# (PC) Fregia v. Chen

> District Court, E.D. California · March 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10059809

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** March 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
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5
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9 MARK A. FREGIA, Case No. 1:20-cv-01024-NODJ-EPG (PC)
10 Plaintiff,
11 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS’
12 YUCUI CHEN, et al., MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE
GRANTED, IN PART, AND DENIED, IN
13 Defendant. PART
14 (ECF No. 59)
15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS
16

17
18 Plaintiff Mark Fregia is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this
19 civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 4, 16). This case proceeds on
20 Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants Yuchui Chen and Lisa Gosso were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs by purportedly denying him medications while he was confined at the
21
Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (SATF) in Corcoran, California. (ECF Nos.
22
18, 57).
23
Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence shows that they
24
were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and that they are entitled to
25
qualified immunity. (ECF No. 59).
26
For the reasons explained below, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary
27
judgment be granted to the extent that Defendants request dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate
28
1 indifference claim against Defendant Chen. However, it is recommended that the motion be
2 denied to the extent that Defendants request dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim
3 against Defendant Gosso.
4 I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Operative Complaint
5
Plaintiff’s verified first amended complaint alleges,1 in relevant part, that he had a
6
telemedicine appointment with Defendant Chen, a psychiatrist, on January 24, 2024.2 He was
7
taking 225 mg of Effexor at the time to treat his Cluster B personality disorder and Chen renewed
8
his prescription for Effexor and prescribed Vistaril for his sleep disorder. Also present at
9
Plaintiff’s appointment was Defendant Gosso, a medical assistant.
10
On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff was called to a prison clinic for lab work. When he arrived,
11
he was told that a blood sample would be drawn. However, due to his religious beliefs, he told the
12
lab technician that he would not consent to a blood draw. During this discussion, “Gosso
13
appeared and rudely interjected with her uninvited opinions that turned into threats of withholding
14
Plaintiff’s medication if he would not consent to labs.” At this time, “Gosso harbored animosity
15
towards [] Plaintiff over a complaint he had recently made against her.” Plaintiff believes that
16 Gosso showed up to “meddle in [his] affairs . . . simply to get back at him for his complaint.”
17 That evening, Plaintiff went to pill call and learned that his medications, including
18 Effexor, could not be dispensed because “Gosso had e-mailed his doctor and had his medications
19 discontinued.” He was also told that Gosso had specifically told the doctor that he “requested to
20 be taken off his meds” but “this was a lie.” But even if he had requested to be taken off his meds,
21 “Gosso knew that protocol dictated that a person on 225mgs of Effexor had to be slowly weaned
22 off of the medication to prevent painful withdrawal symptoms.” He claims that Gosso
23 “intentionally used her position to abuse and manipulate the medical protocols to do harm to the
Plaintiff” as she knew that he “would begin to experience painful withdrawal symptoms within 24
24
hours of missing a dose of his medication.”
25

26 1 See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A verified complaint may be used as an
opposing affidavit under Rule 56 . . . [if it is] based on personal knowledge and set forth specific facts
27 admissible in evidence.”).
2 For readability, minor alterations—such as altering capitalization, punctuation, and spelling—have been
28 made to some of Plaintiff’s quotations without indicating each change.
1 That night Plaintiff began to experience withdrawal symptoms, and by the morning, they
2 were severe. Plaintiff had “pain in his joints and muscles, running nose, headaches, and nausea.”
3 Because Plaintiff had previously had withdrawals from Effexor, he knew his symptoms would
4 progressively worsen, which “led to panic, suicidal ideation and he eventually ended up in a crisis
bed under suicide watch that evening.”
5
Plaintiff contends that “Dr. Chen was derelict in her duties as a physician when she
6
allowed Defendant Gosso to have her cancel the Plaintiff’s medications with just a phone call”
7
because “she knew of the harmful properties of the drug when the proper methods of stopping the
8
medication was not followed.” He alleges that, because Chen saw him the previous day, during an
9
appointment that he agreed to take his medications, “she should have at least wanted a good
10
explanation as to why he so suddenly wanted to stop his meds.” And Chen did not follow proper
11
procedures in him weaning off his medications. “To so easily let Defendant Gosso abuse the
12
system and harm a patient makes Dr. Chen complicit and [the] most culpable of all Defendants in
13
this matter.”
14
B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
15
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment argues that Defendant Chen was not
16 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs because “even viewing the facts in the
17 light most favorable to Plaintiff, and assuming the report about his request [to discontinue
18 medications] was incorrect, there is nothing in the record to support that Dr. Chen knew that the
19 report that she acted on was inaccurate.”3 (ECF No. 59-1, p. 14).
20 As to Defendant Gosso, the motion argues that she “appropriately reported the
21 developments surrounding Plaintiff’s lab refusal to Dr. Chen, and that she could not have placed
22 Plaintiff’s medications on hold because it is not within her discretion as a medical assistant.” (Id.
23 at 19). Further, “[t]here is no evidence that Gosso knew by making the report, that Dr. Chen
would place Plaintiff’s medication on hold, that Gosso intended that to happen, or knew that it
24
would place Plaintiff at a substantial risk of serious harm.” (Id. at 20). Gosso also argues that she
25
is entitled to qualified immunity because “[t]here are no authorities sufficient to put Defendants
26
27
3 Because the Court finds this argument dispositive, it does not address Defendant Chen’s other arguments,
28 such as her argument that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
1 on notice that reporting Plaintiff’s request to stop medications because he did not want to do
2 blood work . . . was medically unacceptable under the circumstances.” (Id. at 21).
3 In support of their motion, Defendants provide portions of Plaintiff’s deposition, their own
4 declarations, the declarations of other medical professionals, and various medical records
regarding Plaintiff’s treatment during the time period at issue here. (ECF Nos. 59, 73).
5
Plaintiff opposes summary judgment. (ECF No. 119). As an initial matter, he appears to
6
argue that he should not have to respond to the motion based on other filings he has made in this
7
case, e.g., multiple motions for sanctions. Additionally, he generally accuses the Court of working
8
with defense counsel against his interests in this case.
9
As to the merits of the motion, he generally repeats the allegations from his complaint,
10
argues that Defendants have fabricated their account of some of the medical treatment that he
11
received, and challenges the evidence that Defendants submitted in support of their motion for
12
summary judgment. In support of his arguments, Plaintiff states that the factual assertions in his
13
opposition are made under penalty of perjury. He also provides various exhibits, including
14
correctional health care services procedures, discovery documents, and various medical records.
15
Defendants filed a reply, which repeats their arguments in favor of summary judgment
16 and argues that Plaintiff presents only conclusory and speculative allegations that are insufficient
17 to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial. (ECF No. 124, p. 5).
18 II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
19 Summary judgment in favor of a party is appropriate when there “is no genuine dispute as
20 to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 56(a); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“If there is a genuine
22 dispute about material facts, summary judgment will not be granted.”). A party asserting that a
23 fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
24
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
25
interrogatory answers, or other materials, or showing that the materials cited do not establish the
26
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
27
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
28
1 A party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
2 district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
3 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
4 any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Where the non-
5
moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an
6
absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627
7
F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). If the moving party does so, “the burden then shifts to the non-
8
moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial,”
9
which is not a light burden, the party “must come forth with evidence from which a jury could
10
reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.” Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
11
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
12
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
13
find for the plaintiff.”). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
14
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
15
Additionally, “[a] summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory
16 allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
17 In reviewing the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court “must draw all
18 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Comite de Jornaleros
19 de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). It need only
20 draw inferences, however, where there is “evidence in the record . . . from which a reasonable
21 inference . . . may be drawn”; the Court need not entertain inferences that are unsupported by fact.
22 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2 (citation omitted). And “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be
23 believed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court may
consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties but is not required to do so. Fed.
24
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.
25
2001).
26
\\\
27
\\\
28
1 III. DISCUSSION4
2 B. Legal Standards
3 Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
4 by denying him his medications.
“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate
5
must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,
6
1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires Plaintiff
7
to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition
8
could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and
9
(2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting
10
McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citation and internal quotations
11
marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
12
Cir. 1997) (en banc).
13
Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and
14
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057
15
(9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate
16 indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a
17 prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d
18 at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an unjustifiably high
19 risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is insufficient to
20 establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 & n.5
21 (1994) (citations omitted).
22 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between
23 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to
24
4 As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues in his opposition that this Court should not even address Defendants’
25 motion for summary judgment. Referencing various filings in this case, including his numerous motions
for sanctions, Plaintiff states that he should not have “to answer th[e] motion [for summary judgment] by
26 Defendants.” (ECF No. 119, p. 1). He generally accuses the Court of conspiring with defense counsel to
hamper his litigation of this case. (See id. at 2-4). However, Plaintiff provides no developed argument or
27 any evidence to substantiate such baseless allegations of a court conspiracy to hamper his litigation.
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff requests that the Court not rule on the motion for summary
28 judgment, the request is denied.
1 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989);
2 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a
3 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid
4 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not
become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
5
106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff
6
must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the
7
circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
8
C. Defendant Chen
9
Turning to the merits, the essence of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Chen is that she
10
“was derelict in her duties as a Physician when she allowed Defendant Gosso to have her cancel
11
[his] medications with just a phone call” and she should have demanded an explanation as to
12
Plaintiff’s purported statement, relayed by Gosso, that he wanted to stop his medications and, in
13
any event, Chen should have weaned him off his medications. (ECF No. 16, p. 10).
14
Chen responds that, “even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and
15
assuming the report about his request was incorrect, there is nothing in the record to support that
16 Dr. Chen knew that the report that she acted on was inaccurate” so as to establish her deliberate
17 indifference. (ECF No. 15, p. 14). Pertinent here, Chen, through her declaration, acknowledges
18 that she placed Plaintiff’s medications on hold on January 25, 2018, upon receipt of a report that
19 “Mr. Fregia requested to stop all his medication because he did not want to do labs.” (ECF No.
20 59-8, p. 4). She asserts that Plaintiff had the right, at his level of care, to refuse medication. (Id. at
21 4-5). However, she “made sure he was on [her] schedule to discuss the matter.” (Id. at 4). She
22 asserts that, from the relevant time period of January 25 to January 30, Plaintiff still ultimately
23 received his medications from other providers, except for one day of Effexor because Plaintiff
refused the medication, which he had a right to do. (ECF No. 59-8, pp. 1-8). And she states that,
24
when she returned to work on January 29, she resumed his prescription. (Id. at 8). And on January
25
30, she had an appointment with Plaintiff. (Id. at 8).
26
While Plaintiff disputes most of Chen’s account of the medical care that he received, he
27
admits that he had the right to refuse his medication, that he did see some members of the mental
28
1 health staff at SATF during the relevant time period, that he received at least one dose of his
2 medication during the relevant time period, and that when Chen returned to work on January 29,
3 she resumed his medications and noted that she would see Plaintiff the next day. (ECF No. 119,
4 pp. 19, 53, 68-73).
Even viewing the undisputed facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, he fails to put
5
forth sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find in his favor as to Defendant Chen.
6
Notably, while Plaintiff contends that Chen should have independently confirmed his purported
7
request to stop his medications, he fails to present any evidence or argument that such failure
8
amounts to deliberate indifference. Importantly, he fails to offer any facts or legal argument
9
showing that Chen had any reason to doubt Gosso’s representation that Plaintiff wanted to stop
10
his medications, or that simply failing to verify another medical professional’s factual
11
representation itself was wanton. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (“[A]n inadvertent failure to
12
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction
13
of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”). Although Chen stopped Plaintiff’s
14
medications, it was only for a short period of time, and she resumed them upon her return, thus
15
indicating that she had no intention to deny medications that Plaintiff wanted to take.
16 Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that Chen should have weaned him off his
17 medications, the Court cannot find any reason to deny summary judgment. As described above,
18 the undisputed facts establish that Chen believed that Plaintiff had requested to stop his
19 medications. And Plaintiff concedes that he could not be forced to take them. Plaintiff cannot
20 both concede that he has the right to not take medication and then argue that Chen was required to
21 administer it over his objection. See McNeil v. Singh, No. 1:12-CV-01005-RRB, 2013 WL
22 1876127, at *19, n.59 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2013), aff’d, 559 F. App’x 624 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While it
23 was clearly within McNeil's rights to refuse medical treatment, he has no right to refuse treatment
and then claim deliberate indifference to his medical condition.”).
24
In light of the above circumstances, no jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant
25
Chen subjectively knew of and disregarded a serious risk to Plaintiff’s health. Accordingly, the
26
Court will recommend that summary judgment be granted as to Defendant Chen.
27
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28
1 D. Defendant Gosso
2 The essence of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Gosso is that, because he filed a
3 complaint against her, she falsely reported to Chen that Plaintiff wanted to stop taking his
4 medications because she knew that Chen would place them on hold and that Plaintiff would
experience painful withdraw symptoms. (ECF No. 16, p. 5).
5
Gosso argues that she “appropriately reported the developments surrounding Plaintiff’s
6
lab refusal to Dr. Chen, and that she could not have placed Plaintiff’s medications on hold
7
because it is not within her discretion as a medical assistant.” (ECF No. 59-1, p. 19). Further,
8
“[t]here is no evidence that Gosso knew by making the report, that Dr. Chen would place
9
Plaintiff’s medication on hold, that Gosso intended that to happen, or knew that it would place
10
Plaintiff at a substantial risk of serious harm.” (Id. at 20).
11
The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. First, the fact that Gosso did not directly
12
place a hold on Plaintiff’s medications is of no consequence. A person deprives another of a
13
constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in
14
another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes
15
the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs.,
16 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.
17 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a
18 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to
19 inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at
20 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of
21 proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
22 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, accepting the
23 allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, by falsely reporting that Plaintiff wanted to stop
taking his medications, Gosso set in motion the hold on his medications by Chen, making Gosso
24
liable under § 1983.
25
Gosso’s related argument—that there is no evidence that she could have known or
26
intended that Chen would place Plaintiff’s medication on hold and that this could harm
27
Plaintiff—is belied by the record. Notably, Plaintiff’s allegations that Gosso was angry at him
28
1 because he filed a complaint against her and thus threatened to withhold his medications if he did
2 not consent to lab work would support Plaintiff’s claim that Gosso knew that falsely relaying that
3 Plaintiff did not want to take his medications may result in Chen placing them on hold and that
4 she had a motive to make a false report.
Moreover, Gosso’s own declaration undermines her argument:
5
[W]hen I worked as an MA in psychiatry, if an inmate refused to do labs, the
6
phlebotomist or person doing the blood draw, would often report that information
7 to me, and I would report that information to the patient’s doctor. Similarly, if a
patient stated he was requesting to stop medication, and I became aware of that
8 information, I would report it to the patient’s doctor.
9 . . . . If a patient refused blood work in the morning, it would not be uncommon for
the phlebotomist to have me talk to the patient. In my experience, sometimes
10 patients reconsider after initially refusing, when they are informed that they run a
risk that their medication could be placed on hold by the ordering physician. It
11 would also not be uncommon for me to report blood work refusals, that I am made
aware of, to the ordering doctor, in this case Dr. Chen. Because, I ran Dr. Chen’s
12
Tele-psychiatry line, I would be logged on the computer with her before she
13 started seeing patients for the day and between appointments, and I would report
that matter directly to her in private.
14
(ECF No. 59-6, pp. 2-3) (emphasis added). Elsewhere she states:
15 The following day, January 25, 2018, at approximately 9:45 a.m., Dr. Chen
documented, “Patient was seen yesterday, [t]oday MA reported that patient
16
requested to stop all his medication because he does not want to do labs. He has
17 been refusing labs for two separate occasions and lab RN attempted to explain, he
was reportedly becoming verbally abusive and aggressive towards staff. He was
18 reportedly claiming he will “602” everyone here and do[es] not wish to take his
medications.” Dr. Chen further documented “I will place his medications on hold
19
and see him in IDTT to discuss the issue.” Dr. Chen then notes “placed both
20 Effexor 225 mg and Vistaril suspended.” I do not have a recollection of this
communication independent of Dr. Chen’s note, but I was Dr. Chen’s MA at the
21 time, and it would not have been uncommon for me to report to her a patient’s
refusal of blood work and a patient’s request to stop all medication, so that she
22 could address the matter. As Dr. Chen’s assigned MA, one of my duties was to
keep her informed regarding her patients.
23
(Id. at 4) (emphasis added).
24
Notably, Gosso acknowledges that a doctor may place a hold on medication if a patient
25
refused lab work and that she was Chen’s medical assistant at the time and she would have been
26
in a position to report Plaintiff’s request to stop all medication. A reasonable inference is that she
27
would have known in this case that falsely reporting that Plaintiff did not want to take his
28
1 medications because of required lab work would mean that Chen would put a hold on Plaintiff’s
2 medications.
3 Likewise, the Court rejects Gosso’s contention that she could not have known that
4 Plaintiff’s failure to receive his medications would cause him harm. First, a reasonable person
would know that withholding medications from a prisoner might cause them harm. See Estelle,
5
429 U.S. at 103 (“These elementary principles establish the government’s obligation to provide
6
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison
7
authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be
8
met.”). Further, Gosso’s declaration states that she had medical training as a certified medical
9
assistant and one of her duties was providing patients with consent forms. (ECF No. 59-6, p. 2).
10
She attaches Plaintiff’s signed consent form to her declaration, which states, in part in a checked
11
box:
12
I understand that I may change my decision regarding the use of the medication(s)
13 at any time by telling any member of my treatment team, though discontinuance of
the medication will need to be discussed with my doctor. Should I decide to stop
14 or decrease psychiatric medication(s) I have been informed to do this under the
guidance of my staff and absolutely not stop or decrease medication(s) suddenly
15 or on my own.
16 (Id. at 20) (emphasis added).
17 Simply put, it is reasonable to infer that Gosso, a medical professional, who provides a
18 form to patients warning them to not stop or decrease their medications on their own would know
19 that Plaintiff could face a substantial risk of harm by her putting in motion a series of events that
20 led to Plaintiff’s medications being stopped. And here, although Defendants dispute whether
21 Plaintiff actually suffered harm from not taking the medications, Plaintiff claims, based on his
personal knowledge of prior withdrawal symptoms, that he suffered pain in his joints and
22
muscles, running nose, headaches and nausea and suicidal thoughts that led to him being placed
23
in a crisis bed under suicide watch. (ECF No. 16, p. 5).
24
Accordingly, because there is a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court recommends
25
that summary judgment be denied as to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Gosso.
26
E. Qualified Immunity
27
Defendant Gosso also argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because “[t]here
28
1 are no authorities sufficient to put Defendants on notice that reporting Plaintiff’s request to stop
2 medications because he did not want to do blood work . . . was medically unacceptable under the
3 circumstances.” (ECF No. 59-1, p. 21).
4 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
5
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
6
231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In determining whether a
7
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must decide (1) whether the facts shown by
8
plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly
9
established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. To be
10
clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear “that every ‘reasonable official would [have
11
understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2090
12
(2012) (quoting Al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741) (alteration in original). This immunity protects “all but
13
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
14
335, 341 (1986).
15 Binding caselaw “need not catalogue every way in which” prison conditions can
be constitutionally inadequate “for us to conclude that a reasonable official would
16
understand that his actions violated” an inmate’s rights. Castro v. County of Los
17 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Rather, “a right is clearly
established when the ‘contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable
18 official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003)).
19
Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754, 769 (9th Cir. 2023)
20
Here, Gosso’s argument relies on her own version of the facts, i.e., that she simply
21
reported Plaintiff’s request to stop his medications, which led to medication hold by Chen.
22
However, in light of the above disputed facts, the Court believes the relevant question is whether
23
there is clearly established caselaw holding that a medical professional’s intentional interference
24
with a Plaintiff obtaining his medications violates the Constitution.
25
Notably, the Supreme Court addressed this issue long ago:
26 We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” proscribed
27
by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by
28 prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
1 intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
> interfering with the treatment once prescribed.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104—05 (internal citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
° Simply put, Gosso would have reasonably understood that falsely reporting that Plaintiff
‘ wanted to stop his medications, in an effort to deny him medical care, would violate Plaintiff's
° constitutional rights. Accordingly, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.
6 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7 Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
8 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 59) be granted, in part, and denied,
9 in part.
10 a. Defendants be granted summary judgment to the extent that they seek dismissal of
11 Plaintiffs deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Chen.
12 b. Defendants be denied summary judgment to the extent that they seek dismissal of
13 Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Gosso.
14 2. The case proceed only on Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Gosso was deliberately
15 indifferent to his serious medical needs.
16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within thirty (30)
18 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
19 objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
50 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed
within thirty (30) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.
Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394
(9th Cir. 1991)).
24 | SO ORDERED.
25 . .
Dated: _ March 8, 2024 [Je hey
26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
27
28
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10059809. Public record. Not legal advice.