# Rose v. Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC

> District Court, E.D. California · January 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10058776

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** January 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 ----oo0oo----
11
12 ROBERT ROSE and PAUL SIMI, on No. 2:23-cv-01979 WBS AC
behalf of themselves and those
13 similarly situated,
14 Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
15 v. AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
16 CEMEX CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
PACIFIC, LLC, and DOES 1 through
17 50,
18 Defendants.
19
20 ----oo0oo----
21 Plaintiffs Robert Rose and Paul Simi brought this
22 putative labor class action against Cemex Construction Materials
23 Pacific, LLC, a cement pouring company that employed plaintiffs
24 as cement truck drivers, in Sacramento Superior Court. Defendant
25 removed to federal court. Plaintiffs allege multiple violations
26 of California law, including (1) failure to pay wages for all
27 hours worked, Cal. Lab. Code § 216; (2) failure to pay wages at
28 agreed upon rates, id. §§ 221-223; (3) failure to pay overtime
1 wages, id. § 510; (4) failure to pay meal period premiums, id. §
2 512; (5) failure to timely pay wages, id. § 204; (6) failure to
3 provide accurate itemized wage statements, id. § 226; (7) failure
4 to pay wages upon termination of employment, id. §§ 201-203; and
5 (8) unfair competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. (Compl.
6 (Docket No. 1-1 at 16-33).)
7 Defendant moves to dismiss the action in its entirety
8 (Docket No. 6), arguing that the claims are preempted by the
9 Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and that plaintiffs
10 failed to satisfy the requirement under the LMRA that plaintiffs
11 exhaust the remedies provided for by the collective bargaining
12 agreements (“CBAs”). Plaintiffs move to remand the action
13 (Docket No. 12), arguing that the court lacks federal question
14 jurisdiction because the LMRA does not preempt their claims.
15 I. Judicial Notice
16 Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice
17 of multiple documents. (Docket No. 60-2.) Though a court
18 generally may not consider material outside the complaint on a
19 motion to dismiss, the court may look beyond the pleadings at
20 “matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs,
21 Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
22 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial
23 notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable
24 dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial
25 court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and
26 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
27 be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
28 Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice
1 of the applicable CBAs. Plaintiffs do not dispute the accuracy
2 of the CBAs provided by defendant and do not object to the court
3 taking judicial notice of the CBAs. (See Docket No. 11-1.) “It
4 is often necessary to consider the contents of a CBA to decide a
5 motion to dismiss based on an argument of complete preemption,
6 which is considered an ‘independent corollary to the well-pleaded
7 complaint rule.’” Patrick v. Nat’l Football League, No. 23-cv-
8 1069 DMG SHK, 2023 WL 6162672, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2023)
9 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393
10 (1987)). See also Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., 146 F.
11 Supp. 3d 1187, 1192–93 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Parrino v. FFIP,
12 Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1998)) (taking judicial notice
13 of CBA “‘because complete preemption often applies to complaints
14 drawn to evade federal jurisdiction,’” and therefore “‘the court
15 may look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether
16 the claims alleged as state law causes of action in fact are
17 necessarily federal claims’”) (alterations adopted). The court
18 therefore takes judicial notice of Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 to
19 defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, which are the CBAs
20 covering July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2021, and July 1, 2021
21 through June 30, 2024, respectively.
22 The court further takes judicial notice of Exhibit 4 to
23 defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, which is an information
24 page concerning the California minimum wage. This document was
25 retrieved from the State of California Department of Industrial
26 Relations website and is therefore a matter of public record not
27 subject to reasonable dispute. See Khoja v. Orexigen
28 Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018); Gerritsen
1 v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1033 (C.D. Cal.
2 2015).1
3 II. LMRA Preemption
4 The court will first address the underlying question of
5 whether the claims are preempted by the LMRA, and then turn to
6 the motions to remand and dismiss.
7 Section 301 of the LMRA provides federal question
8 jurisdiction over “suits for violation of contracts between an
9 employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Here,
10 there was a CBA between defendant and a union. (See Ex. 1, 2.)
11 “[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted [section 301] to compel the
12 complete preemption of state law claims brought to enforce
13 collective bargaining agreements.” Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410
14 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
15 No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S.
16 557, 560 (1968)).
17 Whether a claim is preempted by the LMRA is a two-step
18 inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the asserted
19 claim involves a right which “exists solely as a result of the
20 CBA” or “by virtue of state law.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l
21 Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal
22 quotation marks omitted). If the right exists solely because of
23 the CBA, then the state law claim is preempted. Id. If the
24 right exists independently of the CBA, then the court must move
25 to the second step, “asking whether the right is nevertheless
26 substantially dependent on analysis of a [CBA].” Id. (internal
27
1 The court does not take judicial notice of Exhibit 3,
28 which is not necessary to resolution of the motions.
1 quotation marks omitted). If it is, then the state law claim is
2 preempted.
3 A. First Claim
4 The court first examines whether plaintiffs’ first
5 claim for failure to pay wages for all hours worked under Cal.
6 Lab. Code § 216 involves a right which “exists solely as a result
7 of the CBA” or “by virtue of state law.” See Kobold, 832 F.3d at
8 1032. For the first step of the preemption inquiry, “a court
9 must focus its inquiry on the legal character of a claim . . .
10 and not whether a grievance [under the CBA] arising from
11 precisely the same set of facts could be pursued.” Id. at 1033
12 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394) (emphasis in original).
13 “Only if the claim is ‘founded directly on rights created by a
14 collective-bargaining agreement’ does § 301 preempt it.” Id.
15 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994)). Claims
16 are not preempted under the first step “if they just refer to a
17 CBA-defined right, rely in part on a CBA’s terms of employment,
18 run parallel to a CBA violation, or invite use of the CBA as a
19 defense.” Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921
20 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).
21 Plaintiffs’ claim under § 216 clearly does not arise
22 directly from the CBAs, but rather from the California Labor
23 Code. And “‘the mere existence of a CBA does not compel
24 preemption of plaintiff’s state law . . . claims.’” See McGinty
25 v. Holt of Cal., No. 2:22-cv-00865 WBS AC, 2022 WL 3226130, at *2
26 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2022) (quoting Miller v. Bimbo Bakeries USA,
27 Inc., No. 11-cv-00378 WHA, 2011 WL 1362171, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
28 11, 2011)) (alterations adopted). The court therefore turns to
1 the second step of the inquiry.
2 “[T]o determine whether a state [statutory claim] is
3 ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA” under the second
4 step of the test, a court must “decide whether the claim can be
5 resolved by looking to versus interpreting the CBA.” Burnside v.
6 Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). A state
7 statutory claim that requires “interpreting” a CBA is said to be
8 “substantially dependent” on the CBA, and thus preempted by LMRA
9 section 301. Id. A state statutory claim that merely requires
10 “looking to” a CBA, on the other hand, is said not to be
11 “substantially dependent” on the CBA, and thus is not preempted
12 by the LMRA. Id. “At this second step of the analysis, claims
13 are only preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over
14 the meaning of contract terms.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc.,
15 913 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
16 omitted).
17 Defendant does not detail what interpretation of --
18 rather than mere reference to -– the CBAs would be required to
19 resolve the first claim. The motion provides excerpts of the
20 CBAs that lay out the relevant wage and hour terms but does not
21 explain which terms would potentially be contested. There is no
22 indication that there are any “questions about the scope,
23 meaning, or application of” the terms establishing the hour
24 calculations and rates of pay. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125.
25 As far as the court can see, resolving plaintiffs’
26 first claim would only require “looking to” the CBAs to aid in
27 calculating the hours and pay rates to be used in determining
28 whether defendant violated the Labor Code. See Burnside, 491
1 F.3d at 1060. The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs’
2 first claim is not preempted by the LMRA. See Livadas, 512 U.S.
3 at 125 (claims under California Labor Code were not preempted by
4 LMRA where, “[b]eyond the simple need to refer to bargained-for
5 wage rates in computing the penalty, the collective-bargaining
6 agreement [was] irrelevant to the dispute”); Beck v. Saint-Gobain
7 Containers, No. 2:16-cv-03638 CAS SK, 2016 WL 4769716, at *5
8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016) (LMRA does not preempt a claim where
9 “the terms of the CBA will only be considered by way of reference
10 and will not be reasonably disputed by the parties”).
11 B. Second Claim
12 Plaintiffs’ second claim alleges that defendant failed
13 to pay agreed-upon wages in violation of California Labor Code §§
14 221-23.
15 Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ second claim is
16 preempted at step one because, insofar as it is brought under
17 sections 222 and 223, it expressly relies upon the CBAs. Section
18 222 makes it “unlawful, in case of any wage agreement arrived at
19 through collective bargaining . . . to withhold from said
20 employee any part of the wage agreed upon.” Id. § 222 (emphasis
21 added). Section 223 provides that “[w]here any statute or
22 contract requires an employer to maintain the designated wage
23 scale, it shall be unlawful to secretly pay a lower wage while
24 purporting to pay the wage designated by statute or by contract.”
25 Id. § 223 (emphasis added).
26 The court is unconvinced. In Schurke, the en banc
27 Ninth Circuit considered a preemption challenge to a “state law
28 right to reschedule vacation leave for family medical purposes”
1 where the plaintiff’s “underlying right to vacation leave” was
2 established by a CBA. 898 F.3d at 913. Like California Labor
3 Code §§ 222-23, the state statute at issue in Schurke expressly
4 relied upon the terms established by CBAs. See id. at 914. The
5 Ninth Circuit nonetheless concluded that the claim at issue arose
6 directly from state law at step one because the plaintiff alleged
7 a violation of a “state law right,” not the CBA itself. See id.
8 at 927. See also Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1131,
9 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (collecting cases and concluding that
10 claims arising under California Labor Code sections 222 and 223
11 are not preempted). Here, plaintiffs similarly allege violation
12 of a state law right, namely the right to agreed-upon wages. The
13 second claim therefore arises from state law rather than directly
14 from the CBAs.
15 The court thus turns to the second step. As with the
16 first claim, defendants have not pointed to any potentially
17 contested term that might require that the court interpret,
18 rather than merely refer to, the CBAs at issue in determining
19 whether it violated the California Labor Code. The second claim
20 is therefore not preempted by the LMRA.
21 C. Third Claim
22 Plaintiffs’ third claim alleges that defendant failed
23 to pay overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code §
24 510. Section 510 provides that the “requirements of this section
25 do not apply to the payment of overtime compensation to an
26 employee working pursuant to . . . [a]n alternative workweek
27 schedule adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
28 pursuant to Section 514.” Cal. Lab. Code § 510(a)(2). Section
1 514 states that “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee
2 covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the
3 agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and
4 working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement
5 provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a
6 regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than
7 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Id. § 514. “By
8 its terms, therefore . . . section 510 does not apply to an
9 employee who is subject to a qualifying CBA.” Curtis, 913 F.3d
10 at 1153–54.
11 As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Curtis, if the
12 applicable CBA “meet[s] the requirements of section 514, [the
13 employee’s] right to overtime exists solely as a result of the
14 CBA, and therefore is preempted under § 301.” Id. at 1154
15 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CBAs here plainly meet
16 these requirements, which plaintiffs do not appear to dispute.
17 (See Ex. 1 at 2-17, Ex. 2 at 4-19 (providing wage and hour
18 policies, descriptions of job duties and various working
19 conditions, overtime premiums for all employees, and a starting
20 minimum wage rate of $28.36 for concrete truck drivers); Ex. 4 at
21 2 (stating that California’s minimum wage for employers with 26
22 employees or more was $11 in 2018 and increased to $15.50 by
23 2023).) Plaintiffs’ third claim is therefore completely
24 preempted by the LMRA. See Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1154.
25 Plaintiffs try to distinguish the instant case from
26 Curtis on the basis that the claim does not require
27 interpretation of the underlying CBAs; however, this argument
28 confuses the analysis. Whether the claim requires interpretation
1 of a CBA is part of the second step of the analysis, not the
2 first. As the court has concluded, the third claim is preempted
3 at step one.
4 C. Fourth Claim
5 Plaintiffs’ fourth claim alleges that defendant failed
6 to pay meal period premiums in violation of California Labor Code
7 § 512. Section 512’s protections do not extend to certain
8 employees, including those in construction occupations, who are
9 covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement that
10 “expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working
11 conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal periods
12 for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes
13 concerning application of its meal period provisions, premium
14 wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly
15 rate of pay of not less than 30 percent more than the state
16 minimum wage rate.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 512(e)-(f). Plaintiffs
17 are engaged in a construction occupation and the CBAs here
18 plainly meet section 512(e)’s requirements, which plaintiffs do
19 not appear to dispute. (See Ex. 1 at 2-23, Ex. 2 at 4-24
20 (providing wage and hour policies, descriptions of job duties and
21 various working conditions, meal periods for all employees, final
22 and binding arbitration of meal period grievances, overtime
23 premiums for all employees, and a starting minimum wage rate of
24 $28.36 for concrete truck drivers); Ex. 4 at 2 (stating that
25 California’s minimum wage for employers with 26 employees or more
26 was $11 in 2018 and increased to $15.50 by 2023).)
27 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in Curtis held
28 that because section 514 excludes employees who are subject to a
1 qualifying CBA from the protections of section 510, claims under
2 section 510 are completely preempted when there is a qualifying
3 CBA. See 913 F.3d 1154. Curtis did not address whether claims
4 subject to section 512’s CBA exception are completely preempted.
5 However, “both sections 512 and 514 have nearly identical
6 exemptions that make the rights they confer negotiable.”
7 Radcliff v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 519 F. Supp. 3d 743, 751–
8 52 (S.D. Cal. 2021). The court therefore “sees no reason why
9 Curtis should not be extended to preempt meal period claims made
10 by an employee who falls within the exemption set forth in
11 section 512(e).” See id.
12 In line with this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit has
13 extended Curtis’s logic to section 512’s CBA exemption in an
14 unpublished memorandum decision. See Marquez v. Toll Glob.
15 Forwarding, 804 F. App’x 679, 680 (9th Cir. 2020). Multiple
16 district courts have similarly applied Curtis to section 512.
17 See, e.g., Radcliff, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 751-52; Schwanke v. Minim
18 Prods., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00111 SVW JPR, 2021 WL 4924772, at *2
19 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2021); Rodriguez v. USF Reddaway Inc., No.
20 2:22-cv-00210 TLN DB, 2022 WL 18012518, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30,
21 2022); Jimenez v. Young’s Mkt. Co., LLC, No. 21-cv-02410 EMC,
22 2021 WL 5999082, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021); Blackwell v.
23 Com. Refrigeration Specialists, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-01968 KJM CKD,
24 2021 WL 2634501, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2021). The court
25 agrees with this line of cases and therefore concludes that
26 plaintiffs’ fourth claim under section 512 is completely
27 preempted by the LMRA.
28 Plaintiffs argue that the exemption does not apply here
1 because the CBAs provide that defendant “will comply with all
2 applicable law and regulations governing meal periods” (see Ex. 1
3 at 7, Ex. 2 at 9), indicating a contractual intent for section
4 512’s protections to apply. The court is unpersuaded. The
5 unambiguous text of section 512 mandates that all employees be
6 excluded from the section’s protections when an applicable CBA
7 has the required terms, without regard to the intent of the
8 parties. See Cal. Lab. Code § 512(e).
9 Even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ argument, the
10 claim would be preempted at step two of the analysis. By arguing
11 that language from the CBA indicates that the parties intended to
12 circumvent section 512’s CBA exemption, plaintiffs have put the
13 meaning of a contract term at issue. As a result, the court
14 would be required to interpret, rather than merely refer to, the
15 terms of the CBA in deciding the claim. See Burnside, 491 F.3d
16 at 1060-61. The claim would therefore be preempted. See id.;
17 Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153.
18 D. Fifth Claim
19 Plaintiffs’ fifth claim alleges that defendant failed
20 to timely pay wages in violation of California Labor Code § 204.
21 Section 204 provides that “when employees are covered by a
22 collective bargaining agreement that provides different pay
23 arrangements [than those provided for in section 204], those
24 arrangements shall apply to the covered employees.” Cal. Lab.
25 Code § 204(c). The CBAs here plainly meet these requirements.
26 (Compare Ex. 1 at 9, Ex. 2 at 10 (“All employees will be paid
27 their wages at regular weekly paydays.”) with Cal. Lab. Code §
28 204(a) (“All wages . . . are due and payable twice during each
1 calendar month . . . .”).)
2 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in Curtis held
3 that claims subject to a statutory exception are completely
4 preempted. See 913 F.3d 1154. Several district courts have
5 extended Curtis’s reasoning to section 204. See, e.g., Renteria-
6 Hinjosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01413 DJC DB, 2023
7 WL 6519308, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2023); Ariola v. Raytheon CA
8 Techs. Corp., No. 23-cv-4664 MWF AGR, 2023 WL 5764296, at *7
9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023); Johnson v. San Francisco Health Care &
10 Rehab Inc., No. 22-cv-01982 JSC, 2022 WL 2789809, at *9 (N.D.
11 Cal. July 15, 2022); Tolentino v. Gillig, LLC, No. 20-cv-7427
12 MMC, 2021 WL 121193, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The CBA exception
13 under section 204 operates similarly to the exception discussed
14 in Curtis, and as such the court “sees no principled reason why
15 the holding of Curtis would not extend to section 204 claims.”
16 See Ariola, 2023 WL 5764296, at *8. The court therefore
17 concludes that plaintiffs’ fifth claim under section 204 is
18 completely preempted by the LMRA.
19 E. Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims
20 Plaintiffs’ sixth claim alleges failure to provide
21 accurate itemized wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code § 226; the
22 seventh claim alleges failure to pay wages owed upon termination
23 of employment, id. §§ 201-203; and the eighth claim alleges
24 unfair competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Defendant
25 argues only that because plaintiffs’ first through fifth claims
26 are preempted, the remaining claims –- which, as pled, are
27 derivative of the first through fifth claims –- must also fail.
28 However, as discussed above, the first and second claims are not
1 preempted. The court therefore concludes that the sixth,
2 seventh, and eighth claims are not preempted by the LMRA.
3 III. Motion to Remand
4 “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an
5 action filed in state court to federal court if the federal court
6 would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”
7 Moore-Thomas v. Ala. Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th
8 Cir. 2009). If “it appears that the district court lacks subject
9 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §
10 1447(c).
11 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over actions
12 arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to the
13 doctrine of complete preemption, a state law claim preempted by
14 section 301 of the LMRA “is considered, from its inception, a
15 federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Balcorta
16 v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th
17 Cir. 2000). Such claims may be removed to and heard in federal
18 court. Jackson v. S. California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 646 (9th
19 Cir. 1989).
20 As explained above, several of plaintiffs’ state law
21 claims are completely preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.
22 Accordingly, the court has federal question jurisdiction and will
23 deny plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
24 IV. Motion to Dismiss
25 “Prior to bringing suit, an employee seeking to
26 vindicate personal rights under a collective bargaining agreement
27 must first attempt to exhaust any mandatory or exclusive
28 grievance procedures provided in the agreement.” Soremekun v.
1 Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2007).
2 Therefore, a claim preempted by section 301 of the LMRA should be
3 dismissed if brought by an employee who failed to exhaust the
4 applicable CBA’s mandatory grievance procedure. See Kobold, 832
5 F.3d at 1036.
6 At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that all claims
7 arising under the CBAs must be grieved pursuant to the procedures
8 outlined therein. Defendant argues that because plaintiffs do
9 not plead that they utilized the mandatory grievance procedures
10 outlined in the CBAs, the preempted claims must be dismissed. As
11 explained above, the court concludes that the third, fourth, and
12 fifth claims are completely preempted by the LMRA. Because
13 plaintiffs do not plead that they exhausted the remedies provided
14 for in the CBAs, those claims must be dismissed.
15 Also as explained above, the court concludes that the
16 first, second, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims are not
17 preempted by the LMRA. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss those
18 claims will be denied.
19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to
20 remand (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to
22 dismiss (Docket No. 6) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to
23 the third claim for overtime wages, fourth claim for failure to
24 pay meal period premiums, and fifth claim for failure to timely
25 pay wages, which are hereby DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss is
26 DENIED in all other respects.
27 Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order
28 to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with
enn enone nn nn nn nn nn nn en OI IEE OD NE

1 this Order. .
2 Dated: January 25, 2024 ehh A, ha bee
WILLIAM B. SHUBB
3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10058776. Public record. Not legal advice.