Plaintiff concedes that he did not exhaust his administrative
9 remedies as to one of his First Amendment claims before filing the instant suit. During his
10 deposition, Plaintiff stated that he never filed an administrative grievance in connection with his
11 claim that Defendants Broomfield and Voong denied him access to established grievance
12 procedures in violation of the First Amendment. Quinn Decl., Ex. A, 32:7-18. Therefore, the
13 Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against Defendants
14 Broomfield and Voong as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against them. The record in this
15 case demonstrates that Plaintiff had the opportunity and ability to properly exhaust this First
16 Amendment claim—but he concedes that he failed to do so. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
17 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to his First Amendment claim Defendants
18 Broomfield and Voong, which is subject to dismissal without prejudice. See McKinney v. Carey,
19 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (proper course in claims dismissed due to failure to
20 exhaust administrative remedies is dismissal without prejudice to refiling).
21 C. Analysis of Remaining Claims
22 1. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
23 As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated against him for filing an
24 administrative grievance. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment
25 retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action
26 against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action
27 (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not
1 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995)
2 (prisoner suing prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated
3 against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance
4 legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline); Barnett v.
5 Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,
6 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (contention that actions “arbitrary and capricious” sufficient to allege
7 retaliation). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was
8 constitutionally protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the
9 alleged retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological
10 interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from
11 circumstantial evidence).
12 a. Defendants VanMastrigt, Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster,
Arnold, Shelton, and Samara
13
Plaintiff claims that Defendants VanMastrigt, Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster,
14
Arnold, Shelton, and Samara violated his First Amendment rights insofar as they were involved in
15
failing to rectify or correct the false RVR and in retaliation against Plaintiff for filing an
16
administrative grievance against Defendant Cartwright. There is no evidence of causation,
17
however.
18
The second element of a retaliation action, causation, requires showing that the prison
19
official intended to take the adverse action out of “retaliatory animus” to “silence and punish” the
20
inmate for his or her protected speech, as opposed to for some other reason. Shepard v. Quillen,
21
840 F.3d 686, 698-91 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether
22
defendant sent inmate to ad seg with intent to (1) follow Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3335(a) or
23
(2) retaliate for inmate’s complaint about staff misconduct). Evidence probative of retaliatory
24
animus includes the prison official’s expressed opposition to the speech and evidence that the
25
prison official’s proffered reason for the adverse action was false or pretextual. Id. at 690.
26
Retaliatory motive may also be shown by proximity and time coupled with inconsistency with
27
previous actions. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). Mere speculation that
1 defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir.
2 2014) (citing cases) (affirming grant of summary judgment where no evidence that defendants
3 knew about plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in
4 reference to prior lawsuit).
5 There is no evidence that any of the aforementioned Defendants expressed any animus
6 towards Plaintiff or his history of filing administrative appeals, including the November 13, 2017
7 grievance against Defendant Cartwright. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that these Defendants
8 retaliated against him because they could have released him from ad seg but failed to do so.
9 Quinn Decl., Ex. A at 22:12-23:3; 28:23-29:4. Thus, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony revealed that
10 his retaliation claim against these Defendants does not involve prison officials who took adverse
11 action against him because he engaged in “protected conduct,” i.e., filing the November 13, 2017
12 grievance against Defendant Cartwright. See id. Furthermore, in his deposition, Plaintiff claimed
13 that many of the aforementioned Defendants did not communicate with him about the November
14 13, 2017 grievance against Defendant Cartwright. Id. at 18:10-11 (Defendant Pearl); 23:4-7
15 (Defendant Samara); 31:9-17, 32:2-6 (Defendant Jaugun); 33:5-15 (Defendant Cartwright).
16 Plaintiff also claimed that some of the remaining Defendants did not communicate with him
17 outside of their decisions relating to his placement in ad seg. Id. at 23:18-24 (Defendant
18 Sangmaster); 28:1-10 (Defendant Arnold). Thus, no evidence exists showing that prior to these
19 Defendants’ alleged retaliatory actions (i.e., failing to rectify or correct the false RVR), they knew
20 about his November 13, 2017 grievance against Defendant Cartwright. As such, Plaintiff seems to
21 only rely upon speculation that these Defendants had a retaliatory motive, which is not sufficient.
22 See Wood, 753 F.3d at 904. Accordingly, Defendants VanMastrigt, Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl,
23 Sangmaster, Arnold, Shelton, and Samara are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First
24 Amendment retaliation claim, and the motion for summary judgment as to this claim is
25 GRANTED.
26 b. Defendants Cartwright and Jaugan
27 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Cartwright and Jaugan retaliated against Plaintiff for filing
1 Cartwright falsified an RVR that led to Plaintiff’s placement in ad seg, and Defendant Jaugan
2 prepared a false supplemental rules violation report that bolstered Defendant Cartwright’s RVR.
3 See Dkt. 1 at 16, 17.
4 However, there is similarly no evidence of causation, namely that Plaintiff’s prior
5 November 13, 2017 grievance caused Defendants Cartwright’s and Jaugan’s actions.
6 First, as to Defendant Jaugan, this Defendant was not named in the November 13, 2017
7 grievance, and there is no evidence that he knew about it. In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he
8 never communicated with Defendant Jaugan about the November 13, 2017 grievance or about any
9 inmate appeal for that matter. Quinn Decl., Ex. A at 31:15-17. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that
10 he never had any conversations or interacted with Defendant Jaugan at any time. Id. at 32: 2-6.
11 Thus, no evidence exists showing that Defendant Jaugan expressed any retaliatory animus towards
12 Plaintiff.
13 Next, as to Defendant Cartwright, who was named in the November 13, 2017 grievance,
14 Plaintiff claims that he never discussed that grievance or any inmate appeal with Defendant
15 Cartwright. Id. at 33: 5-15. Plaintiff claims that other than their interaction on November 8, 2017,
16 he did not have any other conversations or interactions with Defendant Cartwright. Id. at 33:8-15.
17 According to Defendant Cartwright’s declaration, he did not know that Plaintiff filed a grievance
18 against him “until weeks after the incident” and he “had no knowledge of the grievance when [he]
19 prepared the [RVR].” Cartwright Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant Cartwright claims that he submitted the
20 RVR (based on the November 8, 2017 incident) on November 15, 2017 because he had been either
21 sick or off work during that one week interim. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant Cartwright also points out that
22 once he submitted the RVR, Plaintiff was moved to ad seg because of the “threatening remarks
23 that he had made to [Defendant Cartwright] during the incident.” Id. ¶ 4. Thus, evidence exists
24 that Defendant Cartwright’s action of preparing the RVR was not motivated by Plaintiff’s
25 protected speech, but rather by broader prison-security purposes.
26 To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Defendants Jaugan’s and Cartwright’s actions took
27 place after Plaintiff filed the November 13, 2017 grievance, mere timing is not enough to show
1 after protected speech; rather, Plaintiff must show a nexus between the two. See Huskey v. City of
2 San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on logical fallacy of post
3 hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”). As explained above, Plaintiff
4 has failed to show such a nexus. Absent additional evidence tying Defendants Jaugan’s and
5 Cartwright’s actions to Plaintiff’s protected speech, his claim of retaliatory motive is merely
6 speculative and does not amount to a constitutional violation. See id. (summary judgment proper
7 against plaintiff who could only speculate that adverse employment decision was due to his
8 negative comments about his supervisor six or seven months earlier); see also Wood, 753 F.3d at
9 904. Accordingly, Defendants Jaugan and Cartwright are entitled to summary judgment on
10 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
11 this claim.
12 2. Eighth Amendment Claim For Filing False RVRs
13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jaugan and Cartwright are liable for being deliberately
14 indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health needs by writing false RVRs that led to his placement in ad
15 seg, which caused him to suffer anxiety and sleep deprivation.
16 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, or in this case mental health needs,
17 violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v.
18 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),
19 overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.
20 1997) (en banc). The analysis of a claim of “deliberate indifference” to serious medical needs
21 involves an examination of two elements: (1) the existence of a prisoner’s serious medical needs
22 and (2) the establishment of a deliberately indifferent response by the defendants to those needs.
23 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.
24 A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
25 further significant injury or the “wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429
26 U.S. at 104). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a
27 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate
1 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but
2 “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but
3 was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.
4 Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) overruled on other grounds by
5 Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). In order for deliberate indifference
6 to be established, therefore, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the
7 defendant and a resulting harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
8 Here, Plaintiff presents no evidence indicating that Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright
9 knew of Plaintiff’s mental health needs. In his deposition, Plaintiff confirmed that he never
10 mentioned that he suffered from anxiety, sleep deprivation, or any other “psychological or mental
11 health issue that [he was] having in the ad seg” to Defendant Pearl on November 29, 2017, after he
12 was moved to ad seg. Quinn Decl., Ex. A at 15:21-18:11. As mentioned above, after being
13 transferred to ad seg, he met with another psychologist and reported that he had “some adaptation
14 to the ad seg unit,” “denied any changes in appetite or sleep,” and complained only of weight-loss
15 due to lack of food in his cell. Id. at 18:25-19:17.
16 Furthermore, to state a claim for deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must allege that
17 Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright were subjectively aware that filing the allegedly false RVRs
18 would risk a substantial and dangerous impact on Plaintiff’s mental stability, and consciously
19 disregarded that risk. However, as mentioned, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that
20 Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright knew or even should have known of the fragility of Plaintiff’s
21 mental state, such that they could demonstrate indifference to that condition. Plaintiff does not
22 allege sufficient facts to establish liability with respect to either Defendant Jaugun or Defendant
23 Cartwright. Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under section 1983 only if the
24 plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected
25 right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives another of a
26 constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in
27 another’s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes
1 Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright completed the alleged false RVRs. After Plaintiff was placed
2 in ad seg, he claimed to suffer from anxiety and sleep deprivation from being housed in ad seg.
3 However, nothing in the record shows that Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright could have known
4 about Plaintiff’s mental health concerns at the time they completed the RVRs.
5 Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot support a section 1983 claim against
6 Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright simply on the allegation that these Defendants authored false
7 RVRs, as there is no protected Constitutional right to be free from false disciplinary charges. Dkt.
8 21 at 16 (citing Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (no constitutional claims
9 based on falsity of disciplinary charges); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986)
10 (“The prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly
11 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”); Hanrahan
12 v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (allegations of a false or fabricated disciplinary
13 charge against an inmate fail to state a claim under section 1983); Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp.
14 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (prisoners have no constitutional right to be free from wrongfully
15 issued disciplinary reports); Harvey v. Burris, No. C 14-4133-RS(PR), 2015 WL 8178572, *3
16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2015) (allegations that defendants filed false disciplinary report did not give
17 rise to section 1983 claim)). The Court agrees with Defendants.
18 False charges alone are not actionable under section 1983 because falsely accusing a
19 person of misconduct does not violate a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
20 States. For a false accusation to be potentially actionable, the false charge must implicate some
21 constitutional right, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process. An allegation of a
22 false charge that results in discipline that is not severe enough to amount to a deprivation of a
23 protected liberty interest under Sandin7—i.e., by imposing an atypical and significant hardship or
24 by inevitably affecting the duration of confinement—does not state a claim under section 1983.
25 See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002) (no section 1983 claim was stated
26 for allegedly false charges because disciplinary confinement imposed was too short to amount to
27
1 atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). Even if the false charge does result in discipline
2 that amounts to the deprivation of a protected liberty interest under Sandin, a section 1983 claim is
3 not stated if the inmate is afforded the procedural protections required by federal law at the
4 disciplinary hearing. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 654; Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452; Freeman, 808 F.2d at
5 951.
6 In essence, Plaintiff claims in a conclusory fashion that Defendant Jaugun and Cartwright
7 were deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs based on their completion of the
8 aforementioned false RVRs. However, sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice. See
9 Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. Based on these conclusory allegations, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
10 Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health needs
11 based solely on these Defendants’ alleged submission of false RVRs.
12 Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the Eighth
13 Amendment claim against Defendants Jaugun and Cartwright for deliberate indifference to
14 Plaintiff’s mental health needs based on filing false RVRs.
15 3. Eighth Amendment and Due Process Claims Relating to Plaintiff’s
Placement in Ad Seg
16
a. Eighth Amendment Claim
17
Plaintiff claims that Defendants VanMastrigt, Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster,
18
Arnold, Shelton, and Samara violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights for removing him from
19
his housing and transferring him to ad seg without adequate procedural protections or evidentiary
20
support.
21
The Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend.
22
VIII. But, the “transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for non-
23
punitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison
24
sentence.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) overruled on other grounds by Sandin, 515
25
U.S. 472. Additionally, an indeterminate stay in ad seg, without more, does not constitute cruel
26
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Anderson v. County of Kern,
27
45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (no contact with any other inmate in ad seg, either for
1 exercise, day room access or otherwise not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
2 916 (1995).
3 Here, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as to his allegations relating
4 to deprivations while he was held in ad seg for forty-four days from November 15, 2017 through
5 December 28, 2017, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to raise a triable
6 issue of fact as to whether the alleged deprivations came anywhere near amounting to cruel and
7 unusual punishment, so as to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Cf. Madrid v. Gomez, 889
8 F. Supp. 1146, 1227-30, 1260-65 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (overall harsh conditions of Pelican Bay State
9 Prison’s Security Housing Unit do not violate the Eighth Amendment for the non-mentally ill
10 inmates therein). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
11 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim relating to his placement in ad seg.
12 b. Due Process Claim
13 Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated by Defendants VanMastrigt,
14 Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster, Arnold, Shelton, and Samara (1) based on their failure to
15 correct the allegedly false RVRs, and (2) insofar as he was removed from his housing and
16 transferred to ad seg without adequate procedural protections or evidentiary support.
17 The requirements of due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by
18 the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
19 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). A protected liberty interest may be created either by the Due Process
20 Clause of its own force or by states through statutes or regulations. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.
21 The hardship associated with ad seg, such as loss of recreational and rehabilitative programs or
22 confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of time, is not so severe as to violate the Due
23 Process Clause itself. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986)
24 abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-83.
25 Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by the nature
26 of the penal system. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Although prison disciplinary
27 proceedings do not require the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution, the
1 regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, and (2) the
2 liberty in question is one of “real substance.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-87; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-
3 57 n.19.
4 “[R]eal substance” will generally be limited to freedom from (1) restraint that imposes
5 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
6 or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at
7 484-87.
8 As mentioned above, the hardship associated with ad seg, such as loss of recreational and
9 rehabilitative programs or confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of time, is not so severe
10 as to violate the Due Process Clause itself. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1091-92. Thus, Plaintiff has no
11 constitutional right or interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause to be free from
12 placement in ad seg. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that California statutes and prison
13 regulations create a liberty interest in freedom from ad seg which is protected by due process. Id.
14 at 1098. Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations § 3335(a) permits placement in ad seg
15 where the presence of an inmate in the general population poses a threat to his own safety and/or
16 to an ongoing investigation of serious misconduct or criminal activity. Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15,
17 § 3335(a). Section 3339(a) provides that release from segregation shall occur at the earliest
18 possible time. Id., § 3339(a). Toussaint held that, when read together, these regulations create a
19 liberty interest in freedom from ad seg. 801 F.2d at 1098.
20 Therefore, before a prisoner may be placed in ad seg for the violation of prison rules, he or
21 she must be afforded five procedural protections. First, “written notice of the charges must be
22 given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him
23 to marshal the facts and prepare a defense.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Second, “[a]t least a brief
24 period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare
25 for the appearance before the [disciplinary committee].” Id. Third, “there must be a ‘written
26 statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons’ for the disciplinary action.”
27 Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, “the inmate facing
1 his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
2 correctional goals.” Id. at 566. Fifth,

3 [w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity
of the issues makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect
4 and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of
the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . .
5 to have adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . .
inmate designated by the staff.
6
Id. at 570.
7
In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the Supreme Court held that
8
disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy due process requirements unless there is “some evidence”
9
in the record to support the findings of the prison disciplinary board. The Ninth Circuit requires
10
that “some evidence” also support a decision to place an inmate in segregation for administrative
11
reasons. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). Ascertaining whether
12
the standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment
13
of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. Id. Instead, the relevant question is
14
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. Id.
15
First, Plaintiff’s fails to state a claim for the violation of due process against the
16
aforementioned Defendants based on their failure to correct the allegedly false RVRs because
17
Plaintiff fails to identify the liberty interest to which he was entitled and that he was deprived of
18
based on their actions. Also, Plaintiff has not claimed that any of these Defendants had
19
knowledge that the charges listed on the RVR against Plaintiff were false. Therefore, this claim
20
does not provide a basis for a due process violation.
21
Second, Plaintiff holds each of the aforementioned Defendants liable for various reasons.
22
Defendant VanMastrigt as well as Classification Committee members Defendants Forncrook and
23
Maxfield violated his due process rights by approving the Administrative Segregation Unit
24
Placement Notice that resulted from Defendants Jaugan’s and Cartwright’s false RVRs. Dkt. 1 at
25
6, 15-19. Defendant Sangmaster endorsed the “false allegations” by approving the RVRs, and
26
Defendant Arnold endorsed the false RVRs by classifying the RVR and requesting a mental health
27
assessment. Id. at 6, 30. Defendant Shelton was the RVR Hearing Officer who found Plaintiff
1 guilty of Threatening Staff and signed the Disciplinary Hearing Results. Id. at 6, 30-37.
2 Defendant Samara was the Chief Disciplinary Officer who affirmed and signed the Disciplinary
3 Hearing Results. Id. at 6, 37-39. Finally, Defendant Pearl was the psychologist who conducted
4 Plaintiff’s mental health assessment and prepared the mental health assessment report. Id. at 6, 19.
5 It seems that Plaintiff claims that these Defendants signed documents which contained false or
6 fabricated charges stemming from the false RVR, but did nothing to correct them and prevent his
7 placement in ad seg. Id. at 6; Quinn Decl., Ex. A at 22:12-23:3. However, as stated above,
8 Plaintiff fails to show that these Defendants were aware that the RVRs stemming from the
9 November 8, 2017 incident contained any fabrications. Plaintiff has thus provided no basis on
10 which a jury could find that Defendants VanMastrigt, Forncrook, Maxfield, Pearl, Sangmaster,
11 Arnold, Shelton, and Samara knowingly signed or approved a false or fabricated report.
12 Meanwhile, Defendant Cartwright has provided a declaration in which he stated under
13 penalty of perjury that on November 8, 2017, he witnessed Plaintiff make “a number of
14 threatening remarks to [Defendant Cartwright], such as, ‘You’re nothing by a coward, you fucking
15 bitch,’ and ‘I’ll beat your ass when I get out of here.’” Cartwright Decl. ¶ 2. Defendant
16 Cartwright claims that he was sick or off work for the next week and when he returned to work on
17 November 15, 2017, he “prepared a[n] [RVR] concerning the November 8, 2017 incident.” Id.
18 ¶¶ 3-4. While Plaintiff refutes Defendant Cartwright’s version of the events on November 8,
19 2017, Plaintiff agrees that he was present during the incident but claims that Defendant Cartwright
20 called Plaintiff a “pedophil[e]” during that confrontation. Dkt. 1 at 8. Again, aside from
21 disagreeing with Defendant Cartwright’s version of the November 8, 2017 incident, Plaintiff does
22 not present any more evidence other than his conclusory statement that the RVRs written by
23 Defendants Jaugan8 and Cartwright were “false.” Id. at 6, 17. As mentioned above, sweeping
24
8 The Court notes that Defendant Jaugan’s supplemental RVR does not relate to the
25
November 8, 2017 incident. Dkt. 1 at 17. Instead, it relates to an April 2017 incident, during
which he had a conversation with Plaintiff during which “[Plaintiff] would make rude remarks to
26
[Defendant Jaugan] . . . in regards to [his] accent.” Id. Plaintiff said, “This Mother Fucker
shouldn’t be working at the desk, you can’t even understand him.” Id. During another incident in
27
August 2017, Defendant Jaugan claims that while he made his announcements, Plaintiff “would
1 conclusory allegations will not suffice. Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993)
2 (“When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it
3 cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material
4 fact.”).
5 Third, any decisions relating to the threatening staff RVR were made by Defendant
6 Shelton, the senior hearing officer. Dkt. 1 at 30-39. In reaching the decision to find Plaintiff
7 guilty, Defendant Shelton relied on the report prepared by Defendant Cartwright, the incident
8 package prepared by Defendant VanMastrigt, Plaintiff’s “plea, verbal and written statements,” the
9 Investigative Employee report, and the mental health assessment report prepared by Defendant
10 Pearl. Id. at 35. It was then the job of the Defendant Shelton, the Investigative Employee, and the
11 SQSP Investigative Services Unit, not any of the other aforementioned Defendants, to investigate
12 further into the threatening staff RVR. See Dkt. 1 at 30-39. The record shows that at the hearing
13 for the threatening staff RVR, Plaintiff received advance written notice of the charges, at least
14 twenty-four hours of preparation time, a written statement from the committee explaining the basis
15 for its decision, and the opportunity to present evidence in his defense and call witnesses9. See id.
16 Plaintiff was given a hearing on his threatening staff RVR on December 4, 2017. See id. Thus, it
17 seems that Plaintiff received all the due process protections required by Wolff.
18 Plaintiff claims that during the RVR hearing, Defendant Shelton did not take into account
19 Plaintiff’s “RVR supplemental witness report” or his “other witness statements [by] [Correctional
20 Officers] M. Martinez [and] N. Faghirzaden [and] inmate’s statements.” Dkt. 1 at 40. It seems
21 that Plaintiff wished for such evidence to bolster his claim that the charges in the RVR were false.
22 However, although an inmate has the right under Wolff to present documentary evidence in
23 support of his defense, that right is limited by correctional and institutional concerns. See Wolff,
24 418 U.S. at 566. A legitimate correctional concern is the prompt resolution of disciplinary
25

26
Defendant Jaugan were false. However, the Court considers Defendant Jaugan’s supplement RVR
to the extent that it was submitted in support of the threatening staff RVR.
27
1 charges. See generally id. (“Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the
2 hearing within reasonable limits”). Thus, while Wolff requires that an inmate be allowed to
3 present evidence, it does not command that he be allowed unlimited time in which to do so or to
4 make a request that the hearing officer consider evidence not already gathered. In addition, it may
5 seem that Plaintiff’s denial of the charges and that his supporting evidence could create triable
6 issues of fact. They do not do so, however, because both the Court and a properly-instructed jury
7 must apply the same rule from Superintendent v. Hill to determine whether there was a due
8 process violation. The question for the Court—or for a jury—is not whether Plaintiff was guilty
9 of the offense; instead, the question is whether there was “some evidence” to support Defendant
10 Shelton’s decision. Review of this disciplinary decision illustrates the very limited nature of the
11 “some evidence” inquiry, as the reviewing court (or a jury considering such a claim) cannot
12 reweigh the evidence but instead must consider only whether there was “some evidence” in the
13 record to support the senior hearing officer’s conclusion. Superintendent v. Hill does not permit
14 such a re-weighing of the evidence by the Court or by a jury, and instead commands that the
15 decision be upheld if “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
16 reached by the disciplinary board.” 472 U.S. at 455-56. On the evidence in the record, a
17 reasonable juror could find that there was “some evidence” to support Defendant Shelton’s
18 disciplinary decision.
19 Lastly, the Court notes that on November 15, 2017, Plaintiff was placed in ad seg due to
20 the pending threatening staff RVR stemming from the November 8, 2017 incident. Dkt. 1 at 18.
21 An investigation regarding the November 8, 2017 incident was ongoing, and thus Plaintiff was
22 housed in ad seg until that investigation was complete. See id. As explained above, Title 15 of
23 the California Code of Regulations § 3335(a) permits placement of an inmate in ad seg if that
24 inmate’s presence in the general population would threaten an ongoing investigation of serious
25 misconduct or criminal activity. See Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15, § 3335(a). Here, the record contains
26 “some evidence” to support the prison officials’ decision to place Plaintiff in ad seg during that
27 time, i.e., prior to the RVR hearing. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104. The Court notes that after
1 day forfeiture of credits. See Dkt. 1 at 35, 37. The record further shows that at Plaintiff's
2 Classification Committee Chrono hearing on December 28, 2017, the committee elected to assess
3 || Plaintiff and to impose “a 3 month 16 day mitigated [ad seg] term for [the] RVR dated
4 11/08/17... ,” but it “elect[ed] to suspend the remainder of the [ad seg] term effective
5 12/28/2017.”!° Dkt. 1 at 51. As mentioned, Plaintiff was therefore released from ad seg on
6 December 28, 2017.
7 In sum, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the due process claim because
8 (1) Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence showing that Defendants fabricated charges against
9 || him; and (2) Plaintiff received all necessary due process protections during his detention in ad seg.
10 || Accordingly, their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to this claim.
11 || Iv. CONCLUSION
12 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
13 || allclaims.!' Dkt. 21. Plaintiffs unexhausted claim—his First Amendment claim against
14 || Defendants Voong and Broomfield—is DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling after exhausting
3 15 California’s prison administrative process. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200-01.
a 16 The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.
3 17 This Order terminates Docket No. 21.
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 || Dated: March 1, 2021 Capees Nag of ec
J E YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
20 nited States District Judge
21
22
23
24
25 10 The Court notes that Plaintiffs claims in his complaint relate only to his initial
placement and retention in ad seg as a result of the threatening staff RVR as opposed to the
26 mitigated (and suspended) ad seg term imposed by the committee on December 28, 2017. See
27 '! The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
28 on Plaintiffs above-referenced claims obviates the need to address their alternative argument
regarding an entitlement to qualified immunity.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10066881. Public record. Not legal advice.